Court cannot order release of car used for drugs during case pendency

Order of release was premature and made in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165.

It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.

In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:

A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to "all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act." Simply put, the law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture any property that is owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.

Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.

We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation is not consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act, including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential chemicals,is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas follows:

Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.

During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodialegis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.

The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property pending disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.

There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that ofArticle 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of theCrime. – Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.

The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal Codein People v. Jose, concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused when they committed theforcible abduction with rape, although the car did not belong to any of them, holding:

xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx

Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a third person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.

However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in the RTC that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car because it appeared to bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No. 9165, and contends that the car should not be released from the custody of the law because it had been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. It insists that the car is a property in custodialegis and may not be released during the pendency of the trial.

We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.

We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that pointof the proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom should remain in custodialegis in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.

Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.

The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTCas being in custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence. Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in contravention with the express language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.

Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It appears thaton August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and further ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug evidence except the buy-bust money and the genuine money,because:

The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in view of the glaring blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down to the presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. (PDEA v. Brodett)