David v. David (G.R. No. 162365; January 15, 2014)
FACTS: On July 7, 1995, Respondent Eduardo C. David (Eduardo), and his brother Edwin C. David (Edwin), acting on their own and in behalf of their co-heirs, sold their inherited properties to Petitioner Roberto R. David (Roberto), specifically: (a) a 1,231 square meters parcel of land, together with all the improvements thereon, located in Baguio City (Baguio City lot); and (b) 2 units International CO 967- Truck Tractor with two Mi-Bed Trailers. A deed of sale with assumption of mortgage (deed of sale) embodied the terms of their agreement, stipulating that the consideration for the sale was P6,000,000.00, of which P2,000,000.00 was to be paid to Eduardo and Edwin, and the remaining P4,000,000.00 to be paid to Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in Baguio City to settle the outstanding obligation secured by a mortgage on such properties. Eduardo and Edwin was given the right to repurchase within 3 years from the execution of the deed of sale based on the purchase price agreed upon, plus 12% interest per annum.
A memorandum of agreement (MOA) was executed by Roberto and Edwin in April 1997, with spouses Marquez and Soledad Go, by which they agreed to sell the Baguio City lot to the latter for P10,000,000.00. The Spouses Go then deposited the amount of P10,000,000.00 to Robertos account. Thereafter, Roberto gave Eduardo P2,800,00.00 and returned to him one of the truck tractors and trailers subject of the deed of sale.
When Eduardo demanded for the return of the other truck tractor and trailer but Roberto refused, he initiated a replevin suit again the latter, alleging that he was exercising his right to repurchase under the deed of sale. Roberto then denied that Eduardo could repurchase the properties in question; and insisted that the MOA had extinguished their deed of sale by novation.
The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of Eduardo on December 5, 2001. RTC opined that the stipulation giving Eduardo the right to repurchase had made the deed of sale a conditional sale; that Eduardo had fulfilled the conditions for the exercise of the right to repurchase; that the ownership of the properties had reverted to Eduardo; that Robertos defense of novation had no merit; and that due to Roberto's bad faith in refusing to satisfy Eduardos claim.
Roberto appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. It opined that although there was no express exercise of the right to repurchase, the sum of all the relevant circumstances indicated that there was an exercise of the right to repurchase pursuant to the deed of sale, that the findings of the RTC to the effect that the conditions for the exercise of the right to repurchase had been adequately satisfied by Eduardo, and that no novation as claimed by Roberto had intervened.
The CA denied Robert's motion for reconsideration. Hence, Roberto filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Respondent Eduardo exercise his right to repurchase?
HELD: A sale with right to repurchase is governed by Article 1601 of the Civil Code, which provides that: Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves the right to repurchase the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with the provisions of Article 1616 and other stipulations which may have been agreed upon. Conformably with Article 1616, the seller given the right to repurchase may exercise his right of redemption by paying the buyer: (a) the price of the sale, (b) the expenses of the contract, (c) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (d) the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold.
The CA and the RTC both found and held that Eduardo had complied with the conditions stipulated in the deed of sale and prescribed by Article 1616 of the Civil Code. From the testimony of the defendant himself, the preconditions for the exercise of the plaintiffs right to repurchase were adequately satisfied by the latter. The alleged repurchase was exercised within the stipulated period of 3 years from the time the Deed of Sale was executed. Moreover, the defendant returned to plaintiff the amount of P2,800,000.00 from the total purchase price of P10,000,000.00. This only means that this is the excess amount pertaining to plaintiff and co-heirs after the defendant deducted the repurchase price of P2,000,000.00 plus interests and his expenses. Add to that is the fact that defendant returned one of the trucks and trailers subject of the Deed of Sale.
In Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tan, the court ruled that a redemption within the period allowed by law is not a matter of intent but of payment or valid tender of the full redemption price within the period. Verily, the tender of payment is the sellers manifestation of his desire to repurchase the property with the offer of immediate performance.
In the present case, Eduardo paid the repurchase price to Roberto by depositing the proceeds of the sale of the Baguio City lot in the latter's account. Such payment was an effective exercise of the right to repurchase. On the other hand, the court dismissed as devoid of merit Roberto's insistence that the MOA had extinguished the obligations established under the deed of sale by novation. In sales with the right to repurchase, the title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor within the stipulated period. Accordingly, the ownership of the affected properties reverted to Eduardo once he complied with the condition for the repurchase, thereby entitling him to the possession of the other motor vehicle with trailer.
DENIED