Merced v. GSIS (G.R. No. 167140; November 23, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: COL. FRANCISCO DELA MERCED, substituted by his heirs namely, LUIS CESAR DELA MERCED, BLANQUITA DELA MERCED nee MACATANGAY, and MARIA OLIVIA M. PAREDES, Petitioners, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and Spouses VICTOR and MILAGROS MANLONGAT, Respondents.
FACTS: This case involves five registered parcels of land located within the Antonio Subdivision, Pasig City Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 (subject properties). These lots were originally owned by, and titled in the name of, Jose C. Zulueta (Zulueta), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26105 which contains several lots other than the subject properties within the Antonio Subdivision.
Later, the Zulueta spouses mortgaged several lots contained in TCT No. 26105 to the GSIS, which eventually foreclosed on the mortgaged properties, including the subject properties. Upon consolidation of GSISs ownership, TCT No. 26105 in Zuluetas name was cancelled, and TCT No. 23554 was issued in GSISs name.
Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners predecessor, Francisco Dela Merced (Dela Merced), later on substituted by his heirs, filed a complaint praying for the nullity of the GSIS foreclosure on the subject properties (Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8) on the ground that he, not the Zuluetas, was the owner of these lots at the time of the foreclosure. Dela Merced also impleaded Victor and Milagros Manlongat, who were claiming Lot 6, Block 2 by virtue of a sale executed by the GSIS in their daughters (Elizabeth Manlongat) favor. Dela Merced argued that, due to the nullity of GSISs foreclosure over the subject properties, it had no ownership right that could be transferred to Elizabeth Manlongat.
After a protracted litigation, the SC rendered a Decision in the petitioners favor and nullified GSISs foreclosure of the subject properties because these lots were never part of its mortgage agreement with the Zulueta spouses. Pursuant to the finality of the Decision, petitioners filed a Motion for Execution which GSIS opposed on the basis of Section 39 of the GSIS Act of 1997 (RA 8291 which allegedly exempts GSIS funds and properties from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy and other court processes. A writ of execution was finally issued, however, first by the RTC and then by the CA. The GSIS filed a petition for review before the SC which was denied by the latter.
After the resolution of the issue of GSISs exemption, petitioners encountered more problems with the execution of the Decision. According to the RD of Pasig City, Policarpio Espenesin, he could not cancel the titles of GSIS over Lots 7 and 8 because it no longer had title over these two lots and had already conveyed the same to two other persons. Hence, the RD claimed that the writ of execution must first be modified to include the cancellation of derivative titles of the GSIS title.
ISSUES: [1] Can the GSIS still raise the issue of exemption?
[2] Can a final and executory judgment against GSIS and Manlongat be enforced against their successors-in-interest or holders of derivative titles?[3] Does an order to cancel title to a particular property include an order to provide technical descriptions and segregate it from its mother title?
HELD: [1] The issue of GSIS's alleged exemption under RA 8291 had been finally decided against when this Court denied GSIS's petition for review. GSIS's attempt to resurrect the same issue by interjecting the same in this proceeding is barred by the principle of "law of the case," which states that "determinations of questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such determination has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort."
Later, the Zulueta spouses mortgaged several lots contained in TCT No. 26105 to the GSIS, which eventually foreclosed on the mortgaged properties, including the subject properties. Upon consolidation of GSISs ownership, TCT No. 26105 in Zuluetas name was cancelled, and TCT No. 23554 was issued in GSISs name.
Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners predecessor, Francisco Dela Merced (Dela Merced), later on substituted by his heirs, filed a complaint praying for the nullity of the GSIS foreclosure on the subject properties (Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8) on the ground that he, not the Zuluetas, was the owner of these lots at the time of the foreclosure. Dela Merced also impleaded Victor and Milagros Manlongat, who were claiming Lot 6, Block 2 by virtue of a sale executed by the GSIS in their daughters (Elizabeth Manlongat) favor. Dela Merced argued that, due to the nullity of GSISs foreclosure over the subject properties, it had no ownership right that could be transferred to Elizabeth Manlongat.
After a protracted litigation, the SC rendered a Decision in the petitioners favor and nullified GSISs foreclosure of the subject properties because these lots were never part of its mortgage agreement with the Zulueta spouses. Pursuant to the finality of the Decision, petitioners filed a Motion for Execution which GSIS opposed on the basis of Section 39 of the GSIS Act of 1997 (RA 8291 which allegedly exempts GSIS funds and properties from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy and other court processes. A writ of execution was finally issued, however, first by the RTC and then by the CA. The GSIS filed a petition for review before the SC which was denied by the latter.
After the resolution of the issue of GSISs exemption, petitioners encountered more problems with the execution of the Decision. According to the RD of Pasig City, Policarpio Espenesin, he could not cancel the titles of GSIS over Lots 7 and 8 because it no longer had title over these two lots and had already conveyed the same to two other persons. Hence, the RD claimed that the writ of execution must first be modified to include the cancellation of derivative titles of the GSIS title.
ISSUES: [1] Can the GSIS still raise the issue of exemption?
[2] Can a final and executory judgment against GSIS and Manlongat be enforced against their successors-in-interest or holders of derivative titles?[3] Does an order to cancel title to a particular property include an order to provide technical descriptions and segregate it from its mother title?
HELD: [1] The issue of GSIS's alleged exemption under RA 8291 had been finally decided against when this Court denied GSIS's petition for review. GSIS's attempt to resurrect the same issue by interjecting the same in this proceeding is barred by the principle of "law of the case," which states that "determinations of questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such determination has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort."
[2] A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. It is not disputed that petitioners caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 23554 of the lots in question. The current holders of the derivative titles to these lots were aware of such annotation when the individual titles were issued to them. Ineluctably, both were bound by the outcome of the litigation.
[3] The order contained in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is for the RD to cancel GSIS's titles over Lot 10, Block 2 and Lot 8, Block 8, inter alia. Whether these titles are individual or contained in a mother title is of no consequence. The RD has to cause their cancellation. If the cancellation can only be carried out by requiring GSIS or the Bureau of Lands to provide the necessary information, then they can be compelled to do so. Otherwise, the Courts decision would be rendered inefficacious, and GSIS would retain ostensible ownership over the lots by the simple expedience that they are included in a mother title, instead of individual titles. That result is manifestly contrary to the Court's ruling and would subvert the very purpose of bringing this case for a complete resolution.