Esguerra v. Valle Verde (G.R. No. 173012; June 13, 2012)


CASE DIGEST: DOLORES T. ESGUERRA, Petitioner, v. VALLE VERDE COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and ERNESTO VILLALUNA,Respondents.

FACTS: 
On January 15, 2000, the Couples for Christ held a seminar at the country club. Esguerra, as the Cost Control Supervisor, was tasked to oversee the seminar held in the two function rooms the Ballroom and the Tanay Room. The arrangement was that the food shall be served in the form of pre-paid buffet, while the drinks shall be paid in a "pay as you order" basis.

The Valle Verde Management found out the following day that only the proceeds from the Tanay Room had been remitted to the accounting department. To resolve the issue, Valle Verde conducted an investigation; the employees who were assigned in the two function rooms were summoned and made to explain, in writing, what had transpired.

On March 6, 2000, Valle Verde sent a memorandum to Esguerra requiring her to show cause as to why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for the non-remittance of the Ballroom sales. Esguerra was placed under preventive suspension with pay, pending investigation.

In her letter-response, Esguerra denied having committed any misappropriation. She explained that it had been her daughter (who was assigned as a food checker) who lost the money. To settle the matter, Esguerra paid the unaccounted amount as soon as her daughter informed her about it.

Valle Verde found Esguerra explanation unsatisfactory and, on July 26, 2000, issued a second memorandum terminating Esguerra employment.

Esguerra filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. In April 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Esguerra appealed the case to the NLRC. In its December 27, 2002 decision, the NLRC affirmed with modification the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.

Esguerra filed a partial motion for reconsideration, while Valle Verde filed its own motion for reconsideration.The NLRC denied Esguerra motion, but granted Valle Verde motion. Thus, it set aside its December 27, 2002 decision and affirmed the April 5, 2002 decision of the labor arbiter.

Aggrieved, Esguerra elevated her case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. In its February 7, 2006 decision, the CA denied Esguerra petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: 

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the NLRC decision and resolution?
HELD: Procedural aspect of Esguerra dismissal - The Court failed to find any irregularities in the service of notice to Esguerra. The memorandum dated March 6, 2000 informed her of the charges, and clearly directed her to show cause, in writing, why no disciplinary action should be imposed against her. Esguerra allegation that the notice was insufficient since it failed to contain any intention to terminate her is incorrect.

In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, the Court underscored the significance of the two-notice rule in dismissing an employee:

To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer decision to dismiss the employee.

Contrary to Esguerra allegation, the law does not require that an intention to terminate one employment should be included in the first notice. It is enough that employees are properly apprised of the charges brought against them so they can properly prepare their defenses; it is only during the second notice that the intention to terminate one employment should be explicitly stated.

There is also no basis to question the absence of a proper hearing. The existence of an actual, formal "trial-type" hearing, although preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee's right to be heard. Esguerra was able to present her defenses; and only upon proper consideration of it did Valle Verde send the second memorandum terminating her employment. Since Valle Verde complied with the two-notice requirement, no procedural defect exists in Esguerra termination.

Substantive aspect of Esguerra dismissal - There are two (2) classes of positions of trust the first class consists of managerial employees, or those vested with the power to lay down management policies; and the second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.

Esguerra held the position of Cost Control Supervisor and had the duty to remit to the accounting department the cash sales proceeds from every transaction she was assigned to.This is not a routine task that a regular employee may perform; it is related to the handling of business expenditures or finances. For this reason, Esguerra occupies a position of trust and confidence a position enumerated in the second class of positions of trust. Any breach of the trust imposed upon her can be a valid cause for dismissal.

In Jardine Davies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment can be invoked when an employee holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence. In order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be related to the performance of the duties of the dismissed employee and must show that he or she is unfit to continue working for the employer for violation of the trust reposed in him or her.

There is no merit in the allegation that it was Esguerra daughter who should be held liable. She had no custody of the cash sales since it was not part of her duties as a food checker. It was Esguerra responsibility to account for the cash proceeds; in case of problems, she should have promptly reported it, regardless of who was at fault. Esguerra failure to make the proper report reflects on her irresponsibility in the custody of cash for which she was accountable, it was her duty to account for the sales proceeds, and she should have known about the missing amount immediately after the event.

DENIED