Cadastral courts' jurisdiction to order issuance of new titles in place of title issued under voluntary registration proceedings
The dissenting view perceives a material difference between the present acknowledgment of the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 and the titles involved in the Gonzaga and MWSS cases. It dwells on the fact that the titles debunked in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases, which find origination from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, seem to have been derived from Cadastral Case No. 34 also covering the Maysilo Estate. It is in fact the theory of the dissent that there are, in effect, two competing sources of title the OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 arising from the issuance of Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429; and OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City in Cadastral Case No. 34. It is further opined that the registration of lands pursuant to Cadastral Case No. 34, even if the date of such registration is 3 May 1917, is void since such registration could not supplant the earlier decision of the land registration court.
The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established principles in land cases. Had it been adopted by the Court, the effect would have been to precipitate the utter astonishment of legal scholars, professionals and students alike.
The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands already registered in ordinary land registration cases was acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San Agustin. Such jurisdiction is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz that the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such lands even extends to the determination of which one of the several conflicting registered titles shall prevail[, as such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, the express purpose of cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered to be within the jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings.
The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar concerned the validity of an order of a cadastral court directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Sideco and his children, at Sidecos own prayer, over land previously registered in the name of Crispulo Sideco. This Court ruled that such order was valid and did not amount to a readjudication of the title. After the cadastral proceedings therein had been initiated, the chief surveyor had reported to the cadastral court that the land was covered by a decree in a land registration proceeding and registered in the name of Sideco; the surveyor recommended that the title be cancelled and a new one issued in the names of such persons as the court may determine. In ruling that the new titles were valid, the Court stated that [t]he proceedings did not in any way purport to reexamine the title already issued, or to readjudicate the title of the land. They were precisely predicated on the finality of the title already issued, because it was the registered owner who was asked to express his desire with respect thereto, and the courts order precisely followed the petition of the registered owner.
The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura, himself a former Register of Deeds, explains why cadastral courts have jurisdiction to order the issuance of new titles in place of the title issued under voluntary registration proceedings:
Inasmuch as the land is identified in the plan by cadastral number, it is necessary that a new title be issued, giving the lot its cadastral number in accordance with the cadastral survey. This does not mean that the court has the power to alter the decree entered in the previous registration proceeding. The court cannot change or modify the said decree. It does not adjudicate the title anew. It simply deals with the certificate of title. This is for the convenience of the landowner because it is easier for him to identify his property inasmuch as all the lands brought under the cadastral survey are designated by cadastral numbers.
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of land, already issued in the name of a person, in the name of another, divesting the registered owner of the title already issued in his favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to impair his substantial rights. Yet such prohibition does not mean that the cadastral court will not have jurisdiction over the action involving the previously registered land, as explained in Pamintuan and Timbol, or that the cadastral court may not issue a new title at all even if it would not impair the rights of the previously registered owner, as emphasized in Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the simplistic conclusion that because there was a cadastral case covering the Maysilo Estate from which the titles emanated, such titles could not have been valid. It is clear that there could be such titles issued, and they would be valid for so long as they do not impair the rights of the original registrant to whom OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 was issued. (G.R. No. 123346; December 14, 2007)
The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established principles in land cases. Had it been adopted by the Court, the effect would have been to precipitate the utter astonishment of legal scholars, professionals and students alike.
The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands already registered in ordinary land registration cases was acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San Agustin. Such jurisdiction is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz that the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such lands even extends to the determination of which one of the several conflicting registered titles shall prevail[, as such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, the express purpose of cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered to be within the jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings.
The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar concerned the validity of an order of a cadastral court directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Sideco and his children, at Sidecos own prayer, over land previously registered in the name of Crispulo Sideco. This Court ruled that such order was valid and did not amount to a readjudication of the title. After the cadastral proceedings therein had been initiated, the chief surveyor had reported to the cadastral court that the land was covered by a decree in a land registration proceeding and registered in the name of Sideco; the surveyor recommended that the title be cancelled and a new one issued in the names of such persons as the court may determine. In ruling that the new titles were valid, the Court stated that [t]he proceedings did not in any way purport to reexamine the title already issued, or to readjudicate the title of the land. They were precisely predicated on the finality of the title already issued, because it was the registered owner who was asked to express his desire with respect thereto, and the courts order precisely followed the petition of the registered owner.The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura, himself a former Register of Deeds, explains why cadastral courts have jurisdiction to order the issuance of new titles in place of the title issued under voluntary registration proceedings:
Inasmuch as the land is identified in the plan by cadastral number, it is necessary that a new title be issued, giving the lot its cadastral number in accordance with the cadastral survey. This does not mean that the court has the power to alter the decree entered in the previous registration proceeding. The court cannot change or modify the said decree. It does not adjudicate the title anew. It simply deals with the certificate of title. This is for the convenience of the landowner because it is easier for him to identify his property inasmuch as all the lands brought under the cadastral survey are designated by cadastral numbers.
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of land, already issued in the name of a person, in the name of another, divesting the registered owner of the title already issued in his favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to impair his substantial rights. Yet such prohibition does not mean that the cadastral court will not have jurisdiction over the action involving the previously registered land, as explained in Pamintuan and Timbol, or that the cadastral court may not issue a new title at all even if it would not impair the rights of the previously registered owner, as emphasized in Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the simplistic conclusion that because there was a cadastral case covering the Maysilo Estate from which the titles emanated, such titles could not have been valid. It is clear that there could be such titles issued, and they would be valid for so long as they do not impair the rights of the original registrant to whom OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 was issued. (G.R. No. 123346; December 14, 2007)