G.R. No. 212988. Oct 3, 2018

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 212988, October 03, 2018 ] PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., now BDO LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., petitioner v. TROJAN METAL INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED, WALFRIDO[1] S. DIZON, ELIZABETH C. DIZON, and JOHN DOE, respondents.

An order of execution that varies the terms of the judgment is null and void.
This Petition for Review[2] seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals January 14, 2014 Decision[3] and June 2, 2014 Resolution,[4] which dismissed PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.'s (PCI Leasing) Petition for Certiorari[5] and denied reconsideration, respectively. The Court of Appeals, in effect, sustained the Regional Trial Court December 2, 2011 Order,[6] directing the issuance of a writ of execution against PCI Leasing for P1,025,000.00.

The pertinent facts[7] are as follows:

This case arose from an execution of the final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. Q-99-37559[8] involving a Complaint for Recovery of Sum of Money and/or Personal Property with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Replevin[9] filed by PCI Leasing against: (1) Trojan Metal Industries, Inc. (Trojan Metal Industries); (2) Walfrido S. Dizon and Elizabeth C. Dizon (collectively, the Dizon Spouses), Trojan Metal Industries' President and General Manager,[10] and Vice President for Finance, respectively;[11] and (3) John Doe.[12]

Sometime in 1997, Trojan Metal Industries sought to obtain a loan from PCI Leasing. Instead of extending the loan, PCI Leasing proposed to purchase some of Trojan Metal Industries' pieces of equipment. The parties executed deeds of sale evidencing Trojan Metal Industries' sale to PCI Leasing of the various equipment for the total amount of P2,865,070.00.[13]

The parties then entered into a lease agreement whereby Trojan Metal Industries leased from PCI Leasing the various equipment which it previously owned. The lease agreement required Trojan Metal Industries to give PCI Leasing a guaranty deposit of P 1,030,350.00, which would serve as security for the timely performance of Trojan Metal Industries' obligations under the lease agreement. This guaranty deposit would automatically be forfeited should Trojan Metal Industries return the leased equipment before the expiration of the lease agreement.[14]

To secure an additional loan from another financing company, Trojan Metal Industries used the leased equipment as temporary collateral. PCI Leasing considered the second mortgage a violation of their lease agreement. At that time, Trojan Metal Industries' partial payments had reached P1,717,091.00. On December 8, 1998, PCI Leasing sent a demand letter for the payment of Trojan Metal Industries' outstanding obligation.[15]

On May 7, 1999, PCI Leasing filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a Complaint[16] against Trojan Metal Industries, the Dizon Spouses, and John Doe for recovery of sum of money and personal property with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.[17]

On September 7, 1999, the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of replevin. Not long after, PCI Leasing sold the leased equipment to a third party and collected the proceeds amounting to P1,025,000.00.[18]

On July 23, 2002, the Regional Trial Court sustained[19] the lease agreement between the parties and directed Trojan Metal Industries and the Dizon Spouses to pay their remaining rental obligation with legal interest plus attorney's fees. :

Trojan Metal Industries, the Dizon Spouses, and John Doe filed an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals.[20]

The Court of Appeals dismissed their appeal and reversed[21] the Regional Trial Court. It ruled that the sale with lease agreement between the parties was in fact a loan secured by chattel mortgage. It further held that since PCI Leasing sold the equipment to a third party for P1,025,000.00 and Trojan Metal Industries paid PCI Leasing a guaranty deposit of P1,030,350.00, PCI Leasing had in its hands the sum of P2,055,350.00. On the other hand, Trojan Metal Industries' remaining obligation of P888,423.48, or an excess of P1,166,826.52, should be returned to it in accordance with Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Hence, the Court of Appeals dismissed PCI Leasing's complaint and directed it to pay Trojan Metal Industries the amount of PI, 166,826.52by way of refund.[22]

PCI Leasing filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 176381.[23]

In its December 15, 2010 Decision,[24] this Court affirmed[25] the Court of Appeals' finding that the transaction between the parties was simply a loan secured by a chattel mortgage, but disagreed on the computation of the amount to be refunded by PCI Leasing.[26] This Court held that the amount of the principal loan was P1,834,720.00, which was the net amount actually received by Trojan Metal Industries.[27] Loan payments, totaling P1,717,091.00, should be deducted from the sum of the principal loan of P1,834,720.00 and the applicable interest.[28] Since PCI Leasing sold the mortgaged equipment to a third party for P1,025,000.00, these proceeds should be applied to offset the remaining balance on the principal loan plus applicable interest.[29] However, as the exact date[30] of the sale of the mortgaged equipment could not be determined from the records, this Court remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court for the computation of the total amount due[31] in accordance with the following formula derived from the rules laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[32]
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE = [principal - partial payments made] + [interest + interest on interest], where

Interest = remaining balance x 12% per annum x no. of years from due date (8 December 1998 when demand was made) until date of sale to a third party

Interest on interest = interest computed as of the filing of the complaint on 7 May 1999 x 12% x no. of years until date of sale to a third party.[33]
This Court further held that P1,025,000.00, representing the proceeds of the sale to a third party already in PCI Leasing's hands, should be deducted from the computed total amount due. The difference represents overpayment by Trojan Metal Industries, which the law requires PCI Leasing to refund to it.[34] The dispositive portion of this Court's December 15, 2010 Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 5 October 2006 Decision and the 23 January 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75855. Petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to PAY respondent Trojan Metal Industries, Inc., by way of refund, the excess amount to be computed by the Regional Trial Court based on the formula specified above, with interest at 12% per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Costs against petitioner.[35]
This Court's December 15, 2010 Decision became final and executory on March 23, 2011 and the case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court.[36]

After the parties submitted their respective computations[37] of the judgment award, Branch 79, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City issued an Order dated December 2, 2011,[38] thus:
[T]he Court believes that the computation of the plaintiff is correct and in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court.

Accordingly, let a writ of execution issue against the plaintiff for the payment of P1,221,459.24 to the defendant minus the sum of P196,459.24 representing the deduction from the proceeds of the sale to the third party or a net total of P1,025,000.00.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
PCI Leasing filed a motion for correction of the Regional Trial Court December 2, 2011 Order, which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its February 27, 2012 Order, thus:
In view of the foregoing, the plaintiffs motion for correction is hereby DENIED. Let a writ of execution issue against the plaintiff for the payment of P1,025,000.00 to the defendants by way of refund of the defendants' overpayment to the plaintiff corporation.[40]
PCI Leasing filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the Regional Trial Court in its April 20, 2012 Order.[41]

PCI Leasing then filed its Petition for Certiorari under Ruled 65[42] before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed[43] PCI Leasing's Petition for Certiorari for being an improper remedy. Even assuming that the petition was treated as a petition for review under Rule 42, the Court of Appeals held that it still would not prosper for having been filed beyond the prescribed period.[44] At any rate, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to establish its entitlement to certiorari.[45] The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals January 14, 2014 Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Orders dated 27 February 2012 and 20 April 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 79, Quezon City STAND.[46]
PCI Leasing filed its Motion for Reconsideration,[47] which the Court of Appeals denied in its June 2, 2014 Resolution.[48]

Hence, PCI Leasing filed this Petition for Review under Rule 45 before this Court on July 8, 2014.[49]

This Petition argues that:
The Court of Appeals has so far sanctioned the lower court's departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by refusing to correct the obvious clerical and grievous error the lower court committed in the order dated 2 December 2011.[50]
Petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court upheld in its December 2, 2011 Order the correctness of its computation involving P1,221,459.24 as the principal loan plus applicable interest minus P1,025,000.00, which petitioner received from the sale of the mortgaged equipment, leaving a balance of P196,459.24.[51] However, petitioner submits that the Regional Trial Court committed a mistake when it interchanged "plaintiff and "defendant," and jumbled the amounts involved, viz.:
Accordingly, let a writ of execution issue against the plaintiff for the payment of P1,221,459.24 to the defendant minus the sum of P196,459.24 representing the deduction from the proceeds of the sale to the third party or a net total of P1,025,000.00.[52] (Emphasis supplied)
According to petitioner, the second paragraph of the December 2, 2011 Order should have read instead, thus:
Accordingly, let a writ of execution issue against THE DEFENDANT for the payment of P1,221,459.24 to THE PLAINTIFF minus the sum of P1,025,000.00 representing the deduction from the proceeds of the sale to the third party or a net total of P196,459.24.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner further submits that the mistake was a simple clerical error which the Regional Trial Court should have corrected at the very first instance when it filed its Motion for Correction. It adds that the second paragraph of the December 2, 2011 Order does not make any sense in the context of both parties' computations and this Court's December 15, 2010 Decision in G.R.No. 176381.[54] It contends that the Court of Appeals "sanctioned" the Regional Trial Court's error when it refused to make the necessary correction.[55]

In its Comment,[56] Trojan Metal Industries countered that the Petition does not raise the correct issue of whether the Court of Appeals properly dismissed petitioner's Rule 65 petition for being an improper remedy, and should therefore not be given due course.[57] Further, it states that "[petitioner failed to show a strong indication of the lower court's grave abuse of discretion."[58]

Petitioner filed its Reply[59] in compliance with this Court's March 11, 2015 Resolution.[60] It argues that the Regional Trial Court February 27, 2012 and April 20, 2012 Orders were orders of execution, which under Rule 41, Section l(e) of the Rules of Court are not appealable; hence, its resort to a Rule 65 petition was proper.[61] It further reiterates that the Regional Trial Court committed a palpable error in the second paragraph of its December 2, 2011 Order when it interchanged the words "plaintiff and "defendant."[62] Thus, it calls on the supervisory power of this Court[63] "to correct this clerical but grievous error" committed by the Regional Trial Court and to implement the formula laid down in this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 176381.[64]

The Petition is partially granted.

I

The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that petitioner's remedy to assail "the alleged wrong computation made by the [Regional Trial Court] in its Order dated 2 December 2011"[65] should have been an ordinary appeal.[66]

Section 1(f) of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution.

Section 1. Subject of Appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:

a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
c) An interlocutory order;
d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
f) An order of execution;
g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied)
The basis for the rule prohibiting appeals from orders of execution is the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.[67] Under this doctrine, a final and executory judgment, however erroneous, can no longer be amended, modified, or set aside, whether by the court rendering it or by an appellate court.[68] The doctrine "is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice"[69] that litigations should have a definite conclusion at a given time even at the risk of occasional errors. As this Court explained in Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation.[70]
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.[71] (Emphasis in the original)

II

Before implementing this Court's December 15, 2010 Decision, the Regional Trial Court directed the parties to submit their respective computations in accordance with the formula stated in this Decision.

After the parties submitted their respective Compliance, the Regional Trial Court issued its December 2, 2011 Order, stating as follows:
[T]he Court believes that the computation of the plaintiff is correct and in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court.

Accordingly, let a writ of execution issue against the plaintiff for the payment of P1,221,459.24 to the defendant minus the sum of P196,459.24 representing the deduction from the proceeds of the sale to the third party or a net total of P1,025,000.00.[72] (Emphasis supplied)
According to petitioner, following its computation, which was upheld by the Regional Trial Court, the second paragraph of the December 2, 2011 Order should, instead, have read like this:
Accordingly, let a writ of execution issue against THE DEFENDANT for the payment of P1,221,459.24 to THE PLAINTIFFminus the sum of P1,025,000.00representing the deduction from the proceeds of the sale to the third party or a net total of P196,459.24.[73] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner submits that this clerical mistake should have been corrected by the Regional Trial Court at the very first instance when it filed its Motion for Correction. It contends that the Court of Appeals compounded the Regional Trial Court's error when it refused to make the necessary correction.[74]

This Court rules that the Regional Trial Court indeed committed a mistake in the second paragraph of its December 2, 2011 Order when it interchanged the words "plaintiff and "defendant," and jumbled the amounts involved. This error is plain to see from a simple comparison with the computation submitted by petitioner and sustained by the Regional Trial Court, and a reading of this Court's December 15, 2010 Decision.

The outstanding obligation of respondents as computed by petitioner is P1,221,459.24. Deducting from P1,221,459.24 the amount of P1,025,000.00, the proceeds received by PCI Leasing from the sale of the mortgaged property to a third party, results in a net obligation of P196,459.24 on the part of respondents.

However, the Regional Trial Court directed the issuance of a writ of execution against "[petitioner] for the payment of [P]1,221,459.24 to [respondents] minus the sum of [P]196,459.24 representing the deduction from the proceeds of the sale to the third party or a net total of [P]1,025,000.00."[75]

This was an error which the Regional Trial Court could have corrected at the very first instance when PCI Leasing filed its Motion for Correction. Its failure to correct its error constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

III

Nonetheless, this Court finds that petitioner's computation is not fully in accord with this Court's December 15, 2010 Decision.

The Motion for Correction filed by petitioner before the Regional Trial Court sought to correct an "obvious clerical error" [76] in its December 2, 2011 Order of Execution. Upon the Regional Trial Court's denial of this motion and petitioner's subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration, petitioner brought the matter before the Court of Appeals via a Rule 65 petition. From the denial of its petition for certiorari, petitioner sought recourse to this Court through a petition for review under Rule 45. To determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded the absence of grave abuse of discretion of the Regional Trial Court, this Court necessarily had to go over the computation submitted by petitioner vis a vis the December 2, 2011 Order of Execution.

This appeal requires this Court to consider not simply the points urged by petitioner, but all other jurisdictional errors that may have attended the actions of the lower courts. Thus, "when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court ... to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."[77]

This Court finds that the Regional Trial Court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed petitioner's computation, which effectively modified this Court's December 15, 2010 Decision.

It is a basic rule that an execution must conform to the judgment it seeks to enforce.[78] "[A]ny alteration or amendment which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction."[79] Certiorari will lie to abate an order of execution that is found to be at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced.[80]The dispositive portion of this Court's December 15, 2010 Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 5 October 2006 Decision and the 23 January 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75855. Petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to PAY respondent Trojan Metal Industries, Inc., by way of refund, the excess amount to be computed by the Regional Trial Court based on the formula specified above, with interest at 12% per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Costs against petitioner.[81] (Emphasis supplied) The formula adverted to is as follows:

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE [principal - partial payments made] + [interest + interest on interest], where

Interest = remaining balance x 12% per annum x no. of years from due date (8 December 1998 when demand was made) until date of sale to a third party

Interest on interest = interest computed as of the filing of the complaint on 7 May 1999 x 12% x no. of years until date of sale to a third party.[82]
In this Decision, this Court already determined that the principal loan extended to respondent was "P1,834,720.00, which was the net amount actually received by [Trojan Metal Industries] (proceeds of the sale of the equipment to [PCI Leasing] minus the guaranty deposit)."[83] Deducted from this principal loan of P1,834,720.00 are the loan payments amounting to P1,717,091.00, leaving a remaining balance of P117,629.00.

This Court further held that this remaining balance of P117,629.00 plus applicable interest, or the total amount due, should be deducted from P1,025,000.00, which pertains to the proceeds of the sale to a third party already in PCI Leasing's hands.

Since the exact date of the sale of the mortgaged equipment could not be determined from the case records, this Court remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court for the computation of the total amount due.

In other words, all that the Regional Trial Court had to do was simply to plug in the date of sale of the mortgaged property to a third party, and to compute the applicable interests according to the formula provided.

However, petitioner's computation, which was upheld by the Regional Trial Court, modified this Court's December 15, 2010 Decision by imposing 12% interest on the loan obligation even prior to the date of demand; by compounding the interest annually for the first three (3) years; and by adopting its own procedure for the offsetting of the guaranty deposit against the principal loan. Specifically, the differences are as follows:


Petitioner's Computation Decision dated December 15, 2010
Petitioner took into account Section 6 of the lease agreement between the parties, stating to the effect that the guaranty deposit would be automatically forfeited in case the lessee returns the leased property to the lessor for any reason before the expiration of the lease agreement.
This Court held that the principal loan extended to respondent was "P1,834,720.00, which was the net amount actually received by [Trojan Metal Industries]."[86]
In other words, the guaranty deposit was offset straightaway from the proceeds of the sale of the equipment to PCI Leasing, thus:
Since it was only on August 27, 1999 when petitioner paid the required bond for the writ of replevin that petitioner could regain possession of the property, and consequently forfeit the guaranty deposit, petitioner concluded that for the period April 8, 1997 to August 27, 1997, the loan still stood at P2,865,070.00.[84]
2. Petitioner then applied 12% interest on the principal, compounded annually, from April 8, 1997 to August 27, 1999 before deducting the guaranty deposit, as follows:

  1. Principal (P2,865,070.00) plus 12% interest from 8 April 1997 to 8 April 1998 = P3,208,878.40
  2. Principal (P3,208,878.40) plus 12% interest from 8 April 1998 to 8 April 1999 = P3,593,943.80
  3. Principal (P3,593,943.80) plus 12% interest from 8 April 1999 to 27 August 1999 = P3,758,182.11 [85]
P3,758,182.11 — P1,030,350.00 =
P2,727,832.11
P2,865,070.00
- P1,030,350.00 = P1,834,720.00
3. Petitioner further applied 12% interest on the outstanding loan from August 27, 1999 to February 10, 2000, when the mortgaged properties were sold to a third party, then deducted partial payments of P1,717,091.00 to get the remaining balance as of February 10, 2000, as follows: 
P2,727,832.11 x 0.12/365 x 163 days[87] = P2,874,014.01 [88] Remaining balance
= P2,874,014.01 -P1,717,091.00 = P1,156,923.01[ 89] 
Deducted from the principal loan of P1,834,720.00 are the loan payments amounting to P1,717,091.00, which leaves a remaining balance of P117,629.00
This Court's December 15, 2010 Decision expressly stated that no interest can be applied prior to the date of demand or on December 8, 1998 because Trojan Metal Industries was not yet in default, viz.: In the absence of stipulation, the applicable interest due on the remaining balance of the loan is the legal rate of 12% per annum, computed from the date [PCI Leasing] sent a demand letter to [Trojan Metal Industries] on 8 December 1998. No interest can be charged prior to this date because [Trojan Metal Industries] was not yet in default prior to 8 December 1998.[90]
4. Thereafter, petitioner plugged in the computed remaining balance to the formula given in this Court's December 15, 2010 Decision, thus:

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE = [P1,156,923.01] + [interest + interest on interest] 
Interest = remaining balance x 12% per annum x no. of years from due date (December 8, 1998 when the demand was made) until date of sale to a third party

Interest = P1,156,923.01 x 0.12/365 x 422 days [91] = P160,511.18[92]

Interest on interest = interest computed as of the filing of the complaint on 7 May 1999 x 12% x no. of years until date of sale to a third party.[93]

Interest on interest = P56,673.38[94] = [P1,156,923.01] + [P56,673.38 + P7,862.85] = P1,221,459.24[95]
The remaining balance of P117,629.00 and the date of sale of the mortgaged property—February 10, 2000—is plugged in the formula: TOTAL AMOUNT DUE = [P117,629.00] + [interest + interest on interest], where



Interest = P117,629.00 x 0.12/365 x 429 days[96] = P16,590.52





Interest on interest = P5,800.88[97] x .12/365 x 279 days[98]

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE
= [P117,629.00] + [P16,590.52 + P532.09]
P134,751.61"[99]
5. Deducting the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to a third party:
P1,221,459.24-P1,025,000.00 = P196,459.24.
Respondent has a payable amountof 196,459.24.
The balance of respondent's loan obligation is then applied against the proceeds in PCI Leasing's hands: 
P1,025,000.00 - P134,751.61 = P890,248.39

PCI Leasing must return to
 respondent the amount of P890,248.39.

Applying folly and faithfully the guidelines laid down in the Court's December 15, 2010 Decision, this Court undertakes this corrective action by setting aside the December 2, 2011 Order of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court, and directing the issuance of a writ of execution against petitioner for P890,248.39 to be paid to respondent Trojan Metal Industries, by way of refund.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals January 14, 2014 Decision and June 2, 2014 Resolution are SET ASIDE. Let a Writ of Execution be issued against petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., now BDO Leasing and Finance, Inc., for the payment to respondent Trojan Metal Industries, Inc., by way of refund, the amount of P890,248.39.

SO ORDERED.

[1] Referred to as "Wilfrido" and "Walfredo" in other parts of the rollo, see pp. 28, 37, and 44. For consistency, this Resolution will use "Walfrido," as used most commonly by the parties and the lower courts.

[2] Rollo, pp. 3-27. Filed under Rule 45.

[3] Id. at 123-135. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 125212, was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Francisco P. Acosta of the Special Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

[4] Id. at 154-155. The Resolution, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 125212, was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Francisco P. Acosta of the Former Special Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

[5] Id. at 87-122.

[6] Id. at 86. The Order, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37559, was penned by Acting Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. of Branch 79, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.

[7] As narrated in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al., 653 Phil. 296 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[8] The case eventually reached this Court in G.R. No. 176381, entitled PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al., 653 Phil. 296 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[9] Rollo, p. 4.

[10] Id.

[11] Id. .

[12] Id. at 124.

[13] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al, 653 Phil. 296, 301 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[14] Id.

[15] Id. at 302.

[16] Rollo, pp. 28-36.

[17] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al., 653 Phil. 296, 302 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[18] Id.

[19] Rollo, pp. 37-43. The Decision was penned by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr.

[20] Id. at 45.

[21] Id. at 44-54. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75855 and promulgated on October 5, 2006, was penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. of the Sixteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

[22] Id. at 53-54. The CA Decision mentioned "P1,030,000.00" instead of P1,030,350.00 and "P2,055,250.00" instead of P2,055,350.00.

[23] Id. at 57.

[24] Id. at 57-72.

[25] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al., 653 Phil. 296 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[26] Id. at 309.

[27] Id. The proceeds of the sale from PCI Leasing (P2,865,070.00) less the guaranty deposit paid by Trojan Metal Industries (P1,030,350.00).

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 309-310.

[30] The exact date of the sale was needed to compute the interest on the remaining balance of the loan.

[31] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al., 653 Phil. 296, 310 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]. M

[32] 304 Phil. 236 (1994) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

[33] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al., 653 Phil. 296, 311-312 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[34] Id. at 312.

[35] Id. at 313.

[36] Rollo, p. 127.

[37] Id. at 73-81 (Compliance for PCI Leasing) and 82-85 (Compliance for Trojan Metal Industries).

[38] Id. at 86. The Order was penned by Acting Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.

[39] Id.

[40] Id. at 127-128.

[41] Id. at 128.

[42] Id. at 87-122.

[43] Id. at 123-135.

[44] Id. at 129-131.

[45] Id. at 134.

[46] Id.

[47] Id. at 136-145.

[48] Id. at 154-155.

[49] Id. at 3.

[50] Id.

[51] Id. at 16.

[52] Id.

[53] Id.

[54] Id. at 16-17.

[55] Id. at 16.

[56] Id. at 166-171. This Court dispensed with the comment of the Dizon Spouses in the Resolution dated March 11, 2015. See rollo, p. 173.

[57] Id. at 168.

[58] Id. at 169.

[59] Id. at 175-188.

[60] Id. at 173-174.

[61] Id. at 176-177.

[62] Id. at 184.

[63] Id. at 179.

[64] Id. at 184.

[65] Id. at 129.

[66] Id. at 130.

[67] Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

[68] King Integrated Security Services Inc. v. Gatan, 453 Phil. 293 (2003) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division], citing abular v. CA, 204 Phil. 654 (1982) [Per J. De Castro, Second Division].

[69] Provincial Government of Aurora vMarco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015 11 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

[70] 697 Phil. 619(2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

[71] Id. at 629, citing Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez, 582 Phil 357 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

[72] Rollo, p. 86.

[73] Id. at 16.

[74] Id.

[75] Id. at 86.

[76] Id. at 13.

[77] Sanchez v. Zosa, 160-A Phil. 813, 819 (1975) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].

[78] Chiquita Brands, Inc. v. Omelio, G.R. No. 189102, June 7, 2017 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; UPSI Property Holdings, Inc. v. Diesel Construction Co., Inc., 740 Phil. 650 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]; and Development Bank of the Phils. v. Union Bank of the Philippines, 464 Phil. 161 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

[79] Magallanes v. Sun Yat Sen Elementary School, 566 Phil. 77, 86 (2008) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division].

[80] Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 207 Phil. 758 (1983) [Per J. Plana, First Division].

[81] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al., 653 Phil. 296, 313 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[82] Id. at 311-312.

[83] Rollo, p. 67.

[84] Id. at 76-77.
[85] Id. at 77-78.

[86] Id.

[87] This should be 167 days: From August 27, 1999 to February 10, 2000.

[88] Rollo, p. 78.

[89] Id.

[90] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al., 653 Phil. 296 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[91] This should be 429 days: From December 8, 1998 to February 10, 2000.

[92] Rollo, p. 79.

[93] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Trojan Metal Industries Incorporated, et al., 653 Phil. 296, 311-312 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[94] Interest computed as of the filing of the complaint on May 7, 1999. = P1,156,923.01 x 0.12/365 x 149 (December 8, 1998 to May 7, 1999). = P56,673.38 (Rollo, p. 79).

[95] Rollo, p. 79.

[96] From December 8, 1998 to February 10, 2000.

[97] Interest computed as of the filing of the complaint on May 7, 1999.

= P117,629 x 0.12/365 x 150 (December 8, 1998 to May 7, 1999).
= P5,800.88.

[98] From May 7, 1999 to February 10, 2000.

[99] Rollo, p. 79.

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