Case Digest: Mitra v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191938 : October 19, 2010
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V. GONZALES AND ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration Filed by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments filed by private respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (private respondents), dated July 19, 2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing our Decision of July 2, 2010 (July 2, 2010 Decision or Decision).We annulled in this Decision the February 10, 2010 and May 4, 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied the private respondents petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra).
To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited certiorari jurisdiction in election cases, we are not only obliged but are constitutionally bound to intervene when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion in this case, a situation where resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, mutated from being errors of judgment to errors of jurisdiction.Based on our evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan.We also found that the COMELEC failed to critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.
On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents evidence failed to sufficiently controvert.Specifically, the private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.
In this regard, we took note of the incremental moves Mitra undertook to establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following:(1) hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion ofhis house.Thus, we found that under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan.We also emphasized that the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC concerning his residence was indeed a misrepresentation.In sum, we concluded that the evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra indeed transfered his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law.
In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider our July 2, 2010 Decision. The COMELEC argues that we overstepped our review power over its factual findings; as a specialized constitutional body, the findings and conclusions of the COMELEC are generally respected and even given the status of finality.The COMELEC also contends that the Court erred in taking cognizance of the present petition since the issues raised therein are essentially factual in nature.It claims that it is elementary that the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorariis limited to correcting questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether the SC erred when it reviewed the probative value of the evidence presented and substituted its own factual findings over that of the public respondent.
HELD: We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and for oral arguments.
We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondent's arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision.Thus, both the COMELEC and private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting reconsideration.The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties original submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall require.
Having said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the aspects of the case the motions touched upon, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of our July 2, 2010 Decision.
REMEDIAL LAW: petition for certiorari
First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Court improperly exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize that Mitras petition failed to allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.They also stress that the Court should respect and consider the COMELEC's findings of fact to be final and non-reviewable.
COMELEC's submission in this regard that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari is wholly erroneous.This submission appears to have confused the standards of the Courts power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the COMELEC to grossly misread the import of Mitras petition before the Court.
To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court.Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not under the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground,i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The basis for the Courts review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that [U]nless otherwise provided by [the] Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64)specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule65 in the filing of a petition forcertiorari, subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections and Dario v. Mison, the Court construed the above-cited constitutional provision as relating to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 (although with a different reglementary period for filing)and not to an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court now clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special civil action ofcertiorariunder Rule 65, except as therein provided.In Ocate v. Commission on Elections, we further held that:
The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues.
POLITICAL LAW: judicial power
The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in defining judicial power, pointedly states that
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of this Court in grave abuse of discretion situations, and differentiates this authority from the power of review by appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELEC's position that patently confuses the mode of review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides.
We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents proposition that the Court erred in exercising its limited certiorari jurisdiction.Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution And the Rules of Court provide, we stress that in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the factual issues.
As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized exceptions to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in acertioraricase the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence.One such exception is when the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable.In this situation, we are duty bound under the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.
Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitras submissions and arguments on grave abuse of discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a COC proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false material representation to deceive the electorate.In fact, Mitras petition plainly argued that the COMELECs grave abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false representation.We completely addressed this issue and, in the process, analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC decision. At every step, we found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence.
ELECTION LAW: residence
The private respondents fail to realize that the important considerations in the present case relate to questions bearing on the cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged deliberate misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency in Aborlan, Palawan.
While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009.As our Decision discussed and as repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence.
These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision.At this point, we only need to address some of the private respondents misleading points in order to clear the air:
1.The private respondents reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to disprove Mitras claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, is misplaced.This argument is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully time-barred and was only up to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the parties.That a lease is fixed for a one-year term is a common practice.What is important is that it is renewable at the option of the parties.In the absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply continues and is deemed renewed.
2.In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitras alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009 allegedly showing Mitras signature.To recall, we found thatbased on the records before us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra.Although the private respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined therecently submittedcolored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding; the alleged signature appears to us to be a merehazy superimposition that does not bear any resemblance at all to Mitras signature.We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value.It did it not at all carry Mitras signature; his secretarys positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latters participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.
3.The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated July 17, 2010, from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not have any record of the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.This late submission was made to show that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan.The Certification pertinently states:
This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our office regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.However, the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.
We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two reasons.First, it was filed only on reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when the case was submitted for resolution.Second, even if it had not been filed late, the Certification does not prove anything; it is, on its face, contradictory.On the one hand, it categorically states that there are no existing records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan. Under what law or regulation the certifying office has the obligation to prepare a list of agricultural business interests in Aborlan has not even been alleged.
At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitras business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed in the present case.Not only was Mitra able to present photographs of his experimental pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe, Ricardo Temple and other witnesses.
ELECTION LAW: deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC
The private respondents also claim that the Court erred in ruling that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We likewise see no merit in this claim.One important point in the present case is that the private respondents failed to prove that there was deliberate material misrepresentation in Mitras statement on his required residency prior to the May 10, 2010 elections. This, as we stressed in our Decision, is a glaring gap in the private respondents case:
We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves he had made to carry it out.From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitras favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go below the level of anequipoise, i.e.,when weighed,Mitras evidence of transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.Under the situationprevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about his residence.
The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the character of Mitras feedmill residence.For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error one that goes beyond an ordinary error of judgment.By failing to take into account whether there had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material representation.In this case, it doubly erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.
The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of using subjective norms, as they now argue thatgiven his stature as a member of the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room in a feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.
We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the COMELECs use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically, hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion of his house.These incremental moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELECs highly subjective non-legal standards do.
Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us, that the respondents have not presented a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC, while the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.
To summarize, both the COMELEC and private respondents have not shown, through their respective motions, sufficient reasons to compel us to modify or reverse our July 2, 2010 Decision.
ELECTION LAW: the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident
The evidence before us, properly considered and carefully reviewed, fully supports our conclusion that the private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.As discussed now and in our Decision of July 2, 2010, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, concluding his transfer in early 2009.Given this proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private respondents to establish the contrary.
Proof to the contrary is sadly lacking, as the dissents reliance on the Certification of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica,PuertoPrincesaCityis misplaced. Theponenciacannot give full evidentiary weight to the aforementioned Certification.
To be sure, a bare certification in a disputed situation cannot suffice to conclusively establish the existence of what the certification alleged. The purported CTC, on the other hand, was neither signed nor thumb-marked by Mitra and, thus, bore no clear indication that it had been adopted and used by Mitra as his own.In our evaluation, we in fact pointedly emphasized that the Puerto Princesa City CTC dated February 3, 2009, if at all, carries little evidentiary value in light of Lilia Camoras (Mitras secretary) positive declaration that she was the one who procured it, while Mitras Aborlan CTC dated March 18, 2009 carried Mitras own signature. Camora fully explained the circumstances under which she secured the CTC of February 3, 2009 and her statement was never disputed.
On the other hand, Commodore Hernandez declaration on its face did not controvert Carme E. Caspes sworn statement which adequately proved that Mitras transfer to Aborlan was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008 and concluded in March 2009.
ELECTION LAW: the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence and in using wrong considerations which lead it to incorrectly conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and that he committed a deliberate misrepresentation in his COC
Contrary to the dissents view, the sworn statements of Maligaya Feedmills customers and former employees that Mitra did not and could not have resided at the mezzanine portion of the Feedmill cannot be given full evidentiary weight, since these statements are in nature of negative testimonies that do not deserve weight and credence in the face of contrary positive evidence, particularly, Carme E. Caspes testimony, cited above, that Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a process that was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008.It is well-settled in the rules of evidence that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.
Additionally, we noted in our Decision that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, as it failed to correctly appreciate that the evidence clearly pointed to fact that Mitra effectively transferred his residence to Aborlan.
To buttress our finding that the COMELEC used personal and subjective assessment standards instead of the standards prescribed by law, we cited Coquilla v. COMELEC, which characterized the term residence as referring to domicile or legal residence, that is the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
ELECTION LAW: the validity or invalidity of the lease contract is not determinative of question of Mitras residence in Aborlan
Beyond the arguments raised about the invalidity of the lease contract, what is significant for purposes of this case is the immateriality of the issue to the present case.As we emphasized in our Decision:
The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what concerns us is the question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as his residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was under construction) and whether he indeed resided there.The notarys compliance with the notarial law likewise assumes no materiality as it is a defect not imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties affirmation before a notary public of the contracts genuineness and due execution.
The dissents thesis that Mitras allegation in his Motion for Reconsideration (dated February 13, 2010) before the COMELEC en banc that he had already transferred to the newly constructed house in Aborlan negates the proposition that the lease agreement is extendible from month to month - is misleading.The significance of Mitras statement in his Motion for Reconsideration that he had already transferred to his newly constructed house in Aborlan must not be read in isolation; it must be appreciated under the backdrop of Mitras explicit intention to make Aborlan his permanent residence through an incremental transfer of residence, as evidenced by the following:
(1) his initial transfer through the leased dwelling at the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill;
(2) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and
(3) the construction of a house on this lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion of his house.
All these should of course be read with the establishment of Mitras business interest in Aborlan and his transfer of registration as a voter.
With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will.We cannot deny, however, that the people of Palawan have spoken in an election where residency qualification had been squarely raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict on Mitras qualifications.
Under these terms, we cannot be any clearer.
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V. GONZALES AND ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration Filed by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments filed by private respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (private respondents), dated July 19, 2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing our Decision of July 2, 2010 (July 2, 2010 Decision or Decision).We annulled in this Decision the February 10, 2010 and May 4, 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied the private respondents petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra).
To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited certiorari jurisdiction in election cases, we are not only obliged but are constitutionally bound to intervene when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion in this case, a situation where resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, mutated from being errors of judgment to errors of jurisdiction.Based on our evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan.We also found that the COMELEC failed to critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.
On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents evidence failed to sufficiently controvert.Specifically, the private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.
In this regard, we took note of the incremental moves Mitra undertook to establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following:(1) hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion ofhis house.Thus, we found that under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan.We also emphasized that the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC concerning his residence was indeed a misrepresentation.In sum, we concluded that the evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra indeed transfered his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law.
In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider our July 2, 2010 Decision. The COMELEC argues that we overstepped our review power over its factual findings; as a specialized constitutional body, the findings and conclusions of the COMELEC are generally respected and even given the status of finality.The COMELEC also contends that the Court erred in taking cognizance of the present petition since the issues raised therein are essentially factual in nature.It claims that it is elementary that the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorariis limited to correcting questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether the SC erred when it reviewed the probative value of the evidence presented and substituted its own factual findings over that of the public respondent.
HELD: We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and for oral arguments.
We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondent's arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision.Thus, both the COMELEC and private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting reconsideration.The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties original submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall require.
Having said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the aspects of the case the motions touched upon, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of our July 2, 2010 Decision.
REMEDIAL LAW: petition for certiorari
First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Court improperly exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize that Mitras petition failed to allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.They also stress that the Court should respect and consider the COMELEC's findings of fact to be final and non-reviewable.
COMELEC's submission in this regard that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari is wholly erroneous.This submission appears to have confused the standards of the Courts power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the COMELEC to grossly misread the import of Mitras petition before the Court.
To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court.Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not under the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground,i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The basis for the Courts review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that [U]nless otherwise provided by [the] Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64)specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule65 in the filing of a petition forcertiorari, subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections and Dario v. Mison, the Court construed the above-cited constitutional provision as relating to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 (although with a different reglementary period for filing)and not to an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court now clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special civil action ofcertiorariunder Rule 65, except as therein provided.In Ocate v. Commission on Elections, we further held that:
The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues.
POLITICAL LAW: judicial power
The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in defining judicial power, pointedly states that
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of this Court in grave abuse of discretion situations, and differentiates this authority from the power of review by appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELEC's position that patently confuses the mode of review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides.
We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents proposition that the Court erred in exercising its limited certiorari jurisdiction.Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution And the Rules of Court provide, we stress that in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the factual issues.
As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized exceptions to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in acertioraricase the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence.One such exception is when the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable.In this situation, we are duty bound under the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.
Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitras submissions and arguments on grave abuse of discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a COC proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false material representation to deceive the electorate.In fact, Mitras petition plainly argued that the COMELECs grave abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false representation.We completely addressed this issue and, in the process, analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC decision. At every step, we found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence.
ELECTION LAW: residence
The private respondents fail to realize that the important considerations in the present case relate to questions bearing on the cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged deliberate misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency in Aborlan, Palawan.
While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009.As our Decision discussed and as repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence.
These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision.At this point, we only need to address some of the private respondents misleading points in order to clear the air:
1.The private respondents reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to disprove Mitras claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, is misplaced.This argument is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully time-barred and was only up to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the parties.That a lease is fixed for a one-year term is a common practice.What is important is that it is renewable at the option of the parties.In the absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply continues and is deemed renewed.
2.In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitras alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009 allegedly showing Mitras signature.To recall, we found thatbased on the records before us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra.Although the private respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined therecently submittedcolored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding; the alleged signature appears to us to be a merehazy superimposition that does not bear any resemblance at all to Mitras signature.We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value.It did it not at all carry Mitras signature; his secretarys positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latters participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.
3.The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated July 17, 2010, from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not have any record of the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.This late submission was made to show that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan.The Certification pertinently states:
This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our office regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.However, the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.
We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two reasons.First, it was filed only on reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when the case was submitted for resolution.Second, even if it had not been filed late, the Certification does not prove anything; it is, on its face, contradictory.On the one hand, it categorically states that there are no existing records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan. Under what law or regulation the certifying office has the obligation to prepare a list of agricultural business interests in Aborlan has not even been alleged.
At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitras business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed in the present case.Not only was Mitra able to present photographs of his experimental pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe, Ricardo Temple and other witnesses.
ELECTION LAW: deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC
The private respondents also claim that the Court erred in ruling that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We likewise see no merit in this claim.One important point in the present case is that the private respondents failed to prove that there was deliberate material misrepresentation in Mitras statement on his required residency prior to the May 10, 2010 elections. This, as we stressed in our Decision, is a glaring gap in the private respondents case:
We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves he had made to carry it out.From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitras favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go below the level of anequipoise, i.e.,when weighed,Mitras evidence of transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.Under the situationprevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about his residence.
The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the character of Mitras feedmill residence.For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error one that goes beyond an ordinary error of judgment.By failing to take into account whether there had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material representation.In this case, it doubly erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.
The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of using subjective norms, as they now argue thatgiven his stature as a member of the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room in a feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.
We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the COMELECs use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically, hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion of his house.These incremental moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELECs highly subjective non-legal standards do.
Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us, that the respondents have not presented a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC, while the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.
To summarize, both the COMELEC and private respondents have not shown, through their respective motions, sufficient reasons to compel us to modify or reverse our July 2, 2010 Decision.
ELECTION LAW: the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident
The evidence before us, properly considered and carefully reviewed, fully supports our conclusion that the private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.As discussed now and in our Decision of July 2, 2010, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, concluding his transfer in early 2009.Given this proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private respondents to establish the contrary.
Proof to the contrary is sadly lacking, as the dissents reliance on the Certification of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica,PuertoPrincesaCityis misplaced. Theponenciacannot give full evidentiary weight to the aforementioned Certification.
To be sure, a bare certification in a disputed situation cannot suffice to conclusively establish the existence of what the certification alleged. The purported CTC, on the other hand, was neither signed nor thumb-marked by Mitra and, thus, bore no clear indication that it had been adopted and used by Mitra as his own.In our evaluation, we in fact pointedly emphasized that the Puerto Princesa City CTC dated February 3, 2009, if at all, carries little evidentiary value in light of Lilia Camoras (Mitras secretary) positive declaration that she was the one who procured it, while Mitras Aborlan CTC dated March 18, 2009 carried Mitras own signature. Camora fully explained the circumstances under which she secured the CTC of February 3, 2009 and her statement was never disputed.
On the other hand, Commodore Hernandez declaration on its face did not controvert Carme E. Caspes sworn statement which adequately proved that Mitras transfer to Aborlan was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008 and concluded in March 2009.
ELECTION LAW: the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence and in using wrong considerations which lead it to incorrectly conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and that he committed a deliberate misrepresentation in his COC
Contrary to the dissents view, the sworn statements of Maligaya Feedmills customers and former employees that Mitra did not and could not have resided at the mezzanine portion of the Feedmill cannot be given full evidentiary weight, since these statements are in nature of negative testimonies that do not deserve weight and credence in the face of contrary positive evidence, particularly, Carme E. Caspes testimony, cited above, that Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a process that was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008.It is well-settled in the rules of evidence that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.
Additionally, we noted in our Decision that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, as it failed to correctly appreciate that the evidence clearly pointed to fact that Mitra effectively transferred his residence to Aborlan.
To buttress our finding that the COMELEC used personal and subjective assessment standards instead of the standards prescribed by law, we cited Coquilla v. COMELEC, which characterized the term residence as referring to domicile or legal residence, that is the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
ELECTION LAW: the validity or invalidity of the lease contract is not determinative of question of Mitras residence in Aborlan
Beyond the arguments raised about the invalidity of the lease contract, what is significant for purposes of this case is the immateriality of the issue to the present case.As we emphasized in our Decision:
The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what concerns us is the question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as his residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was under construction) and whether he indeed resided there.The notarys compliance with the notarial law likewise assumes no materiality as it is a defect not imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties affirmation before a notary public of the contracts genuineness and due execution.
The dissents thesis that Mitras allegation in his Motion for Reconsideration (dated February 13, 2010) before the COMELEC en banc that he had already transferred to the newly constructed house in Aborlan negates the proposition that the lease agreement is extendible from month to month - is misleading.The significance of Mitras statement in his Motion for Reconsideration that he had already transferred to his newly constructed house in Aborlan must not be read in isolation; it must be appreciated under the backdrop of Mitras explicit intention to make Aborlan his permanent residence through an incremental transfer of residence, as evidenced by the following:
(1) his initial transfer through the leased dwelling at the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill;
(2) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and
(3) the construction of a house on this lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion of his house.
All these should of course be read with the establishment of Mitras business interest in Aborlan and his transfer of registration as a voter.
With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will.We cannot deny, however, that the people of Palawan have spoken in an election where residency qualification had been squarely raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict on Mitras qualifications.
Under these terms, we cannot be any clearer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to DENY with FINALITY, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and motion for oral arguments now before us.Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
