CASE DIGEST: NM Rothschild vs. Lepanto Consolidated
G.R. No. 175799
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, Petitioner, v. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY,Respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the RTC of Makati City a Complaint against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages. Upon respondents motion, the trial court authorized respondents counsel to personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on petitioner.
The petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint on the following grounds: (a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of summons; (b) the Complaint failed to state a cause of action and respondent does not have any against petitioner; (c) the action is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to the trial court, there was a proper service of summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license to do business in the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Written Power of Attorney designating some person on whom summons and other legal processes maybe served. The trial court also held that the Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The other allegations in the Motion to Dismiss were brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be ventilated during the trial.
ISSUES:
I. Whether petitioner is a real party in interest
II. Whether or not it was proper for the petitioner to resort to a petition for certiorari with the CA
III. Whether or not the lower courts correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss
HELD:
(1) Respondent points out that as of the date of the filing of the Petition, there is no such corporation that goes by the name NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited. Petitioner claims that NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited still exists as a corporation under the laws of Australia under the new name Investec Australia Limited. We find the submissions of petitioner on the change of its corporate name satisfactory and resolve not to dismiss the present Petition for Review on the ground of not being prosecuted under the name of the real party in interest.
(2) We have held time and again that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. The general rule, therefore, is that the denial of a Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for Certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, we have likewise held that when the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of Certiorari may be justified
The resolution of the present Petition therefore entails an inquiry into whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its denial of petitioners Motion to Dismiss. A mere error in judgment on the part of the trial court would undeniably be inadequate for us to reverse the disposition by the Court of Appeals.
(3) As correctly ruled by both the RTC and the CA, the alleged absence of a cause of action, the alleged estoppel on the part of petitioner, and the argument that respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged contracts, are not grounds in a Motion to Dismiss as enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16[17] of the Rules of Court. Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary issues closely related to the validity and/or existence of respondents alleged cause of action and should therefore be threshed out during the trial.
As regards the allegation of failure to state a cause of action, while the same is usually available as a ground in a Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present Petition without going into the very merits of the main case. In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint that the Hedging Contracts are void for being contrary to Article 2018[25] of the Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the Hedging Contracts, despite the express stipulation for deliveries of gold, the intention of the parties was allegedly merely to compel each other to pay the difference between the value of the gold at the forward price stated in the contract and its market price at the supposed time of delivery. The determination of whether or not the Complaint stated a cause of action would therefore involve an inquiry into whether or not the assailed contracts are void under Philippine laws. This is, precisely, the very issue to be determined. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.
Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person on account of the improper service of summons. Summons was served on petitioner through the DFA, with respondents counsel personally bringing the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia. Moreover, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss on account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, Petitioner, v. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY,Respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the RTC of Makati City a Complaint against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages. Upon respondents motion, the trial court authorized respondents counsel to personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on petitioner.
The petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint on the following grounds: (a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of summons; (b) the Complaint failed to state a cause of action and respondent does not have any against petitioner; (c) the action is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to the trial court, there was a proper service of summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license to do business in the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Written Power of Attorney designating some person on whom summons and other legal processes maybe served. The trial court also held that the Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The other allegations in the Motion to Dismiss were brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be ventilated during the trial.
ISSUES:
I. Whether petitioner is a real party in interest
II. Whether or not it was proper for the petitioner to resort to a petition for certiorari with the CA
III. Whether or not the lower courts correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss
HELD:
(1) Respondent points out that as of the date of the filing of the Petition, there is no such corporation that goes by the name NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited. Petitioner claims that NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited still exists as a corporation under the laws of Australia under the new name Investec Australia Limited. We find the submissions of petitioner on the change of its corporate name satisfactory and resolve not to dismiss the present Petition for Review on the ground of not being prosecuted under the name of the real party in interest.
(2) We have held time and again that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. The general rule, therefore, is that the denial of a Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for Certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, we have likewise held that when the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of Certiorari may be justified
The resolution of the present Petition therefore entails an inquiry into whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its denial of petitioners Motion to Dismiss. A mere error in judgment on the part of the trial court would undeniably be inadequate for us to reverse the disposition by the Court of Appeals.
(3) As correctly ruled by both the RTC and the CA, the alleged absence of a cause of action, the alleged estoppel on the part of petitioner, and the argument that respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged contracts, are not grounds in a Motion to Dismiss as enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16[17] of the Rules of Court. Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary issues closely related to the validity and/or existence of respondents alleged cause of action and should therefore be threshed out during the trial.
As regards the allegation of failure to state a cause of action, while the same is usually available as a ground in a Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present Petition without going into the very merits of the main case. In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint that the Hedging Contracts are void for being contrary to Article 2018[25] of the Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the Hedging Contracts, despite the express stipulation for deliveries of gold, the intention of the parties was allegedly merely to compel each other to pay the difference between the value of the gold at the forward price stated in the contract and its market price at the supposed time of delivery. The determination of whether or not the Complaint stated a cause of action would therefore involve an inquiry into whether or not the assailed contracts are void under Philippine laws. This is, precisely, the very issue to be determined. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.
Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person on account of the improper service of summons. Summons was served on petitioner through the DFA, with respondents counsel personally bringing the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia. Moreover, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss on account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
