5 Rudiments in Proving Intent to Kill; Presumptions
Let's calibrate accused-appellant's liability for the incised wounds sustained by Virginia. Both the trial court and the appellate court found Glino liable for attempted murder. The RTC and the CA are in agreement that there was intent to kill Virginia as well.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.
In People v. Delim, the Court had occasion to explain the rudiments of proving intent to kill in crimes against persons. It may consist in: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and (5) the motives of accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
In the case under review, intent to kill Virginia is betrayed by the conduct of accused-appellant and his co-assailant Baloes before, at the time of, and immediately after the commission of the crime. In her testimony before the trial court, Virginia disclosed that she was shocked and was initially unable to come to Domingo's succor as the first blow was struck; that as Domingo was about to fall down from where he was seated, she embraced him; that she tried to shield him from further attacks; that when the assault ceased, her finger was gushing with blood.
If the assailants also intended to kill her, they could have easily stabbed her in any vital part of her body. They did not. The nature and location of her wound militates against the finding of their intent to kill. According to the physician who examined her immediately after the incident, Virginia suffered from an incised wound measuring 2.5 centimeters by 0.2 centimeter in her fifth digit, right hand.
Gleaned from the foregoing, it is crystal-clear that the wound on Virginia was inflicted during her attempt to shield Domingo from accused-appellants and Baloes knife thrusts. It bears stressing that Virginia embraced Domingo while the assault upon him was at its peak. Evidently, the wound was inflicted while she was in that position.
The wound required medical attendance, and rendered Virginia incapable of labor, for a period of ten (10) to thirty (30) days. Clearly, accused-appellant Glino should be held liable for less serious physical injuries only, and not attempted murder.
Although the indictment was for attempted murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious physical injuries is tenable, considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former.
The essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the felony of murder. Simply put, an accused may be convicted of slight, less serious or serious physical injuries in a prosecution for homicide or murder, inasmuch as the infliction of physical injuries could lead to any of the latter offenses when carried out to its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential requisite of the crime of homicide or murder intent to kill is not required in a prosecution for physical injuries. (G.R. No. 173793; December 4, 2007)
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.
In People v. Delim, the Court had occasion to explain the rudiments of proving intent to kill in crimes against persons. It may consist in: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and (5) the motives of accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
In the case under review, intent to kill Virginia is betrayed by the conduct of accused-appellant and his co-assailant Baloes before, at the time of, and immediately after the commission of the crime. In her testimony before the trial court, Virginia disclosed that she was shocked and was initially unable to come to Domingo's succor as the first blow was struck; that as Domingo was about to fall down from where he was seated, she embraced him; that she tried to shield him from further attacks; that when the assault ceased, her finger was gushing with blood.If the assailants also intended to kill her, they could have easily stabbed her in any vital part of her body. They did not. The nature and location of her wound militates against the finding of their intent to kill. According to the physician who examined her immediately after the incident, Virginia suffered from an incised wound measuring 2.5 centimeters by 0.2 centimeter in her fifth digit, right hand.
Gleaned from the foregoing, it is crystal-clear that the wound on Virginia was inflicted during her attempt to shield Domingo from accused-appellants and Baloes knife thrusts. It bears stressing that Virginia embraced Domingo while the assault upon him was at its peak. Evidently, the wound was inflicted while she was in that position.
The wound required medical attendance, and rendered Virginia incapable of labor, for a period of ten (10) to thirty (30) days. Clearly, accused-appellant Glino should be held liable for less serious physical injuries only, and not attempted murder.
Although the indictment was for attempted murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious physical injuries is tenable, considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former.
The essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the felony of murder. Simply put, an accused may be convicted of slight, less serious or serious physical injuries in a prosecution for homicide or murder, inasmuch as the infliction of physical injuries could lead to any of the latter offenses when carried out to its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential requisite of the crime of homicide or murder intent to kill is not required in a prosecution for physical injuries. (G.R. No. 173793; December 4, 2007)