CHAPTER 33: FULL TEXT OF AND COMMENTS ON THE HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION

PRINCIPLES AND CASES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:

A PROCEDURAL APPROACH

 

-oOo-

 

MARK ANGELO S. DELA PEÑA

To cite this online book, please use the following:

Dela Peña. 2023. "Principles and Cases in Private International Law: A Procedural Approach." Published by Project Jurisprudence - Philippines. Published: September 17, 2023. Link: [Insert link] Last accessed: [Insert date of access].

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CHAPTER 33:

FULL TEXT OF AND COMMENTS ON

THE HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION

            Below, quoted in full, is the text of the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters. The quoted text is italized and is fully indented while the comments of the author are in normal text and indentation.

 

CHAPTER I – SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

 

Article 1

Scope

 

1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil or commercial matters. It shall not extend in particular to revenue, customs or administrative matters.

 

2. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement in one Contracting State of a judgment given by a court of another Contracting State.

 

            Considering that private international law primarily relates to the private transactions of private individuals, tax and administrative matters are not treated under the Convention. Tax matters and procedures are often confined within the territorial limits of the state concerned while administrative matters such as the removal or suspension of government employees, officers and officials are internal matters that pertain to the local and institutional mechanisms of the government involved.

 

Article 2

Exclusions from scope

 

1. This Convention shall not apply to the following matters –

 

(a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons;

 

(b) maintenance obligations;^[1]

 

(c) other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and other rights or obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships;

 

(d) wills and succession;

 

(e) insolvency, composition, resolution of financial institutions, and analogous matters;

 

(f) the carriage of passengers and goods;

 

(g) transboundary marine pollution, marine pollution in areas beyond national jurisdiction, ship-source marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, and general average;

 

(h) liability for nuclear damage;

 

(i) the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, and the validity of decisions of their organs;

 

(j) the validity of entries in public registers;

 

(k) defamation;

 

(l) privacy;

 

(m) intellectual property;

 

(n) activities of armed forces, including the activities of their personnel in the exercise of their official duties;

 

(o) law enforcement activities, including the activities of law enforcement personnel in the exercise of their official duties;

 

(p) anti-trust (competition) matters, except where the judgment is based on conduct that constitutes an anti-competitive agreement or concerted practice among actual or potential competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids, establish output restrictions or quotas, or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or lines of commerce, and where such conduct and its effect both occurred in the State of origin;

 

(q) sovereign debt restructuring through unilateral State measures.

 

2. A judgment is not excluded from the scope of this Convention where a matter to which this Convention does not apply arose merely as a preliminary question in the proceedings in which the judgment was given, and not as an object of the proceedings. In particular, the mere fact that such a matter arose by way of defence does not exclude a judgment from the Convention, if that matter was not an object of the proceedings.

 

3. This Convention shall not apply to arbitration and related proceedings.

 

4. A judgment is not excluded from the scope of this Convention by the mere fact that a State, including a government, a governmental agency or any person acting for a State, was a party to the proceedings.

 

5. Nothing in this Convention shall affect privileges and immunities of States or of international organisations, in respect of themselves and of their property.

 

            As to exclusion (a) above, the status, condition and legal capacity of persons is governed by their national law.^[2] This is why, as a rule, such matters cannot be covered by a foreign judgment.

 

            As to exclusion (b) above, “maintenance obligations” are those arising from a family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity, including a maintenance obligation in respect of a child regardless of the marital status of the parents. This is covered by the 2007 Maintenance Obligations Protocol, which is the reason for its exclusion under the Convention. In the Philippines, A.M. No. 21-03-02-SC^[3] treats of the rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions and judgments on support.

 

            As to exclusion (c) above, i.e., other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and other rights or obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships, a state usually provides that property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by its laws. For example, in the Philippines, the property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: (a) by marriage settlements executed before the marriage; (b) by the provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (c) by the local custom.^[4] The reason for exclusion under the Convention is probably the usually public policy or state interest of indivdual countries in family law matters.

 

            As to exclusion (d) above, i.e., wills and succession, while succession is a civil law matter, such matters are excluded under the Convention because of two reasons, among others. First is the lex rei sitae principle; property is governed by the law of the place where it is situated. Hence, it is expected that the forum of the lex situs that will determine, as a rule, what becomes of property, whether real or person, located within its jurisdiction. In the Philippines, the extrinsic validty of the will is governed by lex loci celebrationis while its intrinsic validty – such as the order of succession, the amount of succcesional rights, and the capacity of heirs to succeed – is governed by the national law of the decedent whose succession is in question. Second, if a foreign probate court decides to allow a will, for example, the problem is that, under Philippine laws, no real or personal property shall pass without probate under the forum’s procedure.^[5] In other words, even if a foreign court has allowed a will, a mere petition for recognition and enforcement thereof will not be sufficient insofar as Philippine laws are concerned because the same will has to undergo probate (“reprobate”)^[6] in a proper Philippine court.

 

As to exclusion (e) above, i.e.,  insolvency, composition, resolution of financial institutions, and analogous matters, the fear is that cross-border insolvency laws may have the risk of being too all-encompassing, which, if it is founded on universality and unity, can go against contractual expectations.^[7] The author is constrained to quote a full paragraph from Fletcher (1993) because of the way his book described the problem or problems about international insolvency in a succinct yet very illuminating. He said: “The problems generated by international insolvency are not solely confined to the sphere of international banking, nor are they particularly new in the experience of private international lawyers. Attempts to construct theoretical models for the solution of these problems have been made in the past, but they have generally failed to commend themselves at the practical level. On the other hand, the difficulty of obtaining wide-scale international agreement to any but the most limited of practical proposals for cross-border collaboration quickly becomes obvious in face of the divergent national laws regarding credit, security, and insolvency, which penetrate deeply into the socioeconomic bedrock of the sovereign states concerned. The reluctance to turn over assets to be administered abroad according to a different insolvency law regime is understandable.”^[8] Despite these difficulties, the international community has shown participation and effort in determining the proper, practical and possible private international law guidelines for insolvency disputes,^[9] especially that of banks.

 

As to exclusion (f) above, i.e., the carriage of passengers and goods, there are existing conventions in relation to these matters such as but not limited to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air.^[10]

 

As to exclusion (g) above, i.e., transboundary marine pollution, marine pollution in areas beyond national jurisdiction, ship-source marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, and general average, there are also existing international conventions and protocols on these matters. The same is true for exclusion (h), i.e.,  liability for nuclear damage.

 

As to exclusion (i) above, i.e., the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, and the validity of decisions of their organs, whether or not an organization or a corporation is a juridical entity (a person in the eyes of the law) is a matter for a state to decide, not the forum of a foreign country. A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state acting according to law.^[11] Logically, since its existence flows from the Philippine state which breathes life into it, its rights and privileges are solely dependent on its creator.

 

As to exclusion (j) above, i.e., the validity of entries in public registers, it must be recalled that entries in the civil registry are matters concerning the status or condition of a person such as his/her name, birth, civil status, death and so on. This being the case, they refer to a person’s status and legal condition and are governed by the national law of the preson whose civil registry entries are in question. A foreign court, for example, would be acting without authority to declare the correction of entries in a certificate of live birth of a Filipino.

 

As to exclusion (k) above, i.e., defamation, the difficulty usually arises from the fact that defamation laws are not only varying in degrees of penalty across states but also different in terms of treatment. Some states consider defamation as a mere civil wrong while others criminalize it. Not only this but also the fact that the consequences of a defamatory act may be categorized as something that transcends boundaries, especially with the present state of technological advancements.

 

In the Philippines, deliberations in Congress in relation to defamation indicate that the concern was with no other matter than the “place” where the civil and criminal actions for written defamation may or should be filed.^[12] The attention was on venue, not jurisdiction.^[13] The Supreme Court of the Philippines has clarified that the rules venue for criminal actions based on written defamation are as follows: (a) whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published; (b) if the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the province where s/he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense; (c) if the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila, Philippines at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila; and, (d) if the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.^[14] Without these venue requirements under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, a private person induced by a motive to harass could, similarly as a public officer, coerce a journalist to defend against a libel suit filed in the most remote of places.^[15]

 

Even the rules on venue for civil actions arising from injury caused by defamation are governed by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.^[16] To quote, the provision states:

 

“Article 360. Persons responsible. – Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

 

“The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

 

“The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, However, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published: Provided, Further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa: Provided, Furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.”

           

            Due to the peculiar nature of the act of defamation and its seemingly transboundary effects, there is a need to establish special rules, which is the reason for the exclusion of (k) above. Experience has shown that, without care, the rules could allow the offended party to harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.^[17] With this in mind, the Supreme Court held that, if the defamatory statement is alleged to have been made through radio, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines – not Section 15 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court – governs in determining the venue of the action.^[18] This conclusion is supported by the rule that in construing a statute, the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes which induced the enactment of a law are important factors to be considered in its construction.^[19]

 

            In simpler terms, the problem with defamation venue rules in the real of private international law is that complexity emerges where the tortious act has been committed in one place but the harm occurred in another.^[20] To attempt to resolve this, the trend has been towards the proximity principle which provides that the applicable law shall be the law which has the strongest connection with the tortious situation.^[21] While there is still no concrete resolution to these venue questions, Prévost, E. (2019) appears correct in saying that:

 

“While claimants have an established right to choose the court where they launch a defamation lawsuit, the deliberate choice of a jurisdiction that is likely to be favourable to the claimant can have a significant chilling effect on the freedom of expression. In an environment where virtually any court in any country where content is accessed online may be chosen to launch a libel suit, defendants (whether individuals or legal entities, such as media) face heightened levels of unpredictability, which may in turn influence their expression.”^[22]

 

As to exclusion (l) above, i.e., privacy, also referring to data protection, and exclusion (m), intellectual property, the same issues on predictability that are attendant to defamation cases may arise.^[23]

 

As to exclusion (n) above, i,e., activities of armed forces, including the activities of their personnel in the exercise of their official duties, and exclusion (o), i.e., law enforcement activities, including the activities of law enforcement personnel in the exercise of their official duties, the rationale behind such exclusions can be drawn from an analogous application of the act of state doctrine and the principles of immunity or qualified immunity. Note that the official acts of the armed forces of a state and its law enforcement elements flow from the concept of sovereignty or what is known as constituent functions. Constituent function are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature. These are functions which the government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.^[24] If a foreign court is not supposed to sit in judgment over the acts of another state in its official capacity, this rule applies to exclusion (n) and exclusion (o) relative to activities of armed forces or law enforcement activities.

 

As to exclusion (p) above, i.e., anti-trust (competition) matters, except anti-competitive in relation to anti-competition activities where such conduct and its effect both occurred in the state of origin, normally, the issue is on diversity of citizenship. In the Philippines, conflict of laws rules would not be much of a problem if the anti-trust offenders are Filipinos residing in the Philippines. This, however, has become complex, especially because of the access of multinational corporations to different state territories, thereby affecting multiple markets. According to Buxbaum, H. L., & Michaels, R. (2012), “consistent focus on the affected market for questions of jurisdiction and applicable law is possible and yields consistent and acceptable results. It is problematic, however, where more than one market is affected. Where multiple defendants are involved, as in the case of a cartel, the domicile of one among them does not provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over the others. A mechanism for aggregating claims from multiple jurisdictions implicates significant conflict-of-laws issues. The successful introduction of such a mechanism in Europe may require a base level of similarity in the procedural laws of the Member States.”^[25]

 

As to exclusion (q) above, i.e., sovereign debt restructuring through unilateral State measures, suffice it to say that a sovereign debt is not enforced through local channels or local forums if sought to be enforced by another sovereign. The complication arises from private bondholders or private lenders who may be inclined to recover through judicial means their credit against a foreign state defaulting on its sovereign debt.^[26]

 

Such private creditors will have a problem in pursuing their claims in a Philippine forum because of the concept of royal prerogative of dishonesty that prevails in Philippine jurisprudence. ^[27] As a general rule, a state may not be sued.^[28] However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit.^[29] There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability only if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. However, when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity, no such waiver may be implied. Statutory provisions waiving state immunity are construed in strictissimi juris because waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.^[30]

 

Article 3

Definitions

 

1. In this Convention –

 

(a) “defendant” means a person against whom the claim or counterclaim was brought in the State of origin;

 

(b) “judgment” means any decision on the merits given by a court, whatever that decision may be called, including a decree or order, and a determination of costs or expenses of the proceedings by the court (including an officer of the court), provided that the determination relates to a decision on the merits which may be recognised or enforced under this Convention. An interim measure of protection is not a judgment.

 

2. An entity or person other than a natural person shall be considered to be habitually resident in the State –

 

(a) where it has its statutory seat;

 

(b) under the law of which it was incorporated or formed;

 

(c) where it has its central administration; or

 

(d) where it has its principal place of business.

 

            Here, it can be seen that that the Convention delimits the meaning of the term “judgment” while defining or enumerating the conflict of laws factors or contacts relative to juridical persons like corporations.

 

            An interim measure of protection is not a judgment, says the convention, because interim measures or reliefs – also known as provisional remedies – are really not judgments on the merits but are mere procedural devices in order to preserve the status quo or protect the parties while the litigation is pending.

 

            Anent the habitual residence (domicile) of a juridical entity such as a corporation, the convention pegs the same in four situses: (a) the place where the law sets its domicile; (b) the place where the corporation is legally registered or created; (c) the place where its board of directors sits; and, the place where it conducts its principal business.

 

CHAPTER II – RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT

 

Article 4

General provisions

 

1. A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State (State of origin) shall be recognised and enforced in another Contracting State (requested State) in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in this Convention.

 

2. There shall be no review of the merits of the judgment in the requested State. There may only be such consideration as is necessary for the application of this Convention.

 

3. A judgment shall be recognised only if it has effect in the State of origin, and shall be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin.

 

4. Recognition or enforcement may be postponed or refused if the judgment referred to under paragraph 3 is the subject of review in the State of origin or if the time limit for seeking ordinary review has not expired. A refusal does not prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of the judgment.

 

            Article 4 of the Convention as quoted above provides for the jurisdiction of the forum of a contracting state to recognize and enforce the judgments and decisions of a foreign court. Whereas, in the Philippines, the mother status on jurisdiction is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, Article 4 (1) appears to be a generally acceptable principle of international law, thus providing jurisdiction, based on the concepts of amity, comity and cooperation among nations.

 

            Article 4 (2) limits the power of review of the forum over the foreign judgment or decision. As a general rule, the forum cannot relitigate the merits of the case as this would amount to a disrespect for the processes of that foreign court which rendered it, whose processes are presumed to be under lawful exercise of jurisdiction.^[31]

 

            Article 4 (3) affirms the age-old rule that an action barred elsewhere is likewise barred in the Philippines.

 

            Article 4 (4) adopts the internationally widespread concepts of litis pendentia. In Philippine municipal law, litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation in which another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. According to the Supreme Court, this “theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.”^[32]

           

            Article 4 (4) also recognizes that a foreign judgment or decision may be subject to appeal or review. In fact, in the Philippines, execution shall only issue as a matter of right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.^[33]

 

            Moreover, Article 4 (4) states that a “refusal does not prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of the judgment.” The term “refusal” was used by the Convention. Thus, this author’s view that a court’s most prudent action, for example, in case the affirmative defense of forum non conveniens is properly established, is not to dismiss the case but merely to refuse to exercise jurisdiction.

 

Article 5

Bases for recognition and enforcement

 

1. A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if one of the following requirements is met –

 

(a) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought was habitually resident in the State of origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin;

 

(b) the natural person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought had their principal place of business in the State of origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin and the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of that business;

 

(c) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought is the person that brought the claim, other than a counterclaim, on which the judgment is based;

 

(d) the defendant maintained a branch, agency, or other establishment without separate legal personality in the State of origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin, and the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of that branch, agency, or establishment;

 

(e) the defendant expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the court of origin in the course of the proceedings in which the judgment was given;

 

(f) the defendant argued on the merits before the court of origin without contesting jurisdiction within the timeframe provided in the law of the State of origin, unless it is evident that an objection to jurisdiction or to the exercise of jurisdiction would not have succeeded under that law;

 

(g) the judgment ruled on a contractual obligation and it was given by a court of the State in which performance of that obligation took place, or should have taken place, in accordance with

 

(i) the agreement of the parties, or

 

(ii) the law applicable to the contract, in the absence of an agreed place of performance, unless the activities of the defendant in relation to the transaction clearly did not constitute a purposeful and substantial connection to that State;

 

(h) the judgment ruled on a lease of immovable property (tenancy) and it was given by a court of the State in which the property is situated;

 

(i) the judgment ruled against the defendant on a contractual obligation secured by a right in rem in immovable property located in the State of origin, if the contractual claim was brought together with a claim against the same defendant relating to that right in rem;

 

(j) the judgment ruled on a non-contractual obligation arising from death, physical injury, damage to or loss of tangible property, and the act or omission directly causing such harm occurred in the State of origin, irrespective of where that harm occurred;

 

(k) the judgment concerns the validity, construction, effects, administration or variation of a trust created voluntarily and evidenced in writing, and –

 

(i) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin was designated in the trust instrument as a State in the courts of which disputes about such matters are to be determined; or

 

(ii) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin was expressly or impliedly designated in the trust instrument as the State in which the principal place of administration of the trust is situated.

 

This sub-paragraph only applies to judgments regarding internal aspects of a trust between persons who are or were within the trust relationship;

 

(l) the judgment ruled on a counterclaim –

 

(i) to the extent that it was in favour of the counterclaimant, provided that the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim; or

 

(ii) to the extent that it was against the counterclaimant, unless the law of the State of origin required the counterclaim to be filed in order to avoid preclusion;

 

(m) the judgment was given by a court designated in an agreement concluded or documented in writing or by any other means of communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference, other than an exclusive choice of court agreement.

 

For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, an “exclusive choice of court agreement” means an agreement concluded by two or more parties that designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one State or one or more specific courts of one State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.

 

2. If recognition or enforcement is sought against a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer) in matters relating to a consumer contract, or against an employee in matters relating to the employee’s contract of employment –

 

(a) paragraph 1(e) applies only if the consent was addressed to the court, orally or in writing;

 

(b) paragraph 1(f), (g) and (m) do not apply.

 

3. Paragraph 1 does not apply to a judgment that ruled on a residential lease of immovable property (tenancy) or ruled on the registration of immovable property. Such a judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement only if it was given by a court of the State where the property is situated.

 

            Before proceeding from here, the student must understand that, when the words “plaintiff” and “defendant” are used in the following commentaries, such words refer to the parties in the case heard by the forum court, i.e., the foreign court that rendered the judgment or decision sought to be recognized and enforced in the Philippines. When the words “petitioner” and “respondent” are used in the following commentaries, such words refer to the parties in the petition for recognition and enforcement filed in a Philippine court for the purpose of executing and satisfying the foreign judgment or decision issued by the foreign court.

 

As mentioned, a judgment or decision rendered by a foreign court is not automatically recognized or enforced in the Philippines. According to the Convention, such judgment or decision may be recognized and enforced, in a proper petition, by a Philippine forum in any of the cases enumerated under Article 5. Article 5 appears to anchor on over-person jurisdiction exercised by the foreign forum which rendered said judgment or decision. For example, Article 5.1 (a), 5.1 (b) and 5.1 (c) speak about the domiciliary status of the defendant in the state of the foreign forum, about the principal place of business of the defendant (if the judgment or decision is based on claims arising from such business or its activities), and about the fact that the respondent in the petition for recognition and enforcement was the plaintiff – not simply a counterclaimant – in the case heard and decided by the foreign forum.

 

Article 5.1 (d) speaks of the respondent’s branch operations, agency relationship or any other business organization without separate juridical personality in the state of the foreign forum, that existed in said foreign state at the time when said respondent was made a party to the case in the foreign forum.

 

Article 5.1 (e) and 5.1 (f) speak of voluntary appearance.

 

Article 5.1 (g) refers to an obligation arising from contract adjudged by the foreign court, performance of which occurred in the forum state or “should have taken place” in the forum state. The phrase “should have taken place” refers to the principle of lex solutionis or the law of the place where the parties intend such performance. To determine whether or not performance occurred or should have occurred in the forum state, the analysis should look into the stipulations of the parties and the law applicable to the contract. The law applicable to the contract will prevail only in the absence of a stipulation on the place of performance. Also, despite the lack of such stipulation, the intention of the parties may be inferred from the purpose of the contract or the substantial connection of the parties to a certain state.

 

Article 5.1 (h) refers to lex rei sitae.

 

Article 5.1 (i) refers to lex rei sitae in relation to a quasi in rem judgment rendered by the foreign forum but is sought to be enforced in an in personam manner in another state. For example, a foreclosure action was granted by a Canadian court in favor of the creditor. In case there is deficiency after forced sale of the foreclosed immovable, the credit may go after the defendant in a Philippine court by enforcing the same foreign judgment in an in personam manner through a petition for recognition and enforcement.

 

Article 5.1 (j) refers to a tort that occurred in the jurisdiction of the foreign court. This has reference to the lex loci delicti commissi rule.

 

Article 5.1 (k) refers a trust evidence by a written instrument (also known in the Philippines as an express trust) which was declared valid or was construed one way or another by the forum of the foreign state. However, it must be noted that the written instrument must stipulate that the forum of the foreign state is the proper venue or that express or implied designation in the trust instrument was made by reason of the fact that the principal place of administration of the trust is situated in the state of the foreign forum. Such judgment or decision of the foreign court on the trust may be enforced in the Philippines only in an in personam manner, i.e., the foreign court’s adjudications on ownership or title to the property in trust will yield to the doctrine of lex rei sitae.

 

Article 5.1 (l) refers to a counterclaim where the counterclaimant won the case in the forum of the foreign state, as long as the counterclaim arose from the same transaction or occurrence subject of the claim (main complaint). This means that, if the counterclaim is merely a permissive counterclaim, i.e., a claim that did not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions constituting the material allegations of the main complaint, the foreign court’s grant of such permissive counterclaim is deemed ineligible for enforcement in another state. But then again, that other state may opt to grant a petition for recognition and enforcement over such prevailing permissive counterclaim. Also, enforcement by the plaintiff may be sought over the foreign court’s judgment against the counterclaimant.

 

Article 5.1 (m) refers to a choice of court stipulation entered into by the contracting parties who are the plaintiffs and defendants in the case decided by the foreign court. If the parties made, in their contract, an exclusive choice of court stipulation, it would be a violation of their expectations to enforce the foreign court’s judgment in another state.

 

Article 5.2 refers to consumer actions and labor disputes. For labor disputes in the realm of private international law, please see the case of Cadalin v. POEA, G.R. No. L-104776, December 5, 1994.

 

Article 5.3 emphasizes on conflict of laws rules on judgments relating immovable property, especially on the registration of real property. Note that judgments directly affecting title to an immovable need not be enforced in another state because jurisdiction of the forum over the res would generally be enough.

 

Article 6

Exclusive basis for recognition and enforcement

 

Notwithstanding Article 5, a judgment that ruled on rights in rem in immovable property shall be recognised and enforced if and only if the property is situated in the State of origin.

 

            Article 6 cited above clashes with the Philippine concepts of in rem judgments and of the court’s jurisdiction over the res. The question is how the foreign court could acquire jurisdiction in the first place over an immovable property located in the Philippines and render judgment regarding real rights over the same. The next question is whether Philippine courts should allow a foreign court’s judgment over ownership and other real rights over a real property in the Philippines.

 

Article 7

Refusal of recognition and enforcement

 

1. Recognition or enforcement may be refused if –

 

(a) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document, including a statement of the essential elements of the claim –

 

(i) was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable them to arrange for their defence, unless the defendant entered an appearance and presented their case without contesting notification in the court of origin, provided that the law of the State of origin permitted notification to be contested; or

 

(ii) was notified to the defendant in the requested State in a manner that is incompatible with fundamental principles of the requested State concerning service of documents;

 

(b) the judgment was obtained by fraud;

 

(c) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including situations where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State and situations involving infringements of security or sovereignty of that State;

 

(d) the proceedings in the court of origin were contrary to an agreement, or a designation in a trust instrument, under which the dispute in question was to be determined in a court of a State other than the State of origin;

 

(e) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given by a court of the requested State in a dispute between the same parties; or

 

(f) the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given by a court of another State between the same parties on the same subject matter, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the requested State.

 

2. Recognition or enforcement may be postponed or refused if proceedings between the same parties on the same subject matter are pending before a court of the requested State, where –

 

(a) the court of the requested State was seised before the court of origin; and

 

(b) there is a close connection between the dispute and the requested State.

 

A refusal under this paragraph does not prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of the judgment.

 

A local forum may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment if (a) there was no sufficient notice to the defendant, i.e., violation of due process, unless the defendant voluntarily appeared; (b) even if there was notice to the defendant, over-person jurisdiction was not properly acquired; (c) the judgment was obtained by fraud^[34]; (d) the forum’s public policy or public security would be violated; (e) the proceedings in the foreign court were in violation of the contractual expectations of the parties; (f) there is res judicata whether local or international in nature; (g) there is litis pendetia in the local forum (which jurisdiction was acquired first prior to the acquisition by the foreign forum); or, (h) there is close connection between the dispute and the local forum.

 

Note that Article 7 of the Convention, specifically under Article 7.2, uses the terms “postpone” and “refuse.” By analogy, this vindicates the author’s hypothesis that, if, during the trial of the case, the court finds a factual basis to refuse exercise its jurisdiction, the more prudent course of action is either to archive the case or to await the termination of presentation of evidence and withhold the issuance of judgment or resolution. Also take note that Article 7 states that the local court’s refusal to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment does not bar the re-filing of a proper petition, or the revival of a petition already archived, should subsequent developments justify such re-filing or such revival.

 

Article 8

Preliminary questions

 

1. A ruling on a preliminary question shall not be recognised or enforced under this Convention if the ruling is on a matter to which this Convention does not apply or on a matter referred to in Article 6 on which a court of a State other than the State referred to in that Article ruled.

 

2. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment was based on a ruling on a matter to which this Convention does not apply, or on a matter referred to in Article 6 on which a court of a State other than the State referred to in that Article ruled.

 

            Article 8.1 of the Convention refers to what a situation in which the forum finds that a “main” or “principal” question turns upon the decision of a “preliminary” question.^[35] It appears to the author that the concept of “preliminary question” in conflict of laws is similar to the concept of “prejudicial questions” under Philippine law.

 

            Under the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the doctrine of prejudicial question is conceptualized under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

 

Section 6. Suspension by Reason of Prejudicial Question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in court for trial, and shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

 

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

 

In the case of Torres v. Garchitorena,^[36] the Supreme Court held that a prejudicial question does not exist not only because the criminal action was instituted before the civil action, but also because the issues and factual findings in the civil case are not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.^[37]

 

While the concept of prejudicial questions under Philippine law is restricted to a criminal-civil case situation, the concept of “preliminary question” under conflict of laws is not. Cormack, J. M. (1940) gave the following illustration in order to properly understand what preliminary questions are in the realm of private international law:

 

“To consider, as an illustration, a situation involving a series of preliminary questions, let it be supposed that the forum, jurisdiction A, is the situs of personal property, to be administered at death. The forum holds that this is to be governed by the law of the domicile of the decedent, jurisdiction B. A question arises as to whether a claimant is legitimate, so as to be entitled to take. This turns upon the validity of a marriage performed in jurisdiction C. This depends upon the effect to be given to a divorce previously granted in jurisdiction D. Analyzing this situation, the question of legitimacy is a preliminary question to the determination of the principal question whether the claimant is entitled to share in the estate. The validity of the marriage in jurisdiction C is a preliminary question to the determination of the question of legitimacy. The effect to be given to the divorce in jurisdiction D is a preliminary question to the determination of the validity of the marriage. This last ·preliminary question, upon which the case ultimately turns, is the latest problem to appear chronologically in the course of investigation into the case, but in the solution of the case it is logically the question which must be disposed of first. As the same is true in considering each of the other preliminary questions, in relation to their principal questions, respectively, it may be said that preliminary questions logically must be disposed of in the inverse order of their chronological appearance in the case. Each preliminary question may involve problems of characterization and localization. Under the doctrine, in each instance the conflict-of-laws rule to govern the preliminary question should be that of the jurisdiction governing the principal question, for the solution of which determination of the particular preliminary question is required.”^[38]

 

            Hence, for example, if the question on the validity of marriage is governed by the laws of Canada, and in an estate case pending in the Philippines, the legitimate status of the children under said marriage is one of the issues, a look into Canadian law may be required to settle whether that foreign law declares such children as legitimate and illegitimate. If, however, the decedent is a national of Alabama, Alabama law will determine the effects of their legitimacy or illegitimacy to the amount of their successional rights and their capacity to succeed. Hence, it appears that there are three questions here: (a) whether the marriage is valid; (b) whether the children are legitimate; and; (c) how much they are entitled to inherit. Question (c) appears to be dependent on the answer to question (b) while question (b) appears to be dependent on question (a). In other words, question (a) is a preliminary question to question (b) which, in turn, is a preliminary question to question (c).

 

            Cormack, J. M. (1940) is of the opinion that the matter on preliminary questions is merely illusory.^[39] This author is inclined to agree with Cormack, J. M. (1940) because, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, all questions (a), (b) and (c) may be resolved by the court in one proceeding. All that is needed is proof of the laws of Canada and of the laws of Alabama. Moreover, if the judgment of the Canadian court on the validity of the marriage is pleaded and proved, the party opposing such validity has limited grounds to repel the same, especially owing to the faith and credit given to judgments of foreign courts, more especially on the merits of the case.

 

            All foreign judgments are a question of fact. Their existence must be properly pleaded and proved. If they are proved in the course of the proceedings, Philippine courts are not in the position to re-litigate the same on the merits. The remedy for the Philippine court is simply to follow its own conflict of laws rules.

 

            However, Article 8.2 to be overly strict in the application of the preliminary question doctrine. It, in effect, states that, if, in the above example, the Canadian court’s judgment on the validity of the marriage is sought to be recognized in the Philippines, said judgment must be in accordance with the provisions of the Convention; otherwise, recognition shall be refused. However, in the eyes of Philippine law, the judgment itself on the marriage need not even be proved in evidence in order to settle the ultimate issue of inheritance because the proof of the marriage and the foreign law under which the marriage is valid would be enough. The foreign judgment on the marriage would only be relevant if the party opposing the validity of the marriage cannot prove that, from the text of the foreign law, it is invalid. Finally, there is no need for the Convention to restrict the recognition and enforcement of so-called “preliminary questions” because it would suffice to simply apply resolutions to renvoi situations.

 

Article 9

Severability

 

Recognition or enforcement of a severable part of a judgment shall be granted where recognition or enforcement of that part is applied for, or only part of the judgment is capable of being recognised or enforced under this Convention.

 

            The severability of judgments is related – although not closely – to the concept of depacage. Remember that depacage is a concept within the field of conflict of laws whereby different issues within a single case are governed by the laws of different jurisdictions.^[40] In the same manner, different issues in a single case may be treated differently in case of recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

 

            Suppose that petition for recognition and enforcement of a Moroccan judgment was filed before a Philippine forum. The foreign judgment involved three issues: (a) whether or not there was negligence; (b) whether or not the defendant should pay attorney’s fees; and, (c) whether or not the defendant should pay the stipulated rate of interest. The Moroccan court which rendered the judgment sought to be enforced ruled, thus: (a) yes, there was negligence because delivery of medical supplies such as syringe requires extraordinary diligence under Moroccan law; (b) yes, because award of attorney’s fees are automatic under Moroccan law; and, (c) yes, the defendant should pay the stipulated rate of interest at 20% per month under Moroccan law. In confronting this petition, the Philippine forum may find that ruling (c) is against the public policy of the Philippines, for example, while finding that rulings (a) and (b) are not. Simply because ruling (c) is against public policy does not mean that the whole judgment is beyond enforcement. The local forum may opt to refuse to recognize and enforce ruling (c) but proceed to do so for rulings (a) and (b). This is what severability means under Article 9 of the Convention.

 

            In fact, Philippine courts may even opt to recognize and enforce ruling (c) but temper or modify the same on valid grounds such as public policy. For instance, this happened in the case of Estate of Mitich v. Mercantile Insurance^[41] in which the Supreme Court of the Philippines found the award of 10% legal interest per annum iniquitous and unconscionable considering that the California court already awarded moral damages (i.e., emotional distress) in the amount of $250,000.00 and punitive damages in the amount of $500,000.00. “The Court is simply not prepared to do that. Hence, the Court is disinclined to exacerbate the colossal financial burden on Mercantile.”

 

            In the Estate of Mitch case,^[42] while the Supreme Court allowed the recognition and enforcement of a California court’s judgment, it did not swallow hook, line and sinker all of the legal conclusions contained therein.

 

Article 10

Damages

 

1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suffered.

 

2. The court addressed shall take into account whether and to what extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating to the proceedings.

 

            From the viewpoint of a Filipino law student, Article 10.1 may seem to mean that the judgment does not award actual damages. However, if read in light of Article 10.2, it actually means that the award of damages does not  actually cover all costs and expenses arising from the loss or harm suffered. Because of this, Langer (2019) wrote: “This limitation of damages is significant, because it is very common for damages to be far in excess of actual loss or harm suffered. In addition to exemplary or punitive damages, there are also consequential damages, incidental damages and liquidated damages. Under the convention, these categories of damages may not be enforceable. As a result, this provision may be used as a sword for those challenging the enforcement of foreign judgment.”^[43]

 

Article 11

Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires)

 

Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) which a court of a Contracting State has approved, or which have been concluded in the course of proceedings before a court of a Contracting State, and which are enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin, shall be enforced under this Convention in the same manner as a judgment.

 

            For example, according to Turkish law, if the parties have reached a settlement agreement – otherwise known as a compromise agreement – in the course of litigation, they make ask the court to record the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement in a court judgment. Such a court judgment that adopts or simply copies the terms and conditions of the settlement or compromise between the parties is enforceable under the Convention as a court judgment or decision. However, the settlement agreement, in and of itself, does not benefit from such enforceability.^[44]

 

            In the Philippines, a compromise judgment is a decision rendered by a court sanctioning the agreement between the parties concerning the determination of the controversy at hand. Essentially, it is a contract, stamped with judicial imprimatur, between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust  their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which each of them prefers in the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing. Upon court approval of a compromise agreement, it transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.^[45]

 

Ordinarily, a judgment based on compromise is not appealable. It should not be disturbed except upon a showing of vitiated consent or forgery. The reason for the rule is that when both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, it is only natural to presume that such action constitutes an implicit, as undeniable as an express, waiver of the right to appeal against said decision.  Thus, a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory, and is conclusive between the parties.^[46]

 

Under Article 11 of the Convention, a judicial settlement – also known as a compromise judgment – if enforceable in the same manner as a judgment or decision is treated the same way. Thus, it may be petitioned for recognition and enforcement in another state’s forum.

 

Article 12

Documents to be produced

 

1. The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement shall produce –

 

(a) a complete and certified copy of the judgment;

 

(b) if the judgment was given by default, the original or a certified copy of a document establishing that the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document was notified to the defaulting party;

 

(c) any documents necessary to establish that the judgment has effect or, where applicable, is enforceable in the State of origin;

 

(d) in the case referred to in Article 11, a certificate of a court (including an officer of the court) of the State of origin stating that the judicial settlement or a part of it is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin.

 

2. If the terms of the judgment do not permit the court addressed to verify whether the conditions of this Chapter have been complied with, that court may require any necessary documents.

 

3. An application for recognition or enforcement may be accompanied by a document relating to the judgment, issued by a court (including an officer of the court) of the State of origin, in the form recommended and published by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.

 

4. If the documents referred to in this Article are not in an official language of the requested State, they shall be accompanied by a certified translation into an official language, unless the law of the requested State provides otherwise.

 

            Article 12 of the Convention refers to the process itself of having the judgment or decision recognized and enforced in the local forum. It appears from the next of Article 12 itself that the party petitioning the local forum for such recognition and enforcement is required to produce (a) a complete and certified copy of the judgment; (b) if the same is a default judgment, the original or a certified copy of the sheriff’s return on the service of summons or some such equivalent document; (c) other documents that prove the enforceability of the judgment or decision in the state of the forum that issued said judgment or decision; (d) if the same is a judicial settlement (compromise judgment), a certification from the court that the same is enforceable in the same manner as judgments. The wording of Article 12.1 appears to mandate the production of these documents.

 

            It is curious to say that least that Article 12.1 (c) requires the production of any documents necessary to establish that the judgment has effect or, where applicable, is enforceable in the state of origin. Insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, there is no need to prove this because there is a presumption under the Rules of Court that a court or a judge, whether local or foreign, acting as such was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.^[47]

 

            Article 12.2 tempers the mandatory language of Article 12.1 by saying that any necessary documents may be required by the local forum in order to establish important questions arising from Chapter II (Recognition and Enforcement) such as but not limited to proof of notice or compliance with due process in the foreign forum, proof that the counter-claim arose from the same transaction as that in the initiatory action, proof of choice of court stipulation, and proof of enforceability of judicial settlements (compromise agreements).

           

            Article 12.3 uses the word “may.” In the Philippines, proof of foreign law or a foreign judgment must be in accordance with the Rules of Court. Section 24 of Rule 132 thereof states: “Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.”

 

            Article 12.4 echoes Section 33 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines. It states: “Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. — Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.”

 

Article 13

Procedure

 

1. The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or registration for enforcement, and the enforcement of the judgment, are governed by the law of the requested State unless this Convention provides otherwise. The court of the requested State shall act expeditiously.

 

2. The court of the requested State shall not refuse the recognition or enforcement of a judgment under this Convention on the ground that recognition or enforcement should be sought in another State.

 

            Article 13.1 confirms the doctrine of lex fori, i.e., the law of the place of the court where the case is pending. To repeat, matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum.

 

            The Philippine Supreme Court has ruled: “As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.”^[48]

 

            Article 13.2, on the other hand, refers to the existence of an alternative alien forum. Simply because the petition for recognition and enforcement of judgment may be filed elsewhere, i.e., in a different jurisdiction, does not justify the local forum’s refusal to take cognizance of the case and exercise jurisdiction over the same. The existence of an alternative alien forum forum becomes material and relevant only in the proper invocation and proof of the defense of forum non conveniens.

 

Article 14

Costs of proceedings

 

1. No security, bond or deposit, however described, shall be required from a party who in one Contracting State applies for enforcement of a judgment given by a court of another Contracting State on the sole ground that such party is a foreign national or is not domiciled or resident in the State in which enforcement is sought.

 

2. An order for payment of costs or expenses of proceedings, made in a Contracting State against any person exempt from requirements as to security, bond, or deposit by virtue of paragraph 1 or of the law of the State where proceedings have been instituted, shall, on the application of the person entitled to the benefit of the order, be rendered enforceable in any other Contracting State.

 

3. A State may declare that it shall not apply paragraph 1 or designate by a declaration which of its courts shall not apply paragraph 1.

 

Article 15

Recognition and enforcement under national law

 

Subject to Article 6, this Convention does not prevent the recognition or enforcement of judgments under national law.

 

            Enforcement of foreign judgment means that the domestic court will compel the judgment debtor to comply with the foreign judgment which the domestic court has recognized. The enforcement process is often left to municipal law and it differs vastly among countries.^[49]

 

CHAPTER III – GENERAL CLAUSES

 

Article 16

Transitional provision

 

This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments if, at the time the proceedings were instituted in the State of origin, the Convention had effect between that State and the requested State.

 

Article 17

Declarations limiting recognition and enforcement

 

A State may declare that its courts may refuse to recognise or enforce a judgment given by a court of another Contracting State if the parties were resident in the requested State, and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, other than the location of the court of origin, were connected only with the requested State.

 

            The local forum, under Article 17, may refuse to recognize and enforce a judgment issued by the court of a foreign country if the plaintiff and the defendant are residents of the state of the local forum and all connecting factors and relevant elements of the dispute are connected to the state of the local forum. This is more so if the only international aspect of the case is the location of the foreign forum that rendered the judgment.

 

            In this case, the case in reality does not have an international aspect. According to Brand & Herrup (2008), the purpose is to “permit a Contracting State to declare that it will not recognise or enforce such a judgment if the case would have been wholly domestic to it, if the original proceedings had been brought in its courts.”^[50]

 

If the plaintiff and the defendant are Filipinos and all other elements or aspects of the case (connecting factors) are connected to the Philippines but the action, for some reason, was filed in South Korea and the South Korean court rendered a judgment against the defendant, Philippine courts would be justified in refusing a petition for recognition and enforcement of the South Korean court decision because the case could have been a domestic proceeding had the parties chosen to file the case in a Philippine court in the first place.

 

Article 18

Declarations with respect to specific matters

 

1. Where a State has a strong interest in not applying this Convention to a specific matter, that State may declare that it will not apply the Convention to that matter. The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration is no broader than necessary and that the specific matter excluded is clearly and precisely defined.

 

2. With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not apply –

 

(a) in the Contracting State that made the declaration;

 

(b) in other Contracting States, where recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State that made the declaration is sought.

 

            Article 18 refers to the “strong interest” of a contracting state to justify non-application of the Convention. While “strong interest” appears to be the same as “public policy,” there is a view that the two different from each other.^[51] According to Xia & Liu (2022), citing Huang (2005),^[52] regarding the relationship between public order and strong interests, “we need to explore the meaning of public order firstly. Judging from the definition of public order in the general teaching material of private international law, it means that when a country’s court hears a foreign-related civil and commercial dispute, according to the conflicting rules stipulated by its own country, the regulations of other countries should be applied. However, if the application of the foreign laws contradicts the strong interests, basic policies, concepts of morality or fundamental principles of its country, then the foreign laws will be excluded from application, and the domestic laws will be used instead. It can be seen from this definition that the strong interests of the State of court seised are contained in public order, but considering the basic policies, concepts of morality or fundamental principles that are juxtaposed with, the emphasis of strong interests here is placed on the words basic or fundamental, whether social, moral, or legal.”^[53] Hence, “violating the public order of a country will inevitably involve violations of certain “strong interests” of the country; however, violating a country’s “strong interests” does not necessarily violate the public order of that country. Therefore, when discussing the connotation of “strong interests” and the “strong interests” of the State of court seised in the definition of public order separately, it is obvious that the former one has a wider range.”^[54] A strong interest of a state may refer to the rights and lives enjoyed by certain types of subjects or a collection of events that have a huge impact on a country’s legislative planning and social governance for specific issues.

 

            For example, while not wholly related to conflict of laws, in the Philippines, while there is no public policy against the return of a dictator into the country, the Supreme Court in the case of Marcos v. Manglapus^[55] declared that: “We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice. The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.” In this case, the Supreme Court appears to have found a “strong interest” to disallow the return of a dictator recently catapulted from power despite such dictator’s invocation of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

 

Article 19

Declarations with respect to judgments pertaining to a State

 

1. A State may declare that it shall not apply this Convention to judgments arising from proceedings to which any of the following is a party –

 

(a) that State, or a natural person acting for that State; or

 

(b) a government agency of that State, or a natural person acting for such a government agency.

 

The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration is no broader than necessary and that the exclusion from scope is clearly and precisely defined. The declaration shall not distinguish between judgments where the State, a government agency of that State or a natural person acting for either of them is a defendant or claimant in the proceedings before the court of origin.

 

2. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a State that made a declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 may be refused if the judgment arose from proceedings to which either the State that made the declaration or the requested State, one of their government agencies or a natural person acting for either of them is a party, to the same extent as specified in the declaration.

 

            “The Convention does not exclude judgments from its scope merely because a State was a party to the proceedings (Art. 2(4)). While the Convention expressly applies only to civil or commercial matters (Art. 1(1)), some delegations maintained that this limitation could be challenging to apply with regard to a State party, in particular with respect to whether a State party was exercising sovereign powers. A further concern was that the preservation of immunities in Article 2(5) might be insufficient to protect State interests. Article 19 responds to these concerns by allowing States to make a declaration excluding the application of the Convention to judgments that arose from proceedings to which such a State was a party.”^[56]

 

“One of the difficult issues in drafting what is now Article 19 of the Convention was to exclude the possibility of States making such a declaration in relation to State-owned enterprises. It was clear that many States did not want the Convention to permit States to declare that the normal commercial activities of a State-owned enterprise could be covered by an Article 19 declaration. They feared that this would create an economic imbalance in that States which own entities engaged in commercial activities could refuse to recognise or enforce judgments given against them in other Contracting States because they had declared those activities of that entity to fall within the scope of the declaration. In order to avoid this the Diplomatic Session amended Article 19, as it was in square bracketed form in the draft Convention prepared by the Special Commission, so that it no longer refers at all to State entities but rather only to State agencies with the common understanding that a State-owned enterprise is not a State agency for this purpose.”^[57]

 

            In this author’s humble view, Article 19 seems to be based on the doctrine of state immunity. Notice that Article 19.1 clarifies that the declaration shall not distinguish between judgments where the State, a government agency or a natural person acting for either of them, is a defendant or claimant in the proceedings before the court of origin. Moreover, it should not distinguish between judgments depending on whether they are the judgment creditor or the judgment debtor.^[58] When the declaring State merely intervenes in the proceedings in the State of origin as a third party, the judgment may circulate as between the claimant and the defendant, who are not affected by the declaration. This safeguard seeks to prevent strategic or opportunistic declarations. However, in practice, it cannot prevent the declaring State from recognizing or enforcing the favorable judgment under its own national law. This would occur outside the scope of the Convention, i.e., not under Article 15.^[59]

 

Article 20

Uniform interpretation

                                                                                

In the interpretation of this Convention, regard shall be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application.

 

            The local court sought to pass upon the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment must take into account the prevailing principles and discussions in the legal community, especially the theories and doctrines behind private international law. In other words, the local forum must decide an international dispute with an international mind.

 

Article 21

Review of operation of the Convention

 

The Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law shall at regular intervals make arrangements for review of the operation of this Convention, including any declarations, and shall report to the Council on General Affairs and Policy.

 

Article 22

Non-unified legal systems

 

1. In relation to a Contracting State in which two or more systems of law apply in different territorial units with regard to any matter dealt with in this Convention –

 

(a) any reference to the law or procedure of a State shall be construed as referring, where appropriate, to the law or procedure in force in the relevant territorial unit;

 

(b) any reference to the court or courts of a State shall be construed as referring, where appropriate, to the court or courts in the relevant territorial unit;

 

(c) any reference to a connection with a State shall be construed as referring, where appropriate, to a connection with the relevant territorial unit;

 

(d) any reference to a connecting factor in relation to a State shall be construed as referring, where appropriate, to that connecting factor in relation to the relevant territorial unit.

 

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, a Contracting State with two or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply shall not be bound to apply this Convention to situations which involve solely such different territorial units.

 

3. A court in a territorial unit of a Contracting State with two or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply shall not be bound to recognise or enforce a judgment from another Contracting State solely because the judgment has been recognised or enforced in another territorial unit of the same Contracting State under this Convention.

 

4. This Article shall not apply to Regional Economic Integration Organisations.

 

            Article 22 does not really apply to the Philippine, being a state with a single system of laws and procedures. Said article properly applies to countries like the United States, Canada, China or the United Kingdom where different regions or parts of the country are governed by different legislative, judicial or administrative systems.

 

Article 23

Relationship with other international instruments

 

1. This Convention shall be interpreted so far as possible to be compatible with other treaties in force for Contracting States, whether concluded before or after this Convention.

 

2. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting State of a treaty that was concluded before this Convention.

 

3. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting State of a treaty concluded after this Convention as concerns the recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State that is also a Party to that treaty. Nothing in the other treaty shall affect the obligations under Article 6 towards Contracting States that are not Parties to that treaty.

 

4. This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this Convention as concerns the recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State that is also a Member State of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation where –

 

(a) the rules were adopted before this Convention was concluded; or

 

(b) the rules were adopted after this Convention was concluded, to the extent that they do not affect the obligations under Article 6 towards Contracting States that are not Member States of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation.

 

            Article 23 above-cited provides for a rule of interpretation in case there are other applicable treaties or convention to the dispute in question. For example, he “problem of conflicting instruments arises only if two conditions are fulfilled. First, the State of the court addressed must be a Party to both instruments. If that State is a Party to only one, its courts will simply apply that one. Article 23 is, therefore, addressed to States that are parties to both the Convention and to another legally binding international instrument that conflicts with it. Second, there must be an actual incompatibility between the two instruments. In other words, the application of the two instruments must lead to incompatible results in a concrete situation. Where this is not the case, both instruments can be applied. In some cases, an apparent incompatibility may be eliminated through interpretation. Where this is possible, the problem is solved. Article 23(1) reflects this approach.”^[60] It appears to the author that the sub-provisions of Article 23 appear to be basic principles on statutory construction.

 

CHAPTER IV – FINAL CLAUSES

 

Article 24

Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

 

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States.

 

2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory States.

 

3. This Convention shall be open for accession by all States.

 

4. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, depositary of the Convention.

 

            Article 24 simply deals with the method by which a state may become a member of the Convention.

 

Article 25

Declarations with respect to non-unified legal systems

 

1. If a State has two or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply in relation to matters dealt with in this Convention, it may declare that the Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one or more of them. Such a declaration shall state expressly the territorial units to which the Convention applies.

 

2. If a State makes no declaration under this Article, the Convention shall extend to all territorial units of that State.

 

3. This Article shall not apply to Regional Economic Integration Organisations.

 

            “Article 25, like Article 22, refers to States that have two or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply in relation to matters dealt with in this Convention. Since the Convention deals with procedural matters (recognition and enforcement of judgments), such a definition really refers to States composed of two or more territorial units, each with its own judicial system (see supra, paras 355-356). This is the case for federal States, e.g., Canada or the United States of America, but it may occur in other States as well, e.g., the People’s Republic of China or the United Kingdom. REIOs, however, are not covered by this Article (see para. (3)).”^[61]

 

Article 26

Regional Economic Integration Organisations

 

1. A Regional Economic Integration Organisation which is constituted solely by sovereign States and has competence over some or all of the matters governed by this Convention may sign, accept, approve or accede to this Convention. The Regional Economic Integration Organisation shall in that case have the rights and obligations of a Contracting State, to the extent that the Organisation has competence over matters governed by this Convention.

 

2. The Regional Economic Integration Organisation shall, at the time of signature, acceptance, approval or accession, notify the depositary in writing of the matters governed by this Convention in respect of which competence has been transferred to that Organisation by its Member States. The Organisation shall promptly notify the depositary in writing of any changes to its competence as specified in the most recent notice given under this paragraph.

 

3. For the purposes of the entry into force of this Convention, any instrument deposited by a Regional Economic Integration Organisation shall not be counted unless the Regional Economic Integration Organisation declares in accordance with Article 27(1) that its Member States will not be Parties to this Convention.

 

4. Any reference to a “Contracting State” or “State” in this Convention shall apply equally, where appropriate, to a Regional Economic Integration Organisation.

 

A Regional Economic Integration Organisation (REIO) may refer to a supra-national organization like the European Union (EU).

 

Article 27

Regional Economic Integration Organisation as a Contracting Party without its Member States

 

1. At the time of signature, acceptance, approval or accession, a Regional Economic Integration Organisation may declare that it exercises competence over all the matters governed by this Convention and that its Member States will not be Parties to this Convention but shall be bound by virtue of the signature, acceptance, approval or accession of the Organisation.

 

2. In the event that a declaration is made by a Regional Economic Integration Organisation in accordance with paragraph 1, any reference to a “Contracting State” or “State” in this Convention shall apply equally, where appropriate, to the Member States of the Organisation.

 

Article 28

Entry into force

 

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which a notification may be made in accordance with Article 29(2) with respect to the second State that has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession referred to in Article 24.

 

2. Thereafter this Convention shall enter into force –

 

(a) for each State subsequently ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to it, on the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which notifications may be made in accordance with Article 29(2) with respect to that State;

 

(b) for a territorial unit to which this Convention has been extended in accordance with Article 25 after the Convention has entered into force for the State making the declaration, on the first day of the month following the expiration of three months after the notification of the declaration referred to in that Article.

 

Article 29

Establishment of relations pursuant to the Convention

 

1. This Convention shall have effect between two Contracting States only if neither of them has notified the depositary regarding the other in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3. In the absence of such a notification, the Convention has effect between two Contracting States from the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which notifications may be made.

 

2. A Contracting State may notify the depositary, within 12 months after the date of the notification by the depositary referred to in Article 32(a), that the ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of another State shall not have the effect of establishing relations between the two States pursuant to this Convention.

 

3. A State may notify the depositary, upon the deposit of its instrument pursuant to Article 24(4), that its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall not have the effect of establishing relations with a Contracting State pursuant to this Convention.

 

4. A Contracting State may at any time withdraw a notification that it has made under paragraph 2 or 3. Such a withdrawal shall take effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of three months following the date of notification.

 

Article 30

Declarations

 

1. Declarations referred to in Articles 14, 17, 18, 19 and 25 may be made upon signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession or at any time thereafter, and may be modified or withdrawn at any time.

 

2. Declarations, modifications and withdrawals shall be notified to the depositary.

 

3. A declaration made at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall take effect simultaneously with the entry into force of this Convention for the State concerned.

 

4. A declaration made at a subsequent time, and any modification or withdrawal of a declaration, shall take effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of three months following the date on which the notification is received by the depositary.

 

5. A declaration made at a subsequent time, and any modification or withdrawal of a declaration, shall not apply to judgments resulting from proceedings that have already been instituted before the court of origin when the declaration takes effect.

 

Article 31

Denunciation

 

1. A Contracting State to this Convention may denounce it by a notification in writing addressed to the depositary. The denunciation may be limited to certain territorial units of a non-unified legal system to which this Convention applies.

 

2. The denunciation shall take effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of 12 months after the date on which the notification is received by the depositary. Where a longer period for the denunciation to take effect is specified in the notification, the denunciation shall take effect upon the expiration of such longer period after the date on which the notification is received by the depositary.

 

Article 32

Notifications by the depositary

 

The depositary shall notify the Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, and other States and Regional Economic Integration Organisations which have signed, ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to this Convention in accordance with Articles 24, 26 and 27 of the following –

 

(a) the signatures, ratifications, acceptances, approvals and accessions referred to in Articles 24, 26 and 27;

 

(b) the date on which this Convention enters into force in accordance with Article 28;

 

(c) the notifications, declarations, modifications and withdrawals referred to in Articles 26, 27, 29 and 30; and

 

(d) the denunciations referred to in Article 31.

x---------------------------------------------x

^[1] In the Philippines, “maintenance obligation” refers to the obligation to support.

^[2] Article 15 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[3] Rules on Action for Support and Petition for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Decisions or Judgments on Support.

^[4] Article 74 of the Family Code of the Pilippines.

^[5] Article 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. (New Civil Code of the Philippines)

^[6] Section 1. Will proved outside Philippines may be allowed here. — Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines. (Rule 77 of the Rules of Court)

^[7] Goswami, Parineeta, Pre-Insolvency Proceedings in Private International Law (April 6, 2023). National Journal for Legal Research and Innovative Ideas, VOLUME 3 ISSUE 3, 2023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4412184.

^[8] Ian F. Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment, 27 INT'L L. 429 (1993) https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol27/iss2/7.

^[9] See Prel. Doc. No 6 of December 2021 by the HCCH on Private International Law and Insolvency.

^[10] Commonly known as the Warsaw Convention.

^[11] Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, G.R. No. L-23145, November 29, 1968.

^[12] House of Representatives' Congressional Record [Feb. 21 and 22, 1955], Third Congress, Second Session, Vol. II, Nos. 21 & 22, pp. 598-602, 618-624; Senate Congressional Record [May 3, 1955], Vol. II, No. 66, pp. 921-924, and 926.

^[13] People v. Meris, G.R. No. L-13027, June 30, 1960.

^[14] Agbayani v. Sayo, No. L-47880, 30 April 1979, 89 SCRA 699.

^[15] Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125813, February 6, 2007.

^[16] Tieng v. Palacio-Alaras, G.R. No. 164845, July 13, 2021.

^[17] Tieng v. Palacio-Alaras, G.R. No. 164845, July 13, 2021.

^[18] Tieng v. Palacio-Alaras, G.R. No. 164845, July 13, 2021.

^[19] Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131, 145 (1927), citing Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Volume II, pp, 885-886.

^[20] Prévost, E. (2019). Study on forms of liability and jurisdictional issues in the application of civil and administrative defamation laws in Council of Europe member states. Council of Europe, Available at: https://rm. coe. int/study-on-forms-of-liability-and-jurisdictional-issues-in-the-applicati/168096bda9.

^[21] Cour de cassation, Civ. 1ère, 11 May 1999, JDI 1999, p. 1048.

^[22] Prévost, E. (2019). Study on forms of liability and jurisdictional issues in the application of civil and administrative defamation laws in Council of Europe member states. Council of Europe, Available at: https://rm. coe. int/study-on-forms-of-liability-and-jurisdictional-issues-in-the-applicati/168096bda9.

^[23] Hess, Burkhard and von Hein, Jan and Mariottini, Cristina M. and Mariottini, Cristina M., ILA Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy in Private International and Procedural Law (‘Lisbon Guidelines on Privacy’) and Commentary Thereto (June 30, 2022). MPILux Research Paper 2022 (4), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4155091 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4155091.

^[24] Romualdez-Yap v. CSC, G.R. No. 104226, August 12, 1993.

^[25] Buxbaum, H. L., & Michaels, R. (2012). Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in International Antitrust Law–A US Perspective. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION: CONFLICT OF LAWS AND COORDINATION (STUDIES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW), Jürgen Basedow, Stéphanie Francq, Laurence Idot, eds., Oxford: Hart Publishing.

^[26] Mola, L. (2012). Sovereign immunity, insolvent states and private bondholders: Recent national and international case law. The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 11(3), 525-554.

^[27] See DA v. NLRC, G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993, saying: “True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called “the royal prerogative of dishonesty” because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.”

^[28] DOH v. Phil Pharmawealth, G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013.

^[29] United States of America v. Judge Guinto, 261 Phil. 777, 790 (1990).

^[30] Equitable Insurance and Casualty Co., Inc. v. Smith, Bell & Co. (Phils.), Inc., 127 Phil. 547, 549 (1967).

^[31] Section 3 of Rule 131 on disputable presumptions: “(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.”

^[32] Yap v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 186730, June 13, 2012, citing Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Gernale, G.R. No. 163344, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 67, 78-79.

^[33] Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

^[34] Under existing Rules in the Philippines, if applied by analogy, “fraud” here refers to “fraud in connection with a matter of procedure,” also known as extrinsic fraud. See A.M. No. 21-03-02-SC (March 23, 2021).

^[35] Cormack, J. M. (1940). Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws: A Study of Problems Involved in Determining Whether or Not the Forum Should Follow Its Own Choice of a Conflict-of-Laws Principle. S. Cal. L. Rev., 14, 221.

^[36] G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494.

^[37] People v. Camenforte, G.R. No. 220916, June 14, 2021.

^[38] Cormack, J. M. (1940). Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws: A Study of Problems Involved in Determining Whether or Not the Forum Should Follow Its Own Choice of a Conflict-of-Laws Principle. S. Cal. L. Rev., 14, 244.

^[39] Cormack, J. M. (1940). Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws: A Study of Problems Involved in Determining Whether or Not the Forum Should Follow Its Own Choice of a Conflict-of-Laws Principle. S. Cal. L. Rev., 14, 222.

^[40] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%C3%A9pe%C3%A7age.

^[41] G.R. No. 238041, February 15, 2022.

^[42] G.R. No. 238041, February 15, 2022.

^[43] Philip Z. Langer (September 11, 2019). Fox Rothschild LLP Attorneys At Law. NY Law May Remain Best Bet For Enforcing Foreign Awards. https://www.foxrothschild.com/publications/ny-law-may-remain-best-bet-for-enforcing-foreign-awards. Last accessed: September 09, 2023.

^[44] Sural Efecinar C, “Possible Ratification of the Hague Convention by Turkey and Its Effects to the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” (2020) 40(2) PPIL 775. https://doi.org/10.26650/ppil.2020.40.2.0015.

^[45] Diamond Builders Conglomeration v. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, 564 Phil. 756 (2007).

^[46] Unirock v. Carpio, G.R. No. 213421, August 24, 2020.

^[47] Section 3 (n) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

^[48] LWV Construction v. Dupo, G.R. No. 172342, July 13, 2009, citing Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979].

^[49] Okorley, S. (2022). The possible impact of the 2019 Hague Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters on the grounds of international competence in Ghana. UCC Law Journal, 2(1), 85-112.

^[50] Brand, R. A., & Herrup, P. (2008). The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Commentary and Documents. Cambridge University Press.

^[51] Xia, F., & Liu, L. (2022). On the Declaration of Matters Which Have” Strong Interests” under Article 21 of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Beijing L. Rev., 13, 145. https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=115955. Last access: September 09, 2023.

^[52] Huang, J. (2005). Private International Law (2nd ed., pp. 77, 210, 213). Law Press China.

^[53] Xia, F., & Liu, L. (2022). On the Declaration of Matters Which Have” Strong Interests” under Article 21 of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Beijing L. Rev., 13, 145. https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=115955. Last access: September 09, 2023.

^[54] Xia, F., & Liu, L. (2022). On the Declaration of Matters Which Have” Strong Interests” under Article 21 of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Beijing L. Rev., 13, 145. https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=115955. Last access: September 09, 2023.

^[55] G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989.

^[56] Garcimartín, F., & Saumier, G. (2020). Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters-Explanatory Report. https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a1b0b0fc-95b1-4544-935b-b842534a120f.pdf. Last accessed: September 09, 2023.

^[57] Beaumont, P.R. Judgments Convention: Application to Governments. Neth Int Law Rev 67, 121–137 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-020-00163-6. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-020-00163-6. Last accessed: September 09, 2023.

^[58] Garcimartín, F., & Saumier, G. (2020). Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters-Explanatory Report. https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a1b0b0fc-95b1-4544-935b-b842534a120f.pdf. Last accessed: September 09, 2023.

^[59] Garcimartín, F., & Saumier, G. (2020). Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters-Explanatory Report. https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a1b0b0fc-95b1-4544-935b-b842534a120f.pdf. Last accessed: September 09, 2023.

^[60] Garcimartín, F., & Saumier, G. (2020). Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters-Explanatory Report. https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a1b0b0fc-95b1-4544-935b-b842534a120f.pdf. Last accessed: September 09, 2023.

^[61] Garcimartín, F., & Saumier, G. (2020). Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters-Explanatory Report. https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a1b0b0fc-95b1-4544-935b-b842534a120f.pdf. Last accessed: September 09, 2023.