G.R. No. 237079. November 07, 2018

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 237079, November 07, 2018 ] COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER V. OMYA CHEMICAL MERCHANTS, INC., RESPONDENT.

The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc will not entertain appeals assailing interlocutory orders issued by the Court of Tax Appeals in Division, unless it is alleged that "there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and where it can be shown that the court acted without, in excess, or with such grave abuse of discretion that such action ousts it of jurisdiction."[1]

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] assailing the August 30, 2016[3] and January 12, 2017[4] Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division in C.T.A. Case No. 9047, and the June 7, 2017[5] and January 11, 2018[6] Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals En Bane in CTA EB NO. 1593.[7] The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division declared as void the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner)’s assessment of Omya Chemical Merchants, Inc. (Omya)'s deficiency income tax, value-added tax, and expanded withholding tax.[8] The Court of Tax Appeals En Bane dismissed its appeal on the ground of prematurity.[9]

On February 16, 2012, the Revenue District Office No. 50 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Bureau) issued Letter of Authority No. LOA-050-2012-00000036 [SN: eLA201000078095] for the examination of Omya's "books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the period January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010."[10] Omya received the Letter of Authority on February 20, 2012.[11]

On March 1, 2012, Omya submitted documents to the Bureau to comply with the requirements in the Letter of Authority. It submitted additional documents to the Bureau on March 30, 2012 and May 15, 2012.[12]

In its August 23, 2012 Notice of Informal Conference, the Revenue District Office No. 50 found Omya liable for deficiency taxes worth P10,097,397.26. Omya, after receiving the Notice on August 30, 2012, filed its Reply on November 13, 2012.[13]On September 26, 2013, Omya, represented by its Treasurer Purificacion S. Samson (Samson), executed a Waiver of the Defense of Prescription Under the Statute of Limitations of the National Internal Revenue Code (Waiver). Its execution was witnessed by a Bureau representative,. Revenue Officer Ruby S. Munion, and Omya's representative, Junior Accountant Crystal Mae L. Lapitan (Lapitan). Revenue District Officer Ricardo B. Espiritu accepted the waiver that same day. On October 1, 2013, Omya, through Lapitan, received the accepted Waiver.[14] It read:
WAIVER OF THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION UNDER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

I, PURIFICACION S. SAMSON, Treasurer of OMYA CHEMICAL MERCHANTS INC., requests] for the approval by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for more time to submit the documents required in connection with the investigation/reinvestigation/re-evaluation/collection enforcement of my/its All Internal Revenue Tax Liabilities for the year 2010. I/We hereby waive the defense of prescription under the statute of limitations prescribed in Sections 203 & 222, and other related provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, and consent to the assessment and/or collection of tax or taxes of said year which may be found due after investigation/reinvestigation/re-evaluation at any time before or after the lapse of the period of limitations fixed by said sections of National Internal Revenue Code but not later than July 31,2014.
The intent and purpose of this waiver is to afford the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue ample time to carefully consider the legal and/or factual questions involved in the determination of the aforesaid tax liabilities. It is understood, however, that the undersigned taxpayer/taxpayer represented below, by the execution of this waiver, neither admits in advance the correctness of the assessment/assessments which may be made for the year above-mentioned nor waives the right to use any legal remedies accorded by law to secure a credit or refund of such tax that may have been paid for the same year pursuant to the provisions of Sections 204 and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

The period so stated herein may be extended by subsequent waiver in accordance with existing rules and regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.[15](Emphasis in the original)
On July 8, 2014, the Bureau, in its Preliminary Assessment Notice with Details of Discrepancies, found Omya liable in the amount of P5,089,874.82, representing deficiency taxes in 2010.[16] Omya filed its Reply on July 23, 2014 asking for a reinvestigation of its alleged tax liabilities.[17]

In its July 25, 2014 Formal Assessment Notice with Details of Discrepancies, the Bureau ordered Omya to pay P5,132,892.82, representing its deficiency taxes for 2010.[18]

On August 27, 2014, Omya protested the Formal Assessment Notice and filed a Request for Reinvestigation.[19] It requested the cancellation and withdrawal of its deficiency income tax, value-added tax, expanded withholding tax, final withholding tax, documentary stamp tax, final tax withholding, and compromise penalty for 2010.[20]

Omya later filed before the Court of Tax Appeals a Petition for Review questioning the Formal Assessment Notice.[21] It also filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing, which prayed that the Court of Tax Appeals first resolve the issue of prescription.[22] This motion was granted on September 3, 2015.[23]

Omya argued that the Commissioner's right to assess income tax, value-added tax, and expanded withholding tax for 2010 already expired because the Commissioner issued the Formal Assessment Notice only on July 25, 2014.[24] It also contended that the Waiver is void for failure to strictly comply with the requirements of a valid waiver under Section 222(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 20-90, in relation to Revenue Delegation Authority Order No. 05-01.[25]

Omya argued that the Waiver was void because: (1) it did not issue a notarized written authority allowing Samson to sign the waiver for the company; (2) it failed to state the kind and amount of tax involved; (3) it merely had Omya's request for additional time to submit its requirements, whereas a proper waiver must have the Commissioner's approval of the taxpayer's request for reinvestigation and/or reconsideration of its pending internal revenue case; and (4) the notary public was not commissioned in Makati City, where the Waiver was notarized, for 2012 to 2013 and 2013 to 2014.[26]

The Commissioner countered that the Waiver was valid.[27] Further, assuming that it was invalid, the 10-year prescriptive period will apply to final withholding tax and final withholding on value-added tax under Section 222(A) of the National Internal Revenue Code.[28]

On August 30, 2016, the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division issued a Resolution[29] declaring the assessment of Omya's deficiency income tax, value-added tax, and expanded withholding tax for 2010 void.[30] It held that the issuance of the Formal Assessment Notice on July 25, 2014, received by Omya on July 28, 2014, was beyond the prescriptive period with no waiver from Omya.[31] It presented the table that showed the last day of filing of returns for income tax, value-added tax, and expanded withholding tax, as well as the three-year prescriptive period:

Tax Returns and Periods for CY 2010
Due Date for Filing of Return
Date of Filing of Petitioner's Return
Last Day for Issuance of BIR's Deficiency Assessment
Income Tax-CY2010
April 15,2011
April 15, 2011
April 15, 2014
VAT-1 st Quarter
April 25, 2010
April 23, 2010
April 25, 2013
VAT-2 nd Quarter
July 25, 2010
July 23, 2010
July 25, 2013
VAT-3 rd Quarter
October 25, 2010
October 22, 2010
October 25, 2013
VAT-4 th Quarter
January 25, 2011
January 25, 2011
January 25, 2014
EWT - January
February 10,2010
February 10,2010
February 10, 2013
EWT - February
March 10, 2010
March 10,2010
March 10,2013
EWT - March
April 10, 2010
April 12, 2010
April 12, 2013
EWT-April
May 10, 2010
May 7, 2010
May 10, 2013
EWT-May
June 10,2010
June 10, 2010
June 10, 2013
EWT-June
July 10,2010
July 12, 2010
July 12, 2013
EWT-July
August 10,2010
August 10,2010
August 10,2013
EWT - August
September 10,2010
September 9,2010
September 10, 2013
EWT - September
October 10, 2010
October 8, 2010
October 10, 2013
EWT-October
November 10, 2010
November 10, 2010
November 10, 2013
EWT - November
December 10,2010
December 10, 2010
December 10, 2013
EWT -December
January 15, 2011
January 17, 2011
January 17, 2014 [32]

The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division found that the Waiver was executed after the issuance of Revenue Delegation Authority Order No. 05-01, which revised the format in Revenue Memorandum Order No. 20-90, and Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 29-12, which clarified that the format prescribed in it should not be used anymore. Thus, it held that the Waiver complied with the required format. However, it still declared the Waiver as void, since there was no notarized written authority from Omya and the notary public was not commissioned where the waiver was notarized.[33]

The dispositive portion of the August 30, 2016 Resolution provided:
WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion praying that the assessment for deficiency income tax, [value-added tax], and [expanded withholding tax] for calendar year 2010 be declared void is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Formal Assessment Notice for calendar year 2010 against petitioner is declared void but only as to the alleged deficiency income tax, [value-added tax] and [expanded withholding tax].

Let this case be set for trial on the remaining deficiency tax assessments for calendar year 2010.

SO ORDERED.[34] (Emphasis in the original)
The Commissioner moved for reconsideration and cited the circumstances that justified the assumption that Samson was authorized by Omya to sign the Waiver on its behalf:
  1. Ms. Purification Samson (Ms. Samson) is the Head of Finance and Controlling of [Omya] since January 1, 2010. As such, she is
  2. authorized by [Omya] to transact with the [Bureau] for and [on] behalf of the corporation;
  3.  Ms. Samson is the one who received the Letter of Authority (LOA) from the [Bureau] on February 20, 2012;
  4. On three (3) occasions following the receipt of the [Letter of Authority], she partially submitted documents and schedules to the [Bureau] examiner. She is the one who is in constant communication with the [Bureau] regarding [Omya's] audit. She even signed letters/communications to the [Bureau] for and [on] behalf of [Omya] in her capacity as Finance Manager;
  5. Ms. Samson signed the waiver in her capacity as Treasurer of [Omya];
  6. She continued to sign several letters/communications addressed to the [Bureau] on different occasions after the execution of the waiver. [Omya] still continue [s] dealing with [the Commissioner] on the strength of the waiver without questioning the authority of Ms. Purificacion Samson;
  7. During the investigation conducted by the [Bureau], [Omya] enjoyed the benefit of submitting documents to substantiate its claims, contestf,] and negotiate the assessment against it and was able to postpone the payment of taxes by virtue of the waiver executed by Ms. Samson;
  8. It is only during the time that [Omya] filed a protest letter against the Formal Assessment Notice (FAN) issued by the [Commissioner] assessing them of their deficiency taxes that they started to refute the authority of Ms. Samson to sign the waiver for and [on] behalf of the corporation; and
  9. Clearly, it becomes [Omya's] defense to question the authority of Ms. Samson after an assessment was issued against its favor in order to avoid the payment of deficiency taxes.[35]
The Commissioner also averred that it was Omya that had the Waiver notarized. The Commissioner, who just received it, cannot be faulted. Nonetheless, assuming that it was not duly notarized, the Waiver will still remain valid and binding between the Commissioner and Omya.[36]

In its January 12, 2017 Resolution,[37] the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division denied the Commissioner's Motion.[38] It held:
The absence of a notarized written authority and the lack of notarization are, therefore, fatal to the validity of the waiver. Thus, the position of Ms. Samson as Finance Manager; her act of receiving the [Letter of Authority] from the [Bureau] and submitting documents and schedules to the [Bureau] examiner; and her signing of letters/communications to the [Bureau] for and [on] behalf of [Omya] in her capacity as Finance Manager, will not, however, automatically cloth Ms. Samson the authority to execute or sign the waiver [on] behalf of [Omya] absent any specific notarized written authority from [Omya]. Similarly, [the Commissioner's] claim that the waiver, although unnotarized, is still valid and binding between the parties is erroneous as the requirement of notarization is expressly mandated under [RMO No. 20-90, as amended by RDAO No. 05-01] in order for the waiver to be valid.[39]

Its dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration (of the Resolution dated 30 August 2016) is DENIED for lack of merit.

Let this case be set for hearing on the presentation of petitioner's evidence on the remaining deficiency tax assessments for the taxable year 2010.
SO ORDERED.[40] (Emphasis in the original)
On January 30, 2017, the Commissioner filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Tax Appeals En Bane, assailing the August 30, 2016 and January 12, 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals Second Division.[41]

In its June 7, 2017 Resolution,[42] the Court of Tax Appeals En Bane dismissed the Commissioner's Petition on the ground of prematurity.[43] It held that the Division's Resolutions were interlocutory orders that cannot be appealed before it:[44]
Clearly, the appealed twin Resolutions did not fully and finally dispose of the case as in fact trial was ordered to determine the propriety of the remaining assessments for deficiency [final withholding tax], [documentary stamp tax,] and [final withholding on value-added tax].
In other words, there was yet no judgment rendered in the case that could be elevated on appeal to the Court En Bane. Trial is still necessary for the Court to rule on the merit of the other relief sought by respondent. Clearly[,] the assailed twin Resolutions are of interlocutory nature and cannot be challenged by an appeal.[45] (Emphasis in the original)
Its dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is hereby DISMISSED on ground of prematurity.
SO ORDERED.[46](Emphasis in the original)
The Commissioner moved for reconsideration and pointed out that since the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division declared as void the assessment of Omya's deficiency income tax, value-added tax, and expanded withholding tax, its "ruling is effectively an adjudication on the merits insofar as the said items of the assessment are concerned."[47] The Commissioner maintained that Samson validly executed the Waiver on behalf of Omya, and the unnotarized waiver was valid between them.[48]

In its January 11, 2018 Resolution,[49] the Court of Tax Appeals En Bane denied the Commissioner's Motion, affirming its June 7, 2017 Resolution.[50] It held that the Appeal was procedurally infirm for assailing interlocutory orders, and thus, must be dismissed in accordance with Section l(i), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.[51]

The dispositive portion of its January 11, 2018 Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 18, 2017, filed by petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is DENIED, for lack of merit. The challenged Resolution of June 7, 2017 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[52] (Emphasis in the original)
On March 15, 2018, the Commissioner filed a Petition for Review[53] before this Court. Petitioner prays that the August 30, 2016 and January 12, 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division, as well as the June 7, 2017 and January 11, 2018 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals En Bane, be reversed and set aside.[54]

Petitioner argues that when the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division issued the assailed Resolutions, it conclusively declared that petitioner can no longer collect respondent's tax deficiencies for 2010. This is a separate judgment which ultimately disposed of the prescription issue. Petitioner is thus constrained to appeal the judgment. Otherwise, the ruling on the prescription would be final and executory.[55]

On the merits of the case, petitioner reiterates that the Waiver was validly executed by Samson, who was authorized to sign for respondent.[56] Moreover, petitioner should not be faulted for the defect in the Waiver's notarization since it was respondent which facilitated it.[57]

In its Comment,[58] respondent counters that the assailed Resolutions "are merely interlocutory orders because they leave something more for the Court to do."[59] The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division still has to determine petitioner's assessment of respondent's alleged final withholding tax, documentary stamp tax, and final value-added tax withholding deficiencies.

Thus, the Resolutions cannot be the subject of appeal. If petitioner wants to assail the interlocutory orders, petitioner should file a Petition for Certiorari or wait for the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division's Resolution on the remaining tax deficiencies, then elevate the case to the Court of Tax Appeals En Bane via a Petition for Review.[60]

Respondent also insists that the Waiver executed by Samson on respondent's behalf is void. It argues that the Waiver did not strictly comply with the requirements laid down in Revenue Memorandum Order No. 20-90 and Revenue Delegation Authority Order No. 05-01. Moreover, Samson had no apparent authority to execute the Waiver nor was her execution ratified by respondent. Finally, the Waiver was invalidly notarized.[61]

This Court resolves the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the assailed Resolutions were interlocutory orders.
Petitioner asserts that the August 30, 2016 and January 12, 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division are separate judgments that conclusively disposed of the issue of prescription. The Division's ruling on the prescription issue would have been final and executory if petitioner will not be allowed to appeal it before the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.

Petitioner's contention has no merit.

Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc is provided under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125,[62] as amended,[63] which states:
SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. — No civil proceeding involving matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc.[64] (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, Rule 8, Section 4, Paragraph (b) of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals provides:

RULES 8

Procedure in Civil Cases
SEC. 4. Where to Appeal; Mode of Appeal. — ...

(b) An appeal from a decision or resolution of the Court in Division on a motion for reconsideration or new trial shall be taken to the Court by petition for review as provided in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court en bane shall act on the appeal.  (Emphasis supplied)
Under Rule 43, Section 1 of the Rules of Court:

RULE 43

Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the
Court of Appeals
SECTION 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc will only entertain petitioner's appeal if the assailed judgment is final. People v. Escobar[65] explained the concept of final judgments and distinguished it from interlocutory orders:
... A final judgment "leaves nothing else to be done" because the period to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has already ruled on the case. In contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if, between the beginning and the termination of a case, the court decides on a point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the entire controversy.[66] (Citations omitted)
A thorough discussion on the difference between a final judgment and an interlocutory order is provided in Santos v. People, et al. :[67]

The Court distinguishes final judgments and orders from interlocutory orders in this wise:
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "(o)nly final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal[."] Interlocutory or incidental judgments or orders do not stay the progress of an action nor are they subject of appeal "until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other[."] The test to determine whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is this: "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final [."] A court order is final in character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, such that no further questions can come before the court except the execution of the order. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination. The order or judgment may validly refer to the entire controversy or to some definite and separate branch thereof. "In the absence of a statutory definition, a final judgment, order or decree has been held to be ... one that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside." The central point to consider is, therefore, the effects of the order on the rights of the parties. A court order, on the other hand, is merely interlocutory in character if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. The word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy."
In other words, after a final order or judgment, the court should have nothing more to do in respect of the relative rights of the parties to the case. Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions in determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory."[68] (Citations omitted)

Matute v. Court of Appeals[69] explained why an interlocutory order cannot be the made the subject of appeal:
It is settled that an "interlocutory order or decree made in the progress of a case is always under the control of the court until the final decision of the suit, and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment ...." Of similar import is the ruling of this Court declaring that "it is rudimentary that such (interlocutory) orders are subject to change in the discretion of the court.["] Moreover, one of the inherent powers of the court is "To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice." In the language of Chief Justice Moran, paraphrasing the ruling in Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, "since judges are human, susceptible to. mistakes, and are bound to administer justice in accordance with law, they are given the inherent power of amending their orders or judgments so as to make them conformable to law and justice, and they can do so before they lose their jurisdiction of the case, that is before the time to appeal has expired and no appeal has been perfected." And in the abovecited Veluz case, this Court held that "If the trial court should discover or be convinced that it had committed an error in its judgment, or had done an injustice, before the same has become final, it may, upon its own motion or upon a motion of the parties, correct such error in order to do justice between the parties. ... It would seem to be the very height of absurdity to prohibit a trial judge from correcting an error, mistake, or injustice which is called to his attention before he has lost control of his judgment."[70] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Further, this Court held in Santos that interlocutory orders are barred from being appealed to avoid multiplicity of appeals:
Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and not from an interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the case would necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him, and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.[71] (Citation omitted)
Here, the main issue before the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division is the liability of respondent on its alleged deficiency taxes. When it issued the assailed Resolutions, it only dealt with the issue of prescription. Upon finding that petitioner's assessment of respondent's deficiency income tax, value-added tax, and expanded withholding tax for 2010 was void, it set the case for trial on the other deficiency tax assessments. Clearly, the Court of Tax Appeals did not "make a final disposition of the merits of the main controversy or cause of action[.]"[72] It has yet to determine respondent's liability on its deficiency final withholding tax, documentary stamp tax, and final tax withholding. Thus, no other conclusion can be reached than that the August 30, 2016 and January 12, 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division are interlocutory orders, which cannot be appealed.

Moreover, allowing the appeal of the interlocutory orders before the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc may result to multiple appeals, if either party subsequently elevates the judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division on the remaining tax deficiencies. In prosecuting cases, this Court reminds litigants of its ruling in E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Director Francisco, et al.:[73]
Judicial economy, or the goal to have cases prosecuted with the least cost to the parties, requires that unnecessary or frivolous reviews of orders by the trial court, which facilitate the resolution of the main merits of the case, be reviewed together with the main merits of the case. After all, it would be more efficient for an appellate court to review a case in its entire context when the case is finally disposed.[74] (Citation omitted)
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The June 7, 2017 and January 11, 2018 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals En Bane are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (Gesmundo and Reyes, J., Jr., JJ., on wellness leave.)

[1] E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Director Francisco, et al, 794 Phil. 97, 113 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

[2] Rollo, pp. 11-40.

[3] Id. at 64-71. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr. (Chair) and concurred in by Associate Justices Caesar A. Casanova and Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas.

[4] Id. at 73-79. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr. (Chair) and concurred in by Associate Justices Caesar A. Casanova and Catherine T. Manahan.

[5] Id. at 45-53. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino and concurred in by Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario, Associate Justices Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, Ma. Belen Ringpis- Liban, and Catherine T. Manahan of the Court of Tax Appeals, Quezon City.

[6] Id. at 55—59. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino and concurred in by Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario and Associate Justices Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, Ma. Belen Ringpis-Liban, and Catherine T. Manahan of the Court of Tax Appeals, Quezon City. Presiding Justice Del Rosario penned a Concurring Opinion (Id. at 60-62).

[7] Id. at 31, Petition for Review.

[8] Id. at 71, Court of Tax Appeals Second Division Resolution dated August 30,2016.

[9] Id. at 53.

[10] Id. at 65.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 13-14.

[13] Id. at 14 and 65.

[14] Id. at 14-15 and 27-28.

[15] Id. at 14-15.

[16] Id. at 15 and 65.

[17] Id. at 16 and 65.

[18] Id. at 17 and 66.

[19] Id. at 66.

[20] Id. at 18.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id. at 64.

[24] Id. at 66.

[25] Id. at 66 and 110.

[26] Id. at 66-67.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 64-71.

[30] Id. at 71.

[31] Id. at 68.

[32] Id.

[33] Id. at 69-70.

[34] Id. at 71.

[35] Id. at 74-75.

[36] Id. at 75.

[37] Id. at 73-Id. at 79.

[38] Id. at 73-79.

[39] Id. at 78.

[40] Id. at 79.

[41] Id. at 45, Court of Tax Appeals En Bane Resolution dated June 7, 2017

[42] Id. at 45-53.

[43] Id. at 53.

[44] Id. at 50-53.

[45] Id. at 50.

[46] Id. at 53.

[47] Id. at 56.

[48] Id.

[49] Id. at 55-59.

[50] Id. at 59.

[51] Id. at 58.

[52] Id. at 59.

[53] Id. at 11-35.

[54] Id. at 31.

[55] Id. at 20-22.

[56] Id. at 27.

[57] Id. at 28.

[58] Id. at 202-226.

[59] Id. at 206.

[60] Id. at 206-210.

[61] Id. at 210-223.

[62] An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals (1954).

[63] Republic Act No. 9282 (2004).

[64] Republic Act No. 9282 (2004), sec. 11.

[65] G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017, 833 SCRA 180 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

[66] Id. at 201-202.

[67] 585 Phil. 337 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

[68]  Id. at 350-351.

[69] No. L-26751, No. L-26085, and No. L-26106, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768 [Per J. Castro, En Banc].

[70] Id. at 811-812.

[71] Santos v. People, et al, 585 Phil. 337, 352 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

[72] E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Director Francisco, et al, 794 Phil. 97, 113 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

[73] 794 Phil. 97 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

[74]  Id. at 113-114.