CMU v. Exe. Secretary (G.R. No. 184869; September 21, 2010)

CASE DIGEST: CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, REPRESENTED BY OFFICER-IN-CHARGE DR. RODRIGO L. MALUNHAO, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE CHAIRPERSON AND COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, AND THE LEAD CONVENOR OF THE NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY COMMISSION, Respondents. (G.R. No. 184869; September 21, 2010)

FACTS: Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the State. In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those lands under Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162.  Meanwhile, the government distributed more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging to the area's cultural communities.

45 years later, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMU's registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.

CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.

The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion, however, and proceeded to hear CMU's application for preliminary injunction.

The RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP, et al's motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMU's action for lack of jurisdiction.  Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act.

On appeal, the CA dismissed CMU's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that CMU's recourse should have been a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions law--bearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310.

ISSUE:  Did the CMU’s appeal raise purely questions of law? Was the Presidential Proclamation 310 constitutional?

HELD: Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 vests in the CA appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies.  But where an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with the Supreme Court.

As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional.  Did these grounds raise factual issues that are proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?

Regarding the first reason, CMU's action was one for injunction against the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of lands from the university.  Consequently, the CMU's remedy for assailing the correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure question of law, indeed lies with this Court.

As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the case based on the ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional.  Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in the denial of CMU's right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from the parties.  Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised pure questions of law.

The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from CMU.  In CMU v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the DARAB, a national government agency charged with taking both privately-owned and government-owned agricultural lands for distribution to farmers-beneficiaries, ordered the segregation for this purpose of 400 hectares of CMU lands.  The Court nullified the DARAB action considering the inalienable character of such lands, being part of the long term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution.

It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMU's use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture.

They have ceased to be alienable public lands.

Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that "property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested" upon its effectivity "shall be recognized and respected."  In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958.  Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.

Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several tribes belonging to the area's cultural communities in the course of the proceedings for the titling of the lands in CMU's name.  Indeed, eventually, only 3,080 hectares were titled in CMU's name under OCTs 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162.  More than 300 hectares were acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the claims of those tribes.