Filipinas Synthetic v. Santos (G.R. No. 152033. Mar. 16, 2011)

CASE DIGEST: FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS, ET AL., Respondents. Filipinas Synthetic v. Santos (G.R. No. 152033; March 16, 2011).

FACTS: On September 20, 1984, around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along Katipunan Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma containing respondents collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the point of impact, across the White Plains Road landing near the perimeter fence of Camp Aguinaldo, where the Galant Sigma burst into flames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car.

The families of the respondents filed criminal and civil charges against Mejia and the petitioner company. The criminal case was decided in favor of Mejia. The civil charges, on the other hand, were decided in favor of respondents, with the corresponding awards for actual, compensatory, and moral damages, and attorneys fees. The CA affirmed.

ISSUES: Was petitioner employee negligent in causing the accident? Did petitioner company exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in exercising supervision over its employees?

HELD; FIRST ISSUE: Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.

There was proof more than preponderant to conclude that Mejia was traveling at an unlawful speed, hence, the negligent driver. There is on error to say that he (Mejia) was driving more than his claim of 70 kilometers per hour. Section 35 of RA 4136 states that the maximum allowable speed for trucks and buses must not exceed 50 kilometers per hour.SECOND ISSUE: Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was held that in order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.

Petitioner asserts that it had numerous documents in support of its claim that it had exercised the proper diligence in both the selection and supervision of its employees, among them documents showing Mejia's proficiency and physical examinations, his NBI clearances, as well as testimony from the Employee Staff Head of petitioner that employees were given daily operational briefings. Nevertheless, those pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner insufficient. Filsyn admitted that their shuttle buses were used to ferry Filsyn's employees for three shifts. It failed to show whether or not Mejia was on duty driving buses for all three shifts. Fylsin did not even sufficiently prove that it exercised the required supervision of Mejia by ensuring rest periods, particularly for its night shift drivers who are working on a time when most of us are usually taking rest. As correctly argued by the plaintiffs-appellees, this is significant because the accident happened at 11:30 p.m., when the shuttle bus was under the control of a driver having no passenger at all.