Case Digest: GMU Labor Union v. GMU
G.R. No. 183122 : June 15, 2011
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION-INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), Petitioner, v. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183889 : June 15, 2011
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION-INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), ET.AL, Respondents.
PEREZ,J.:
FACTS:
On April 28, 1989, GMC and theUnionentered into a CBA which provided, among other terms, the latters representation of the collective bargaining unit for a three-year term made to retroact to 1 December 1988.On 29 November 1991 or one day before the expiration of the subject CBA, the Union sent a draft CBA proposal to GMC, with a request for counter-proposals from the latter, for the purpose of renegotiating the existing CBA between the parties.In view of GMCs failure to comply with said request, theUnioncommenced the complaint for unfair labor practice which was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, however, said dismissal was reversed and set aside in the 30 January 1998 decision rendered by the Fourth Division of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-0112-94. The Supreme Court found GMC guilty of unfair labor practice.
Thus, the Union filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the claims of the covered employees which it computed in the sum ofP433,786,786.36. However, GMC opposed said motion on the ground, among other matters, that the bargaining unit no longer exist in view of the resignation, retrenchment, retirement and separation from service of workers who have additionally executed waivers and quitclaims acknowledging full settlement of their claims; that the covered employees have already received salary increases and benefits for the period 1991 to 1993; and, that aside from the aforesaid supervening events which precluded the enforcement thereof, the decision rendered in the case simply called for the execution of a CBA incorporating the Unions proposal, not the outright computation of benefits thereunder.
27 October 2005 , the LA rendered a decision limiting the computation of the benefits of theUnions CBA proposal to the remaining two years of the duration of the original CBA or from 1 December 1991 up to 30 November 1993.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA, finding, among other matters, that the duty to maintain thestatus quoand to continue in full force and effect the terms of the existing agreement under Article 253 of theLabor Code of the Philippinesapplies only when the parties agreed to the terms and conditions of the CBA, the NLRC upheld the Executive Labor Arbiters computation on the ground, among others, that the decision sought to be enforced covered only the remaining two years of the duration of the original CBA.
On their petitions before the CA, Unions petition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02226) was partially granted on October 10, 2007, upon the finding that the parties old CBA was superseded by the imposed CBA which provided a term of five years from 1 December 1991 and remained in force until a new CBA is concluded between the parties. The CA, however, faulted the Union for its hasty and premature filing of its motion for issuance of a writ of execution, instead of first demanding the enforcement of the imposed CBA from GMC and, failing the same, referring the matter to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration provided under the imposed CBA, in accordance with Articles 260 and 261 of theLabor Code.
On the other hand, GMCs petition (CA-G.R. SP No. CEB-SP No. 02232) was dismissed for lack of merit on November 16, 2007, finding that both parties were given an opportunity to present their respective positions during the pre-execution conference conducteda quo, the CA ruled that the LAs 27 October 2005 order had attained finality insofar as GMC is concerned, in view of its failure to perfect an appeal therefrom by paying the required appeal fee and posting the cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the benefits computed. The CA likewise held that quitclaims did not extend to the benefits provided under the imposed CBA and that the additional benefits supposedly received by GMCs employees should not be deducted therefrom, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the same.
Hence, this petition.
CA-G.R. CEB-SP Nos. 02226 and 02232 are reversed and set aside.
LABOR LAW
Article XIV of the imposed CBA provides that (t)his Agreement shall be in full force and effect for a period of five (5) years from 1 December 1991, provided that sixty (60) days prior to the lapse of the third year of effectivity hereof, the parties shall open negotiations on economic aspect for the fourth and fifth years effectivity of this Agreement. Considering that no new CBA had been, in the meantime, agreed upon by GMC and the Union, we find that the CAs Special Twentieth Division correctly ruled in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02226 that, pursuant to Article 253 of theLabor Code, the provisions of the imposed CBA continues to have full force and effect until a new CBA has been entered into by the parties.Article 253 mandates the parties to keep thestatus quoand to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. In the same manner that it does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect,the law does not distinguish between a CBA duly agreed upon by the parties and an imposed CBA like the one under consideration.
Considering that the 30 January 1998 decision sought to be enforced confined the application of the imposed CBA to the remaining two-year duration of the original CBA, we find that the computation of the benefits due GMCs covered employees was correctly limited to the period 1 December 1991 to 30 November 1993 in the 27 October 2005 order issued by Executive Labor Arbiter Violeta Ortiz-Bantug and the 20 July 2006 decision rendered by the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000632-2005.
Consequently, insofar as the execution of the 30 January 1998 decision is concerned, theUnionis out on a limb in espousing a computation which extends the benefits of the imposed CBA beyond the remaining two-year duration of the original CBA.The rule is, after all, settled that an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. Since execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity,it must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be enforced.Considering that the decision sought to be enforced pertains to the period 1December 1991 to 30 November 1993, it necessarily follows that the computation of benefits under the imposed CBA should be limited to covered employees who were in GMCs employ during said period of time.While it is true that the provisions of the imposed CBA extend beyond said remaining two-year duration of the original CBA in view of the parties admitted failure to conclude a new CBA, the corresponding computation of the benefits accruing in favor of GMCs covered employees after the term of the original CBA was correctly excluded in the aforesaid 27 October 2005 order issued in RAB VII-06-0475-1992.Rather than the abbreviated pre-execution proceedings before Executive Labor ArbiterVioleta Ortiz-Bantug, the computation of the same benefits beyond 30 November 1993 should, instead, be threshed out by GMC and theUnionin accordance with theGrievance Procedure.
Article II of the imposed CBA, relatedly, provides that (t)he employees covered by this Agreement are those employed as regular monthly paid employees at the [GMC] offices in Cebu City and Lapulapu City, including cadet engineers, salesmen, veterinarians, field and laboratory workers, with the exception of managerial employees, supervisory employees, executive and confidential secretaries, probationary employees and the employees covered by a separate Collective Bargaining Agreement at the Companys Mill in Lapulapu City. Gauged from the express language of the foregoing provision, we find that Executive Labor ArbiterVioleta Ortiz-Bantug correctly excluded the following employees fromthe list of 436 employees submitted by the Union andthe computation of the benefitsfor the period 1December 1991 to 30 November 1993, to wit: (a) 77 employees who were hired or regularized after 30 November 1993; (b)36 daily paid rank and file employees who were covered by a separate CBA; (c) 41 managerial/supervisory employees; and, (d) 1 employee for whom no salary-rate information was submitted in the premises. However, we find that the 234 employees who had already been separated from GMCs employ by the time of the rendition of the 11 February 2004 decision in G.R. No. 146728 should further be added to these excluded employees.
The record shows that said 234 employees were union members whose employment with GMC ceased as a consequence of death, termination due to redundancy, termination due to closure of plant, termination for cause, voluntary resignation, separation or dismissal from service as well as retirement. Upon compliance with GMCs clearance requirements and in consideration of sums ranging fromP38,980.12 toP631,898.72, due payment and receipt of which were duly acknowledged, it appears that said employees executed deeds of waiver, release and quitclaim.
REMEDIAL LAW
The conflicting decisions in CA-G.R. CEB-SP Nos. 02226 and 02232 would have been, in the first place, avoided had the CA consolidated said cases pursuant to Section 3, Rule III of its 2002 Internal Rules (IRCA). Being intimately and substantially related cases, their consolidation should have been ordered to avert the possibility of conflicting decisions in the two cases.
Although rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, neither one of said decisions can, however, be invoked as law of the case insofar as the other case is concerned.The doctrine of law of the case means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controllinglegal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.Considering that a decision becomes the law of the case once it attains finality, it is evident that, without having achieved said status, the herein assailed decisions cannot be invoked as the law of the case by either GMC or theUnion.
The October 27, 2005 order by the Labor Arbiter is reinstated and modified.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION-INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), Petitioner, v. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183889 : June 15, 2011
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION-INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), ET.AL, Respondents.
PEREZ,J.:
FACTS:
On April 28, 1989, GMC and theUnionentered into a CBA which provided, among other terms, the latters representation of the collective bargaining unit for a three-year term made to retroact to 1 December 1988.On 29 November 1991 or one day before the expiration of the subject CBA, the Union sent a draft CBA proposal to GMC, with a request for counter-proposals from the latter, for the purpose of renegotiating the existing CBA between the parties.In view of GMCs failure to comply with said request, theUnioncommenced the complaint for unfair labor practice which was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, however, said dismissal was reversed and set aside in the 30 January 1998 decision rendered by the Fourth Division of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-0112-94. The Supreme Court found GMC guilty of unfair labor practice.
Thus, the Union filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the claims of the covered employees which it computed in the sum ofP433,786,786.36. However, GMC opposed said motion on the ground, among other matters, that the bargaining unit no longer exist in view of the resignation, retrenchment, retirement and separation from service of workers who have additionally executed waivers and quitclaims acknowledging full settlement of their claims; that the covered employees have already received salary increases and benefits for the period 1991 to 1993; and, that aside from the aforesaid supervening events which precluded the enforcement thereof, the decision rendered in the case simply called for the execution of a CBA incorporating the Unions proposal, not the outright computation of benefits thereunder.
27 October 2005 , the LA rendered a decision limiting the computation of the benefits of theUnions CBA proposal to the remaining two years of the duration of the original CBA or from 1 December 1991 up to 30 November 1993.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA, finding, among other matters, that the duty to maintain thestatus quoand to continue in full force and effect the terms of the existing agreement under Article 253 of theLabor Code of the Philippinesapplies only when the parties agreed to the terms and conditions of the CBA, the NLRC upheld the Executive Labor Arbiters computation on the ground, among others, that the decision sought to be enforced covered only the remaining two years of the duration of the original CBA.
On their petitions before the CA, Unions petition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02226) was partially granted on October 10, 2007, upon the finding that the parties old CBA was superseded by the imposed CBA which provided a term of five years from 1 December 1991 and remained in force until a new CBA is concluded between the parties. The CA, however, faulted the Union for its hasty and premature filing of its motion for issuance of a writ of execution, instead of first demanding the enforcement of the imposed CBA from GMC and, failing the same, referring the matter to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration provided under the imposed CBA, in accordance with Articles 260 and 261 of theLabor Code.
On the other hand, GMCs petition (CA-G.R. SP No. CEB-SP No. 02232) was dismissed for lack of merit on November 16, 2007, finding that both parties were given an opportunity to present their respective positions during the pre-execution conference conducteda quo, the CA ruled that the LAs 27 October 2005 order had attained finality insofar as GMC is concerned, in view of its failure to perfect an appeal therefrom by paying the required appeal fee and posting the cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the benefits computed. The CA likewise held that quitclaims did not extend to the benefits provided under the imposed CBA and that the additional benefits supposedly received by GMCs employees should not be deducted therefrom, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the same.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:HELD:
Whether or not the imposed CBA which provided a term of five years from 1 December 1991 remains in force until a new CBA is concluded between the parties?
CA-G.R. CEB-SP Nos. 02226 and 02232 are reversed and set aside.
LABOR LAW
Article XIV of the imposed CBA provides that (t)his Agreement shall be in full force and effect for a period of five (5) years from 1 December 1991, provided that sixty (60) days prior to the lapse of the third year of effectivity hereof, the parties shall open negotiations on economic aspect for the fourth and fifth years effectivity of this Agreement. Considering that no new CBA had been, in the meantime, agreed upon by GMC and the Union, we find that the CAs Special Twentieth Division correctly ruled in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02226 that, pursuant to Article 253 of theLabor Code, the provisions of the imposed CBA continues to have full force and effect until a new CBA has been entered into by the parties.Article 253 mandates the parties to keep thestatus quoand to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. In the same manner that it does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect,the law does not distinguish between a CBA duly agreed upon by the parties and an imposed CBA like the one under consideration.
Considering that the 30 January 1998 decision sought to be enforced confined the application of the imposed CBA to the remaining two-year duration of the original CBA, we find that the computation of the benefits due GMCs covered employees was correctly limited to the period 1 December 1991 to 30 November 1993 in the 27 October 2005 order issued by Executive Labor Arbiter Violeta Ortiz-Bantug and the 20 July 2006 decision rendered by the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000632-2005.
Consequently, insofar as the execution of the 30 January 1998 decision is concerned, theUnionis out on a limb in espousing a computation which extends the benefits of the imposed CBA beyond the remaining two-year duration of the original CBA.The rule is, after all, settled that an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. Since execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity,it must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be enforced.Considering that the decision sought to be enforced pertains to the period 1December 1991 to 30 November 1993, it necessarily follows that the computation of benefits under the imposed CBA should be limited to covered employees who were in GMCs employ during said period of time.While it is true that the provisions of the imposed CBA extend beyond said remaining two-year duration of the original CBA in view of the parties admitted failure to conclude a new CBA, the corresponding computation of the benefits accruing in favor of GMCs covered employees after the term of the original CBA was correctly excluded in the aforesaid 27 October 2005 order issued in RAB VII-06-0475-1992.Rather than the abbreviated pre-execution proceedings before Executive Labor ArbiterVioleta Ortiz-Bantug, the computation of the same benefits beyond 30 November 1993 should, instead, be threshed out by GMC and theUnionin accordance with theGrievance Procedure.
Article II of the imposed CBA, relatedly, provides that (t)he employees covered by this Agreement are those employed as regular monthly paid employees at the [GMC] offices in Cebu City and Lapulapu City, including cadet engineers, salesmen, veterinarians, field and laboratory workers, with the exception of managerial employees, supervisory employees, executive and confidential secretaries, probationary employees and the employees covered by a separate Collective Bargaining Agreement at the Companys Mill in Lapulapu City. Gauged from the express language of the foregoing provision, we find that Executive Labor ArbiterVioleta Ortiz-Bantug correctly excluded the following employees fromthe list of 436 employees submitted by the Union andthe computation of the benefitsfor the period 1December 1991 to 30 November 1993, to wit: (a) 77 employees who were hired or regularized after 30 November 1993; (b)36 daily paid rank and file employees who were covered by a separate CBA; (c) 41 managerial/supervisory employees; and, (d) 1 employee for whom no salary-rate information was submitted in the premises. However, we find that the 234 employees who had already been separated from GMCs employ by the time of the rendition of the 11 February 2004 decision in G.R. No. 146728 should further be added to these excluded employees.
The record shows that said 234 employees were union members whose employment with GMC ceased as a consequence of death, termination due to redundancy, termination due to closure of plant, termination for cause, voluntary resignation, separation or dismissal from service as well as retirement. Upon compliance with GMCs clearance requirements and in consideration of sums ranging fromP38,980.12 toP631,898.72, due payment and receipt of which were duly acknowledged, it appears that said employees executed deeds of waiver, release and quitclaim.
REMEDIAL LAW
The conflicting decisions in CA-G.R. CEB-SP Nos. 02226 and 02232 would have been, in the first place, avoided had the CA consolidated said cases pursuant to Section 3, Rule III of its 2002 Internal Rules (IRCA). Being intimately and substantially related cases, their consolidation should have been ordered to avert the possibility of conflicting decisions in the two cases.
Although rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, neither one of said decisions can, however, be invoked as law of the case insofar as the other case is concerned.The doctrine of law of the case means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controllinglegal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.Considering that a decision becomes the law of the case once it attains finality, it is evident that, without having achieved said status, the herein assailed decisions cannot be invoked as the law of the case by either GMC or theUnion.
The October 27, 2005 order by the Labor Arbiter is reinstated and modified.
