Estoppel, waiver vs. Rule 16

The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in, equity which, broadly defined, is justice according to natural law and right. It is a principle intended to avoid a clear case of injustice.

The term is hardly distinguishable from a waiver of right. Estoppel, like its said counterpart, must be unequivocal and intentional for, when misapplied, it can easily become a most convenient and effective means of injustice. Estoppel is NOT understood to be a principle that, as a rule, should prevalently apply but, such as it concededly is, as a mere exception from the standard legal norms of general application that can be invoked only in highly exceptional and justifiable cases.

Tested by the above criteria, the Supreme Court has held it propitious to re-examine specifically the question of whether or not the submission of other issues in a motion to dismiss, or of an affirmative defense (as distinguished from an affirmative relief) in an answer, would necessarily foreclose, and have the effect of a waiver of, the right of a defendant to set up the courts lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

A motion to dismiss may be filed on the following grounds:

[a] That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject of the action or suit;
[b] That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit;
[c] The venue is improperly laid;
[d] That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
[e] That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
[f] That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations;
[g] That the complaint states no cause of action;
[h] That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
[i] That the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds;
[j] That the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.Any ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss, except improper venue, may, as further set forth in Section 5 of Rule 16, be pleaded as an affirmative defense and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. An answer itself contains the negative, as well as affirmative, defenses upon which the defendant may rely (Section 4, Rule 6, Rules of Court). A negative defense denies the material facts averred in the complaint essential to establish the plaintiffs cause of action, while an affirmative defense in an allegation of a new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint, would, nevertheless, prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff. Inclusive of these defenses are those mentioned in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which would permit the filing of a motion to dismiss.

In the same manner that the plaintiff may assert two or more causes of action in a court suit, a defendant is likewise expressly allowed, under Section 2, Rule 8, of the Rules of Court, to put up his own defenses alternatively or even hypothetically. Indeed, under Section 2, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, except for the failure to state a cause of action, are deemed waived. We take this to mean that a defendant may, in fact, feel enjoined to set up, along with his objection to the courts jurisdiction over his person, all other possible defenses. It thus appears that it is not the invocation of any of such defenses, but the failure to so raise them, that can result in waiver or estoppel. By defenses, of course, we refer to the grounds provided for in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that must be asserted in a motion to dismiss or by way of affirmative defenses in an answer. (G.R. No. 182729. September 29, 2010)