CHAPTER 25: DEATH & SUCCESSION
PRINCIPLES AND CASES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A PROCEDURAL APPROACH
-oOo-
MARK ANGELO S. DELA PEÑA
To cite this online book, please use the following:
Dela Peña. 2023. "Principles and Cases in Private International Law: A Procedural Approach." Published by Project Jurisprudence - Philippines. Published: September 17, 2023. Link: [Insert link] Last accessed: [Insert date of access].
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Death has been defined as the cessation of life.[1] Death spawns many legal issues such as succession,[2] dissolution of marriage, extinguishment of obligations, funeral rights, and many more.
For example, under Article 777 of the New Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Under Article 99 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the absolute community terminates upon the death of either spouse. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. At the occurence of death, civil personality is extinguished.[3]
DEATH VS. ABSENCE
Article 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired
Absence is different from death. Death is the cessation of life[4] while absence is a person’s disappearance from his/her domicile, without his/her being unknown and without him/her leaving an agent to administer his/her property.[5] Thus, again, in the same manner that adoption and use of name comingle as concepts of status or condition, the same applies to absence and domicile.
DEATH, ACTUAL & CONSTRUCTIVE
The first question, therefore, is as to when death occurs. In the Philippines, there are two types of death: (a) actual and (b) presumptive or constructive.[6]
Proof of actual death is best shown via the person’s death certificate. On the otherhand, presumptive death operates by law, i.e., it is a presumption juris tantum.[7] The law sets certain rules in the presumption of the death of a person, requiring only absence and the lapse of a period of time as discussed in the previous pages of this book. However, if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.[8]
In the Philippines, for other purposes, presumptive death occurs by operation of law under circumstances provided by the law or the rules. The pertainent laws and rules are quoted as follows:
Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.[9]
Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.[10]
Article 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents.[11]
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.[12]
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[13]
Notice that, for purposes of remarriage, the institution of a proper petition for presumptive death is required by the Rules of Court. The Family Code of the Philippines even provides as follows:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.[14]
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.[15]
When death occurs, the law student should first think about succession. While real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated,[16] intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions – including the capacity of heirs to succeed,[17] shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Article 16 and Article 1039 of the New Civil Code of the Philippine talk about intrinsic validity.
As to extrinsic validity, the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.[18]
In the resolution of the succession of a decedent, following aspects of the case are important to take note of: (a) the nationality of the decedent; (b) the presence or absence of a last will and testament; (c) the domicile of the decedent; (d) the place of execution of the will, if any; (e) the place of the forum called to settle the intestate or testate estate of the decedent; (f)
The nationality principle is not applied when determining the extrinsic validity of an alien's last will and testament. When it comes to the probate of an alien's will, whether executed here or abroad, the alien's national law may be pleaded and proved before the probate court. Otherwise, Philippine law will govern by default.[19]
The nationality principle is embodied in Article 15 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines:
“Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.”
The second paragraph of Article 16 of the Civil Code then provides that the national law of aliens shall regulate their personal rights:
“Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
“However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”
Under the nationality principle, Philippine laws continue to apply to Filipino citizens when it comes to their “family rights and duties... status, condition and legal capacity” even if they do not reside in the Philippines. In the same manner, the Philippines respects the national personal laws of aliens and defers to them when it comes to succession issues and “the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions.”[20] However, the probate of a will only involves its extrinsic validity and does not delve into its intrinsic validity, unless there are exceptional circumstances which would require the probate court to touch upon the intrinsic validity of the will.[21]
When it comes to the form and solemnities of wills, which are part of its extrinsic validity, Article 17 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provides that the law of the country of execution shall govern:
“The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
“When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
“Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.”
Even if it is assumed that the foreign law applies, it does not necessarily mean that the Philippine court loses jurisdiction. Foreign law, when relevant, must still be proven as a fact by evidence, as Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws.[22]
Courts, therefore, retain jurisdiction over the subject matter of a probate case and the res in litem even if foreign law is invoked.[23]
FORMALITIES OF WILLS
FOR FOREIGNERS
Articles 816 and 817 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provide for the probate of an alien's will. Article 816 reads:
“The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”
Article 816 covers a situation where the alien decedent was abroad when the will was executed. It provides that the will can be submitted for probate in the Philippines, using either the law where the decedent resides or Philippine law. Article 816 of the Civil Code clearly made this jurisdiction’s laws applicable, as seen with the phrase “in conformity with those which this Code provides.”
On the other hand, Article 817 states:
“A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.”
Article 817 provides that a will by an alien executed in the Philippines shall be treated as if it were executed according to Philippine laws, if it was validly executed and accordingly could have been probated under the laws of the alien's country of nationality.
Further, Article 817 does not exclude the participation of Philippine courts in the probate of an alien's will, especially when the will passes real property in the Philippines. It provides an option to the heirs or the executor: to use Philippine law, or plead and prove foreign law. Thus, it does not remove jurisdiction from the Philippine courts.
This option is clear from the clause “which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country,” which implies that either the alien's national law or Philippine law applies in the probate proceedings. Additionally, the clause “shall have the same effect as if executed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines” creates a fiction that foreign law if proven will have the same effect as Philippine law.
Clearly from the above, as to the extrinsic validity of an alien's will, Articles 816 and 817 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines both allow the application of Philippine law.
The power of our courts to probate a will executed by an alien is likewise apparent in Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, which provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, their will may be proved in the Regional Trial Court of any province in which they had an estate:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
In Palaganas v. Palaganas,[24] the Supreme Court ruled that the trial court properly allowed the probate of an American citizen's will, which had not yet undergone probate in the alien decedent's country of nationality, stating thus:
“But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
“In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
“Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devises of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.”[25]
If an alien-decedent duly executes a will in accordance with the forms and solemnities required by Philippine law, barring any other defect as to the extrinsic validity of the will, the courts may take cognizance of the petition and allow the probate of the will. In fact, wills of foreigners executed in the Philippines may be probated if they have estate in the Philippines, because probate of the properties can only be effected under Philippine law. In Johannes v. Harvey,[26] the Supreme Court held:
“It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the United States. The ancillary administration is proper, wherever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.”[27]
The case of In Re Will of Palaganas (Palaganas v. Palagas),[28] the dispute was about the probate before a Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner although it had not yet been probated in its place of execution. In this case, it was insisted that Ruperta's will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, i.e., the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. However, the Court ruled that reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that the process of probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established. Besides, requiring that a will is first probated in a foreign country before having the same probated in Philippine curts is on the side of impracticality. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it would be as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since Philippine law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.[29]
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
FOREIGNER’S WILL
When the law of a foreigner whose will is under consideration does disregards the compulsory heir provisions of Philippine courts, foreign law – the national law of the testator – may be pleaded and proved in order to justify such disregard. Even if the foreign law disregards the mandatory legitime of heirs under Philippine laws, an argument on the basis of public policy would still not prevail because, precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, “notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article” when the lawmakers incorporated Article 11 of the Old Civil Code as Article 17 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Old Civil Code into Article 16 in the New Civil Code of the Philippines.[30] The Supreme Court ventured the guess that Congress must have had the purpose of making the second paragraph of Article 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Article 1039 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.[31]
The High Court found it evident that, whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in the Philippine system of legitimes, Congress has not been inclined to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, the order of succession, capacity to succeed of the heirs and the intrinsic provisions of the will to the decedent’s national law.[32] Generalia specialibus non derogant; specific provisions must prevail over general ones.[33]
In Bellis v. Bellis,[34] appellants pointed out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he (the testator) intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as the Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo,[35] a provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void. This is because his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters enumerated under Article 16 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines mandated to be governed by his national law.[36] In the Bellis case,[37] the parties admitted that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, and that under the laws of Texas, there were no forced heirs or compulsory legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.[38]
To recapitulate, the study of public international law in the field of succession law, the law student must keep in mind the following provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines:
“Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”
“Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
“When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
“Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.”
“Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines.”
“Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”
“Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.”
“Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed.”
“Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.”
TESTATOR’S DESIGNATION
OF APPLICABLE LAW
Under Article 5.1 of the Convention of 1 August 1989 on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons,[39] a person may designate the law of a particular state to govern the succession to the whole of his estate; this designation will be effective only, if at the time of the designation or of his/her death, such person was a national of that state or had his habitual residence there.
The question now for the law student is whether, in the context of Philippine succession law, a testator may include a valid and enforceable choice-of-law clause in his/her last will and testament. To answer this question, analysis should start with Philippine law which provides that intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.[40] Indeed, Philippine law has set the application of the decedent’s national law in terms of these aspects of succession.
If the Philippine court, for example, looks into the national law of a Michigan decedent and finds that Michigan law allows the decedent to make a choice of law in his/her last will, there can be no objection. Assume, for this example, that the Michigan testator chose Maryland law to apply in his/her will. However, the problem here is that the proponent of the will would be obliged again to prove the existence and contents of Maryland law as this is a foreign law. This “designation of law” or choice of law in a testator’s will is supported by United States jurisprudence such as the case of Harrison v. Nixon[41] which set the principle called “manifest intention.”[42]
In the case of a Filipino, then, the question is whether a Filipino testator has the same liberty to designate a foreign law to apply to his/her will. To answer this question, it is first important to determine whether such provision is an extrinsic matter or an intrinsic matter.
The extrinsic validity of a will refers to a finding by a court that all the formalities of either a holographic or notarial will have been sufficiently complied with, leading to the legal conclusion that the will submitted to probate is authentic and duly executed.[43] The Supreme Court explained in the case of Dorotheo v. Court of Appeals[44] that a probate proceeding deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on four aspects: (a) whether the will submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (b) compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills; (c) the testamentary capacity of the testator; and, (d) the due execution of the last will and testament.
The extrinsic validity of a will, i.e., that the document purporting to be a will is determined to be authentic and duly executed by the decedent, is different from its intrinsic validity because intrinsic validity of the will refers to the manner in which the properties were apportioned,[45] thus relating to whether the order and allocation of successional rights are in accordance with law. It can also refer to whether an heir has not been disqualified from inheriting from the decedent.[46]
The question of whether testamentary choice of law is an extrinsic or an intrinsic matter is important because the rule on lex loci celebrationis generally applies to the extrinsic validity of the will, except of course on the matter of the testamentary capacity[47] of the testator. By the process of elimination, it becomes clear that testamentary choice of law is an intrinsic matter.
Now confronting the question head on, a Filipino testator designates a foreign law to apply to his/her last will and testament. Whether or not a public policy is involved in the Philippine system of legitimes is not clear.[48] Whether there is such a public policy, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.[49] Nonetheless, since s/he is a national of the Philippines, the disposition of his/her estate must be governed by the law of this jurisdiction which compels certain persons such as a spouse and children to inherit a portion defined by law. If the testamentary choice of law impairs this system of legitimes, such cannot be given effect because acts contrary to the mandatory provisions of law are void.[50] If, however, the testamentary choice of law relates to the disposition of the Filipino testator’s free portion, i.e., the portion of his estate s/he is free to control after deduction of the legitime and without impairing such legitime, the same may be given effect. The reason for this is that it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession.[51] All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.[52]
MICIANO V. BRIMO
The case of Miciano v. Brimo[53] was about the partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo. The judicial administrator of said estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The opposition was based on the argument that the partition in question put into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo’s will which were not in accordance with the laws of the decendent’s Turkish nationality, for which reason they should be declared void as being in violation of the old Civil Code’s provision the nationality principle in matters of succession. The student must note that the nationality principle under the old Code and under the New Civil Code of the Philippines has practically remained the same, except for the addition of Article 1039 in the latter.
However, the oppositor was not able to prove that said testamentary dispositions were in fact not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter. Hence, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of processual presumption, citing an older case.[54]
The oppositor actually wanted the trial court to defer the approval of the scheme of partition until such time that he would be able to arrange evidence to prove Turkish law. The trial court refused to defer the proceedings, asking therefore for another opportunity to present evidence. According to the Supreme Court, said refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary on the part of the trial court, especially considering that the oppositor was actually granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence. This author believes that the main point here is that, despite the ample opportunity given to the oppositor, he still failed to prove the existence of foreign law. In other words, the proceedings cannot be made to wait for the parties to make arrangements regarding their evidence; hence, as long as ample time in accordance with law and the rules was given to them, failure to prove foreign law would still be fatal.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court still made a ruling in favor of the oppositor inasmuch as his institution as a legatee was concerned. The institution of legatees in the Brimo’s will was under the condition that the instituted legatees would respect the testator’s will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, i.e., Turkish laws, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who would fail to comply with it would be prevented from receiving a legacy arising from the last will. However, the Court found that said condition was void for being contrary to law because it expressly ignored the testator’s national law when, according to Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which was applicable at the time, the national law of the testator should govern his testamentary dispositions.
Three things can be learned from the Miciano v. Brimo case. First, proof of foreign law must be pleaded and proved within the time allowed for the proceedings to progress. Second, even if foreign law is not proved and even if Philippine laws are made to apply, the courts are not prohibited from making a determination of the nationality of the decedent, especially if the same is expressed in his/her last will. Third, if Philippine law is the proper choice of law, a provision of the will that contravenes the laws in this jurisdiction may be declared void.
CAYETANO V. LEONIDAS
In the case of Cayetano v. Leonidas,[55] Adoracion C. Campos – American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania – died on January 31, 1977, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos. Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased testator. Hermogenes Campos was preterited in the will.
The Supreme Court held that, as a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.[56] Here, it was maintained that since the court a quo allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
Article 16 and Article 1039 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines were applied by the Court in resolving this issue. It was held that the law which governed Adoracion Campo’s will was the law of Pennsylvania, which was the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admitted that the Pennsylvania law did not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testator to a complete stranger, it was argued that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine law. However, the Court countered that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 and Article 1039 of the New Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must be applied.
VDA. DE PEREZ V. TOLETE
The case of Vda. De Perez v. Tolete[57] is about Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and who established a successful medical practice in New York. The Cunanans lived in New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14. On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor. On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administrator of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
There were two issues in this case. First is whether the joint probate of two wills should be allowed. Second is whether the will should be considered extrinsically valid and under what law.
According to the Supreme Court, there was merit in the argument that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. The contrary view that the Rules of Court on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for each of the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, stating that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of justice.[58]
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators’ reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.[59] Here, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contained essentially the same provisions and pertain to pieces of property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As the Supreme Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.[60]
As to the question of extrinsic validity, the respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, would only be effective in the Philippines upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
“Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.” (Emphases supplied by this author)
Thus, according to the above quotation, the will of an alien is extrinsically valid and may be allowed in probate in the Philippines in three instances: (a) its formalities comply with the law of the residence of the testator; (b) its formalities comply with the national law of the testator; or, (c) its formalities comply with Philippine law. A Filipino testator who resides in the Philippine would only have one option in the formalities of his/her will and cannot avail of the formalities under Article 816. However, a Texas citizen who resides in China may avail of the formalities allowed under said provision.
In the case of the Cunanan spouses, the petitioner failed to prove the pertinent foreign law during the proceedings in the lower court. There being no proof that both wills conformed with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws, the foreign law cannot be taken judicial notice of. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (a) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (b) the testator’s domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (c) the admission of the will to probate in such foreign country; (d) the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal; and, (e) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.[61] Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of them.[62]
During the proceedings in the lower court, petitioner moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate.[63]
FLUEMER V. HIX
In Re Estate of Hix (Fluemer v. Hix),[64] it was the theory of petitioner that the alleged will was executed in West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To bolster this, there was submission of a copy of a textbook with annotations about West Virginia law, certified to by the Director of the National Library. The Supreme Court said that such submission was far from compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in Philippine courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.[65]
In the Fluemer v. Hix case, the requirements of the law were not met. There was also no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in Section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure.[66] Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in Section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point was the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, or that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia was said to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside outside of the Philippine Islands, it would then be the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means.
The Supreme Court also said in the Fluemer case that it was necessary for petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. The Court appeared to consider that the recitals in the alleged will were not sufficient to establish the fact of domicile. This is important to think about because of two reasons. First, if the will is proved extrinsically valid, the recitals in the will regarding the testator’s domicile should be considered prima facie proof of such fact. Second, however, if the will’s extrinsic validity is not proved extrinsically valid, the question is whether there can be a presumption as to the truth of the recitals made therein, which do not affect the intrinsic aspects of the will.
For example, under Article 834 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, the recognition of a nonmarital[67] child does not lose its legal effect, even though the will wherein it was made should be revoked. Hence, the question is whether a void will for lack of the formalities required by law, which declares that the domicile or residence of the testator is in a certain state, should be recognized insofar as such declaration is concerned.
GIBBS V. GOVERNMENT
Gibbs v. Government of the Philippine Islands[68] was about the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs. Eva died intestate in California. Both Allison and Eva were California citizens at the time of her death, domiciling therein.
Eva’s estate included parcels of land located in Manila, Philippines. The question was whether new certificates of title should be issued to Allison without requiring him to show proof of payment of succession tax under Philippine law.
The Supreme Court, speaking through the pen of American Justice Butte, said that the law of California should be resorted to. This was a problematic analysis because, at the time, the Philippine was practically autonomous and separate from the United States, although still operating under what is known as the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Jones Law) which was enacted by the Congress of the United States. Nonetheless, the Court refused to settle the matter of succession because the case was merely amount taxes due.
As to the question of whether Eva at the time of her death was the owner of a descendible interest in the parcels Philippine land, the Court was faced with a dilemma. The Court asked: “If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.” It was nevertheless ruled that he nature and extent of the title which vested in Eva at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. Consdiering that the parcels of land in question were acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of Allison and Evan, under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband.
Note that this case was decided before the effectivity of the New Civil Code of the Philippines and way prior to the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines.
IN RE ESTATE OF EMIL H. JOHNSON
In the case of In Re Estate of Johnson,[69] Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a last will and testament dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of which was around Php231,800.00. It was holographic instrument written in the testator’s own handwriting and signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses as required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was then applicable. Note that this was a 1918 case.
According to the Supreme Court, the holographic will was not executed in conformity with the provisions of Philippine law; hence, could not have been proved under Section 618 as mentioned above.
Five days after Johnson’s death, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Manila for the probate of this will, alleging that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that state; and, therefore, it could properly be probated here pursuant to Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Said Section 636, which was applicable at that time, said:
“Will made here by alien.—A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.”
The trial court allowed probate of the will.
Opposition was made on the probate of the will because (a) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the City of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at the time the will in question was executed; (b) the will should be considered invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois; (c) the order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and, (d) the order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
As to the issue of residence, the Supreme Court noted that the attempt to annul the probate of the will did not assert that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The most that was said on this point was that he was “never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was a resident of the City of Manila.” Of course, residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois. This argument attempted to refute the testator’s citizenship in Illinois, therefore, was found to be wholly insufficient.
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them, the probate is conclusive.[70]
Considering that the judgment of the trial court recited that the will was executed in conformity with the law of Illinois and also, in effect, that the testator was a citizen of that State, said judgment had become an unassailable basis. In fact, no evidence was adduced to show that the testator had abandoned Illinois as the state of his permanent domicile. On the contrary, the records reflected that he had a certificate of naturalization from Illinois.
As to the issue on the sufficiency and validity of the will under Illinois law, the problem about the trial court, however, was that it took judicial notice of the law of Illinois. The Supreme Court recognized that it was an error for the court to do so but said: “such error is not now available to the petitioner.” Hence, considering that the issue was not raised during the proceedings below, the Court in effect said that oppositor could no longer raise the same on appeal.
As to the issue on lack of notice, the Supreme Court held that the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated. Citing the case of In Re Davis,[71] it was pronounced that “the proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property.”
Anent the issue on jurisdiction, the Court found it sufficient to say: “It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks essential jurisdiction over the probate of wills.”
LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS[72]
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became a New York citizen, albeit a domiciliary of the Philippines, long before and at the time of: (a) his divorce from Paula, a Filipina; (b) marriage to Alicia; (c) execution of his will; and (4d) death, was duly established, admitted and undisputed. What then is the applicable law? And, who is entitled to inherit from Lorenzo?
Article 15 of the New Civil Code provides for the nationality principle over a person’s family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity. Article 16, on the other hand, provides that intrinsic testamentary provisions are governed by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
It appears from the facts of this case that the trial court and the Court of Appeals hastily disregarded the foreign law and quickly applied Philippine law on the premise that “American law follows the domiciliary theory,” thereby applying the renvoi principle, without giving attention to the foreign law invoked in the pleadings. The trial court also held that the will was intrinsically invalid simply because it contained dispositions in favor of Alicia (the second wife), who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alicia, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
Short of castigating the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that, first, there was no reason to apply the theory of renvoi because, in the first place, there was no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine was called for or required by New York law. Second, the incidents of the case being necessarily governed by foreign law under the nationality principle, the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to give due course to the question of foreign law. Third, the claim that Alicia was a paramour, being the wife after the divorce, ignored the principles of comity extended to the recognition of foreign divorce decrees in the Philippines. Fourth, whether the will was intrinsically valid and who should inherit from Lorenzo were issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Also, whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required could be answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. Fifth, whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent’s national law.
In finis, the Court wrote the following fallo:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
“In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
“Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente's will and determination of the parties' successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
“No costs.
“SO ORDERED.”
[1] Continental Steel v. Montaño, G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009, 618 Phil. 634, citing Black's Law Dictionary.
[2] Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. (New Civil Code of the Philippines)
[3] Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (New Civil Code of the Philippines)
[4] Continental Steel v. Montaño, G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009.
[5] Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013.
[6] See Valdez v. Republic, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009.
[7] See Valdez v. Republic, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009.
[8] Article 43 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[9] New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[10] New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[11] New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[12] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
[13] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
[14] Family Code of the Philippines.
[15] Family Code of the Philippines.
[16] Article 16 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[17] Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (New Civil Code of the Philippines)
[18] Article 17 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[19] In Re Will of Lipson, G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020.
[20] In Re Will of Lipson, G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020.
[21] Spouses Ajero v. Court of Appeals, 306 Phil 500, 509 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[22] Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
[23] In Re Will of Lipson, G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020.
[24] Palaganas v. Palaganas, 655 Phil. 535, 539-540 (2011) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
[25] Palaganas v. Palaganas, 655 Phil. 535, 539-540 (2011) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
[26] 43 Phil. 175 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[27] 3 Phil. 175 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[28] G.R. No. 169144. January 26, 2011, 655 Phil. 535.
[29] Article 838 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court.
[30] Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967.
[31] Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967.
[32] Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967.
[33] See Tuna Processing v. Philippine Kingford, G.R. No. 185582, February 29, 2012.
[34] G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967.
[35] 50 Phil. 867, 870.
[36] Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967.
[37] G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967.
[38] G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967.
[39] Concluded on August 1st, 1989.
[40] Article 16 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[41] 34 U.S. 483 (1835).
[42] See Yiannopoulos, A. N. (1958). Wills of Movables in American International Conflicts Law: A Critique of the Domiciliary Rule. Calif. L. Rev., 46, 185.
[43] In Re Will of Lipson, G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020.
[44] 377 Phil 851 (19991) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[45] Tanchanco v. Santos, G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020.
[46] In Re Will of Lipson, G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020.
[47] Capacity of a person is governed by his/her national law (Article 15 of the New Civil Code of the Philpipines).
[48] In Re Testate Estate of Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967.
[49] In Re Testate Estate of Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967.
[50] Article 5 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[51] Seangio v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006.
[52] Tolentino, Arturo M., “Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,” Volume III, p. 30.
[53] G.R. No. 22595, November 01, 1924, 50 Phil. 867.
[54] Lim and Urn vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472.
[55] G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984, 214 Phil. 460.
[56] Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478. See also Morales v. Olondriz, G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016.
[57] 302 Phil. 764 FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 76714. June 02, 1994 ].
[58] Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984].
[59] Article 818 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
[60] Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990].
[61] III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930].
[62] Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974].
[63] Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978].
[64] 54 Phil. 610 [ G. R. No. L-32636. March 17, 1930 ].
[65] In Re Estate of Johnson [1918], 339 Phil. 156 [ G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918 ].
[66] This was the prevailing rule of procedure at the time.
[67] This is the new term used in jurisprudence to refer to illegitimate children.
[68] 59 Phil. 293 [ G.R. No. 35694. December 23, 1933 ].
[69] 39 Phil. 156 [ G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918 ].
[70] Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395; Montafiano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.
[71] 136 Cal., 590, 596.
[72] 399 Phil. 342 [ G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000 ].
