SC rules affidavit of recantation unreliable, worthless
x x x Merely because a witness says that what he had declared is false and that what he now says is true, is not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous testimony is false. No such reasoning has ever crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is that a witness may be impeached by a previous contradictory statement x x x not that a previous statement is presumed to be false merely because a witness now says that the same is not true. The jurisprudence of this Court has always been otherwise, i.e., that contradictory testimony given subsequently does not necessarily discredit the previous testimony if the contradictions are satisfactorily explained. (U.S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; U.S. vs. Briones, 28 Phil. 362; U.S. vs. Dasiip, 26 Phil. 503; U.S. vs. Lazaro, 34 Phil. 871)."[18]
Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had given the testimony later on changed his mind.[19] Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.[20] Unless there be special circumstances which, coupled with the retraction of the witness, really raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by him at the trial and accepted by the trial judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction, or its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion, an acquittal of the accused based on such a retraction would not be justified.[21]
This Court has always looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously given in court.[22] The asserted motives for the repudiation are commonly held suspect, and the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit of repudiation are frequently and deservedly subject to serious doubt.[23]
Such being the experience of this court, we should proceed with extreme caution and judicial prudence in according any probative value to affidavits of recantation in the light of the sad reality that the same can be easily secured from poor and ignorant witnesses for some financial consideration[24] or through intimidation.[25] Especially when the affidavit of retraction is executed by a prosecution witness after the judgment of conviction has already been rendered, "it is too late in the day for his recantation without portraying himself as a liar."[26] At most, the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value.[27]
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible.[28] The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence.[29] A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed.[30] The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare that all the foregoing is actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation.[31]And in situations, like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently executed by the recanting witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand[32] and that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.[33]
Applying the aforegoing principles, we are hardly perturbed in our affirmance of petitioners' conviction. Furthermore, the following antecedent facts and circumstances render the recantation out of context: (1) complaining witness Homer Tabuzo went through all the trouble of instructing his wife, (while he was in Manila in November, 1977, when told that the treasury warrants were encashed at the PNB), to file the proper complaint and to get xerox copies of the treasury warrants from the PNB; (2) he proceeded to the authorities the day after he arrived from Manila, around five (5) days after the treasury warrants were encashed, to file a formal complaint regarding the falsification of his signature; and (3) he participated in the various stages of the investigation and the trial whenever he was summoned by the Fiscal or the Judge. That he executed the affidavit of recantation in July, 1985 or eight (8) years after the cases were filed, borders on incredulity. More importantly, the affidavit of recantation did not cover all points raised and facts established during the trial. Neither did it refute testimonial and documentary evidence of other witnesses, especially, for instance, the other pharmacy owners who were made to appear to have filed bids and submitted price quotations, when the truth was that they did not. In short, the said affidavit did not at all explain the other evidence considered by the court a quo in rendering the judgment of conviction, which evidence unequivocally shows petitioners to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged against them.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals), dated April 30, 1984, in AC-G.R. Nos. 24729 and 2473-CR, is HEREBY DISMISSED, with costs.
SO ORDERED. (G.R. Nos. 70168-69. July 24, 1996)
