CASE DIGEST: Bergonia v. South East Asian Airlines
G.R. No. 195227 : April 21, 2014
FROILAN M. BERGONIO JR., ET AL., Petitioners, v. SOUTH EAST ASIAN AIRLINES AND IRENE CORNIER, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
On April 30, 2004, the petitioners filed before the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal suspension with prayer for reinstatement against respondents South East Asian Airlines (SEAIR) and Irene Dornier as SEAIRs President (collectively, the respondents).
In a decision dated May 31, 2005, the LA found the petitioners illegally dismissed and ordered the respondents, among others, to immediately reinstate the petitioners with full backwages. The respondents received their copy of this decision on July 8, 2005.
On August 20, 2005, the petitioners filed before the LA a Motion for issuance of Writ of Execution for their immediate reinstatement.
During the scheduled pre-execution conference held on September 14, 2005, the respondents manifested their option to reinstate the petitioners in the payroll. The payroll reinstatement, however, did not materialize. Thus, on September 22, 2005, the petitioners filed before the LA a manifestation for their immediate reinstatement.
On October 3, 2005, the respondents filed an opposition to the petitioners motion for execution. They claimed that the relationship between them and the petitioners had already been strained because of the petitioners threatening text messages, thus precluding the latters reinstatement.
On October 7, 2005, the LA granted the petitioners motion and issued a writ of execution.
The respondents moved to quash the writ of execution with a prayer to hold in abeyance the implementation of the reinstatement order. They maintained that the relationship between them and the petitioners had been so strained that reinstatement was no longer possible.
The October 7, 2005 writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. In response, the petitioners filed a motion for re-computation of accrued wages, and, on January 25, 2006, a motion for execution of the re-computed amount. On February 16, 2006, the LA granted this motion and issued an alias writ of execution.
On February 21, 2006, the respondents issued a Memorandum directing the petitioners to report for work on February 24, 2006. The petitioners failed to report for work on the appointed date. On February 28, 2006, the respondents moved before the LA to suspend the order for the petitioners reinstatement.
Meanwhile, the respondents appealed with the NLRC the May 31, 2005 illegal dismissal ruling of the LA.
In an order dated August 15, 2006, the NLRC dismissed the respondents appeal for non-perfection. The NLRC likewise denied the respondents motion for reconsideration in its November 29, 2006 resolution, prompting the respondents to file before the CA a petition for certiorari.
The NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment on February 6, 2007 declaring its November 29, 2006 resolution final and executory. On December 18, 2007, the CA rendered its decision (on the illegal dismissal ruling of the LA) partly granting the respondents petition. The CA declared the petitioners dismissal valid and awarded them P30,000.00 as nominal damages for the respondents failure to observe due process.
The records show that the petitioners appealed the December 18, 2007 CA decision with this Court. In a resolution dated August 4, 2008, the Court denied the petition. The Court likewise denied the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration, and thereafter issued an Entry of Judgment certifying that its August 4, 2008 resolution had become final and executory on March 9, 2009.
On January 31, 2008, the petitioners filed with the LA an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Immediate Release of the Garnished Amount.
In its March 13, 2008 order, the LA granted the petitioners motion; it directed Metrobank-San Lorenzo to release the P1,900,000.00 garnished amount. The LA found valid and meritorious the respondents claim for accrued wages in view of the respondents refusal to reinstate the petitioners despite the final and executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of its (LAs) May 31, 2005 decision. The LA noted that as of the December 18, 2007 CA decision (that reversed the illegal dismissal findings of the LA), the petitioners accrued wages amounted to P3,078,366.33.
The NLRC affirmed in toto the LAs March 13, 2008 order. The NLRC afterwards denied the respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The respondents assailed the July 16, 2008 decision and September 29, 2009 resolution of the NLRC via a petition for certiorari filed with the CA.
The CA granted the respondents petition.18 It reversed and set aside the July 16, 2008 decision and the September 29, 2009 resolution of the NLRC and remanded the case to the Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC for the proper computation of the petitioners accrued wages, computed up to February 24, 2006.
The CA agreed that the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision is immediately executory even pending appeal, such that the employer is obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until the decision (finding the employee illegally dismissed including the reinstatement order) is reversed by a higher court.
ISSUES:
FROILAN M. BERGONIO JR., ET AL., Petitioners, v. SOUTH EAST ASIAN AIRLINES AND IRENE CORNIER, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
On April 30, 2004, the petitioners filed before the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal suspension with prayer for reinstatement against respondents South East Asian Airlines (SEAIR) and Irene Dornier as SEAIRs President (collectively, the respondents).
In a decision dated May 31, 2005, the LA found the petitioners illegally dismissed and ordered the respondents, among others, to immediately reinstate the petitioners with full backwages. The respondents received their copy of this decision on July 8, 2005.
On August 20, 2005, the petitioners filed before the LA a Motion for issuance of Writ of Execution for their immediate reinstatement.
During the scheduled pre-execution conference held on September 14, 2005, the respondents manifested their option to reinstate the petitioners in the payroll. The payroll reinstatement, however, did not materialize. Thus, on September 22, 2005, the petitioners filed before the LA a manifestation for their immediate reinstatement.
On October 3, 2005, the respondents filed an opposition to the petitioners motion for execution. They claimed that the relationship between them and the petitioners had already been strained because of the petitioners threatening text messages, thus precluding the latters reinstatement.
On October 7, 2005, the LA granted the petitioners motion and issued a writ of execution.
The respondents moved to quash the writ of execution with a prayer to hold in abeyance the implementation of the reinstatement order. They maintained that the relationship between them and the petitioners had been so strained that reinstatement was no longer possible.
The October 7, 2005 writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. In response, the petitioners filed a motion for re-computation of accrued wages, and, on January 25, 2006, a motion for execution of the re-computed amount. On February 16, 2006, the LA granted this motion and issued an alias writ of execution.
On February 21, 2006, the respondents issued a Memorandum directing the petitioners to report for work on February 24, 2006. The petitioners failed to report for work on the appointed date. On February 28, 2006, the respondents moved before the LA to suspend the order for the petitioners reinstatement.
Meanwhile, the respondents appealed with the NLRC the May 31, 2005 illegal dismissal ruling of the LA.
In an order dated August 15, 2006, the NLRC dismissed the respondents appeal for non-perfection. The NLRC likewise denied the respondents motion for reconsideration in its November 29, 2006 resolution, prompting the respondents to file before the CA a petition for certiorari.
The NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment on February 6, 2007 declaring its November 29, 2006 resolution final and executory. On December 18, 2007, the CA rendered its decision (on the illegal dismissal ruling of the LA) partly granting the respondents petition. The CA declared the petitioners dismissal valid and awarded them P30,000.00 as nominal damages for the respondents failure to observe due process.
The records show that the petitioners appealed the December 18, 2007 CA decision with this Court. In a resolution dated August 4, 2008, the Court denied the petition. The Court likewise denied the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration, and thereafter issued an Entry of Judgment certifying that its August 4, 2008 resolution had become final and executory on March 9, 2009.
On January 31, 2008, the petitioners filed with the LA an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Immediate Release of the Garnished Amount.
In its March 13, 2008 order, the LA granted the petitioners motion; it directed Metrobank-San Lorenzo to release the P1,900,000.00 garnished amount. The LA found valid and meritorious the respondents claim for accrued wages in view of the respondents refusal to reinstate the petitioners despite the final and executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of its (LAs) May 31, 2005 decision. The LA noted that as of the December 18, 2007 CA decision (that reversed the illegal dismissal findings of the LA), the petitioners accrued wages amounted to P3,078,366.33.
The NLRC affirmed in toto the LAs March 13, 2008 order. The NLRC afterwards denied the respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The respondents assailed the July 16, 2008 decision and September 29, 2009 resolution of the NLRC via a petition for certiorari filed with the CA.
The CA granted the respondents petition.18 It reversed and set aside the July 16, 2008 decision and the September 29, 2009 resolution of the NLRC and remanded the case to the Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC for the proper computation of the petitioners accrued wages, computed up to February 24, 2006.
The CA agreed that the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision is immediately executory even pending appeal, such that the employer is obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until the decision (finding the employee illegally dismissed including the reinstatement order) is reversed by a higher court.
ISSUES:
1) Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?
2) Whether the petitioners may recover the accrued wages prior to the CAs reversal of the LAs May 31, 2005 decision.
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW
In a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, what we review are the legal errors that the CA may have committed in the assailed decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional errors that we undertake in an original certiorari action. In reviewing the legal correctness of the CA decision in a labor case taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we examine the CA decision in the context that it determined the presence or the absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it and not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision, on the merits of the case, was correct. Otherwise stated, we proceed from the premise that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. In addition, the Courts jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari is limited to resolving only questions of law.
Resolution of this question of law, however, is inextricably linked with the largely factual issue of whether the accrued wages should be computed until December 17, 2008 when the CA reversed the illegal dismissal findings of the LA or only until February 24, 2006 when the petitioners were supposed to report for work per the February 21, 2006 Memorandum. In either case, the determination of this factual issue presupposes another factual issue, i.e., whether the delay in the execution of the reinstatement order was due to the respondents fault. As questions of fact, they are proscribed by our Rule 45 jurisdiction; we generally cannot address these factual issues except to the extent necessary to determine whether the CA correctly found the NLRC in grave abuse of discretion in affirming the release of the garnished amount despite the respondents issuance of and the petitioners failure to comply with the February 21, 2006 return-to-work Memorandum.
The jurisdictional limitations of our Rule 45 review of the CAs Rule 65 decision in labor cases, notwithstanding, we resolve this petitions factual issues for we find legal errors in the CAs decision. Our consideration of the facts taken within this narrow scope of our factual review power convinced us, as our subsequent discussion will show, that no grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRC decision.
LABOR LAW
Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor Code governs appeals from, and the execution of, the LAs decision. Pertinently, paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 223. APPEAL
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
Under paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code, the LAs order for the reinstatement of an employee found illegally dismissed is immediately executory even during pendency of the employers appeal from the decision. Under this provision, the employer must reinstate the employee either by physically admitting him under the conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal, and paying his wages; or, at the employers option, merely reinstating the employee in the payroll until the decision is reversed by the higher court. Failure of the employer to comply with the reinstatement order, by exercising the options in the alternative, renders him liable to pay the employees salaries.
Otherwise stated, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which reinstatement is immediately executory. Unless the appellate tribunal issues a restraining order, the LA is duty bound to implement the order of reinstatement and the employer has no option but to comply with it.
Moreover, and equally worth emphasizing, is that an order of reinstatement issued by the LA is self-executory, i.e., the dismissed employee need not even apply for and the LA need not even issue a writ of execution to trigger the employers duty to reinstate the dismissed employee.
In Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, et. al., decided in 1997, the Court clarified once and for all this self-executory nature of a reinstatement order. After tracing back the various Court rulings interpreting the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 671527 on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the Court concluded that to otherwise require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order.
In short, therefore, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its immediate and automatic execution even pending appeal. The employer is duty-bound to reinstate the employee, failing which, the employer is liable instead to pay the dismissed employees salary. The Courts consistent and prevailing treatment and interpretation of the reinstatement order as immediately enforceable, in fact, merely underscores the right to security of tenure of employees that the Constitution protects.
LABOR LAW
As we amply discussed above, an employer is obliged to immediately reinstate the employee upon the LAs finding of illegal dismissal; if the employer fails, it is liable to pay the salary of the dismissed employee. Of course, it is not always the case that the LAs finding of illegal dismissal is, on appeal by the employer, upheld by the appellate court. After the LAs decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employers duty to reinstate the dismissed employee is effectively terminated. This means that an employer is no longer obliged to keep the employee in the actual service or in the payroll. The employee, in turn, is not required to return the wages that he had received prior to the reversal of the LAs decision.
The reversal by a higher tribunal of the LAs finding (of illegal dismissal), notwithstanding, an employer, who, despite the LAs order of reinstatement, did not reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal up to the reversal by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the accrued wages of the employee, i.e., the unpaid salary accruing up to the time the higher tribunal reverses the decision. The rule, therefore, is that an employee may still recover the accrued wages up to and despite the reversal by the higher tribunal. This entitlement of the employee to the accrued wages proceeds from the immediate and self-executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision.
By way of exception to the above rule, an employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages if shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer.
To determine whether an employee is thus barred, two tests must be satisfied: (1) actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. Note that under the second test, the delay must be without the employers fault. If the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LAs decision.
LABOR LAW
As we earlier pointed out, the core issue to be resolved is whether the petitioners may recover the accrued wages until the CAs reversal of the LAs decision. An affirmative answer to this question will lead us to reverse the assailed CA decision for legal errors and reinstate the NLRCs decision affirming the release of the garnished amount. Otherwise, we uphold the CAs decision to be legally correct. To resolve this question, we apply the two-fold test.
First, the existence of delay -whether there was actual delay or whether the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal? We answer this test in the affirmative.
To recall, on May 31, 2005, the LA rendered the decision finding the petitioners illegally dismissed and ordering their immediate reinstatement. Per the records, the respondents received copy of this decision on July 8, 2005. On August 20, 2005, the petitioners filed before the LA a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for their immediate reinstatement. The LA issued the Writ of Execution on October 7, 2005. From the time the respondents received copy of the LAs decision, and the issuance of the writ of execution, until the CA reversed this decision on December 17, 2008, the respondents had not reinstated the petitioners, either by actual reinstatement or in the payroll. This continued non-execution of the reinstatement order in fact moved the LA to issue an alias writ of execution on February 16, 2006 and another writ of execution on April 24, 2007.
From these facts and without doubt, there was actual delay in the execution of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs May 31, 2005 decision before it was reversed in the CAs decision.
Second, the cause of the delay whether the delay was not due to the employers unjustified act or omission. We answer this test in the negative; we find that the delay in the execution of the reinstatement pending appeal was due to the respondents unjustified acts.
In reversing, for grave abuse of discretion, the NLRCs order affirming the release of the garnished amount, the CA relied on the fact of the issuance of the February 21, 2006 Memorandum and of the petitioners failure to comply with its return-to-work directive. In other words, with the issuance of this Memorandum, the CA considered the respondents as having sufficiently complied with their obligation to reinstate the petitioners. And, the subsequent delay in or the non-execution of the reinstatement order was no longer the respondents fault, but rather of the petitioners who refused to report back to work despite the directive.
Our careful consideration of the facts and the circumstances that surrounded the case convinced us that the delay in the reinstatement pending appeal was due to the respondents fault. For one, the respondents filed several pleadings to suspend the execution of the LAs reinstatement order, i.e., the opposition to the petitioners motion for execution filed on October 3, 2005; the motion to quash the October 7, 2005 writ of execution with prayer to hold in abeyance the implementation of the reinstatement order; and the motion to suspend the order for the petitioners reinstatement filed on February 28, 2006 after the LA issued the February 16, 2006 alias writ of execution. These pleadings, to our mind, show a determined effort on the respondents part to prevent or suspend the execution of the reinstatement pending appeal.
Another reason is that the respondents, contrary to the CAs conclusion, did not sufficiently notify the petitioners of their intent to actually reinstate them; neither did the respondents give them ample opportunity to comply with the return-to-work directive. We note that the respondents delivered the February 21, 2006 Memorandum (requiring the petitioners to report for work on February 24, 2006) only in the afternoon of February 23, 2006. Worse, the respondents handed the notice to only one of the petitioners Pelaez who did not act in representation of the others. Evidently, the petitioners could not reasonably be expected to comply with a directive that they had no or insufficient notice of.
Lastly, the petitioners continuously and actively pursued the execution of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision, i.e., by filing several motions for execution of the reinstatement order, and motion to cite the respondents in contempt and re-computation of the accrued wages for the respondents continued failure to reinstate them.
These facts altogether show that the respondents were not at all sincere in reinstating the petitioners. These facts when taken together with the fact of delay reveal the respondents obstinate resolve and willful disregard of the immediate and self-executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision.
A further and final point that we considered in concluding that the delay was due to the respondents fault is the fact that per the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules), employers are required to submit a report of compliance within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the LAs decision, noncompliance with which signifies a clear refusal to reinstate.
All told, under the facts and the surrounding circumstances, the delay was due to the acts of the respondents that we find were unjustified. We reiterate and emphasize, Article 223, paragraph 3, of the Labor Code mandates the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee, either by actually reinstating him/her under the conditions prevailing prior to the dismissal or, at the option of the employer, in the payroll. The respondents' failure in this case to exercise either option rendered them liable for the petitioners' accrued salaiy until the LA decision was reversed by the CA on December 17, 2008. We, therefore, find that the NLRC, in affirming the release of the garnished amount, merely implemented the mandate of Article 223; it simply recognized as immediate and self executory the reinstatement aspect of the LA's decision.
GRANTED.
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW
In a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, what we review are the legal errors that the CA may have committed in the assailed decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional errors that we undertake in an original certiorari action. In reviewing the legal correctness of the CA decision in a labor case taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we examine the CA decision in the context that it determined the presence or the absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it and not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision, on the merits of the case, was correct. Otherwise stated, we proceed from the premise that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. In addition, the Courts jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari is limited to resolving only questions of law.
Resolution of this question of law, however, is inextricably linked with the largely factual issue of whether the accrued wages should be computed until December 17, 2008 when the CA reversed the illegal dismissal findings of the LA or only until February 24, 2006 when the petitioners were supposed to report for work per the February 21, 2006 Memorandum. In either case, the determination of this factual issue presupposes another factual issue, i.e., whether the delay in the execution of the reinstatement order was due to the respondents fault. As questions of fact, they are proscribed by our Rule 45 jurisdiction; we generally cannot address these factual issues except to the extent necessary to determine whether the CA correctly found the NLRC in grave abuse of discretion in affirming the release of the garnished amount despite the respondents issuance of and the petitioners failure to comply with the February 21, 2006 return-to-work Memorandum.
The jurisdictional limitations of our Rule 45 review of the CAs Rule 65 decision in labor cases, notwithstanding, we resolve this petitions factual issues for we find legal errors in the CAs decision. Our consideration of the facts taken within this narrow scope of our factual review power convinced us, as our subsequent discussion will show, that no grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRC decision.
LABOR LAW
Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor Code governs appeals from, and the execution of, the LAs decision. Pertinently, paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 223. APPEAL
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
Under paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code, the LAs order for the reinstatement of an employee found illegally dismissed is immediately executory even during pendency of the employers appeal from the decision. Under this provision, the employer must reinstate the employee either by physically admitting him under the conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal, and paying his wages; or, at the employers option, merely reinstating the employee in the payroll until the decision is reversed by the higher court. Failure of the employer to comply with the reinstatement order, by exercising the options in the alternative, renders him liable to pay the employees salaries.
Otherwise stated, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which reinstatement is immediately executory. Unless the appellate tribunal issues a restraining order, the LA is duty bound to implement the order of reinstatement and the employer has no option but to comply with it.
Moreover, and equally worth emphasizing, is that an order of reinstatement issued by the LA is self-executory, i.e., the dismissed employee need not even apply for and the LA need not even issue a writ of execution to trigger the employers duty to reinstate the dismissed employee.
In Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, et. al., decided in 1997, the Court clarified once and for all this self-executory nature of a reinstatement order. After tracing back the various Court rulings interpreting the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 671527 on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the Court concluded that to otherwise require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order.
In short, therefore, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its immediate and automatic execution even pending appeal. The employer is duty-bound to reinstate the employee, failing which, the employer is liable instead to pay the dismissed employees salary. The Courts consistent and prevailing treatment and interpretation of the reinstatement order as immediately enforceable, in fact, merely underscores the right to security of tenure of employees that the Constitution protects.
LABOR LAW
As we amply discussed above, an employer is obliged to immediately reinstate the employee upon the LAs finding of illegal dismissal; if the employer fails, it is liable to pay the salary of the dismissed employee. Of course, it is not always the case that the LAs finding of illegal dismissal is, on appeal by the employer, upheld by the appellate court. After the LAs decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employers duty to reinstate the dismissed employee is effectively terminated. This means that an employer is no longer obliged to keep the employee in the actual service or in the payroll. The employee, in turn, is not required to return the wages that he had received prior to the reversal of the LAs decision.
The reversal by a higher tribunal of the LAs finding (of illegal dismissal), notwithstanding, an employer, who, despite the LAs order of reinstatement, did not reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal up to the reversal by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the accrued wages of the employee, i.e., the unpaid salary accruing up to the time the higher tribunal reverses the decision. The rule, therefore, is that an employee may still recover the accrued wages up to and despite the reversal by the higher tribunal. This entitlement of the employee to the accrued wages proceeds from the immediate and self-executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision.
By way of exception to the above rule, an employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages if shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer.
To determine whether an employee is thus barred, two tests must be satisfied: (1) actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. Note that under the second test, the delay must be without the employers fault. If the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LAs decision.
LABOR LAW
As we earlier pointed out, the core issue to be resolved is whether the petitioners may recover the accrued wages until the CAs reversal of the LAs decision. An affirmative answer to this question will lead us to reverse the assailed CA decision for legal errors and reinstate the NLRCs decision affirming the release of the garnished amount. Otherwise, we uphold the CAs decision to be legally correct. To resolve this question, we apply the two-fold test.
First, the existence of delay -whether there was actual delay or whether the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal? We answer this test in the affirmative.
To recall, on May 31, 2005, the LA rendered the decision finding the petitioners illegally dismissed and ordering their immediate reinstatement. Per the records, the respondents received copy of this decision on July 8, 2005. On August 20, 2005, the petitioners filed before the LA a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for their immediate reinstatement. The LA issued the Writ of Execution on October 7, 2005. From the time the respondents received copy of the LAs decision, and the issuance of the writ of execution, until the CA reversed this decision on December 17, 2008, the respondents had not reinstated the petitioners, either by actual reinstatement or in the payroll. This continued non-execution of the reinstatement order in fact moved the LA to issue an alias writ of execution on February 16, 2006 and another writ of execution on April 24, 2007.
From these facts and without doubt, there was actual delay in the execution of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs May 31, 2005 decision before it was reversed in the CAs decision.
Second, the cause of the delay whether the delay was not due to the employers unjustified act or omission. We answer this test in the negative; we find that the delay in the execution of the reinstatement pending appeal was due to the respondents unjustified acts.
In reversing, for grave abuse of discretion, the NLRCs order affirming the release of the garnished amount, the CA relied on the fact of the issuance of the February 21, 2006 Memorandum and of the petitioners failure to comply with its return-to-work directive. In other words, with the issuance of this Memorandum, the CA considered the respondents as having sufficiently complied with their obligation to reinstate the petitioners. And, the subsequent delay in or the non-execution of the reinstatement order was no longer the respondents fault, but rather of the petitioners who refused to report back to work despite the directive.
Our careful consideration of the facts and the circumstances that surrounded the case convinced us that the delay in the reinstatement pending appeal was due to the respondents fault. For one, the respondents filed several pleadings to suspend the execution of the LAs reinstatement order, i.e., the opposition to the petitioners motion for execution filed on October 3, 2005; the motion to quash the October 7, 2005 writ of execution with prayer to hold in abeyance the implementation of the reinstatement order; and the motion to suspend the order for the petitioners reinstatement filed on February 28, 2006 after the LA issued the February 16, 2006 alias writ of execution. These pleadings, to our mind, show a determined effort on the respondents part to prevent or suspend the execution of the reinstatement pending appeal.
Another reason is that the respondents, contrary to the CAs conclusion, did not sufficiently notify the petitioners of their intent to actually reinstate them; neither did the respondents give them ample opportunity to comply with the return-to-work directive. We note that the respondents delivered the February 21, 2006 Memorandum (requiring the petitioners to report for work on February 24, 2006) only in the afternoon of February 23, 2006. Worse, the respondents handed the notice to only one of the petitioners Pelaez who did not act in representation of the others. Evidently, the petitioners could not reasonably be expected to comply with a directive that they had no or insufficient notice of.
Lastly, the petitioners continuously and actively pursued the execution of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision, i.e., by filing several motions for execution of the reinstatement order, and motion to cite the respondents in contempt and re-computation of the accrued wages for the respondents continued failure to reinstate them.
These facts altogether show that the respondents were not at all sincere in reinstating the petitioners. These facts when taken together with the fact of delay reveal the respondents obstinate resolve and willful disregard of the immediate and self-executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of the LAs decision.
A further and final point that we considered in concluding that the delay was due to the respondents fault is the fact that per the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules), employers are required to submit a report of compliance within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the LAs decision, noncompliance with which signifies a clear refusal to reinstate.
All told, under the facts and the surrounding circumstances, the delay was due to the acts of the respondents that we find were unjustified. We reiterate and emphasize, Article 223, paragraph 3, of the Labor Code mandates the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee, either by actually reinstating him/her under the conditions prevailing prior to the dismissal or, at the option of the employer, in the payroll. The respondents' failure in this case to exercise either option rendered them liable for the petitioners' accrued salaiy until the LA decision was reversed by the CA on December 17, 2008. We, therefore, find that the NLRC, in affirming the release of the garnished amount, merely implemented the mandate of Article 223; it simply recognized as immediate and self executory the reinstatement aspect of the LA's decision.
GRANTED.
