Lagman v. Medialdea (G.R. No. 231658; July 5, 2017)
CASE DIGEST: REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners vs. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents. (G.R. No. 231658; July 5, 2017).
FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
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Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf IP (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
President Duterte concluded, "While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled."
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 390 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same".
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned (Petitions) the Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte's Proclamation of martial law. The OSG sided with President Duterte.
ISSUES:
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[1] Are the Petitions the proper proceeding to invoke the SC's power of review over proclamations of martial law?
[2] Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts?
[3] Is the President required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of National Defense?
[4] Is the President is required to take into account only the situation at the time ff the proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situati n to have not been accurately reported?
[5] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of tlie factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actiorls that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately
[6] Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habea~ corpus; · a. What are the parameters for review? b. Who has the burden of proof? I !I c. What is the threshold of evidence?
[7] Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Couj involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the President ~~ Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of th~ privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law
[8] Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null and void: a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region;
[9] Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]: a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao 1 region;
[10] Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
[11] Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.HELD:
[0] The Constitution only requires that questions regarding the validity and factual basis of a proclamation of martial law or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be raised by any citizen, considering the transcendental importance of such questions.
[1] Yes, the Petitions invoke the proper proceedings as contemplated by the Constitution. "The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from filing."
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Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The Constitution confers the Supreme Court the power to review martial law proclamations.
A petition for certiorari is not the proper petition. The power of the Supreme Court to review the factual basis of martial law proclamations is not limited by Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. It's a completely different proceeding not limited by lack of or abuses of discretion.
The factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.
In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
[2] The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the judicial power to review to be exercised independently from the congressional power to revoke.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although, concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
[3] The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President's decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions, is a judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
[4] There is no vagueness because the whereas clauses of the Proclamation explain the meaning of "other rebel groups." Also, the vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. Vagueness doctrine applies only in free speech cases.
Moreover, lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
[5] The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55. The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.
[6] After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration.
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension. In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
[7] To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
[8] There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he has received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and public safety requires the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To be precise, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are only five out of the seven statements bulleted in the President's Report. Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that he had no personal knowledge of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus stands, there is no question or challenge with respect to the reliability of the other incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without sufficient factual basis. Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.
[9] Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
nvasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints were set up; 244 schools and churches were burned;245 civilian hostages were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced to join their group; 248 medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered;249 reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered;250 and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.
Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ ff habeas corpus are necessary for the protection of the security of the natil.; suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "precautiona , and although it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for t e purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state or the entire country and our sovereign people".253 Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao."
To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents and information classified as "confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national security. These documents may contain information detailing the position of government troops and rebels, stock of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during the closed door session held by the Court, some information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or Report. But then again, the discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the Preside
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence repo1s and classified documents. "It is for the President as [C]ommander-in- [C]hief of the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified evidence qr documents/]reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands thb suspension of the writ."256 Significantly, respect to these so-called classifietl documents is accorded even "when [the] authors of or witnesses to thes~ 257 I documents may not be revealed."
The Court has no machinery or tool equal to that of the Commander-in-Chief to ably and properly assess the ground conditions.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department, particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the assessment of the President.
The Constitution has provided sufficient safeguards against possible abuses of Commander-inChief's powers; further curtailment of Presidential powers should not only be discouraged but also avoided.
The Court can only act within the confines of its power. For the Court to overreach is to infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. "The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system."281
To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours after the proclamation of martial law none of the members of this Court could have divined that more than ten thousand souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would have to secure those places also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta ' Romato Maute would be apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato City.
TERRORISM v. REBELLION
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It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has be' n ongoing for decades. While some groups have sought legal and peace 1 means, others have resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebelli n may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader sco e covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one f the various means by which terrorism can be committed.299 However, while the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.After all, the ~ ~I extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish sutjh powers.
Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 whiJh states that rebellion and terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of each other ?r that they cannot co-exist together. RA 93 72 does not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have differett elements.
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