Separate opinions (G.R. No. 207145)
I write this Separate Opinion to present an
alternative approach in resolving the present case. This alternative approach
discusses (and raises questions about) the procedure that this Court observes
in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning quasi-legislative acts. In my view, the attendant facts of the present case and the
ponencia’s approach aptly illustrate the need to revisit our present
approach.
In recent years, we have been relaxing
the certiorari requirements of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court[1] to give due course to certiorari petitions
assailing quasi-legislative acts. Awareness of the impact of this trend is
crucial, since we can only act on the basis of the “judicial
power” granted to us by the Constitution. In blunter terms, our present
approach is necessarily rooted in, and must be consistent with, the
constitutional definition of judicial power.
Judicial power, as
defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, includes
“the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.”
Thus, in determining whether the Court should take
jurisdiction over a case, it must, necessarily, first determine whether there
is an actual controversy in which the Court can grant the appropriate relief through its
judgment. This may involve private rights that are legally demandable and enforceable, or public rights, which involve the nullification of a governmental act that had been
exercised without, or in excess of its, jurisdiction.
At
present, we have been allowing petitions for certiorari and
prohibition to assail a quasi-legislative act whenever we find a paramount
importance in deciding the petitions.
This approach, in my view,
has no essential relation to the question of whether an actual controversy
exists; hence, its use as a standard in determining whether to take
jurisdiction over a petition is inherently contrary to the requirements for the exercise of judicial
power.
Factual antecedents
The present petition
for certiorari and prohibition assails
the validity of Joint Circular No. 1 dated November 29, 2012 of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) and Department of Health
(DOH), as well as Joint Circular dated September 3, 2012 of the DBM
and Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The petitioners are
officers and members of the Philippine Public Health Association, Inc.
(PPHAI). On January 23, 2013, they sent a letter addressed to the
respondents Secretary of Budget and Management and Secretary of Health,
expressing their opposition to the Joint Circulars as they diminish the
benefits granted to them by the Magna Carta of Public
Health Workers (Republic Act No. 7305, hereinafter RA 7305).
Thereafter,
the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before this Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
respondents for issuing the joint circulars. According to the
petitioners, the joint circulars had been issued with grave abuse of
discretion for the following reasons:
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(1)
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the joint circulars impose additional requirements to the grant of hazard pay, i.e., it requires the PHWs’ duties to expose
them to danger, when RA 7305 does not require such condition;
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(2)
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the joint circulars unduly fix subsistence allowance at Php50 per day for full-time service and Php25 for part-time
service, and these not in accordance with the prevailing circumstances required by
RA 7305;
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(3)
|
the joint circulars prematurely took effect on January 1, 2012;
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(4)
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longevity pay had been wrongfully granted only to regular plantilla positions, and unduly withheld the Step Increment due to Length of Service from those who have already been granted longevity pay.
[Emphasis supplied.]
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The ponencia aptly characterized the
respondents’ acts as quasi-legislative in nature;
hence, they are acts not assailable through the writs
of certiorari and prohibition under the strict terms of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
From this characterization, the ponencia proceeded to
discuss the substantive issues raised in the petition to “finally resolve the doubt over the Joint Circulars’ validity.”
According to the ponencia, “the pressing
issue of whether or not the joint circulars regulating the salaries and
benefits relied upon by public health workers were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion rightly deserves its prompt resolution.”
The ponencia partially
granted the petition, and held that the following aspects of the Joint
Circulars are tainted with grave abuse of discretion: (1) the ineligibility of
grantees of longevity pay from receiving the step increment due to length of
service is unenforceable as it had not been published in the ONAR; and (2) the
imposition of hazard pay below the minimum prescribed under RA 7305 is
invalid.
The traditional approach in assailing quasi-legislative acts
I agree with the ponencia’s conclusion that
the petitioners availed of an improper remedy to
directly assail the Joint Circulars before the Court.
A writ
of certiorari lies against judicial or quasi-judicial acts,
while a writ of prohibition is the proper remedy to address judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial acts. Hence, under these terms alone, the
present petition is easily dismissible for having been an improper remedy.
Traditionally,
the proper remedy to assail the validity of these joint circulars would have
been through an ordinary action for nullification filed with the proper
Regional Trial Court. Any allegation that the respondents are performing or
threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction
may appropriately be prevented or prohibited through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.[2]
Had the petitioners availed of the
proper remedy, then immediate recourse to this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari or prohibition
would have been avoided. While this Court has original jurisdiction to issue
these extraordinary writs, this jurisdiction is shared with the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals.
As a matter of policy, direct
recourse to the Court is frowned upon and a violation of the policy renders a
petition dismissible under the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
Despite the observed impropriety of remedies used,
the ponencia proceeded to render its decision on the case,
and partially granted it under the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it lowers the hazard pay at rates below the minimum prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5 (a) of its Revised IRR, is declared INVALID. The DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it provides that an official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment Due to Length of Service, is declared UNENFORCEABLE. The validity, however, of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular as to the qualification of actual exposure to danger for PHW’s entitlement to hazard pay, the rates Php50 and Php25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on the basis of the PHW’s status in the plantilla of regular positions, is UPHELD.
The ponencia’s approach in resolving the petition is not
without precedent. Indeed, in the past, we have granted petitions
for certiorari and prohibition that assail
quasi-legislative acts despite the use of inappropriate remedies in
questioning the quasi-legislative acts.
In granting the petitions
and invalidating the questioned legislative act, we gave consideration to the
“transcendental nature and paramount importance” of deciding the
issues they raised. In some cases, we also invoked “compelling state interest” as
reason to justify the early resolution of these issues,[3] and observed
as well the need for the Court to make a final and definitive pronouncement on pivotal issues for
everyone’s enlightenment and guidance.[4]
The public importance of resolving issues in a petition should not
determine whether the Court takes jurisdiction over a case
In my view, the public importance of resolving the issues
presented in a petition should not determine the Court’s jurisdiction
over a case, as public importance does not affect the subject matter of these
petitions. That a petition relates to a matter of public importance does not
make the abuse in the exercise of discretion any more or less grave.
For
instance, we gave due course to the petitions
for certiorari in Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary,[5] and in Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines v. Secretary
of Health,[6] both of which assail quasi-legislative acts.
The
administrative rules in these petitions carry different public policy reasons
behind them, and I cannot see how these policy goals could have affected the
fact that in both cases, the respondent administrative agency acted outside of
its jurisdiction in issuing administrative rules that contradict with, or are
not contemplated by, the laws they seek to implement.
In more
concrete terms, the right to have access to quality education, which is the
state interest in issuing the assailed Executive Order No. 566 in Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary,[7] does not have any direct bearing on the fact that its provisions
extended beyond the provisions of the laws it seeks to implement.
The
same argument applies to Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No.
2006-0012, which had been invalidated through
a certiorari petition in Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines v. Secretary
of Health.[8] That the nation has an interest in promoting the breastfeeding of
Filipino infants does not affect the authority of the Secretary of Health to
issue administrative rules that are beyond what the Milk Code requires.
A
law, by its very nature and definition, governs human conduct that is
important to society.[9] That the State, through Congress, found that a
particular conduct should be regulated already speaks of the importance of,
and need for, this regulation.
Necessarily, any deviation from this
regulation carries some degree of importance to the public, because society,
by agreeing to a regulation, has an interest that it be applied to all persons
covered by the law, without exception.
Our Constitution has
established how the need for regulation is identified, as well as the process
for its formulation and implementation. The identification function has been
given to Congress through the process of law-making. Implementation, on the
other hand, has been given to the Executive. Our task in the Judiciary comes
only in cases of conflict, either in the implementation of these laws or in
the exercise of the powers of the two other branches of government.[10]
This
is how our republican, democratic system of government institutionalizes the
doctrine of separation of powers, with each branch of government reigning
supreme over its particular designation under the Constitution.[11]
When
we, as the Highest Court of the land, decree that an issue involving the
implementation of a law is of paramount interest, does this declaration not
teeter towards the role assigned for Congress, which possesses the plenary
power to determine what needs are to be regulated and how the regulation
should operate?
This problem, I believe, becomes even starker when
we look at this phenomenon at the macro-level: when we, by exception, decide to take jurisdiction in some cases, and apply the general rule in others. Thereby, we, in effect, determine that public issues are
more important or paramount than others.
Taking an active part in
determining how public issues are prioritized is not part of the judicial
power vested in the Court. We may do this tangentially, as the outcome of our cases could demonstrate public importance, but we cannot and should not make this outcome the basis of when we should
exercise judicial power.
A survey of cases involving a petition
for certiorari against a quasi-legislative act shows
the uneven, and rather arbitrary, record of how we determine the paramount importance standard.
We
have, in the past, relaxed the requirements for certiorari in petitions against the following
quasi-legislative acts: (1) Commission on Audit Circular No. 89-299 lifting
the pre-audit of government transactions of national government
agencies;[12] (2) Comelec Resolution No. 8678 considering any candidate
holding public appointive office to have ipso facto resigned upon filing his
or her Certificate of Candidacy;[13] (3) Comelec Resolution No. 9615
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political
parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred
twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes,
respectively;[14] (4) Executive Order No. 566 (EO 566) and Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007 (RIRR)
directing the Commission on Higher Education to regulate the establishment and
operation of review centers;[15] and (5) Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
2006-0012 implementing the Milk Code.[16]
On the other
hand, we applied the strict requirements for a certiorari petition against the following: (1)
Section 2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open Access Rules (DSOAR), which
obligates certain customers to advance the amount needed to cover the expenses
of extending lines and installing additional facilities[17] (2) Comelec
Resolution No. 7798 prohibiting barangay officials and tanods from staying in
polling places during elections[18] (3) Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07 and
DAR Memorandum No. 88 involving the reclassification of agricultural
lands[19] (4) Executive Order No. 7 Directing the Rationalization of the
Compensation and Position Classification System in Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations and Government Financial Institutions;[20] and
(5) the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,
otherwise known as the “National Government Center (NGC) Housing and
Land Utilization Act of 2003.”[21]
I believe that all these
quasi-legislative acts involve matters that are important to the public. The
Court is not in the position to weigh which of these regulations carried more
importance than the others by exercising jurisdiction over petitions involving
some of them and dismissing other petitions outright.
Who are we,
for instance, to say that regulating review centers is more important than the
conversion of agricultural lands? Or that the ipso facto resignation of public appointive officials running for office is more
important than the prohibition against barangay officials to stay in polling
places during the elections?
To my mind, these issues all affect
our nation, and the Court cannot and should not impose any standard, unless
the measure is provided in the Constitution or in our laws, to determine why
one petition would be more important than another, such that the former
deserves the relaxation of certiorari requirements.
Furthermore,
the relaxation of certiorari requirements through the
paramount importance exception affects our approach in reviewing cases brought to us on appeal. Our appellate jurisdiction reviews the decisions of the lower court for
errors of law,[22] or errors of law and fact.[23]
In
several cases,[24] however, we reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals denying a petition for certiorari against a
quasi-legislative act based on the terms of the Rules of Court. In these
reversals, we significantly noted the paramount importance of resolving the
case on appeal and, on this basis, relaxed the requirements of the petition
for certiorari filed in the lower court.
This
kind of approach, to my mind, leads to an absurd situation where we
effectively hold that the CA committed an error of law when it applied the rules as provided in the
Rules of Court.
To be sure, when we so act, we send mixed and confusing signals
to the lower courts, which cannot be expected to know when
a certiorari petition may or should be allowed despite
being the improper remedy.
Additionally, this kind of approach
reflects badly on the Court as an institution, as it applies the highly
arbitrary standard of ‘paramount importance’ in place of what is
written in the Rules. A suspicious mind may even attribute malicious motives
when the Court invokes a highly subjective standard such as “paramount
importance.”
The public, no less, is left confused by the
Court’s uneven approach. Thus, it may not hesitate to file a petition
that violates or skirts the margins of the Rules or its jurisprudence, in the
hope that the Court would consider its presented issue to be of paramount
importance and on this basis take cognizance of the petition.
Assailing quasi-legislative acts through the Court’s expanded
jurisdiction
I believe that the better approach in handling
the certiorari cases assailing quasi-legislative acts
should be to treat them as petitions invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdiction. Thus, the standard in determining whether to exercise judicial power in
these cases should be the petitioners’ prima facie that
showing that the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the quasi-legislative act.
Should the petitioners sufficiently
prove, prima facie, a case for grave abuse of discretion, then
the petition should be given due course. If not, then it should be dismissed
outright. Through this approach, which the Court can institutionalize through
appropriate rules, the traditional Rule 65 approach can be maintained,
while providing for rules that sets the parameters to invoke the
courts’ expanded jurisdiction to cover situations of grave abuse of
discretion in any agency of the government.
Notably, most of the certiorari cases
that applied the paramount importance exception eventually granted, or
partially granted, the petition.[25] Thus, the Court, in giving due
course to the petition must have observed that it had merit, and this initial
determination was sufficient to bypass the requirements for
a certiorari petition.
In other words, it was
not the paramount importance of the issues presented that led the Court to
decide on the case; it was - as in the present case - the initially shown
possibility that the injuries claimed may be established and the remedies
prayed for may be granted.
To cite a past example, the difference
between the petitions assailing the quasi-legislative act placing review
centers under the CHED’s regulation, and the act providing for the
conversion of agricultural lands was not the former’s greater importance
so that the rules was relaxed to give it due course. Their difference could be
found in the potency of the issues they presented: in the former, there had
been a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion, as
shown by the eventual grant of the petition. In the latter, the prime facie grave abuse of discretion threshold was not met; thus, it was not given
due course.
I have additionally observed that in several
cases[26] dismissing the petition
for certiorari against quasi-legislative acts, we even
provided arguments against the substantive issues in these petitions. In these
cases, we held the petition to be procedurally infirm (such that it warranted
immediate dismissal), but at the same time noted that these petitions offer no
substantive arguments against the assailed acts, such that the petition would
not be granted even if we were to proceed to give it due course.
In light of these uneven approaches, I believe it to be more practical,
and certainly less arbitrary, if we would only take jurisdiction over
a certiorari petition involving a quasi-legislative act through
an initial, cursory determination of whether there had been a prima facie
showing of grave abuse of discretion.[27]
This approach of course should not affect the ordinary
remedies that may be availed of to assail quasi-legislative acts before the
lower courts. Certiorari, after all, remains to be an
extraordinary writ, to be issued only when there is no other plain, speedy
recourse.
Certiorari, additionally, lies only against acts
of grave abuse of discretion – i.e., an act that is not
only legally erroneous, but is often described as “arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or blatantly in disregard of the law,” so that
government official or agency acting on the matter is divested of
jurisdiction.[28]
The respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in insisting that
public health workers with a salary grade of 19 or lower should be given
less than 25 percent of their salary as hazard pay.
I agree with the ponencia that the respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in formulating the hazard pay of public
health workers with a salary grade of 19 or lower.
The joint
circulars that the respondents formulated determine hazard pay depending on
the actual exposure and level of risk that public health workers experience
while at work. While the respondents possess the discretion to determine how
hazard pay is formulated and to categorize it according to risk and exposure,
the formulation should not be contrary to what the Magna Carta for Public Health Workers provides them.
The formulation of
hazard pay under the joint circulars provides a hazard pay amounting to 25% of
the PHW’s salary only when they are exposed to high risk hazard for 12
or more days. PHWs exposed during a lesser period to high or low risks receive
lower hazard pay; the same goes for PHWs exposed to low risk for 122 or more
days:
This formulation blatantly disregards the text of the Magna Carta, as well as jurisprudence interpreting this text.
RA 7305
provides that the hazard pay of public health workers with a salary grade of
19 or lower should be AT LEAST be 25% of their salary, viz:
Section 21. Hazard Allowance. - Public health workers in hospitals, sanitaria, rural health units, main health centers, health infirmaries, barangay health stations, clinics and other health-related establishments located in difficult areas, strife-torn or embattled areas, distressed or isolated stations, prisons camps, mental hospitals, radiation-exposed clinics, laboratories or disease-infested areas or in areas declared under state of calamity or emergency for the duration thereof which expose them to great danger, contagion, radiation, volcanic activity/eruption, occupational risks or perils to life as determined by the Secretary of Health or the Head of the unit with the approval of the Secretary of Health, shall be compensated hazard allowances equivalent to at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the monthly basic salary of health workers receiving salary grade 19 and below, and five percent (5%) for health workers with salary grade 20 and above.
This provision had already been the subject of the Court’s decision in In Re Entitlement To Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel,[29] where the Court observed that:
In a language too plain to be mistaken, R.A. No. 7305 and its implementing rules mandate that the allocation and distribution of hazard allowances to public health workers within each of the two salary grade brackets at the respective rates of 25% and 5% be based on the salary grade to which the covered employees belong.
While the issue in In Re Entitlement To Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic
Personnel involved hazard allowance for PHWs with a salary of SG 20 and above,
the import of the decision is clear: the rates found in RA 7305 are the
minimum rates prescribed for hazard pay, and the government cannot prescribe
any rate lower than these.
That Joint Resolution No. 4 subsequently
provided for a uniform benefits package for government employees does not
affect existing Magna Carta benefits, including RA 7305.
The Joint Resolution provides:
Nothing in this Joint Resolution shall be interpreted to reduce, diminish or in any way, alter the benefits provided for in existing laws on Magna Carta benefits for specific officials and employees in government, regardless of whether said benefits have already been received or have yet to be implemented.
A simple reading of these laws, as well as that of In Re Entitlement To Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic
Personnel clearly shows that PHWs are entitled to the minimum rates for hazard
pay provided in RA 7305.
By issuing Joint Circulars that completely
disregard this rule, the respondents committed a patent and gross abuse of its
discretion to formulate the amount payable for hazard pay; this disregard
amounted to an evasion of its positive duty to implement RA 7305, particularly
the minimum rates it prescribes for hazard pay.
Thus, the
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in enacting the Joint
Circulars. Its provisions lowering the PHW’s hazard pay below the
minimum required in RA 7305 is thus void. Administrative rules cannot
contradict the laws it implements, and in the present case, the contradiction
against RA 7305 is an invalid act on the part of the respondents.
Given
the existing grave abuse, it becomes easier and more reasonable to recognize
this case as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. This
doctrine, of course, is a procedural matter that must reasonably yield when a
greater substantive reason exists.
For these alternative
reasons, I concur in the result and vote for the grant of the petition.
[1] Specifically, Rule 65, Section 1 on Certiorari, and
Section 2 on Prohibition, viz.:
Section 1. Petition
for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
[2] Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor, 529 Phil. 573,
588 (2006).
[3] Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, December
1, 2009, 606 SCRA 258, 276.
[4] GMA Network v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 205357, September 02, 2014, 734 SCRA 88, 125 – 126.
[5] G.R.
No. 180046, 602 Phil. 342 (2009).
[6] G.R. No. 173034, 561
Phil. 386 (2007).
[7] Supra note 5.
[8] Supra note
6.
[9] The Black’s Law Dictionary provides the following
definitions of law:
1. That which is laid down, ordained, or
established. A rule or method according to which phenomena or actions coexist
or follow each other. 2. A system of principles and rules of human conduct,
being the aggregate of those commandments and principles which are either
prescribed or recognized by the governing power in an organized jural society
as its will in relation to the conduct of the members of such society, and
which it undertakes to maintain and sanction and to use as the criteria of the
actions of such members. "Law" is a solemn expression of legislative will. It
orders and permits and forbids. It announces rewards and punishments. Its
provisions generally relate not to solitary or singular cases, but to what
passes in the ordinary course of affairs. Civ. Code La. arts. 1. 2. "Law,"
without an article, properly implies a science or system of principles or
rules of human conduct, answering to the Latin "jus;" as when it is spoken of
as a subject of study or practice. In this sense, it includes the decisions of
courts of justice, as well as acts of the legislature. The judgment of a
competent, court, until reversed or otherwise superseded, is law, as much as
any statute. Indeed, it may happen that a statute may be passed in violation
of law, that is, of the fundamental law or constitution of a state; that it is
the prerogative of courts in such cases to declare it void, or, in other
words, to declare it not to be law. Rurrill. 3. A rule of civil conduct
prescribed by the supreme power in a, state. 1 Steph. Comm. 25; Civ. Code
Dak. Definition of Law, Black’s Law Dictionary Website,
at http://thelawdictionary.org/letter/l/page/13/ (July 27, 2015).
[10] Belgica, et. al. v. Ochoa, G.R.
No. 208566, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1, 106 – 107.
[11] Angara
v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139, 156 – 157 (1936).
[12] Dela
Llana v. COA, 681 Phil. 186 (2012).
[13] Quinto v. Comelec,
621 Phil. 236 (2009).
[14] GMA Network v. Comelec, G.R. No.
205357, September 02, 2014, 734 SCRA 88.
[15] Review Center
Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, 602 Phil. 342 (2009).
[16] Pharmaceutical
and Healthcare Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of Health, 561
Phil. 386 (2007).
[17] CREBA v. ERC, 638 Phil. 542 (2010).
[18] Concepcion
v. Comelec, 609 Phil. 201 (2009).
[19] CREBA v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 635 Phil. 283 (2010).
[20] Galicto v. Aquino,
G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150.
[21] Supra note
2.
[22] Rule 45 of the Rules of Court limits the issues in
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court to questions of
law, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. —
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with
the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth. (1a, 2a)
[23] Jurisprudence teaches us that "(a)s a
rule, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed
conclusive. As such this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over
again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. This rule,
however, is not without exceptions." The findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit of review by
this Court:
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(3)
when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) when the
appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised
on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves
conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and
(10)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence
of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record. Fuentes v. CA, G.R. No. 109849, February 26, 1997.
[24] See,
as examples, the following cases: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
National Wages Productivity Commission, 543 Phil. 318 (2007)
and Equi-Asia Placement v. DFA, 533 Phil. 590 (2006).
[25] See Quinto
v. Comelec, supra note 13; Review Center Association of the
Philippines v. Ermita, supra note 15; and Pharmaceutical and
Healthcare Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of Health,
supra note 16.
[26] CREBA v Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
supra note 19 and Holy Spirit Home Owners Association v. Defensor,
supra note 21.
[27] See J. Brion’s discussion on
the Power of Judicial Review in his Concurring Opinion in Imbong v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No.204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 489 –
491.
[28] The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as
“a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility.” Office of the
Ombudsman v. Magno, G.R. No. 178923, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 272, 286-287
citing Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation,
438 Phil. 408, 414 (2002); Suliguin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
166046, March 23 2006, 485 SCRA 219, 233; Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, 19-20 (2002); Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
v. Goimco, Sr., 512 Phil. 729, 733-734 (2005) citing Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 786 (2003); Duero v.
Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12, 20 (2002) citing Cuison v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128540, April 15, 1998, 289 SCRA 159, 171.
[29] A.M.
No. 03-9-02-SC, 592 Phil. 389 (2008).
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result with regard to the
declaration that several provisions in the joint circulars are invalid and
unenforceable. However, with much regret, I cannot join the ponencia.
The
remedy sought by petitioners should be granted. The joint circulars
promulgated by the Department of Budget and Management were issued with grave
abuse of discretion because it contravened the provisions of Republic Act No.
7305,[1] also known as the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers.
Certiorari and Prohibition are available remedies when there is a proper
allegation of breach of a constitutional provision and an actual case or
controversy that can narrow the formulation of the relevant doctrines.
Article
VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
In Tañada v. Angara,[2] this court’s duty was characterized as follows:
As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.[3] (Citations omitted)
In addition, this court recently clarified in Araullo v. Aquino III:[4]
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution].[5]
The Department of Budget and Management promulgated joint circulars in clear
and patent breach of Republic Act No. 7305. The joint circulars appear to be
based on Joint Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009, which amended several
laws.[6] The implementation of the joint circulars is imminent and
affects a critical sector of government employees. The parties’
positions have thus become sufficiently adversarial and properly framed within
clear factual ambients.
Republic Act No. 7305 specifically provides that the Management-Health
Workers’ Consultative Council must be consulted for the computation and
grant of allowances to public health workers. Consultation is clearly
statutory. The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7305 provide:
SEC. 22. Subsistence Allowance. — Public health workers who are required to render service within the premises of hospitals, sanitaria, health infirmaries, main health centers, rural health units and barangay health stations, or clinics, and other health-related establishments in order to make their services available at any and all times, shall be entitled to full subsistence allowance of three (3) meals which may be computed in accordance with prevailing circumstances as determined by the Secretary of Health in consultation with the Management-Health Workers’ Consultative Councils, as established under Section 33 of this Act: Provided, That representation and travel allowance shall be given to rural health physicians as enjoyed by municipal agriculturists, municipal planning and development officers and budget officers.
. . . .
SEC. 33. Consultation with Health Workers’ Organizations. — In the formulation of national policies governing the social security of public health workers, professional and health workers’ organizations or union as well as other appropriate government agencies concerned shall be consulted by the Secretary of Health. For this purpose, Management-Health Workers’ Consultative Councils for national, regional and other appropriate levels shall be established and operationalized. (Emphasis supplied)
However, it appears that the joint circulars were issued without the Secretary
of the Department of Health consulting with the Management-Health
Workers’ Consultative Council. It also appears that the assailed joint
circulars[7] were issued pursuant to Joint Circular No. 4, Series of
2009.[8] Joint Resolution No. 4 is entitled “Joint Resolution
Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Modify the Compensation and
Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base Pay Schedule
of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and for Other
Purposes.”[9]
Item 6[10] of Joint Resolution No. 4
removed the requirement that the Secretary of the Department of Health should
discuss with consultative councils the rates of allowances and the release of
Magna Carta benefits. This was also reflected in Provision 1.1 of Department
of Budget and Management-Department of Health Joint Circular No. 1, Series of
2012,[11] which states:
1.0 Background Information
. . . .
The creation of consultative councils for public health workers was a
significant right granted in Republic Act No. 7305. Section 22 of Republic Act
No. 7305 required the Secretary of the Department of Health to consult with
the Management-Health Workers’ Consultative Council to provide for the
computation of subsistence allowances. The concept of this consultative
council was clearly articulated in Section 33. The participation of health
workers in the drafting of the guidelines empowered them. It also achieved
several purposes, which included ensuring immediate feedback from health
workers, and thus increasing the possibility of improving the overall
efficiency of all health agencies.
Announced as part of the package
of rights in Republic Act No. 7305, the Management-Health Workers’
Consultative Council was taken away piecemeal by a broadly entitled joint
resolution. The validity of Joint Resolution No. 4 was suspect because it
revised several laws and was passed by Congress in a manner not provided by
the Constitution.[12]
Department of Budget and Management-Civil
Service Commission Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012,[13] also cites
Joint Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009, as follows:
1.0 Background
Item (4)(d) of the Senate and House of Representatives Joint Resolution No. 4, s. 2009, “Joint Resolution Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and for Other Purposes,” approved by the President of the Philippines on June 17, 2009, provides as follows:
(d) Step Increments – An employee may progress from Step 1 to Step 8 of the salary grade allocation of his/her position in recognition of meritorious performance based on a Performance Management System approved by the CSC and/or through length of service, in accordance with the rules and regulations to be promulgated jointly by the DBM and the CSC.
Employees authorized to receive Longevity Pay under existing laws shall no longer be entitled to Step Increments Due to Length of Service. The grant of Step Increment based on Merit and Performance shall be in lieu of the Productivity Incentive Benefit.
Joint resolutions are not sufficient to notify the public that a statute is
being passed or amended. As in this case, the amendment to a significant
empowering provision in Republic Act No. 7305 was done through a joint
resolution. The general public will be misled when it attempts to understand
the state of the law since it will also have to comb through joint resolutions
in order to ensure that published Republic Acts have not been amended.
Another instance showing grave abuse of discretion is that Department of
Budget and Management-Department of Health Joint Circular No. 1, Series of
2012 provides for rates of hazard pay that are lower than the minimum provided
under Republic Act No. 7305.[14] This was recognized in the ponencia when
it held that the rates of hazard pay must be invalidated for contravening
Republic Act No. 7305.[15]
Petitioners further argue that the assailed joint circulars are null and
void because these were not published in accordance with the 30-day period as
required by Republic Act No. 7305. The ponencia addresses this issue as
follows:
Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by law in order for administrative rules and regulations to be effective. There are, however, several exceptions, one of which are interpretative regulations which “need nothing further than their bare issuance for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.” These regulations need not be published for they add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person.
. . . .
In this case, the DBM-DOH Joint Circular in question gives no real consequence more than what the law itself had already prescribed. There is really no new obligation or duty imposed by the subject circular for it merely reiterated those embodied in RA No. 7305 and its Revised IRR. The Joint Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant the Revised IRR, the validity of which is undisputed. Consequently, whether it was duly published and filed with the UP Law Center – ONAR is necessarily immaterial to its validity because in view of the pronouncements above, interpretative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH circular herein, need not be published nor filed with the UP Law Venter – ONAR in order to be effective. Neither is prior hearing or consultation mandatory.[16] (Citations omitted)
The ponencia further discusses that in any case, the Department of Budget and
Management-Department of Health Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, was
published in the Philippine Star on December 29, 2012.[17]
Section
35 of Republic Act No. 7305 states:
SEC. 35. Rules and Regulations. — The Secretary of Health after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government as well as professional and health workers’ organizations or unions, shall formulate and prepare the necessary rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act. Rules and regulations issued pursuant to this Section shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Republic Act No. 7305 is explicit that rules and regulations “take
effect thirty (30) days after publication.” While Department of Budget
and Management-Department of Health Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012,
provided for its own date of effectivity, it cannot amend what is provided in
the law it implements. In this case, the circular took effect after the lapse
of only three (3) days.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 7305 is a law
while Department of Budget and Management-Department of Health Joint Circular
No. 1, Series of 2012, is an administrative circular. As we ruled in Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Civil
Service Commission,[18] an administrative circular cannot amend the provisions of a law.
While rules issued by administrative bodies are entitled to great respect, “[t]he conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. [T]he function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. x x x [A]dministrative regulations cannot extend the law [nor] amend a legislative enactment; x x x administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law[,]” and in a conflict between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, the former must prevail.[19] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
I agree with the ponencia that the Department of Budget and
Management-Civil Service Commission Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, is
unenforceable because it has not been deposited with the Office of the
National Administrative Register at the University of the Philippines Law
Center.[20] However, it is my opinion that Department of Budget and
Management-Department of Health Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, should
also be deposited with the Office of the National Administrative Register
before it can be validly enforced.
Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3
of the Administrative Code[21] provides that:
SECTION 3. Filing.—(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
Book VII, Chapter 1, Section 2 of the Administrative Code defines “rule” as:
SECTION 2. Definitions.—As used in this Book:
(2) “Rule” means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public.
The assailed joint circulars can be considered as “rules” that
must be deposited with the Office of the National Administrative Register.
These circulars provide guidelines for the implementation of the benefits
provided under Republic Act No. 7305.
The publication of the
assailed joint circulars in a newspaper of general circulation does not remove
the requirement of the Administrative Code that the circulars must be
deposited with the Office of the National Administrative Register. The
pertinent portion of the Guidelines for Receiving and Publication of Rules and
Regulations Filed with the UP Law Center[22] provides:
2. All rules and regulations adopted after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987, which date is on November 23, 1989, must be filed with the U.P. Law Center by either the adopting agency or the implementing agency of the Executive Department authorized to issue rules and regulations and said rules and regulations shall be effective, in addition to other rule-making requirements by law not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code, fifteen days from the date of their filing with the U.P. Law Center unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety, and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
The agency should be advised to inform the U.P. Law Center of the date of effectivity of each rule and when publication in a newspaper is required, to furnish the date/dates of the newspapers where published. In such a case the counting should be reckoned with the last date of publication.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
Admittedly, not all administrative issuances are required to be filed
with the Office of the National Administrative
Register.[24] Nevertheless, it is my opinion that the circulars in this
case affect third parties. The hazard pay and other benefits of public health
workers affect third parties because the grant of these benefits involves the
use of public funds.
Parenthetically, all Department of Budget and
Management circulars affect the public because the Department’s
circulars involve the use of public funds collected from taxpayers. Hence, all
Department of Budget and Management circulars must be deposited with the
Office of the National Administrative Register.[25] Taxpayers have the
right to know where public funds were used and for what reasons. There is no
harm in requiring that circulars be deposited with the Office of the National
Administrative Register. In fact, the requirement that rules must be deposited
with the Office of the National Administrative Register can be easily complied
with. To opt not to deposit a rule with the Office of the National
Administrative Register is suspect for the public has the right to be informed
of government rules and regulations, more so if the rule involves the use of
public funds.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur in the result.
[1] Rep. Act No. 7305 was approved on March 26, 1992.
[2] 338
Phil. 546 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[3] Id. at
574–575.
[4] 728 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En
Banc].
[5] Id. at 74.
[6] Joint Resolution No.
4 amends the following laws: Rep. Act No. 7305 (1992) or the Magna Carta of
Public Health Workers; Rep. Act No. 4670 (1966) or the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers; Rep. Act No. 8439 (1997) or the Magna Carta for Scientists,
Engineers, Researchers and Other Science and Technology Personnel in
Government; Rep. Act No. 9433 (2007) or the Magna Carta for Public Social
Workers; Rep. Act No. 8551 (1998) or the Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998; Exec. Order No. 107 (1999) or Specifying the
Salary Grades of the Officers and Enlisted Personnel of the Philippine
National Police pursuant to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 8551, otherwise
known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998;
Rep. Act No. 9166 (2002) or An Act Promoting the Welfare of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines by Increasing the Rate of Base Pay and other Benefits of
its Officers and Enlisted Personnel and for Other Purposes; Rep. Act No. 9286
(2004) or An Act Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 198, otherwise known
as The Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended; Rep. Act No. 7160
(1991) or the Local Government Code of 1991; Rep. Act No. 9173 (2002) or the
Philippine Nursing Act of 2002.
[7] The assailed joint
circulars are Department of Budget and Management-Civil Service Commission
Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, and Department of Budget and
Management-Department of Health Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012.
[8] Ponencia,
p. 7.
[9] Joint Resolution No. 4 was dated July 28, 2008 and
was approved by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 17, 2009.
[10] Joint
Resolution No. 4 (2008), item 6 provides:
(6) Magna Carta Benefits
– Within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Joint Resolution,
the DBM is hereby authorized to issue the necessary guidelines, rules and
regulations on the grant of Magna Carta benefits authorized for specific
officials and employees in the government to determine those that may be
categorized in the Total Compensation Framework.
Nothing in this
Joint Resolution shall be interpreted to reduce, diminish or, in any way,
alter the benefits provided for in existing laws on Magna Carta benefits for
specific officials and employees in government, regardless of whether said
benefits have been already received or have yet to be implemented.
The
DBM, in coordination with the agencies concerned, shall determine the
qualifications, conditions and rates in the grant of said benefits. Accordingly, the consultative councils, departments and officials
previously authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations of
Magna Carta benefits shall no longer exercise said function relative to the
grant of such benefits. (Emphasis supplied)
[11] Rules and Regulations on the Grant
of Compensation-Related Magna Carta Benefits to Public Health Workers (PHWs)
(2012).
[12] Const., art. VI, secs. 26 and 27 provide:
SECTION
26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2)
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
(Emphasis supplied).
SECTION 27. (1)
Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes
a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign
it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration,
two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members
voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within
thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a
law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power
to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff
bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the House Rules of
the House of Representatives specifically provides:
Section. 58. Third Reading. . . .
No bill or joint resolution shall become law unless it passes three (3) readings on separate days
and printed copies thereof in its final form are distributed to the Members
three (3) days before its passage except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
(Emphasis supplied)
With the insertion of “joint
resolution,” it seems that Congress intercalated a procedure not
sanctioned by the Constitution.
[13] Rules and Regulations on
the Grant of Step Increment/s Due to Meritorious Performance and Step
Increment Due to Length of Service (2012).
[14] Rollo,
pp. 32–33.
[15] Ponencia, p. 16.
[16] Id.
at 11–14.
[17] Id. at 14.
[18] 692 SCRA
384 (2013) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[19] Id. at 399.
[20] Ponencia,
p. 15.
[21] Exec. Order No. 292 (1987).
[22] Guidelines
for Receiving and Publication of Rules and Regulations Filed with the UP Law
Center <http://law.upd.edu.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=324&Itemid=509> (visited April 6, 2015).
[23] Id.
[24] The
Guidelines for Receiving and Publication of Rules and Regulations Filed with
the UP Law Center provide:
9. Rules and Regulations which need not
be filed with the U.P. Law Center, shall, among others, include but not be
limited to, the following:
a) Those which are interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public;
b)
Instructions on the case studies made in petitions for adoption;
c)
Rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or
workload of his personnel or the wearing of uniforms;
d) Rules and
regulations affecting only a particular or specific sector and circularized to
them;
e) Instructions by administrative supervisors concerning the
rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance
of their duties;
f) Memoranda or statements concerning the internal
administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or
procedure available to, the public;
g) Memoranda or circulars
merely disseminating any law, executive order, proclamation, and issuances of
other government agencies.
[25] A comparison of the issuances
published by the Office of the National Administrative Register <http://law.upd.edu.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=324&Itemid=509> visited April 6, 2015) and the issuances uploaded on the Department
of Budget and Management’s website <http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?page_id=815> (visited April 6, 2015) show that there were years when the
Department of Budget and Management did not file copies of its circulars with
the Office of the National Administrative Register.
