IPIC v. Gregorio (G.R. No. 174104; February 14, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: INSURANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CORPORATION v. SPOUSES VIDAL S. GREGORIO and JULITA GREGORIO. (G.R. No. 174104; February 14, 2011).
FACTS: Spouses Vidal Gregorio and Julita Gregorio obtained loans from the Insurance of the Philippine Islands Corporation. By way of security for the said loan, respondents executed Real Estate Mortgage. Respondents failed to pay their loans, as a result of which the mortgaged properties were extrajudicially foreclosed.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against respondents alleging that in 1995, when it was in the process of gathering documents for the purpose of filing an application for the registration and confirmation of its title over the foreclosed properties, it discovered that the said lots were already registered in the names of third persons and transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued to them.
The RTC of Morong, Rizal, ruled in favor of petitioner, while the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC and dismissing the complaint of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner's action for damages is barred by prescription and laches.
ISSUE: Had petitioner's right of action prescribed four years after the subject properties were registered with the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal and TCTs were subsequently issued in the names of third persons?
HELD: The Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause of action accrued at the time it discovered the alleged fraud committed by respondents. It is at this point that the four-year prescriptive period should be counted. However, the Court does not agree with the CA in its ruling that the discovery of the fraud should be reckoned from the time of registration of the titles covering the subject properties. The reckoning period for prescription of petitioner's action should be from the time of actual discovery of the fraud.
Neither may the principle of laches apply in the present case. The essence of laches or “stale demands” is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It is not concerned with mere lapse of time; the fact of delay, standing alone, being insufficient to constitute laches. DENIED.
FACTS: Spouses Vidal Gregorio and Julita Gregorio obtained loans from the Insurance of the Philippine Islands Corporation. By way of security for the said loan, respondents executed Real Estate Mortgage. Respondents failed to pay their loans, as a result of which the mortgaged properties were extrajudicially foreclosed.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against respondents alleging that in 1995, when it was in the process of gathering documents for the purpose of filing an application for the registration and confirmation of its title over the foreclosed properties, it discovered that the said lots were already registered in the names of third persons and transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued to them.
The RTC of Morong, Rizal, ruled in favor of petitioner, while the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC and dismissing the complaint of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner's action for damages is barred by prescription and laches.
ISSUE: Had petitioner's right of action prescribed four years after the subject properties were registered with the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal and TCTs were subsequently issued in the names of third persons?
HELD: The Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause of action accrued at the time it discovered the alleged fraud committed by respondents. It is at this point that the four-year prescriptive period should be counted. However, the Court does not agree with the CA in its ruling that the discovery of the fraud should be reckoned from the time of registration of the titles covering the subject properties. The reckoning period for prescription of petitioner's action should be from the time of actual discovery of the fraud.
Neither may the principle of laches apply in the present case. The essence of laches or “stale demands” is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It is not concerned with mere lapse of time; the fact of delay, standing alone, being insufficient to constitute laches. DENIED.
