Civil liability from other sources (Article 31, Civil Code)

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. (Article 31, Civil Code) This article refers to a civil action which is no longer based on the criminal liability of the defendant, but on an obligation arising from other sources, like law, contracts, quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts. Article 1157 must be recalled in stating: "Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts."

According to Lim v. Ping (G.R. No. 175256, August 23, 2012) a single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender:

1. Civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
2. Independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.

The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries). See Articles 32, 34, 2176, and 1157 of the Civil Code.

An independent civil action is an action that is based upon the same criminal act as in the case of Articles 32, 33 and 34.  When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action being based upon an obligation not arising from the criminal act but from a different source, is not an independent civil action within the meaning of Articles 32, 33 and 34.  Article 31 (drafted by Code Commissioner Capistrano) states a self-explanatory rule different and distinct from that laid down in Articles 32, 33 and 34. (Corpus v. Paje, G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969)

For example, A is prosecuted for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homi­cide. The heirs of the deceased institute a civil action for damages against him based upon quasi-delict under Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which is separate and distinct from criminal negligence punished as a crime or delict under the Revised Penal Code. Quasi-delict is culpa aquiliana and is separate and distinct from criminal negligence, which is a delict. (Corpus v. Paje, G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969)

The dis­tinction is made in Article 2177 itself which in part provides that: "Responsibility for fault or negligence under the pre­ceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.  But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."

Albano explains that, regardless of the result of the criminal prosecution, an independent civil action could still be filed. The reason for this is that the basis of the civil action is no longer the criminal liability of the defendant, but another source, may be a quasi-delict or tort. In other words, as long as the basis of the civil action is separate and different from the delict (crime) complained of, it may proceed separately and independently.

Paras, citing Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, explains that an independent civil action is one that is brought distinctly and separately from a criminal case allowed for considerations of public policy, because the proof needed for civil cases is less than that required for criminal cases. However, generally, success in financially recovering in one case should prevent a recovery of damages in the other. It should be noted that the bringing of the independent civil action is not compulsory. Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2177 give instances of independent civil actions.

In the case of Prudential Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 74886, December 8, 1992), the Supreme Court held that "since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code, petitioner was acting well within its rights in filing an independent civil action to enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against Philippine Rayon." This means that, under Article 31, a civil action to recover the proceeds of sale of goods covered by a trust receipt can proceed independently of the criminal action for violation of the trust receipt law. Citing South City Homes, Inc. vs. BA Finance (G.R. No. 135462, December 7 2001) and Prudential Bank vs. NLRC (321 Phil. 798, 1995), Albano explains that, in such case, the validity of the contract, on which the civil action is based, is not at issue. What is at issue is the violation of an obligation arising from a valid contract which is the trust receipt.

On the other hand, in the case of Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 116463, June 30, 2003), when the civil action is based on a purported contract that is assailed as illegal per se, as when the execution of the contract is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019), Article 31 does not apply. In such a situation, the contract if proven illegal cannot create any valid obligation that can be the basis of a cause of action in a civil case. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, a contract "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law," or a contract that is "expressly prohibited or declared void by law" is void from the very beginning. No party to such void contract can claim any right under such contract or enforce any of its provisions.

Continuing to explain, the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned case said that Article 31 speaks of a civil action "based on an obligation not arising from the act x x x complained of as a felony."  This clearly means that the obligation must arise from an act not constituting a crime.  In the instant case, the act purporting to create the obligation is assailed as a crime in itself.  That act, which is prohibited by law, is the entering into dredging contracts that are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. A contract executed against the provisions of prohibitory laws is void. If the dredging contracts are declared illegal, then no valid obligation can arise from such contracts. Consequently, no civil action based on such contracts can proceed independently of the criminal action. In contrast, where the civil action is based on a contract that can remain valid even if its violation may constitute a crime, the civil action can proceed independently. Thus, in estafa thru violation of the trust receipt law, the violation of the trust receipt constitutes a crime. However, the trust receipt itself remains valid, allowing a civil action based on the trust receipt to proceed independently of the criminal case. (G.R. No. 116463, June 30, 2003)