Disqualification of judges
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides: SEC. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife, or child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
In People v. Kho, this Court held that the foregoing Rule contemplates two kinds of inhibitions compulsory and voluntary. The first paragraph provides that compulsory disqualification conclusively presumes that the judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case. The second paragraph, in turn, leaves to the judges discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons. A judge, however, does not enjoy a wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion to inhibit himself from hearing a case, as the inhibition must be for just and valid causes.
In 1964, this Court, in People v. Gomez and Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, held that a judge may voluntarily inhibit himself on grounds other than those mentioned in paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 and these grounds include bias and partiality. In Pimentel v. Salonga, the Court laid the following guideposts for voluntary inhibition of judges:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflects on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him.
In a long line of cases, this Court has unceasingly re-affirmed the standards laid down in Pimentel. It may be recalled that at the onset of the proceedings, petitioners sought a change of venue in Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P from Palayan City to Metro Manila, due to fear for their lives and those of their witnesses. The prosecution also pointed out that the RVG has the capability of pressuring respondent judge. Despite its pending request for change of venue, respondent judge opted to continue with the proceedings. Significantly, the grounds specified by movants in their Motion to Inhibit are obviously meritorious.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Salonga doctrine that judicial discretion should be exercised in a way that the people's faith in courts of justice should not be impaired becomes relevant. Given the prosecutions apparent lack of faith in respondent judge, she was placed in a difficult position. Should she acquit the accused, her decision will appear to be tainted with bias. Such a situation is highly detrimental, not only to the image of the trial court, but to the integrity of the judicial system. Like Caesars wife, a judge must be beyond suspicion and that he should maintain nothing less than cold neutrality and impartiality. Otherwise, the wisest course for a judge would be to disqualify himself. Thus, respondent judge should have inhibited herself from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P. At any rate, this issue has become moot considering that she had retired from the service on January 7, 2006. (G.R. No. 154150-51; December 10, 2007)
