Case Digest: Nestle & Nestle Waters v. Uniwide Sales, et al.
G.R. No. 174674 : October 20, 2010
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and NESTLE WATERS PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly HIDDEN SPRINGS & PERRIER, INC.),Petitioners,v. UNIWIDE SALES, INC., UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., NAIC RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CLUB, INC., FIRST PARAGON CORPORATION, and UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC., Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for declaration of suspension of payment, formation and appointment of rehabilitation receiver, and approval of rehabilitation plan.
The newly appointed Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the SEC. The plan was anchored on return to core business of retailing; debt reduction via cash settlement and dacion en pago; loan restructuring; waiver of penalties and charges; freezing of interest payments; and restructuring of credit of suppliers, contractors, and private lenders.
The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC an Amended Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). The ARP took into account the planned entry of Casino Guichard Perrachon, envisioned to infuse P3.57 billion in fresh capital. SEC approved the ARP.
The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC a Second Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichard Perrachon's withdrawal. SEC approved the SARP.
Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC praying that the Order approving the SARP be set aside and a new one be issued directing the Interim Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to improve the terms and conditions of the SARP.
SEC denied petitioners' appeal for lack of merit. Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the petition for review filed by petitioners. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative law; doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction
In light of supervening events that have emerged from the time the SEC approved the SARP on 23 December 2002 and from the time the present petition was filed on 3 November 2006, any determination by this Court as to whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated, would be premature.
Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of this case. The Court thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given the supervening events in this case, the SARP is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
Petition for review is DISMISSED.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and NESTLE WATERS PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly HIDDEN SPRINGS & PERRIER, INC.),Petitioners,v. UNIWIDE SALES, INC., UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., NAIC RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CLUB, INC., FIRST PARAGON CORPORATION, and UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC., Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for declaration of suspension of payment, formation and appointment of rehabilitation receiver, and approval of rehabilitation plan.
The newly appointed Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the SEC. The plan was anchored on return to core business of retailing; debt reduction via cash settlement and dacion en pago; loan restructuring; waiver of penalties and charges; freezing of interest payments; and restructuring of credit of suppliers, contractors, and private lenders.
The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC an Amended Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). The ARP took into account the planned entry of Casino Guichard Perrachon, envisioned to infuse P3.57 billion in fresh capital. SEC approved the ARP.
The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC a Second Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichard Perrachon's withdrawal. SEC approved the SARP.
Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC praying that the Order approving the SARP be set aside and a new one be issued directing the Interim Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to improve the terms and conditions of the SARP.
SEC denied petitioners' appeal for lack of merit. Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the petition for review filed by petitioners. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative law; doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction
In light of supervening events that have emerged from the time the SEC approved the SARP on 23 December 2002 and from the time the present petition was filed on 3 November 2006, any determination by this Court as to whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated, would be premature.
Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of this case. The Court thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given the supervening events in this case, the SARP is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
Petition for review is DISMISSED.
