G.R. No. 229167, March 03, 2019
THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 229167, March 03, 2019 ] GEMMA PRADO, PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER DOÑA MONSERRAT LOPEZ EXTENSION HIGH SCHOOL, BRGY. HAWAIIAN, SILAY CITY VS. ROSANNA BUISON.This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]assails the April 28, 2016 Decision[2] and the October 26, 2016 Amended Decision[3] rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 08456.
This case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Rosanna Buison (respondent) against Gemma Prado (petitioner).
Petitioner was a public school teacher and the tutor of respondent's daughter. As such, during tutoring sessions, the former had the liberty t d roam around the latter's house.[4]
Sometime in September 2005, respondent discovered that thee (3) checks in her name and her dollar account passbook were missing. She sought the cancellation of said checks only to find out that the amounts represented by two of them had already been appropriated by someone else. Similarly, when she checked her dollar account, she discovered that her savings therein, in the amount of $1,385.00, had been withdrawn. This prompted respondent to seek police assistance, which ultimately led to an entrapment operation culminating in petitioner's arrest.[5]
On December 13, 2006, Atty. Victoriano B. Tirol, Jr. (Regional Director Tirol) of the Department of Education (DepEd) Region VI issued a Formal Charge/Order[6] in relation to the above-narrated act. Finding a prima facie case for Dishonesty and Misconduct against petitioner, Regional Director Tirol required her to file an Answer with supporting documents and affidavits, within five (5) days from receipt of the charge.
In compliance with the aforesaid directive, petitioner filed her Answer[7] dated March 26, 2007, contending that the act being imputed to her was not connected to the performance of her official duties as a public employee. She also asserted that the charge was prematurely filed. According to her, the pendency of a criminal case for the same act, which was also instituted by respondent, proscribed the institution of administrative proceedings.
After a perusal of petitioner's Answer, Regional Director Tirol ordered the conduct of a Formal Investigation so that the case could be judiciously decided.[8] However, during a preliminary conference held on September 18, 2007, petitioner and respondent agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of position papers and the evidence presented before the DepEd Region VI.[9]In her Position Paper,[10] petitioner maintained that the administrative case could not prosper, as the act complained of was not connected to the performance of her official functions. Additionally, she argued that when the act committed is unrelated to the official duties of the public officer, an administrative proceeding may be instituted only after conviction is decreed by final judgment in a criminal case.
On March 3, 2008, Regional Director Tirol issued a Resolution[11] finding petitioner guilty of the charges against her and meting out the penalty of dismissal. Finding respondent's evidence more credible, Regional Director Tirol ruled that petitioner stole respondent's checks and dollar passbook. He also ruled that petitioner could be held administratively liable regardless of whether the act was done in the performance of her duties as a public school teacher.
Regional Director Tirol's resolution was later confirmed by the DepEd Secretary through an Order[12] dated November 6, 2008 (the November 6, 2008 Order).
Aggrieved, petitioner challenged the November 6, 2008 Order before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), contending that the DepEd Region VI committed procedural irregularities in arriving at its decision to dismiss her.[13]
On March 13, 2012, the CSC, through Decision No. 120162,[14] granted petitioner's appeal and remanded the case to DepEd Region VI for the conduct of a preliminary investigation. The CSC opined that petitioner was deprived of her right to procedural due process since she was not given the opportunity to submit evidence to refute the complaint against her. Thus, the November 6, 2008 Order was effectively set aside.
Consequently, on May 18, 2012, the DepEd Region VI directed the Office of the Schools Division Superintendent of Silay City to conduct a fact-finding/preliminary investigation relative to respondent's complaint][15] This allowed petitioner to file a counter-affidavit dated June 19, 2012, which she admitted to tutoring respondent's daughter, but denied respondent's checks and dollar passbook.[16]
Later, the DepEd Region VI issued a Formal Charge[17] dated July 19, 2012 against petitioner, who was thereby asked to elect whether she wanted to avail of a Formal Investigation.
On August 14, 2012, petitioner filed her Answer,[18] where she elected that a Formal Investigation and hearing be conducted in case the DepEd Region VI found her defense unsatisfactory.
Dissatisfied with the pace of the DepEd's actions, petitioner sought exoneration before the CSC through a motion[19] dated April 30, 2013. arguing that the DepEd had taken no action in the eight (8) months that had elapsed since she filed her answer, petitioner contended that the charges against her must be vacated and set aside. The contention was based on Paragraph 3, Section 66, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), which gives the CSC authority to declare the exoneration of the respondent in a remanded administrative case upon motion duly filed by the latter.
On October 30, 2013, the CSC granted petitioner's motion through Decision No. 131064.[20] Noting that the DepEd Region VI failed to conduct a preliminary investigation as required by the March 13, 2012 Decision, the CSC exonerated petitioner, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion to Vacate and Set Aside the Appealed Decision and Declare Respondent-Appellant Exonerated of the Charges, of Gemma Prado, Public School Teacher, Doña [Monserrat] Lopez Extension High School, Silay City, is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated November 6, 2008 of former Department of Education (DepEd) Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, confirming the Resolution dated March 3, 2008 of Atty. Victoriano B. Tirol, Regional Director, DepEd-Region VI, Iloilo City, finding Prado guilty of Misconduct and Dishonesty and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service, and the Resolution dated August 20, 2010 of DepEd Secretary Br. Armin A. Luistro, denying her motion for reconsideration, are hereby SET ASIDE. Gemma Prado is EXONERATED of the above-mentioned charges. She shall be reinstated to her former position and shall be paid her back salaries and other benefits corresponding to the period of her illegal termination.[21]Disgruntled, the DepEd filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] dated November 20, 2013.
On January 24, 2014, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 1400103[23] (the January 24, 2014 Resolution). Realizing that a preliminary investigation had in fact been conducted, the CSC reversed itself and effectively reinstated the November 6, 2008 Order, through which the dismissal of petitioner had previously been decreed. The fallo of the January 24, 2014 Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of Br. Armin A. Luistro, Secretary, Department of Education (DepEd) is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Civil Service Commission (CSC) Decision No. 13-1064 dated October 30, 2013 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated November 6, 2008 of then DepEd Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, confirming the Resolution dated March 3, 2008 of Atty. Victoriano B. Tirol, Regional Director, DepED-Region VI, Iloilo City, finding Gemma Prado, Public School Teacher, Doña Monserrat Lopez Extension High School, Silay City, guilty of Misconduct and Dishonesty and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service, is hereby REINSTATED.[24]This caused petitioner to elevate her case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43, arguing that she was dismissed without due process.
On April 28, 2016, the CA partially granted petitioner's appeal. While the appellate court ruled that the CSC erred in reinstating the November 6, 2008 Order, it was held that petitioner was not denied due process. The CA noted that the disciplining authority directed the conduct of a fact-finding/preliminary investigation, during which petitioner was allowed to explain her side.[25] Additionally, a Formal Charge was issued, as required by the RRACCS. Lastly, the appellate court held that petitioner's active participation in the administrative investigation meant that she was afforded every opportunity to defend herself. The decretal part of the CA's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The CSC Resolution No. 1400103 dated January 24, 2014 and the CSC Resolution No. 1400680 dated May 6, 2014 rendered by the Civil Service Commission is partly MODIFIED in that the part reinstating the Order dated November 6, 2008 of then DepEd Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, which confirmed the Resolution dated March 3, 2008 of the DepEd - Region VI of Iloilo City is DELETED.Thereafter, petitioner moved that the CA reconsider its April 28, 2016 Decision. While the appellate court refused to do so, it rendered an amended decision, deleting the order to promptly resolve petitioner's case, viz.:
The Regional Director of the Department of Education - Region VI ORDERED to resolve the administrative complaint filed by Rosanna Buison against Gemma Prado within thirty (30) days from the time the case is submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.[26]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED in that the portion ordering the Department of Education to resolve the administrative complaint within thirty days is DELETED. This Court's Decision dated April 28, 2016 is hereby AMENDED to read:Hence, the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The CSC Resolution No. 1400103 dated January 24, 2014 and the CSC Resolution No. 1400680 dated May 6, 2014 rendered by the Civil Service Commission is partly MODIFIED in that the part reinstating the Order dated November 6, 2008 of then DepEd Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, which confirmed the Resolution dated March 3, 2008 of the DepEd - Region VI of Iloilo City is DELETED.SO ORDERED.[27]
SO ORDERED.
In the main, petitioner argued that she was denied due process. She lamented on the failure of the disciplining authority, the DepEd in this case, to conduct a Formal Investigation and create a Formal Investigation Committee. According to her, this omission amounted to a denial of due process, which therefore entitles her to exoneration.[28]
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINSTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HER[29]
The petition lacks merit.
The petition was filed out of time
At the outset, the Court finds that the instant petition was filed out of time. In this regard, petitioner had until January 6, 2017 to file the instant petition. However, she did so only on January 9, 2017.
Enshrined is the rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a component of due process. It is but a mere statutory privilege.[30] Accordingly, appeals must be exercised in the manner and within the period provided for by law.[31] Corollarily, failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed reglementary period renders the challenged judgment final and executory.[32] Thus, a belatedly filed appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter said judgment.[33]
Under the rules, a petition for review on certiorari must be filed within fifteen (15) days, counted from receipt of the resolution denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.[34]
Here, petitioner, on November 22, 2016, received the CA's Resolution denying her motion for reconsideration. Hence, she had until December 7, 2016 to file her petition for review on certiorari. However, instead of doing so, petitioner, on the latter date, filed a motion for extension of time asking for an additional thirty (30) days, counted from the former date, within which to file said petition. The Court granted the motion, thus giving petitioner until January 6, 2017 to file the instant appeal. Nevertheless, despite the extended reglementary period, petitioner still failed to file her petition on time.
Petitioner attributed her failure to timely file the instant petition to her own honest mistake in counting the reglementary period. Admitting fault, she prayed that the Court brush aside technicalities to allow her to establish the merits of her defense, arguing that she should not arbitrarily be stripped of her job as a public school teacher due to a mere procedural lapse.
The Court is not persuaded.
While there have been instances when the rules governing reglementary periods have been relaxed, case law provides that courts may do so only in exceptional cases and for the most compelling reasons,[35] which must be alleged and proved by the party who has failed to timely file his! or her appeal.[36] In other words, the general rule is that appeals must be filed on time, while the exception is that belatedly filed appeals may be given due course only when meritorious grounds exist to justify such late filing.
It is quite obvious that petitioner's proffered excuse, mere oversight, falls short of the standard provided by jurisprudence. Litigants and their counsels have the responsibility to diligently monitor the status of their cases.[37] Thus, petitioner was charged with the duty to keep count of the days that made up the reglementary period, and ultimately to ensure that the instant petition would be filed on time. Failing in such duty, petitioner must be held to suffer the consequences of her mistake.
More, to entertain the instant appeal despite its belated filing would create troublesome precedent that effectively does away with the purpose of the rules on reglementary periods. Like all procedural rules, reglementary periods were designed "to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation."[38] If petitioner's oversight were accepted as a valid excuse, litigants would in effect be permitted, if not encouraged, to file their pleadings out of time—they could easily justify belated filing through the simple expedient of invoking their own "honest mistakes." This would not only render nugatory the reglementary periods set forth in the rules, but also contribute to the already lethargic pace with which courts dispose of cases.
Therefore, on this score alone, the petition's dismissal is in order.
Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, the same result would obtain if the Court were to entertain the merits of petitioner's appeal.
No denial of due process
Due process, in its most basic sense, is "law which hears before it condemns."[39] In administrative cases, the requirement of due process is satisfied when the parties are given notice and a real opportunity to be heard.[40] It is less stringent than due process in judicial proceedings, where a formal trial-type hearing and the chance to cross-examine witnesses are indispensable.[41] Thus, although administrative agencies are not exempt from observing the elementary principles of due process, parties to administrative investigations cannot expect to enjoy the same procedure afforded by the courts to litigants.
The primary cardinal precepts of due process in administrative proceedings were first spelled-out with particularity in 1940, when the Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, decided the seminal case of Ang Tibay, represented by Toribio Teodoro, manager and proprietor, and National Workers' Brotherhood v. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc.[42] Since then, jurisprudence has synthesized these precepts into four (4) rudimentary requirements, viz.:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights;If an administrative body renders a decision without adhering to the above requirements, that decision is void ab initio.[44] The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue, which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.[45] Hence, the prevailing rule is that where a party's right to due process is ignored in a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding, the resulting decision or order is void on the ground that the agency concerned lacked jurisdiction.[46]
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[43]
On the strength of this pronouncement, petitioner prayed that the proceedings before the DepEd and the CSC be vacated and set aside. Pointing to the former agency's failure to conduct a Formal Investigation and create a Formal Investigation Committee within the period provided by the RRACCS, she argued that the CA erred in ruling that her right to due process was respected.[47]
The contention is without merit.
After a meticulous scrutiny of the record, the Court finds that petitioner was never denied due process. Quite the contrary, the DepEd and the CSC have adequately afforded her the opportunity to explain her side at every stage of the administrative investigation held thus far.
Preliminarily, it must be remembered that no judgment or final order has yet been handed down in petitioner's case. When the CA rendered the herein challenged decision, it effectively reinstated the administrative investigation against her, which was previously discontinued by the CSC through its January 24, 2014 Resolution. Said resolution decreed petitioner's dismissal from the service, notwithstanding the fact that no Formal Investigation was conducted by the DepEd, as required by the RRACCS.
The stages of an administrative proceeding, as outlined in the RRACSS, are:
First, the Complaint. The complaint initiates administrative case$ against employees of the civil service.[48] Except when otherwise provided for by law, an administrative complaint may be filed at anytime with the CSC, or the proper heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities.[49]Going back to the main issue, the Court cannot agree with petitioner's argument that she was denied due process. While her administrative case was only at the fifth of the above-enumerated stages, she failed to substantiate her claim that the DepEd and the CSC had, thus far, refused to afford her an opportunity to be heard. In fact, when the latter agency realized that the procedure outlined in the RRACCS was not strictly observed, it remanded the case for the conduct of a fact-finding/preliminary investigation, thus, allowing petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit in refutation of respondent's accusations. Further, after the DepEd issued the resulting Formal Charge, petitioner filed her Answer thereto, setting forth her defenses and even electing that a Formal Investigation be conducted.
Second, the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a complain which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three (3) days from receipt.[50]
Third, the Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation involves the ex parte examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant and the person complained of, as well as documents readily available from other government offices.[51] During said investigation, the parties are given the opportunity to submit affidavits and counter-affidavits. Failure of the person complained of to submit his counter-affidavit shall be considered as a waiver thereof.[52]
Fourth, the Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall submit the investigation report and the complete records of the case to the disciplining authority.[53]
Fifth, the Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established during the investigation, a formal charge shall be issued by the disciplining authority. Otherwise, in the absence of a prima facie case, the complaint shall be dismissed.[54]
Sixth, the Answer. The respondent is then given the chance to controvert the charge by filing an answer, which shall state material facts and applicable laws and contain documentary evidence such as sworn statements covering testimonies of witnesses, in support of one's defense.[55]
Seventh, the Formal Investigation. If the merits of the case cannot be decided judiciously or if the respondent so elects, the disciplining authority shall conduct a formal investigation.[56] At this stage of the proceeding, parties may agree to submit the case for resolution on the basis of position papers/memoranda.[57] However, the rules generally sanction a continuous hearing, where the parties are given the chance to present and rebut evidence.[58]
Eighth, the Formal Investigation Report. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the formal investigation, the hearing officer shall submit a report containing a narration of the material facts, his findings and the evidence supporting said findings, as well as his recommendations to the disciplining authority.[59]
Ninth, the Decision. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Formal Investigation Report, the disciplining authority shall decide the case.[60]
Taking the foregoing into consideration, petitioner was clearly not denied due process. She participated in every stage of the investigation conducted by the DepEd by filing various pleadings, motions, position papers, or memoranda. As a matter of fact, since the inception of this case, petitioner has filed no less than nine (9) such papers, aside from numerous affidavits and counter-affidavits, in the administrative investigation stage alone. Without a doubt, this evidences petitioner's active participation in the proceedings a quo, and belies her contention that she was not afforded an adequate opportunity to be heard. Thus, there is no legal or factual basis to rule that petitioner's administrative case should be vacated for the DepEd's failure to observe the rudiments of due process.
Petitioner should not be exonerated
Next, petitioner argued that her exoneration is warranted by the DepEd's prolonged inaction on the complaint against her. She pointed out that more than eight (8) months had elapsed between the time she requested for a Formal Investigation and the time she filed her motion to set aside respondent's complaint. According to her, Paragraph 3, Section 66, Rule 12 of the RRACCS, supports her plea for exoneration. Said provision reads:
Section 66. When to Remand an Appealed Case to Agency of Origin. - If on appeal, the Commission finds that the disciplining authority violated respondent-appellant's right to due process such as the failure to issue a formal charge, the Commission shall dismiss the appealed case and order the immediate reinstatement of the respondent with payment of back salaries and other benefits. However, the dismissal of the case shall be without prejudice on the part of the disciplining authority to re-file it in accordance with law.Again, petitioner's argument fails to impress.
If a formal charge has been issued but the disciplining authority has violated respondent-appellant's right to procedural due process, the Commission shall remand the appealed case to the agency of origin for further proceedings to be conducted within three (3) calendar month from the date of receipt of the case records, unless there is delay due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, or an extension is granted the Commission on meritorious grounds. The period of delay shall be excluded in the computation of the prescribed period. Within fifteen (15 days from the termination of the proceedings, the disciplining authority shall render his/her decision.
If at the end of the three (3) month period, the disciplining authority failed to conduct further proceedings, the Commission upon motion of the respondent-appellant shall vacate and set aside the appealed decision and declare the respondent-appellant exonerated of the charge/s. If the respondent-appellant is under preventive suspension he/she shall be immediately reinstated and shall be entitled to back salaries and other benefits.[61] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A plain reading of the above provision betrays petitioner's contention that her exoneration is warranted by the DepEd's inaction. As can be gleaned, the respondent in a remanded administrative case is entitled to exoneration only when the disciplining authority fails to conduct further proceedings after the lapse of (3) months from receipt of the records of the case. To be sure, the provision does not set a time frame for the conduct of Formal Investigation. All that it requires is that further proceedings be held disciplining authority within the stated period.
Here, the petitioner's case was remanded to the DepEd on March 13, 2012. While petitioner never bothered to allege the date of receipt of the records by said agency, the fact that the Office of the Schools Division Superintendent of Silay City was directed to conduct a fact-finding/preliminary investigation through the DepEd's May 18, 2012 Order shows that further proceedings were indeed conducted within the period set forth in Section 66 of the RRACCS. Hence, petitioner's insistence on exoneration has no legal leg to stand on.
All told, the Court is firmly convinced that the administrative proceeding against petitioner must proceed. As may be recalled, before the case was elevated to the CA, the last action conducted by the disciplining authority was the issuance of the Formal Charge. When petitioner filed her Answer thereto, she explicitly sought a Formal Investigation, which, under the RRACCS, is a matter of right when so requested.[62] It thus follows that the DepEd must conduct said investigation before proceeding to decide petitioner's case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Administrative Complaint No. RO6-AC-SI-2006-022 is hereby REINSTATED. Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the Department of Education Region VI is ORDERED to conduct a Formal Investigation on the administrative complaint filed by respondent, Rosanna Buison, against petitioner., Gemma Prado.
SO ORDERED. (CARANDANG, J., additional Member per S.O. No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018).
[1] Rollo, pp. 21-55.
[2] Id. at 414-428; penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, with Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi concurring.
[3] Id. at 456-462.
[4] Id. at 414.
[5] Id. at 415-416.
[6] Id. at 60.
[7] Id. at 84-85.
[8] Id. at 88.
[9] Id. at 91.
[10] Id. at 96-100.
[11] Id. at 101-121.
[12] Id at 122-123.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 160-169.
[15] Id. at 288.
[16] Id. at 291.
[17] Id. at 176-178.
[18] Id. at 179-187.
[19] Id. at 170-175.
[20] Id. at 198-205.
[21] Id. at 205.
[22] Id. at 206-208.
[23] Id. at 210-215.
[24] Id. at 215.
[25] Id. at 426-427.
[26] Id. at 427.
[27] Id. at 461.
[28] Id. at 34-42.
[29] Id. at 34.
[30] Sibayan v. Costales, et al., 789 Phil. 2, 9 (2016).
[31]Fenequito, et al. v. Vergara, Jr., 691 Phil. 335, 341-342 (2012).
[32]ABS-CBN Publishing, Inc. v. Director of the Bureau of Trademarks, G.R. No. 217916, June 20, 2018.
[33] Bañez v. Social Security System, 739 Phil. 148, 154-155 (2014).
[34] RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
[35] ABS-CBN Publishing, Inc. v. Director of the Bureau of Trademarks, supra note 32.
[36] Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc., et al. v. Ledesma, 757 Phil. 164, 173, 176 (2015).
[37] Bejarasco, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, 656 Phil. 337, 340 (2011).
[38] Tiangco, et al. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 646 Phil. 554, 568 (2010).
[39] Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32 (1924).
[40] Fontanilla v. The Commissioner Proper, COA, 787 Phil. 713, 726 (2016).
[41] Vivo v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 721 Phil. 34, 39 (2013). [42] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[43] Garcia v. Molina, et al., 642 Phil. 6, 22-23 (2010).
[44] Office of the Ombudsman v. Conti, 806 Phil. 384, 396 (2017).
[45] PO2 Montoya v. Police Director Varilla, et al., 595 Phil. 507, 520 (2008).
[46] Alliance For The Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Hon Garin et al., 793 Phil 831, 853 (2016).
[47] Rollo, p. 35.
[48] Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Section 10
[49] Id., Section 12.
[50] Id., Section 14.
[51] Id., Section 15.
[52] Id., Section 16
[53] Id., Section 18.
[54] Id., Section 20.
[55] Id., Section 23.
[56] Id., Section 30.
[57] Id., Section 31.
[58] Id., Section 36.
[59] Id., Section 43.
[60] Id., Section 44.
[61] Id., Section 66. [62] Id., Section 30.
