Jurisdiction: CHED vs. DECS
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4, 15(2) & (3), 54, 57(3) and 70 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982.
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline among its students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHEDs powers and functions under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHEDs coverage of institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student disciplinary cases.
The Supreme Court cannot agree. On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes.
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides: Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following: Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
x x x x n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private.That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 7722 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of other
government entities having functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.
Section 77 of the MRPS on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that [j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education]. This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would have the Supreme Court believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
To the Supreme Court's mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter. (G.R. No. 127980; December 19, 2007)
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following: Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
x x x x n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private.That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 7722 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of other
government entities having functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.
Section 77 of the MRPS on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that [j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education]. This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would have the Supreme Court believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
To the Supreme Court's mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter. (G.R. No. 127980; December 19, 2007)
