Republic v. Cortez (G.R. No. 186639; February 5, 2014)
FACTS: Respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an applicationfor judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land located at Barangay (Poblacion) Aguho, P. Herrera Street, Pateros, Metro Manila. In support of his application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following documents: (1) tax declarations for various years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the property is classified as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the property, with a certification issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of estate conveying the subject property to Cortez; and (6) escritura de particion extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject property to Felicisima Cotas Cortez mother.
As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of General Default and Cortez was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.
Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 2697, which was declared for taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot No. 2697 was inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946; that, after his parents died, he and his siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their deceased parents and one of the properties allocated to him was the subject property. He alleged that the subject property had been in the possession of his family since time immemorial; that the subject parcel of land is not part of the reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has known the family of Cortez for over sixty (60) years and that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since he came to know them.
The RTC granted Cortez application for registration, however, The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for registration despite the failure of Cortez to comply with the requirements for original registration of title. The petitioner pointed out that, although Cortez declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject parcel of land since time immemorial, no document was ever presented that would establish his predecessors-in-interests possession of the same during the period required by law. That petitioner claimed that Cortez assertion that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property for more than thirty (30) years does not constitute well-neigh incontrovertible evidence required in land registration cases; that it is a mere claim, which should not have been given weight by the RTC.
The CA found that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which, under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, sufficed to convert it to private property. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in affirming the grant of the application for registration?
HELD: The Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. "Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. "As Section 14(2) [of P.D. No. 1529] categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are considered private."
***
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "all things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription," and that property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national wealth.
Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that are considered patrimonial may be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive prescription could commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable; it must also be declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public use, public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, absent an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.
The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration from the state attesting to the patrimonial character of the subject property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that he has acquired title to the subject property by virtue thereof. It is of no moment that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for 57 years at the time he applied for the registration of title thereto. lt is not the notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial.
