To cite this online book, please use the following:

Dela Peña. 2023. "Principles and Cases in Private International Law: A Procedural Approach." Published by Project Jurisprudence - Philippines. Published: September 17, 2023. Link: [Insert link] Last accessed: [Insert date of access].



Tort is a common law principle, seemingly codified under the New Civil Code of the Philippines.[1] In the study of torts law, the law student will encounter terms like “culpa aquiliana,” “quasi-delict,” or “actionable wrong.”

A fuller discussion on torts law is on the shoulders of giants like Aquino and Albano. For the purposes of this book, it is sufficient to state that a tort may be an act or an omission that causes injury to another. It is a civil wrong, other than contractual breach.[2] However, “the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.”[3] The use of the word “tort” instead of “quasi-delict” may be significant since the Supreme Court has noted that a quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit.”[4]

At any rate, suffice it to say that, under Philippine laws, a tort under its common law understanding and a quasi-delict are both actionable wrongs. In fact, in recent cases, the Supreme Court has referred to “torts”[5] and “quasi-delict”[6] interchangeably when enumerating the following elements: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he or she must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.[7]

When a tort occurs, the occurence may be surrounded by different “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” – which might affect the conflicts of law analysis – such as but not limited to (a) the nationality of a person; (b) his/her domicile; (c) his/her residence; (d) his/her place of sojourn; (e) his place of origin; (f) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; (g) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated; (h) the place ·where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed; (i) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised; (j) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis,· (k) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done;[8] and, among others, (l) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such.[9]

If a Filipino citizen punches a Japanese citizen while both are in Japan and the former flees back to the Philippines, the latter may be inclined to fly into this jurisdiction and sue the former in Philippine courts. The question turns to which law should apply to the occurrence and to the rights and obligations of the parties.

The Japanese citizen may, for example, invoke Japanese laws on tort, thinking that the same are more protective of his/her rights or are more sympathetic toward the victim of a tort. As for the Filipino citizen, he may be inclined to invoke Philippine laws.

The forum’s starting point is Philippine laws. However, considering the invocation of a foreign law, if properly pleaded and proved, the court would then be constrained to make a choice of law analysis. As already mentioned, the court make opt to take a traditional approach to the matter, i.e., lex loci delicti, also known as lex loci delicti commissi.

Under the lex loci delicti principle, the tort, as well as the rights and obligations of the parties arising from such tort, is governed by the law of the place of occurrence. This is because, in the tort context, the law of the place of the wrong usually governed traditional choice of law analysis.[10] In the above example problem, following this principle. Japanese laws would apply.

The court may also opt to take a modern approach to the problem such as the most significant relationship rule.[11] Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, for example, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.[12]

With the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability[13] have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, the Supreme Court has had occasion to apply the “State of the most significant relationship” rule whenever it was appropriate to apply, given the factual context of a case.[14]

One of the more significant areas of criticism directed at the lex loci delicti approach involves its application to so-called multi-state torts situations in which the alleged tortious conduct and consequent injury occur in different jurisdictions.[15] The reason for such criticism is the perceived rigidity and inflexibity of this traditional rule while the applause given to the modern theories like the “state with significant relationship rule” and the “center of gravity doctrine” is in relation to their flexibility. However, on the other hand, criticisms to these modern theories may include, among others, lack of predictability, violation of reasonable expectations, complications to judicial tasks, disregard of forum law, and inconvenience.[16]


In Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll,[17] Carroll (the plaintiff) worked as a railroad brakeman, and was injured in Mississippi due to the failure of other employees to inspect the brakes in Alabama. The issue was whether recovery could be obtained for a tortious act in the state where the breach of duty occurred, but not the injury that was produced in a different state.[18] The case was filed in a Mississippi court.

In resolving this, Justice McClellan of the Alabama Supreme Court wrote: “The position of the Mississippi court appears to us to be eminently sound in principle and upon logic. It is admitted, or at least cannot be denied, that negligence of duty unproductive of damnifying results will not authorize or support a recovery. Up to the time train passed out of Alabama no injury had resulted. For all that occurred in Alabama, therefore, no cause of action whatever arose. The face which created the right to sue, the injury without which confessedly no action would lie anywhere, transpired in the State of Mississippi. It was in that State, therefore, necessarily that the cause of action, if any, arose; and whether a cause of action arose and existed at all or not must in all reason be determined by the law which obtained at the time and place when and where the fact which is relied on to justify a recovery transpired. Section 2590 of the Code of Alabama had no efficiency beyond the lines of Alabama. It cannot be allowed to operate upon facts occurring in another State so as to evolve out of them rights and liabilities which do not exist under the law of that State which is of course paramount in the premises where the facts occur in Alabama and a liability becomes fixed in Alabama, it may be enforced in another State having like enactments, or whose policy is not opposed to the spirit of such enactments, but this is quite a different matter. This is hut enforcing the statute upon facts to which it is applicable all of which occur within the territory for the government of which it was enacted. Section 2590 of the Code, in other words is to be interpreted in the light of universally recognized principles of private international or interstate law, as if its operation had been expressly limited to this State and as if its first line read as follows: “When a personal injury is received in Alabama by a servant or employee,” The negligent infliction of an injury here under statutory circumstances creates a right of action here, which, being transitory, may be enforced in any other State or country the comity of which admits of it; but for an injury inflicted elsewhere than in Alabama our statute gives no right of recovery, and the aggrieved party must look to the local law to ascertain what his rights are. Under that law this plaintiff had no cause of action, as we have seen, and hence he has no rights which our courts can enforce, unless it be upon a consideration to be presently adverted to. We have not been inattentive to the suggestions of counsel in this connection, which are based upon that rule of the statutory and common criminal law under which a murderer is punishable where the fatal blow is delivered, regardless of the place where death ensues.—Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40. This principle is patently without application here. There would be some analogy if the plaintiff had been stricken in Alabama and suffered in Mississippi, which is not the fact. I here is, however, an analogy which is afforded by the criminal law, but which points away from the conclusion appellee's counsel desire us to reach. This is found in that well established doctrine of criminal law, that where the unlawful act is committed in one jurisdiction or State and takes effect-produces the result which it is the purpose of the law to prevent, or, it having ensued, punish for-in another jurisdiction or State, the crime is deemed to have been committed and is punished in that jurisdiction or State in which the result is manifested, and not where the act was committed.” In simpler terms, it was held that, considering that the negligent act was committed in Mississippi and the injury occurred in Alabama, the proper court and choice of law would be in Alabama.


            The case of Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,[19] written by Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, decided whether a foreign corporation could be sued in the United States for injuries caused by its products which merely ended up into the American stream of commerce. Essentially, the defense was that Asahi Metal’s only connection to the forum state was its awareness or knowledge that its products are circulated in the United States. In other words, the question was whether such awareness and the existence of the products themselves in United States soil were enough to satisfy the minimum contact requirement to justify the forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign, i.e., out-of-state, defendant.

According to Justia,[20] the main legal conclusion of the case was as follows:

"Simply putting a product in the stream of commerce and being aware that it could reach a certain state does not support personal jurisdiction in that state, since this is not sufficient to show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in that state."

According to the United States Supreme Court, personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant should generally be assessed based on five factors, namely:

  1. What is the burden on the defendant?
  2. What are the interests of the forum state in the litigation?
  3. What is the interest of the plaintiff in litigating the matter in that state?
  4. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate efficiency?
  5. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate policy interests?

Ruling against the presence of proper personal jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court found that the defendant's burden was significant in this case based on both the physical distance and the differences in laws between Japan and the United States. The defendant was not a resident of California. It was also not shown that there would be any disadvantages[21] if the suit against Asahi Metal was heard in a Japanese or Taiwanese court, rather than in Californian court. Finally, neither interstate efficiency nor interstate policy interests would be satisfied by finding jurisdiction.

In other words, therefore, there was no minimum contact unless defendant company purposefully directed its products toward a particular state. Oyez Project, a leading but unofficial archive of United States Supreme Court decisions, summarized the ruling, thus: “Although Asahi placed its products in a stream of commerce that eventually led to California, there was no evidence that the company marketed or in any way anticipated sales in California. The Court also held that the jurisdiction of the California court would be unreasonable for Asahi, given the distance and the fact that this dispute is purely between Asahi and Cheng Shin. The state of California had only a slight interest in this case that did not outweigh the burden on Asahi.”[22]


Grant v. McAuliffe[23] is a decision of the Court of Appeals of California. It was about two California citizens who met an automobile accident in Arizona wherein one of them died as a result. Under Arizona law, a tort action would not survive the death of the plaintiff, while under California law it did.

The first question was whether the survival of a cause of action is a substantive or a procedural matter (the process of characterization). In either case, the second question was whether Arizona law or California law should apply.

First, matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum. Also, the “broad, uncontroverted rule is that the lex loci will govern as to all matters going to the basis of the right of action itself, while the lex fori controls all that is connected merely with the remedy. The Courts will assume that a case is to be governed by the laws of the forum unless it is expressly shown that a different law applies, and in case of doubt as to whether the lex loci or the lex fori should govern, the court will naturally prefer the laws of its own state or country.”[24] It appears that, in the United States, different states treat “survival of cause of action” differently, i.e., some states allow the same to survive while others do not. Hence, the forum law should generally apply. Under California law, a survival statute does not create a new cause of action but simply allows the continuation of an existing action; hence, procedural in nature.

“The general rule is that the survival of a cause of action is governed by the law of the state where the cause arose. Some courts apply this rule even though there is no similar statute in the state of the forum, but other courts have limited their decisions to cases in which there is a similar statute in the forum. This is regarded as a matter pertaining to the substantive right, rather than to the remedy. This principle finds application in causes of action for personal injuries. The survival of such a cause is governed by the law of the place where the injury occurred and the cause of action arose. Many of the courts limit this doctrine to cases in which no action has been brought until after the death of the injured person or of the wrongdoer. The fact that the action is brought in the state of the domicile of the wrongdoer and that by the law of that state the cause of action survives his death is not effective to make the cause of action survive where such action is brought after his death.”[25]

“Since in the instant cases the actions were not instituted before the death of the tort-feasor, and the State of Arizona has no survival statute, but applies the common-law rule that an action for personal injuries against a tort-feasor abates at his death, we must, in view of the authorities cited, hold that upon the death of the tort-feasor, before the filing of the actions, the plaintiffs' right of action abated.”[26]

In other words, the California Court of Appeals ruled that, since under Arizona law where the cause of action for tort does not survive the death of the victim, the action must be considered “abated” by the California forum.

Contrary to the views arrived at by the California Court of Appeals, it is this author’s humble submission that, under Philippine law, a tort creates an obligation on the part of the tortfeasor. Hence, such obligation follows him/her wherever s/he goes. This is evident from the language of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, viz:

“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.” (Underlining and emphasis supplied by this author)

Notice that the language of the provision was not framed from the viewpoint of a right, i.e., a right of action. Rather, it speaks of an obligation to pay damages. In relation to this, an obligation to pay is in personam in nature. Even if the injury occurred elsewhere, the obligation to indemnify for damages should stick to the tortfeasor and state boundaries, regardless of whether survival statutes are procedural or substantive, should not be allowed to defeat such obligation. Otherwise, as stated by Justice Schauer, the rights and claims both in favor of and against an estate are substantive in nature, and vest irrevocably at the date of death.


The case of Gray v. Gray[27] summarized the facts and the principles involved in the first paragraph of the text of the decision itself. Finding no other better way to report what has been said, this authorize quotes said paragraph, viz:

If there is no ground of action in the sovereignty where a tort is alleged to have occurred, there is none anywhere. Whatever would be a bar to an action for tort if brought in the state of its occurrence is a bar in this state although the matter pleaded would not be a bar if the cause of action had arisen here. A New Hampshire wife injured by the negligence of her husband while driving with him in Maine is barred from recovery against him in this state because under Maine law a wife has no cause of action for negligence against her husband. Persons having the status of husband and wife take that status with them into a sister state but the incidents of that status are those prescribed by the law of the place where transactions take place. The theory of a foreign vested right or obligation as a test for the enforcement of an alleged foreign tort is not based upon the idea that a sovereignty is under legal compulsion to recognize the foreign cause of action but such recognition has resulted from the idea that it was the just and politic course to follow. The foreign law is enforced because the law of the forum is that the foreign law shall govern the transactions in question and thus for the purposes of the case the foreign law becomes the local law. Where no evidence is presented that the lex loci includes the doctrine of renvoi the foreign domestic law should be applied; if the doctrine of renvoi were a part of the foreign law the question whether it should be applied would demand determination.”

To summarize, the ruling was that the defendant’s act in Maine was a delict governed by the lex loci delicti rule. It would have been actionable if committed in New Hampshire where the husband and wife were residents; to persons in general, it would be actionable in Maine. However, because of the particular relation of the parties, being husband and wife, Maine law says that there can be no cause of action in such a special instance; therefore, there being no cause of action at the place where the acts complained of were done, there would be no cause of action in the court hearing the case.

Interestingly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in the Gray case also said that the lex loci delicti shall apply has been so firmly established that it should be followed, unless very grave defects therein call for reform. It appears to this author that the “very grave defect” spoken of actually existed in the Gray case. Simply because the occurrence of the tort transpired in a state, of which the parties had no significant connection at all other than the fact that they were merely traversing its roads, which bars a cause of action between husband and wife for negligence. This is precisely the reason why other authors advocate for the application of modern rules such as the center of gravity doctrine and the state with the most significant relationship rule.

Haumschild v. Continental Casualty

Haumschild v. Continental Casualty[28] analyzed the proper choice of law in interspousal immunity in relation to a tort committed in a different state.

In the Haumschild case, it was held that the forum would apply the law of the spouses’ domicile, which allowed the action, rather than that of the place of accident, to determine whether one spouse had the right to sue another for tort; in view of the traditional recognition of the law of the domicile as governing marital relations. In studying this case, the student must compare it with the case of Gray v. Gray,[29] which is an earlier case.

The facts of the Haumschild case has been summarized by Quimbee,[30] thus: “Mr. Haumschild (defendant) and Mrs. Haumschild (plaintiff), domiciliaries of Wisconsin, were in a car accident in California. After the couple divorced, Mrs. Haumschild filed a lawsuit against her former husband and his automobile insurer, Continental Cas. Co. (defendant), in a Wisconsin court, for injuries she received in the accident. Applying California law, the court dismissed her suit on the grounds that California prohibited interspousal tort actions. Wisconsin law, on the other hand, permitted suits between spouses. Mrs. Haumschild appealed.”

As stated above, the domicile of the spouses was made to apply. Citing Emery v. Emery,[31] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that even where an actual conflict-of-laws problem is directly presented, it is sensible and logical to have disabilities to sue and immunities from suit arising from the family relationship determined by reference to the law of the state of the family domicile when the suit is brought in that state. Otherwise, the lex loci will be permitted to interfere seriously with a status and a policy which the state of residence is primarily interested in maintaining.

This ruling in Haumschild departed from the adherence to lex loci rules, which prevailed jurisprudence in centuries prior. Recognizing the discernible trend away from the traditional rules, saying that absolutes should not be made the goal at the sacrifice of progress in furtherance of sound public policy. By doing this, the Wisconsin Supreme Court abandoned the rulings in the cases of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931); Forbes v. Forbes (1938), 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 112; Bourestom v. Bourestom (1939), 231 Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426; Garlin v. Garlin (1951), 260 Wis. 187, 50 N.W.2d 373;  Scholle v. Home Mut. Casualty Co. (1956), 273 Wis. 387, 78 N.W.2d 902; and Hansen v. Hansen (1956), 274 Wis. 262, 80 N.W.2d 230.

Toward the end of its written decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said:

Perhaps a word of caution should be sounded to the effect that the instant decision should not be interpreted as a rejection by this court of the general rule that ordinarily the substantive rights of parties to an action in tort are to be determined in the light of the law of the place of wrong. This decision merely holds that incapacity to sue because of marital status presents a question of family law rather than tort law.”


In Lhuillier v. British Airways,[32] petitioner argued that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but from the tortious conduct committed by airline personnel of respondent in violation of the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on the contract of carriage, she believed she had the option to pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.

On the other hand, respondent maintained that petitioner’s claim for damages fell within the ambit of Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention. As such, the same can only be filed before the courts of United Kingdom or Italy, which was the route of the flight petitioner took in 2005.

Once on board the London-to-Italy flight, petitioner allegedly requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondent’s flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked: “If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!” It was also alleged by petitioner that alleged that, when the plane was about to land in Rome, another flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the plane’s safety regulations being a frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly took his face a mere few centimeters away from that of petitioner and menacingly told her: “We don't like your attitude.”

Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondent’s ground manager and demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were “only doing their job.”

The Supreme Court ruled against petitioner and said that the Warsaw Convention applied in this case because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which were both signatories to the said Convention. As to the argument that the tortious act, not arising from the contract of carriage itself, should not be considered covered by the Convention, the Court cited Carey v. United Airlines[33] and Bloom v. Alaska Airlines[34] and said that a passenger’s legal action against the airline carrier arising from alleged confrontational incident between passenger and flight attendant on international flight should be governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention, even though the incident allegedly involved intentional misconduct by the flight attendant. Hence, the Warsaw Convention governs actions arising from international air travel and provides the exclusive remedy for conduct which falls within its provisions, creating no exception for an injury suffered as a result of intentional conduct.

In the Carey case, the passenger filed an action against the airline arising from an incident involving the former and the airline's flight attendant during an international flight resulting to a heated exchange which included insults and profanity. In the Bloom case, the passenger brought nine causes of action against the airline in the state court, arising from a confrontation with the flight attendant during an international flight to Mexico.


In the Santos III case,[35] the dispute involved the proper interpretation of Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:

Article 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.”

In other words, the issues raised were about the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention and the jurisdiction of Philippine courts over the case.

As to the issue of constitutionality, the petitioner argued that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention violates the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. Answering this, the Court said that the Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. The treaty, being a joint legislative-executive act, enjoys the presumption that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in this country. The designation by the Convention of the most convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and its passenger cannot be a constitutional issue. It is safe to say, based on the Court’s ruling that convenience is not an issue that goes into the constitutionality of a law or a treaty.

Petitioner insisted that the conditions prevailing at the time the Convention was entered into by the Philippines have long ceased to exist; therefore, to the extent that it has lost its basis for approval, it has become unconstitutional, invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Rebutting this, the Court said: “It is true that at the time the Warsaw Convention was drafted, the airline industry was still in its infancy. However, that circumstance alone is not sufficient justification for the rejection of the treaty at this time. The changes recited by the petitioner were, realistically, not entirely unforeseen although they were expected in a general sense only.” In fact, the “more important consideration is that the treaty has not been rejected by the Philippine Government. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically to render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act of rejection, usually made by the head of state, with a statement of the reasons why compliance with the treaty is no longer required.” Hence, the rejection of a treaty is a political question.

As to the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner theorized that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention should be considered a rule merely of venue. Hence, it was waived by defendant when it did not move to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

Venue and jurisdiction, of course, are entirely distinct matters in law. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong place may be waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.[36]

In rejecting petitioner’s theory, the Supreme Court held that the Warsaw Convention provides for jurisdiction rules, not venue rules, based on three reasons. First, the wording of Article 32 of the Convention, which indicates the places where the action for damages “must” be brought. The use of the term “must” underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28 (1). Second, one of the objectives of the Convention is to “regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by air.” Third, the Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28 (1), which means that the phrase “rules as to jurisdiction” used in Article 32 must refer only to Article 28 (1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article 28 (1) as “jurisdictions.”

Another issue raised and passed upon in the Santos III case was the proper interpretation of the term “place of destination.” According to petitioner, his place of destination was Manila, Philippines. However, the place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, should be determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner’s ticket showed that his ultimate destination was San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that the filight was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

The contract between the passenger and the airline should be considered a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a “place of destination.”


[1] Articles 19, 20, 21 and 2176 of said Code.

[2] Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.

[3] Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722, 739 (1966) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc].

[4] Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 298 Phil. 52, 61 (1993) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division], citing the Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines.

[5] Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 615 Phil. 653 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], Corinthian Gardens Association Inc. v. Spouses Tanjangco, 578 Phil. 712 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

[6] Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. v. Adviento, 740 Phil. 336 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division); Philippine National Construction Corp., v. Court of Appeals, 505 Phil. 87 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

[7] Sanggacala v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 209538, July 07, 2021, citing Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. v. Adviento, 740 Phil. 336 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 615 Phil. 653 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], Corinthian Gardens Association Inc. v. Spouses Tanjangco, 578 Phil. 712 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Philippine National Construction Corp., v. Court of Appeals, 505 Phil. 87 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

[8] The lex fori (the law of the forum) is particularly important because matters of procedure not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law. (Vda. de Alcañeses v. Alcañeses, G.R. No. 187847, June 30, 2021)

[9] Vda. de Alcañeses v. Alcañeses, G.R. No. 187847, June 30, 2021, citing Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 105 (1998) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

[10] Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 11-12.

[11] Continental Micronesia v. Basso, G.R. Nos. 178382-83, September 23, 2015.

[12] Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007.

[13] Such theories nclude the (a) German rule of elective concurrence; (b) “State of the most significant relationship” rule (the Second Restatement of 1969); (c) State - interest analysis; and (d) Caver’s Principle of Preference.

[14] Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122191. October 08, 1998.

[15] Shinn, W. E. (1963). Conflict of Laws--Most Significant Relationship Rule. NCL Rev., 42, 419.

[16] See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).

[17] 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803.

[18] Case Briefs. (Date unspecified). Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll. Last accessed: September 10, 2023.

[19] 480 U.S. 102 (1987), decided on February 24, 1987.

[20] Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), presented by Justia (Justia Law). Date unspecified. Last accessed: September 11, 2023.

[21] Think of forum non conveniens.

[22] Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 11, 2023, from

[23] Grant v. Mcauliffe, 255 P.2d 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).

[24] Grant v. Mcauliffe, 255 P.2d 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).

[25] Grant v. Mcauliffe, 255 P.2d 819, 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).

[26] Grant v. Mcauliffe, 255 P.2d 819, 823-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).

[27] Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, (N.H. 1934).

[28] Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959).

[29] Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, (N.H. 1934).

[30] Quimbee. Date unspecified. “Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co.” Last accessed: September 16, 2023.

[31] Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955).

[32] 629 Phil. 365 [ G.R. No. 171092. March 15, 2010 ].

[33] 255 F.3d 1044.

[34] 36 Fed. Appx. 278, 2002 WL 1136727 (C.A. 9).

[35] 285 Phil. 734 [ G.R. No. 101538. June 23, 1992 ].

[36] Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1973, p. 331.