CHAPTER 4: JURISDICTION

PRINCIPLES AND CASES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:

A PROCEDURAL APPROACH

 

-oOo-

 

MARK ANGELO S. DELA PEÑA

To cite this online book, please use the following:

Dela Peña. 2023. "Principles and Cases in Private International Law: A Procedural Approach." Published by Project Jurisprudence - Philippines. Published: September 17, 2023. Link: [Insert link] Last accessed: [Insert date of access].

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CHAPTER 4:

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred by law.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the subject claims.^[1]

In Hasegawa v. Kitamura,^[2] petitioners moved to dismiss the case filed by respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City. Petitioners did not claim that the trial court was not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, the case for specific performance and damages would be one not capable of pecuniary estimation and would be properly cognizable by the said court. Rather, petitioners raised as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.”

The Supreme Court held in the Hasegawa case that these three principles cited by the petitioners are conflict of laws principles that are more applicable and that are proper for the second phase in the settlement of a conflicts dispute, the stage called “choice of law.” They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in the case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. Hence, the petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules was exposed by the fact that they had not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and those of the Philippines. Before determining which law should apply, first, there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of the case, the existence of such law must have already been pleaded and proved.^[3]

In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (a) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (b) Which law will the court apply? and (c) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?^[4]

In the Hasegawa case,^[5] the Supreme Court said: “Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question of whether the application of a substantive law that will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do not always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.”^[6] However, these statements from the High Court, with all due respect, create more confusion than understanding. Citing foreign books and foreign court decisions, the Court’s attempt to explain jurisdiction and its interplay with choice of law did not reach its desired effect.

The study of the interaction between jurisdiction and choice of law should begin with an understanding that jurisdiction, from the eyes of Philippine laws, is conferred by law. It is the law that provides the power to a court to hear and decide a case. Jurisdiction, it is said, can even be described as a concept unaffected by any outside factors such as the amendment of the law conferring jurisdiction because, once a court acquires and exercises jurisdiction over a case, such jurisdiction will adhere, will continue, and will remain until the final disposition of the case. Jurisdiction, after all, is determined by the law at the time of the filing of an action.

Also, forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law.^[7]

Contrary to what the Supreme Court said in the Hasegawa case,^[8] i.e., “jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state,” jurisdiction neither concerns itself with the forum’s convenience nor with the choice of law. This author humbly submits that it is not at all prudent to mix the concept of jurisdiction with the question of whether “it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state.” One reason for this humble submission is that, in the first place, if the defendant is a non-resident foreigner permanently residing in Canada, for example, and if no valid service of summons is effected upon his/her person within the Philippine territory, the case cannot validly proceed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Hence, whether or not the defendant should be caused to travel into the Philippine Islands is entirely a different question from subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is not only a power but also a duty to hear and decide a case. In fact, the 1987 Constitution provides: “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”^[9] In COURAGE v. Secretary Abad, the Supreme Court had occasion to say: “This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”^[10]

Hence, following the Supreme Court’s statements in Hasegawa, it would be a dereliction of duty and an abandonment of a constitutional commitment to refuse to hear and decide a case simply because the forum is an inconvenient court. Because jurisdiction is not only a power but also a duty, it would be improper for a forum to consider, in the determination of whether it has jurisdiction,^[11] whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state. In short, whether or not it is fair or convenient for a defendant to be hailed or dragged into court is not a matter that goes into the subject matter jurisdiction of that court.

If an Alabama national residing in the Philippines, for example, files a divorce petition in the Regional Trial Court of the Philippines, against his/her Filipino spouse, the case definitely involves a foreign element. The nationality of the petitioner is a factual matter that cuts across the territorial lines between Alabama and the Philippines and involves the application of Alabama law – the status of the petitioner being governed by his/her national law – and of Philippine law – the status of the Filipino spouse being governed by Philippine laws and the procedure that governs the petition being governed by the law of the forum. The student will immediately find it obvious that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the divorce petition because no Philippine law or statute confers over it the power to hear and decide a case of this nature. In fact, Philippine family law recognizes only three primary ways of dissolving a marriage: (a) via a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) via a petition for annulment of marriage; and (c) via a petition for declaration of presumptive death of a spouse.

In the case of Republic v. Olaybar,^[12] Merlinda L. Olaybar filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in the proper Philippine court for the cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract. Before this filing, she requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. She impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the interests of the Republic of the Philippines in the preservation of entries in the civil registry, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed decision of the Philippine court granting her petition because (a) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (b) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

Denying the Office of the Solicitor General’s (OSG’s) motion for reconsideration, the court a quo held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that Olaybar’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for the respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The case went up to the Supreme Court, raising the sole issue of whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Finding for Olaybar, the Supreme Court held: “It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of the respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.”^[13]

In the same case, the High Court went on to explain: “To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only evidence of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by canceling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.”^[14]

In other words, while it is true that a Rule 108 petition is not the proper method to declare a marriage void, the circumstances surrounding the Olaybar case justify the use of this procedural device. This is because there was no marriage to speak of and, in fact, Olaybar was not asking for the court to declare her marriage void. She merely sought the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. In granting the correction of the wife portion in the certificate of marriage, the trial court did not declare Olaybar’s marriage void as, in the first place, there was even no marriage to speak of. At any rate, the point is that the correction of entries in a person’s civil records is a subject matter within the power of Philippine courts to decide.

If a Filipino wife files a petition for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of the Philippines against her marriage with her Pennsylvanian husband, the question of jurisdiction is settled by Philippine laws. The foreigner husband cannot validly and successfully invoke the argument that, under his national law, annulment of marriage, for example, is not allowed because the national law of the Filipino wife is governed by Philippine family law which recognizes annulment of marriage on the following grounds: (a) that the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (b) that either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (c) that the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (d) that the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (e) that either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (f) that either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.^[15]

In the Philippines, the filing of an action for the collection of a sum of money arising from a contract of loan with a mortgage over real property will result in the waiver of the power of the creditor to cause the foreclosure of the real property offered as security for the loan. Such action for collection is within the jurisdiction of Philippine courts, whether in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) or in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), depending on the amount of the claim. A foreclosure action, on the other hand, is also within the jurisdiction of Philippine courts, whether in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) or in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), depending on the assessed value of the real property sought to be foreclosed.

An alien creditor who has already sought and litigated a collection of a sum of money in a foreign court against a Filipino debtor will have difficulties in proceeding with a foreclosure action in the Philippines over real property situated in this jurisdiction, not because Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case of foreclosure but because of the public policy against the splitting of causes of action. The same rule applies even if both parties to the case or cases are Filipino citizens.

In the case of Asset Pool v. Spouses Berris,^[16] the Supreme Court ruled: “Petitioner cannot split its cause of action on the Discounting Line by first filing a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage on [a promissory note] and then institute a personal action for the collection of the other four [promissory notes] without violating the proscription against splitting a single cause of action. Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action and, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as ground for the dismissal of the others.”

BANK OF AMERICA V. AMERICAN REALTY CORP.

The case of Bank of America v. American Realty^[17] asked the following question: whether or not a mortgagee-creditor waives its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage constituted over a third-party mortgagor’s property situated in the Philippines by filing an action for the collection of the principal loan before foreign courts. The law student’s immediate reaction, of course, would be to answer in the affirmative because that would constitute a splitting of a cause of action which is against Philippine public policy, and such an answer would be correct. However, there is a different layer to the question, i.e., whether the pendency or finality of a collection case in a foreign court would still result in litis pendentia or res judicata, as the case may be, against a foreclosure case pending in a Philippine court even if the two cases were filed in two different jurisdictions. The answer would still be in the affirmative despite the international setup of the facts of the case.

The basic rule in the Philippines is that, for nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists of the recovery of the credit with the execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his/her action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. By applying the rules above stated, a plaintiff, then, cannot split up his/her single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If s/he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, plural redress for a single breach of contract would be authorized at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.^[18]

In the Bank of America case, the Supreme Court held that, even if the collection suits were filed in a foreign court, the filing of a foreclosure case in the Philippines would still have an effect of abandonment of the right of action to foreclose. To counter this, Bank of America interposed the argument that, under English law, which allegedly was the applicable choice of law, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money. It, however, failed to prove the alleged foreign law; and even if it did successfully plead and prove the same, the argument would still fail because, when a foreign law, a foreign judgment, or a contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.^[19] The public policy sought to be protected by the Court, in this case, was the principle embedded in this jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.^[20]

ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction has multiple aspects. They are (a) jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction over a category or class of cases; (b) jurisdiction over the parties, i.e., the court’s recognized power to compel a person to submit to its processes and the duty to inform such person that a charge, complaint or some other legal proceeding is pending against him/her; (c) jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the court’s power to treat matters relating to property, real rights attached to such property, the status of persons, their condition, their legal capacity and so on; (d) jurisdiction over the issues, i.e., the court’s authority to decide questions raised in the pleadings; and, (e) jurisdiction over the remedies, i.e., the power of the court to pass judgment upon disputes involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable or or its power to settle justiciable questions.

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

As mentioned, law provides for the category or class of cases over which a court may exercise the power to hear and decide. For example, in the Philippines, the mother statute on jurisdiction is Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended, which provides that, if a civil case involves real property the assessed value of which exceeds Php400,000.00, the proper court to assume jurisdiction is the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within whose territorial scope the land or building is located. This is called “subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Another example of subject-matter jurisdiction is in criminal laws. If the maximum penalty imposable does not exceed six years, under the same law,^[21] the proper court to hear and decide the case is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Note that the term “Municipal Trial Court” also refers to Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs).^[22]

Where the court before which the case is filed has no jurisdiction, the proper remedy is a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Upon receipt of the motion to dismiss, the court will determine its own jurisdiction under the principle of “competence-competence”^[23] and, if it legally does not have such jurisdiction, its power, if ever it can be said there is any, is limited to causing the dismissal of the same. Albano, in one of his Bar examination lectures, said that, in fact, the only power of the court is the power to dismiss the case because any and all proceedings conducted by a court without competent jurisdiction are void.

The reason for the inclusion of subject-matter jurisdiction in the study of private international law is that different countries may adopt different sets of laws on court jurisdiction. Moreover, two foreigners may think that they are allowed to file a certain category of cases in the Philippines, which is allowed in their country of origin but which Philippine law does not.

To illustrate, if the Norwegian State uses the same nomenclature for its courts and adopts the same pattern of judicial hierarchy (Municipal Trial Court [MTC] to the Regional Trial Court [RTC] to the Court of Appeals [CA] to the Supreme Court), this does not mean that actions involving title to real property whose assessed value exceeds Php400,000.00 are within the jurisdiction of the Norwegian Regional Trial Court (RTC) simply because this is the rule in the Philippines. The Norwegian State may adopt a different set of rules in the apportionment of the jurisdiction of its courts.

In the Philippines, as jurisdiction is conferred by law, it is the Legislative Branch of the Government through law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts. After all, judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.^[24]

JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES

Another aspect of jurisdiction is that over the parties. It must be recalled that parties to an action may be the plaintiff, the defendant, the accused, the complainant, the respondent, or the petitioner, as the case may be, depending on whether the case is a civil action, a criminal action, a special proceeding or an administrative action.

As to the plaintiff (in a civil action),^[25] jurisdiction over his/her person is acquired by the court by his/her filing of a complaint, petition, or action.^[26] By doing so, the plaintiff recognizes the jurisdiction of the court over his/her person and impliedly allows the court to enforce against him/her whatever judgment or order the court may issue in the course of the proceedings.

As to the defendant, jurisdiction over his/her person is acquired by the court either by the proper service of summons or through his/her voluntary appearance.

JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT THROUGH VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE

Indeed, despite the lack of valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance.^[27] According to the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. However, the inclusion in a motion to dismiss or other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.^[28]

There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court's lack of jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court. When a party appears before the court without qualification, s/he  is deemed to have waived his/her objection regarding lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons.^[29]

As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file an answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is considered voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.^[30]

Rapid City Realty Development Corporation v. Villa^[31] laid down the rules on voluntary appearance as follows: (a) special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (b) accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and, (c) failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.

As held in the case of Interlink Movie Houses v. Court of Appeals,^[32] the abovementioned general rule is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his/her person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. As explained by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case,^[33] a special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance when the defendant explicitly and unequivocably poses objections to the jurisdiction of the court over his/her person.^[34]

JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT THROUGH VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS

A court summons (in plural form, summonses) is a legal document issued by the court through the clerk of court, that orders a person to appear in court or submit an answer to a complaint or an opposition to a petition and interpose his/her defense or defenses, if any, for the proper appreciation of the court in which the case is pending. Summonses are a device that fulfills the constitutional requirement of due process by informing the defendant why s/he is being called to court and warning him/her that failure to appear or file the necessary pleading will have dire consequences.

A person who is properly served with a summons is said to be officially and legally informed of the claims against him/her and s/he is charged with the knowledge and understanding that his/her failure to appear in court or to file an answer, as the case may be, may result in an order declaring him/her in default, i.e., s/he will lose his/her opportunity to participate in proceedings of the case.

PROPER SERVICE OF SUMMONS

Proper service of summons is governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. It is a common misconception that the rules on service of pleadings, documents and other papers under Rule 13 apply to service of summons but this is entirely incorrect.

For example, under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, service of pleadings, documents and other court-bound papers to the opposing party, under certain circumstances, is allowed to be done through registered mail. This is not true under Rule 14 which states that service of summons must be effected in person, i.e., personally served to the defendant by handing a copy of the summons and a copy of the complaint to him/her and informing him/her that s/he is being served.

The rule on service of summons in person is outlined in Section 5 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which states: “Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person and informing the defendant that he or she is being served, or, if he or she refuses to receive and sign for it, by leaving the summons within the view and in the presence of the defendant.”

Another acceptable manner of service of summons, which is the exception rather than the general rule, is what is known as “substituted service of summons” or service of summons in substitution. As the name connotes, the service of summons is not done to the person of the defendant himself/herself but to another person with sufficient age and discretion residing in the residence of the defendant. While service of summons in person is ideal, if the sheriff or any authorized deputy cannot reasonably serve the same within 30 days^[35] from its issuance and after attempting to serve the summons to the person of the defendant at three attempts on two different dates, the server may resort to this second mode.

The rule on substituted service of summons is outlined in Section of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, saying: “If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served personally after at least three (3) attempts on two (2) separate dates, service may be effected: (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence to a person at least eighteen (18) years of age and of sufficient discretion residing therein; (b) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. A competent person includes, but not limited to, one who customarily receives correspondences for the defendant; (c) by leaving copies of the summons, if refused entry upon making his or her authority and purpose known, with any of the officers of the homeowners' association or condominium corporation, or its chief security officer in charge of the community or the building where the defendant may be found; and, (d) by sending an electronic mail to the defendant's electronic mail address, if allowed by the court.”

The best example of a situation in which substituted service of summons is justified is when the defendant is temporarily outside the Philippines.

JARANILLA V. GONZALES

In Jaranilla v. Gonzales,^[36] plaintiffs who were minors were not served with summons in a civil action. They were necessary parties to the action and should be joined as defendants. Some of the adults were appointed guardians ad litem to represent the minor children When the lawyers for the defendants appeared via pleading, they represented in all their pleadings that they were appearing for all the defendants therein.

Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the appearance of the attorneys on behalf of the minors in the action was equivalent to service. The denial by the minors of having authorized said attorneys to represent them may be conceded but such denial does not destroy the presumption that the services of the attorneys were engaged by the guardians ad litem not only to represent themselves but also the minors.

If the duly appointed guardian ad litem, the mother of the minors, did not consider the summons served on her alone as a summons also on her minor children, or if she did not authorize her attorneys to represent her minor children, she should have raised the question in the case before or during the trial or thereafter but before judgment was rendered. The failure of the guardian ad litem and her attorneys to raise the point of lack of summons service in person upon the minors was considered by the Court as a waiver on the part of said minors represented by their mother, their guardian ad litem, to question the lack of such service upon them. As already stated, the voluntary appearance of the attorneys not only for the adult defendants but also for the minors should be equivalent to service.

This author takes this opportunity to remind the student that, under Section 10 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC,^[37] when the defendant is a minor, insane or otherwise an incompetent person, service of summons shall be made upon him/her personally and on his/her legal guardian if s/he has one, or if none, upon his/her guardian ad litem whose appointment shall be applied for by the plaintiff. Again, in the case of a minor, service shall be made on him/her and (not or) his/her parent or guardian.

LA NAVAL DRUG V. CA

La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals^[38] reexamined the question of whether or not the submission of other issues in a motion to dismiss, or of an affirmative defense (as distinguished from an affirmative relief) in an answer, would necessarily foreclose, and have the effect of a waiver of, the right of a defendant to set up the court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Note that this decision was promulgated prior to the recent amendments to the Rules of Court.

Answering the question in the negative, the Supreme Court said that any ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss may be pleaded as an affirmative defense and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. An answer itself contains the negative, as well as affirmative, defenses upon which the defendant may rely. A negative defense denies the material facts averred in the complaint essential to establish the plaintiff's cause of action, while an affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint, would, nevertheless, prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff. Inclusive of these defenses are those mentioned in the then-but-now-collapsed Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which would permit the filing of a motion to dismiss.

In the same manner that a plaintiff may assert two or more causes of action in a court suit, a defendant is likewise expressly allowed under the Rules of Court, to put up his/her defenses alternatively or even hypothetically. Indeed, under the same Rules, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, except for the failure to state a cause of action, are deemed waived. This means that a defendant may, in fact, feel enjoined to set up, along with his/her objection to the court’s jurisdiction over his/her person, all other possible defenses. It thus appears that it is not the invocation of any of such defenses, but the failure to so raise them, that should result in waiver or estoppel. By defenses, of course, is meant the grounds provided for in the now-collapsed Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that must be asserted in a motion to dismiss or by way of affirmative defenses in an answer.

JURISDICTION OVER THE  PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

In criminal cases, the jurisdiction over the accused is acquired via his/her voluntary surrender or through the arrest of his person. Voluntary surrender may be in the form of an appearance in court or the submission of motions or pleadings to seek affirmative relief from the court. Note, however, that the posting of bail is not necessarily a waiver of any illegal arrest.

OVER-PERSON JURISDICTION VS.PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

The reason why over-person jurisdiction is studied in conflict of laws is ^[39]the fact that different states may adopt different rules concerning the proper service of summons or the proper acquisition of jurisdiction over the party. Hence, for example, if service of summons ought to be served upon a defendant who is on foreign soil, problems may arise if the foreign country requires a different mode, method, or manner of service. Also, under Section 48 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, “want of notice to the party” and “want of jurisdiction” may be grounds to repel or question a foreign court decision sought to be recognized or enforced in the Philippines.

JURISDICTION OVER THE RES

Another aspect of jurisdiction is that over the res or “the thing.” The term “res” may refer not only to real or personal property but also to the status, condition, and legal capacity of a person.

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.^[40] It is an error to think that the term “res” only refers to property. As mentioned above, jurisdiction over the res may also be acquired by the “institution of legal proceedings.” For example, in a case involving the annulment of marriage, the Supreme Court held that the same “is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole word. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis. Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff's — theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.”^[41]

.

When proceeding with a case that involves real or personal property, the forum must generally have jurisdiction over the property involved. For example, in real property registration cases under the Torrens System of registration, the land must be within the territorial limits of the Philippines and must fall within the territorial scope of the court hearing the case. In Spouses Tan Sing Pan and Veranga v. Republic,^[42] the Supreme Court cited the early case of Director of Lands v. Aba^[43] and held that the filing of an answer or claim with the cadastral court is equivalent to an application for registration of title to real property; it is thus an action in rem and the land registration court acquires jurisdiction over the res by service of processes in the manner prescribed by the statute. It has been held that a cadastral case being one in rem, any decision rendered therein by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world, including the government.^[44]

As to personal property, theoretical complications may arise. As a general rule, if the focal point or main concern of the dispute is the personal property itself, without any prayer for a party to do, to give, or not to do, the court must ensure that it has jurisdiction over the movable property involved, i.e., it must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and must fall within its territorial scope. If the relief sought is for the defendant to do, to give, or not to do, in personam jurisdiction overrides jurisdiction over the res. On the other hand, if the relief sought is for the declaration of ownership over the personal property involved, in rem jurisdiction gains preference over in personam jurisdiction.

For example, if the case is for replevin, i.e., there is a prayer for the defendant to give back or return a movable, it is safe to argue that, considering that the prayer sought is for the defendant to do a particular thing, lack of jurisdiction over the res is not fatal as the court may issue an order to the defendant to return the personal property to the plaintiff even if such property is located in a foreign country. According to the Supreme Court, in “a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. The service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.”^[45]

In fact, even in the case of real property outside the territorial limits of the forum state, as long as it has in personam jurisdiction, it may order a party to do or not to do acts in relation to the said real property. “For over a hundred years it has been settled black-letter law that a court lacks authority to directly determine and affect title to real property located outside the state in which the court sits. However, it is equally well-established that a court of equity having jurisdiction over a person may act indirectly upon that person's extraterritorial real estate by ordering him or her to act or to cease to act in some particular way in relation to the property. That is, courts distinguish judgments calculated to affect title to property itself from orders directing owners subject to their jurisdiction to take certain actions concerning property located outside the jurisdiction.”^[46]

In relation to the status, condition, or legal capacity of a person, jurisdiction over the res is through legal recognition, i.e., the filing of the necessary action or petition in court thereby recognizing its power as legally effective, of course, in relation to a legal provision that confers such power. If two Japanese are residents of the Philippines and they decide to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the problem is in the Philippine courts’ jurisdiction over their status or condition as married, which is governed by their national law. To point out, Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, which is a principle that is applied even to foreigners under the principle of reciprocity. Hence, as to the two Japanese, Philippine courts have no power to declare the status of their marriage, one way or another, the same being governed by Japanese laws.

In the case of In Re Adoption of Ellis and Ellis,^[47] the Supreme Court held an adoption case is a proceeding in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of the child whose adoption is in question as well as that of petitioners herein. The New Civil Code of the Philippines^[48] adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latters' nationality. Pursuant to this theory, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the status of a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of foreigners. Under Philippine political law, heavily patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, the view is that the personal status, in general, of a person is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of his/her personal law.^[49]

A court cannot decide on a matter (a res) over which the law confers no power to hear and upon which to pass judgment. An example is the jurisdiction over the res in a case of presumptive death. The matter in litem in such a case is the death of a person, which is a status or condition. This is governed by the national law of the person whose death is in question. Whether or not a Filipino citizen is dead is a matter governed by Philippine laws, and the same is true for presumptive death.

In the Philippines, there are two types of death as a condition: (a) actual death which is the cessation of life, and (b) presumptive death which is a fiction of law.

Private international law rules concerning death become very much relevant, for example, if a German citizen dies in the Philippines or becomes absent for eleven years. If German law does not recognize constructive death and requires actual death for purposes of succession, a presumptive death in the eyes of Philippine laws cannot operate regarding the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the capacity to succeed of the heirs of the German decedent because death as a status or condition is governed by the national law of the German.

Even if there is actual death, if German laws provide that a waiting period of seven days, for example, is required by the national law of the decedent before such national is declared legally dead, Article 777 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines cannot apply in its acceptable meaning in the Philippines, i.e., successional rights are transmitted at the moment of death, because the decedent’s national law determines a different “moment of death.”

MABANAG V. GALLEMORE^[50]

In reading the Mabanag case, the student of law must be advised that the De Pedro ruling^[51] is the recent expression of the Court’s interpretation of the rules on this matter.

Going straight to the point, the question in this case was whether the action should be considered in personam or one in rem. Another issue was whether the trial court had no authority or jurisdiction to render a judgment against the defendant, Joseph M. Gallemore, for being a non-resident.

The purpose of the action was to recover Php735.18, an amount said to have been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant for two parcels of land whose sale was later annulled. The defendant was a resident of Los Angeles, California. He had no property in the Philippines, except an alleged debt owed him by a resident of Occidental Misamis. This credit in favor of the defendant, upon petition of the plaintiff, after the filing of the complaint and before the suit was dismissed, was attached to the extent of the plaintiff’s claim for the payment of which the action was brought. The trial court dissolved the attachment in the same order dismissing the case.

The Supreme Court, in resolving the issues, cited Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca,^[52] and Slade Perkins v. Dizon.^[53] According to the Court, when the defendant is not residing and is not found in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his/her person, unless s/he voluntarily appears in court. However, when the action (a) affects the personal status of the plaintiff residing in the Philippines, or (b) is intended to seize or dispose of any property of the defendant, which is located in the Philippines, it may be validly tried by the Philippine courts, for then, such courts can be said to have jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the personal status of the plaintiff or the property of the defendant. In such cases, their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant would not be considered essential.

As the remedy is administered in some states, the theory of attachment, whether it is by process against or to subject the property of a resident or nonresident of the state, is that it partakes essentially of the nature and character of a proceeding in personam and not of a proceeding in rem. And if the defendant appears, the action proceeds in accordance with the practice governing proceedings in personam. Nonetheless, where the defendant fails to appear in the action, the proceeding is to be considered as one in the nature of a proceeding in rem. And where the court acts directly on the property, the title thereof being charged by the court without the intervention of the party, the proceeding unquestionably is one in rem in the fullest meaning of the term.

In attachment proceedings against a non-resident defendant where personal service on him/her is lacking, it is elementary that the court may obtain jurisdiction over the property of the defendant. If no steps have been taken to acquire jurisdiction of the defendant’s person, and s/he fails to appear and answer or otherwise submit himself/herself to the jurisdiction of the court, the court is without jurisdiction to render judgment until there has been a lawful seizure of property owned by him within the jurisdiction of the court.

Tested by the foregoing, the Court ruled that the court a quo properly acquired jurisdiction by virtue of the attachment of the defendant’s credit. Although no jurisdiction was obtained over the defendant’s person, the case may proceed to judgment if there is property in the custody of the court that can be applied to its satisfaction.

JURISDICTION OVER REMEDIES

As a concept, “jurisdiction over the remedies” is a legal idea properly within the rules and regulations of the forum court because remedies are procedural rules that are within the executive prerogative of the Supreme Court under Section 5 (5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states: “The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: [xxx] Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.”

Each jurisdiction has a mechanism to adopt and enforce procedural rules to be observed in its courts. Insofar as the Philippine legal system is concerned, it is the Supreme Court that has the exclusive power to promulgate rules regarding pleading, practice, and procedure. Hence, in a conflicts case, a foreigner cannot insist on a certain remedy or procedural device that is allowed in his/her national law if the same is not allowed in this jurisdiction’s forum. For example, in the United States, the concept of a mistrial is widely recognized in its courts; however, in the Philippines, such procedural remedy cannot be availed of and the alternative is a motion to quash or a petition for certiorari, as the case may be.

Another example is the mode of filing an appeal. While the right to appeal is a statutory right, provided by substantive law, the mode or manner of appeal is governed by the Rules of Court. Notice that, under Section 39 of the Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, “[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from. No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof. This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.” This law only provides for the period to and the right to file an appeal but does not specify the method or manner of doing so. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides: “Section 3. How to appeal. — The appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal.”

A non-Filipino who litigates before a Philippine court cannot insist on the applicability of the procedures in his/her national law. Considering that the Philippine Rules of Court requires a notice of appeal as a mode of taking an appeal, the same shall govern because procedural rules are matters that pertain to the forum alone.

In fact, in extreme circumstances, the forum may be justified in dismissing the case due to the availment of a wrong remedy. For instance, a petition for certiorari is not a remedy for a lost appeal. In one case, not related to conflict of laws, the Supreme Court gave the following ruling: “A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.”^[54]

The author, however, acknowledges that the terms “jurisdiction over the remedies” and “jurisdiction over the issues” have been used interchangeably in Philippine jurisprudence to refer to jurisdiction over the issues, i.e., whether or not a question is political or justiciable. This is discussed in the following paragraphs.

JURISDICTION OVER ISSUES^[55]

The author’s humble understanding of the concept of jurisdiction over the issues is in two ways: (a) that which relates to whether or not a question brought before the court is a justiciable or a political issue; and (b) that which involves the proceedings in court. Here, the second one is discussed first.

During the pre-trial of a case, several matters are taken up. Under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory to consider the following case aspects: (a) the possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution; (b) the simplification of the issues; (c) the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (d) the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof; (e) the limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) the advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner; (g) the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; (h) the advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and (i) such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.^[56]

Notice that one of the matters to be taken up during pre-trial is the simplification of the issues. In practice, the court asks the parties to specify the issues which they wish to be resolved by the judge. It is through this that courts acquire jurisdiction over the issues. As a general rule, courts are not free to roam around at will and decide issues not squarely raised in the pleadings or not raised by the parties. Of course, parties are allowed to incorporate a general prayer for other reliefs just and equitable but, as a rule of thumb, courts must limit themselves to the issues specified by the parties.

To clarify, it is not only the issues raised and pointed out by the parties during pre-trial, which may be the basis of the court’s jurisdiction over the issues. The reliefs sought will also determine the matter or matters to be resolved by the court. For example, if in the pleadings, one of the prayers submitted is for a finding of payment for damages, even if the same is not mentioned during the pre-trial of the case, the court is justified in taking it up in its decision.

Jurisdiction over the issues, in the sense discussed above, is a procedural not a substantive matter. Hence, in a conflicts case, a foreigner cannot insist on whatever practice or procedure is observed in his/her own country in relation to the acquisition by a Philippine forum of jurisdiction over the issues in a case. To illustrate, if the Chinese legal system requires a pleading called “Formal Offer of Issues” for a Chinese court to acquire jurisdiction over the issues, this does not bind a Philippine court even if the parties to a dispute are Chinese nationals.

The other way the term “jurisdiction over the issues” is understood in the Philippine legal system relates to the justiciability of a question. Not all questions can be passed upon by the courts. In short, judicial review is not always the remedy and there are cases in which there is no remedy to question a government act or omission. The courts would have no jurisdiction over the remedies because, for example, the “remedy” (quotes intended) would be suffrage, not judicial recourse.^[57] If the President – the chief architect of foreign relations – establishes friendly relations with China, there is no judicial remedy to prohibit him from doing so and the “remedy” would be for the people to exercise their vote wisely if they believe that China is not an ally.

On one hand, there are questions classified as “justiciable controversies” and, on the other hand, there are those which are labeled as “political controversies.” Political controversies or political questions are also called “non-justiciable questions.” Political or non-justiciable questions are those which cannot be passed upon or resolved by courts because to do so would be violative of the principle of separation of powers. Such questions or political matters belong to the political branches of the Government -- the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch -- and they are considered policy matters. The remedy to question policy matters would not be to go to court; rather, to vote out those who advocate such policies.

In relation to the constitutional concept of judicial power, the remedy of judicial review is available only to (a) controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable (the actual controversy test) and (b) controversies involving grave abuse of discretion in any instrumentality of the Government. Beyond these, courts cannot step in to hear and decide. In other words, over policy questions, judicial review would not be the proper remedy; there would be no remedy. In raising a question to the courts, a party-litigant must show the existence of the court's jurisdiction over the remedies -- i.e. the remedy of judicial review -- to pass upon, resolve, or decide a question which must be a justiciable one, not a political one.^[58]

In the case of Inmates of New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima,^[59] public respondents alleged that the case was not justiciable and that the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over the remedies that petitioners availed of. Petitioners were asking the Supreme Court to declare null and void the prospective application of the beneficial provisions of Republic Act No. 10592,^[60] i.e., the grant of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for study, teaching, and mentoring, and special time allowance for loyalty. In his Separate Concurring Opinion, Justice Leonen said that the public respondents are mistaken because the authority of courts to “settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights” is an aspect of judicial power that is anchored on Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Agreeing that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the remedies, the main decision in this case ordered: “WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid insofar as it provides for the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and special time allowance for loyalty. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections and the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology are REQUIRED to RE-COMPUTE with reasonable dispatch the time allowances due to petitioners and all those who are similarly situated and, thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release from imprisonment in case of full service of sentence, unless they are being confined thereat for any other lawful cause.”

IN PERSONAM, QUASI/IN

REM CLASSIFICATIONS

In other more common cases such as cases for the collection of a sum of money or for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, a foreigner or a Filipino may come to a Philippine court to ask that the decision of a foreign court granting said collection or foreclosure be recognized and enforced in this jurisdiction. The issue, however, with a foreclosure proceeding conducted by a foreign court over real property located in the Philippines is that the opposing party may be inclined to invoke lack of jurisdiction over the property, it being outside the territorial limits of that foreign forum.

An action may be classified into (a) in personam, (b) in rem, and (c) quasi in rem actions. An accion in personam names a person as a defendant in order to enforce against such defendant a personal obligation, i.e., either an obligation to do, to give, or not to do. Whereas, an accion in rem is an action against the thing itself, which binds the whole world. Therefore, in an in rem action, a defendant may be named as a nominal party who does not need to participate in the proceedings to adjudicate the rights of the petitioner and the respondents^[61] but the proceeding is intended to bind the whole world as to a person or a thing’s status, condition or legal capacity, such as the registration of real property, the annulment of marriage, disputes arising from ownership of property and so on. Finally, in an accion quasi in rem, an individual is named as a defendant but the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.^[62]

The matter of whether an action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem becomes relevant as well in a discussion of proper service of summons, jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the parties.

Whether or not an action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem does not concern itself with the location of the property or the territorial jurisdiction of the court over a property. It is an error to think that “jurisdiction over the res” is automatically linked with “in rem actions.”

For example, foreclosure of real property is a quasi in rem action. It has been ruled that “[a] proceeding for judicial foreclosure of a mortgage is an action quasi in rem. It is based on a personal claim sought to be enforced against a specific property of a person named party defendant. And, its purpose is to have the property seized and sold by court order to the end that the proceeds thereof be applied to the payment of plaintiff’s claim.” It is a quasi in rem action precisely because it is like or similar to an in rem action but it is not; implied from this then, it is an in personam action that is similar to an in rem action.

In judicial foreclosure proceedings over real property, jurisdiction over the thing itself, i.e., the property in litigation, or the property sought to be foreclosed, must be within the territorial limits of the Philippines and within the territorial scope of the Philippine court hearing the case. There are two reasons for this: first, Philippine courts cannot pass judgment on real property located in a different jurisdiction because real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated^[63]; and, second, actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.^[64] If it happens that a foreclosure proceeding over real property is decided by a Philippine court despite the fact that the real property concerned is situated in Arizona, it will not depend on the municipal laws of Arizona whether to recognize and give enforcement to the foreclosure decree of the Philippine court. This is a difficult situation because even the Rules of Court of the Philippines allows a foreign judgment to be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction.^[65]

The same is said to be true for a foreclosure decree issued by an Arizona court over real property situated in the Philippines. The Arizona petitioner who commenced the foreclosure proceedings in his/her own country cannot seek enforcement of the said decree through a writ of execution issued by the Arizona court because the processes of a court are limited within its territorial jurisdiction. The remedy would be to file a petition in the proper Philippine court for recognition and enforcement of the Arizona foreclosure decree. However, the defending party may also repel the said decree by evidence of want of jurisdiction.^[66]

WHETHER IN REM, QUASI IN REM, OR IN PERSONAM VS. SERVICE OF SUMMONS

As stated in Valmonte v. Court of Appeals,^[67] it will be helpful to determine first whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the nature of the action.^[68]

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his/her personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing^[69] itself instead of against the person.^[70] An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as a defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his/her interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.^[71]

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If s/he cannot be personally served with a summons within a reasonable time,^[72] substituted service may be made in accordance with the same rule. If s/he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to (a) substituted service; (b) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (c) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (d) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.^[73] 

However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person.^[74] This method of service is possible if such a defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.^[75] An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker^[76] wherein a non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.

On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is generally not fatal in the conferment of jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, the summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.^[77] Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the Philippines and (a) the action affects the personal status of a party; (b) the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (c) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located in the Philippines; or (d) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or, (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.^[78]

DUE PROCESS IN ACCIONS IN REM AND QUASI IN REM

In all cases involving the recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments, the substantive laws and procedural rules of the forum will still govern. For example, the basic requirements of notice and hearing are observed in this jurisdiction.

As mentioned above, actions may be classified as (a) in personam, (b) in rem, or (c) quasi in rem actions. Also as mentioned, whether or not a case falls under either of these classifications has an effect on the proper approach to the service of summons, jurisdiction over the parties and jurisdiction over the res.

As a general rule, proper service of summons upon the defendant is required in in personam actions. This is a basic requirement of notice. In an in personam action, the plaintiff seeks to enforce upon the defendant a personal obligation, i.e., an obligation to do, to give or not to do.^[79] Hence, it would be the height of unfairness to proceed with the case against the defendant without him/her getting reasonable opportunity to be given notice of such fact of pendency of a case against him/her.

Also, as it is traditionally understood, in actions in rem, considering that any court judgment that may arise therefrom will bind only the thing itself and the whole world and will not require a personal obligation from an individual, proper service of summons may be dispensed with as there is person who will be required to obey the judgment. Note that this traditional understanding of an action in rem has been clarified by the Supreme Court.

In the fairly recent case of De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,^[80] the Supreme Court held that, regardless of the type of action – whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem – the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. To avail themselves of substituted service, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriff's actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The sheriff's return, which contains these details, is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and on this basis, the court may allow substituted service. Should the sheriff's return be wanting of these details, substituted service will be irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was presented. Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance.

The seeming contradiction between the rule in the De Pedro case and the traditional understanding of an in rem action must be clarified. In the De Pedro case, summons was served by publication over separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original certificates of title, filed against several defendants. One of the defendants is petitioner Aurora De Pedro (De Pedro). The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan Development Corporation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City on July 7, 1998. Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial, despite the fact that she was a named defendant.

On the other hand, in its very traditional sense, an action in rem or an action quasi in rem is not directed against the person based on his/her personal liability. Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole world. Quasi in rem actions are actions involving the status of a property over which a party has interest. Quasi in rem actions are not binding upon the whole world. They affect only the interests of the particular parties.^[81]

Nonetheless, to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and quasi in rem actions is still required because a person is named a defendant, especially if s/he has an interest in the res in litem.^[82]

ACTIONS “AGAINST THE THING”

The phrase, “against the thing,” to describe in rem actions is a metaphor. It is not the “thing” that is the party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties even in in rem actions. “Against the thing” means that resolution of the case affects interests of others whether direct or indirect. It also assumes that the interests — in the form of rights or duties — attach to the thing which is the subject matter of litigation. In actions in rem, our procedure assumes an active vinculum over those with interests to the thing subject of litigation.^[83]

Hence, if an accion in rem does not – if it is possible – name a person as a defendant, service of summons upon the person of such defendant would not be fatal and would not be required because jurisdiction over the res per se would be sufficient. However, even if an action is classified as in rem or quasi in rem, if a person is named as a defendant – which is usually the case because the the res in litem is always the interest of an individual, service of summons is still required in compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction.^[84]

In a marriage nullity case filed by a wife, although the same action is classified as in rem because it is directed against the thing (the status or condition of being married) itself, the husband is still named as a defendant because he has an interest in the same thing. It would be a violation of due process to simply proceed with a marriage nullity case without the knowledge, without reasonable notice or without reasonable opportunity to be heard being given to a party who has an interest in the thing itself.

CLARIFICATION RE DE PEDRO

RULING & IN REM ACTIONS

The De Pedro ruling must be differentiated with the case of El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca^[85] which was about a case for foreclose of mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the City of Manila. As the defendant was a non-resident at the time of the institution of the action for foreclosure, the plaintiff found it necessary to give notice of summons to the defendant through publication. The defendant’s main objection is that the Philippine court did not properly acquire jurisdiction because service of summons was not personally made upon him. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the bank because involved in this case is the principle that, in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a non-resident who is not served personally within the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res (the thing), and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him.

If a defendant is non-Filipino resident in China at the time of the commencement of an action against him/her, service of summons upon his/her person cannot be expected. Even if s/he is Filipino residing in China temporarily but there is no person of sufficient age and discretion to receive the service of summons for him/her substitutdely, there still can be no expectation of service of summons upon his person. This is because the process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of law requires that the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the question of his personal liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United States on this point, being based upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is binding upon the courts of the Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him.^[86] Therefore, in an action to foreclose a mortgage against a non-resident, upon whom service has been effected exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered.^[87]

In the El Banco Español-Filipino case, the Supreme Court ruled that an action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. Implied from this statement of the court, then, is that an action quasi in rem is primarily an action in personman but merely partakes of the nature of a quasi in rem action and is substantially similar to a quasi in rem action. The High Court went on to explain that the expression “action in rem,” in its narrow application in American legal parlance, is used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as a defendant, but the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property and not to impose upon him any obligation such as that to do, to give or not to do. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated, i.e., quasi in rem. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties and not binding against the whole world in the the way that an action in rem does.

REGISTRATION UNDER

TORRENS SYSTEM

Registration cases over land under the Torrens system are proceedings in rem, not in personam. Such a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, by itself may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants.^[88] Note the use of the term “by itself,” which means that, in a registration case, if claimants are known to the registrant and if they are impleaded in the case, definitely, service of summons should be made upon them, following the De Pedro ruling.^[89]

In land registration cases, jurisdiction is generally acquired by virtue of the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.^[90]

In Acosta v. Salazar,^[91] the two cases that were filed were for cancellation of entries in an original certificate of title and for quieting of title. According to the Supreme Court, these cases can hardly be classified as actions in rem. The first case ought to have been directed against specific persons such as, for example, but not limited to heirs to the land and successors-in-interest who have an interest in the property and who may be classified as indispensable parties. If these indispensable parties are not impleaded in a petition for cancellation of entry in the original certificate of title, they are not bound by the dispositions of the court.^[92] Consequently, any judgment or order of such court can never even attain finality.^[93]

BROWN V. BROWN

In the case of Brown v. Brown,^[94] the case was an action for “divorce from bed and board”^[95] decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. A family court in Rhode Island issued an interlocutory order stopping a party from proceeding with a suit for absolute divorce which he had filed in Maryland. In other words, it is a case in which one court from a state ordered a party to stop pursuing an action which was filed in a foreign court.

According to the decision, a court should not, as a general rule, exercise its power to enjoin foreign divorce proceedings if a spouse sought to be enjoined is a bona fide domiciliary of foreign jurisdiction; foreign domicile is less significant, however, where courts of injunctive state have acquired jurisdiction of matrimonial action between parties prior to establishment of foreign domicile and institution of foreign action. While courts exercise their power to enjoin foreign suits in variety of situations, that power is exercised sparingly and only where equities of case clearly warrant such injunctive relief; this judicial restraint is based on a number of considerations, including difficulty of enforcing such injunctions, reluctance to interfere with individual’s right to seek redress in forum of his own choice, and desire to avoid interference or conflicts with judicial proceedings in sister states.^[96]

In the Brown case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s point was that a forum can validly order to stop a party who is a citizen and a domiciliary of its state from pursuing an action in a foreign state, which may result in forum shopping or litis pendentia. Worse, such proceeding in a foreign court may expose the forum to instability, i.e., there may become varying judgments from different courts, which will result in confusion in the determination of the rights and obligations of the parties. According to that Supreme Court, if the Rhode Island action was filed by the wife before the filing of the Maryland action by the husband who was, at the time of the filing of the former, a domiciliary of Rhode Island, especially if, in fact, the husband has already had been adjudged in willful contempt of Rhode Island child support orders, and where support order was still outstanding, the Rhode Island forum would be warranted in using its equitable powers to enforce its orders and to prevent the child support issue from being sidetracked by the husband’s actions in Maryland.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court ended its decision by saying: “Even if that foreign action would have no legal effect on the issues before the Rhode Island court, it would, again, complicate the resolution of those issues and would place an unfair hurdle in petitioner’s way as she sought to adjudicate her rights arising from the marriage.”

GEMPERLE V. SCHENKER

Gemperle v. Schenker^[97] has been cited as an exception to the general rule. Service of summons was made on the wife, instead of the husband who was also a defendant in the action. The defense was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the husband.

The Supreme Court ruled: “Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although the summons addressed to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in the Philippines.  It is urged by plaintiff that jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through voluntary appearance on his part, he not having made a special appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an answer having been filed in this case, stating that “the defendants, by counsel, answering the plaintiff's complaint, respectfully aver,” which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, confirmed, according to plaintiff, by a P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said answer; but, this counterclaim was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including her husband.  Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative defenses, one of which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of this defense.  Nevertheless, we hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband in the aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued, on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the one at bar, which is a consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.”

MULLANE V. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK & TRUST CO.^[98]

Regarding notices to parties in a pending case, such must be reasonably calculated under the circumstances to inform interested parties of a pending action and give them an opportunity to respond. Notice by publication may be considered insufficient if the names and addresses of the supposed parties are known to the plaintiff.

Central Hanover Bank & Trust set up a trust covering 113 participants and sent notice by publication to all known and unknown beneficiaries to inform them of its application for judicial settlement of the trust. Such a judicial settlement was required by New York law. After the first distribution of the trust, the Bank sent mailed notices to known beneficiaries that could benefit from the interest or principal. Mullane appealed, arguing that the notice by publication by itself was not sufficient and the procedure amounted to lack of proper notice, thereby violating the beneficiaries’ due process rights.

The issue was divided into two questions: (a) whether the notice by publication was sufficient against the known beneficiaries; and (b) whether the notice by publication was sufficient against the unknown beneficiaries. The United States Supreme Court answered question (a) in the affirmative but, as to question (b), in the negative.

An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.^[99] The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information regarding the pending action, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. But if, with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case, these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied.

Of course, as to the beneficiaries whose interests or whereabouts could not, with due diligence, be ascertained, the notice of publication could be considered sufficient. Despite the fact that the unknown beneficiaries may or may not actually read the publication, such a method of notice would still be the best and the most practicable way of informing them. As to known beneficiaries of known place of residence, however, notice by publication stands on a different footing. Exceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that, within the limits of practicability, notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. Where the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are available to the petitioner or the plaintiff, there would be no reason to resort to the method of publication of notices.

---

[1] Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007.

[2] G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007.

[3] Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007.

[4] Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007.

[5] G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007.

[6] Citing Coquia and Aguiling-Pangalangan, Conflict of Laws, 1995 ed., p. 64; Hay, The Interrelation of Jurisdictional Choice of Law in U.S. Conflicts Law, 28 Int'l. & Comp. L.Q. 161 (1979); and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215; 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2585 (1977), citing Justice Black's Dissenting Opinion in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258; 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1242 (1958).

[7] Saudia v. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015.

[8] G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007.

[9] Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

[10] G.R. No. 200418, November 10, 2020.

[11] The power of a court to decide whether it has jurisdiction is called “competence-competence.”

[12] G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014.

[13] G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014.

[14] G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014.

[15] Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

[16] G.R. No. 203194, April 26, 2021.

[17] G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999, 378 Phil. 1279.

[18] Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287.

[19] Philippine Conflict of Laws, Eighth Edition, 1996, Paras, page 46. See also Article 6 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

[20] Also known as the policy against forum shopping.

[21] Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129.

[22] Section 2 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.

[23] Mentioned in passing in Adapon v. Medical Doctors, G.R. No. 229956, June 14, 2021.

[24] Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

[25] Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term “plaintiff” may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)[-]party plaintiff. The term “defendant “may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) - party defendant. (Rule 3 of the Rules of Court)

[26] Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018.

[27] Prudential Bank v. Magdamit, Jr., et al., 746 Phil. 649, 659 (2014).

[28] Section 23 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

[29] G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corporation, G.R. No. 201378, October 18, 2017.

[30] Interlink Movie Houses, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018.

[31] 626 Phil. 211 (2010) (Per J. Carpio Morales, First Division].

[32] G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018.

[33] Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, 606 Phil. 615 (2009).

[34] UCPB v. Ang-Sy, G.R. No. 204753, March 27, 2019, citing the case of Interlink Movie Houses, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018.

[35] Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006, wherein the Supreme Court said “one month from the issuance of summons can be considered reasonable time with regard to personal service on the defendant.”

[36] 96 Phil. 3 [ G.R. No. L-5629. October 11, 1954 ].        

[37] The 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, October 15, 2019.

[38] 306 Phil. 84 [ G.R. No. 103200. August 31, 1994 ].

[39] The author uses “vs.” to mean “vis-a-vis” and “v.” to mean “versus.”

[40] Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007, 515 SCRA 106, 115.

[41] Rayray v. Kyung Lee, G.R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966, citing Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage, 32 Harvard Law Review, 806, 810; Leelar Conflict of Laws (1959), p. 305; Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 1512, Vol. 3.; 15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, sec. 15; I Beale Conflict of Laws (1935), p. 468; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 355; 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Annulment of Marriage, Sec. 60, p. 481; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 115, Anno. 128 ALR 69.

[42] 528 Phil. 623, 630-631 (2006).

[43] 68 Phil. 85, 89 (1939).

[44] Pryce Corporation v. Ponce, G.R. No. 206863, March 22, 2023, citing Nieto v. Quines, 110 Phil. 823, 824 (1961).

[45] Pedro v. Ong, G.R. No. 177598, October 17, 2008, citing Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164041, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 495, 505-506.

[46] Roberts v. Locke, 304 P.3d 116, 120 (Wyo. 2013).

[47] G.R. No. L-16922, April 30, 1963.

[48] Article 15 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

[49] Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714.

[50] 81 Phil. 254 [ G.R. No. L-825. July 20, 1948 ].

[51] G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014.

[52] 37 Phil. 921.

[53] 40 Off. Gaz., [3d Suppl.], No. 7 , p. 216.

[54] Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People, G.R. No. 194214, January 10, 2018.

[55] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 8th Revised Ed., pp. 7-8.

[56] Section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

[57] Project Jurisprudence. (2021, September 18). Jurisdiction over the remedies. PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE. https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2021/09/jurisdiction-over-remedies.html. Last accessed: September 03, 2023.

[58] Project Jurisprudence. (2021, September 18). Jurisdiction over the remedies. PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE. https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2021/09/jurisdiction-over-remedies.html. Last accessed: September 03, 2023.

[59] G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019.

[60] An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 And 99 Of Act No. 3815, As Amended, Otherwise Known As The Revised Penal Code.

[61] De Leon v. Chu, G.R. No. 186522, September 2, 2015 .

[62] Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018.

[63] Article 16 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

[64] Section 1 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

[65] Section 48 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

[66] Section 48 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

[67] 252 SCRA 92, 99 [1996].

[68] Asiavest v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998, 357 Phil. 536.

[69] “The thing,” here, does not only mean a thing in the sense of property but also capacity, condition, capacity, etc.

[70] Dial Corp. v. Soriano, 161 SCRA 737 [1988].

[71] Brown v. Brown, 3 SCRA 451, 456 [1961].

[72] “Reasonable time,” here, has been defined by the Supreme Court in the case of Manotoc v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006), saying: “Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered reasonable time with regard to personal service on the defendant.”

[73] Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070, 1078-1081 (1968).

[74] Boudart v. Tait, 67 Phil. 170, 174-175 1 [1939].

[75] 1 Moran 456.

[76] 125 Phil. 458 [ G.R. No. L-18164. January 23, 1967 ].

[77] Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 92, 99 [1996].

[78] Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

[79] Article 1156 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

[80] G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014.

[81] De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014.

[82] De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014.

[83] De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014.

[84] De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014.

[85] G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918.

[86] Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.

[87] Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.

[88] Acosta v. Salazar, G.R. No. 161034, June 30, 2009, 609 Phil. 48.

[89] De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014.

[90] Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 ed., p. 42.

[91] G.R. No. 161034, June 30, 2009, 609 Phil. 48.

[92] B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Alzul, G.R. No. 169501, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 402, 432.

[93] Acosta v. Salazar, G.R. No. 161034, June 30, 2009, 609 Phil. 48.

[94] Brown v. Brown, 120 R.I. 340, 387 A.2d 1051 (R.I. 1978).

[95] Called in the Philippines as “legal separation.”

[96] Brown v. Brown, 120 R.I. 340, (R.I. 1978).

[97] 125 Phil. 458 [ G.R. No. L-18164. January 23, 1967 ].

[98] 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

[99] Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398.