Case Digest: Pasig Cylinder Meg & Allied Services, et al. v. Rollo, et al.
G.R. No. 173631: September 8, 2010
PASIG CYLINDER MFG., CORP., A.G. & E ALLIED SERVICES, MANUEL ESTEVANEZ, SR., and VIRGILIO GERONIMO, SR., Petitioners, v. DANILO ROLLO, REYNALDO ORANDE, RONIE JOHN ESPINAS, ROGELIO JUAREZ, FELICIANO BERMUDEZ, DAVID OCLARINO, RODRIGO ANDICO, DANTE CALA-OD, JOSE RONNIE SERENIO, CHARLIE AGNO, EDWIN BEDES, JOSEPH RIVERA, FERNANDO SAN PEDRO, JESUS CABRERA, ANASTICO ALINGAS, EDUARDO GUBAN, ROLANDO DEMANO, ROBERTO PINUELA, and EMELITO LOBO, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents, numbering 19, sued petitioners before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for constructive dismissal and payment of employment benefits and damages. Respondents alleged that they were employees of petitioners whom petitioners arbitrarily denied regular work since December 1999 and, in May 2000, were altogether refused entry to their workplace. Respondents also claimed underpayment of wages and non-payment of 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and holiday pay.
Petitioners denied respondents’ claims, contending that the loss of a major client constrained them to reduce the volume of work and shorten respondents’ workweek to three days. As a compromise, petitioners offered respondents separation benefits equivalent to a portion of their total years of service but respondents rejected the offer.
The labor arbiter ruled for respondents and found petitioners liable for constructive dismissal with the ancillary obligation to pay backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
A copy of the arbiter’s ruling, sent through mail, was received by one Arnel Naronio (Naronio), the security guard manning the compound where several businesses, including petitioners’, operated. The document was given to petitioners the following day. Ten days later, on 5 October 2001, petitioners filed their appeal with the NLRC with a motion to reduce the amount of the appeal bond to P100,000, enclosing a bond in that amount.
The NLRC found the appeal barred by prescription and dismissed it. The NLRC reckoned the 10-day appeal period under Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, from Naronio’s receipt of the arbiter’s ruling on 24 September 2001.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the NLRC and dismissed the petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners’ appeal and appeal bond filed with the NLRC were barred by prescription;
LABOR LAW: Under the NLRC rules, service of the ruling is completed upon its receipt by Geronimo or his agent from which the 10-day period for appeal will be counted
HELD:
The resolution of the question on the timeliness of petitioners’ appeal with the NLRC hinges on the reckoning of the 10-day appeal period under Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended. Petitioners submit that the reckoning point is their receipt on 25 September 2001 of the mailed copy of the arbiter’s ruling; respondents counter that it is Naronio’s receipt of the ruling on 24 September 2001. The one day difference is pivotal because petitioners filed their appeal on the 10th day from their receipt of the arbiter’s ruling, and, accordingly, on the 11th from the receipt by Naronio. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals found merit in respondents’ submission. We find merit in petitioners’ and thus, reverse.
Sections 5 and 6, Rule III of the NLRC’s new rules of procedure (NLRC rules), as amended in 1999, on the service of notices and resolutions and proof of completeness of service, provide:
SECTION 5. SERVICE OF NOTICES AND RESOLUTIONS. – (a) x x x in cases of decision[s] and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel/representative by registered mail; x x x
For purposes of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders by the counsel of record.
SECTION 6. PROOF AND COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE. - The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such time. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that petitioners were not represented by counsel before the arbiter. Thus, the arbiter’s ruling was mailed to Geronimo and two other individuals with a common address at “#98 San Guillermo St., Buting, 1601 Pasig City.” Following the NLRC rules, service of the ruling is completed upon its receipt by Geronimo or his agent from which the 10-day period for appeal will be counted. It is not disputed that Geronimo received a copy of the arbiter’s ruling on 25 September 2001. The question then is whether the receipt the day before, 24 September 2001, of the same document by Naronio constitutes receipt by petitioners’ “agent” within the contemplation of Section 6, Rule III of the NLRC rules. We hold that it does not.
Under the Rules of Court and Section 6 (formerly Section 5), Rule III of the NLRC rules, the word “agent” for purposes of serving court processes on juridical persons refers to –
[a] representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. x x x
x x x x
[I]t does not necessarily connote an officer of the corporation. However, though this may include employees other than officers of a corporation, this does not include employees whose duties are not so integrated to the business that their absence or presence will not toll the entire operation of the business. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be determined from the records who hired Naronio; but it is also undisputed that petitioners are not his employers. This test presupposes that the recipient of the legal document is employed by the addressee. For remedial law purposes, Naronio’s receipt of any processes intended for petitioners was receipt by a stranger, without legal significance to petitioners.
Hence, there is merit in petitioners’ submission that they seasonably filed their appeal on 5 October 2001, the 10th day from their receipt of the arbiter’s ruling on 25 September 2001, or within the appeal period in Article 223 of the Labor Code. For ruling to the contrary, thus denying due course to petitioners’ appeal, the appellate court committed reversible error of law.
PASIG CYLINDER MFG., CORP., A.G. & E ALLIED SERVICES, MANUEL ESTEVANEZ, SR., and VIRGILIO GERONIMO, SR., Petitioners, v. DANILO ROLLO, REYNALDO ORANDE, RONIE JOHN ESPINAS, ROGELIO JUAREZ, FELICIANO BERMUDEZ, DAVID OCLARINO, RODRIGO ANDICO, DANTE CALA-OD, JOSE RONNIE SERENIO, CHARLIE AGNO, EDWIN BEDES, JOSEPH RIVERA, FERNANDO SAN PEDRO, JESUS CABRERA, ANASTICO ALINGAS, EDUARDO GUBAN, ROLANDO DEMANO, ROBERTO PINUELA, and EMELITO LOBO, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents, numbering 19, sued petitioners before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for constructive dismissal and payment of employment benefits and damages. Respondents alleged that they were employees of petitioners whom petitioners arbitrarily denied regular work since December 1999 and, in May 2000, were altogether refused entry to their workplace. Respondents also claimed underpayment of wages and non-payment of 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and holiday pay.
Petitioners denied respondents’ claims, contending that the loss of a major client constrained them to reduce the volume of work and shorten respondents’ workweek to three days. As a compromise, petitioners offered respondents separation benefits equivalent to a portion of their total years of service but respondents rejected the offer.
The labor arbiter ruled for respondents and found petitioners liable for constructive dismissal with the ancillary obligation to pay backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
A copy of the arbiter’s ruling, sent through mail, was received by one Arnel Naronio (Naronio), the security guard manning the compound where several businesses, including petitioners’, operated. The document was given to petitioners the following day. Ten days later, on 5 October 2001, petitioners filed their appeal with the NLRC with a motion to reduce the amount of the appeal bond to P100,000, enclosing a bond in that amount.
The NLRC found the appeal barred by prescription and dismissed it. The NLRC reckoned the 10-day appeal period under Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, from Naronio’s receipt of the arbiter’s ruling on 24 September 2001.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the NLRC and dismissed the petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners’ appeal and appeal bond filed with the NLRC were barred by prescription;
LABOR LAW: Under the NLRC rules, service of the ruling is completed upon its receipt by Geronimo or his agent from which the 10-day period for appeal will be counted
HELD:
The resolution of the question on the timeliness of petitioners’ appeal with the NLRC hinges on the reckoning of the 10-day appeal period under Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended. Petitioners submit that the reckoning point is their receipt on 25 September 2001 of the mailed copy of the arbiter’s ruling; respondents counter that it is Naronio’s receipt of the ruling on 24 September 2001. The one day difference is pivotal because petitioners filed their appeal on the 10th day from their receipt of the arbiter’s ruling, and, accordingly, on the 11th from the receipt by Naronio. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals found merit in respondents’ submission. We find merit in petitioners’ and thus, reverse.
Sections 5 and 6, Rule III of the NLRC’s new rules of procedure (NLRC rules), as amended in 1999, on the service of notices and resolutions and proof of completeness of service, provide:
SECTION 5. SERVICE OF NOTICES AND RESOLUTIONS. – (a) x x x in cases of decision[s] and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel/representative by registered mail; x x x
For purposes of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders by the counsel of record.
SECTION 6. PROOF AND COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE. - The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such time. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that petitioners were not represented by counsel before the arbiter. Thus, the arbiter’s ruling was mailed to Geronimo and two other individuals with a common address at “#98 San Guillermo St., Buting, 1601 Pasig City.” Following the NLRC rules, service of the ruling is completed upon its receipt by Geronimo or his agent from which the 10-day period for appeal will be counted. It is not disputed that Geronimo received a copy of the arbiter’s ruling on 25 September 2001. The question then is whether the receipt the day before, 24 September 2001, of the same document by Naronio constitutes receipt by petitioners’ “agent” within the contemplation of Section 6, Rule III of the NLRC rules. We hold that it does not.
Under the Rules of Court and Section 6 (formerly Section 5), Rule III of the NLRC rules, the word “agent” for purposes of serving court processes on juridical persons refers to –
[a] representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. x x x
x x x x
[I]t does not necessarily connote an officer of the corporation. However, though this may include employees other than officers of a corporation, this does not include employees whose duties are not so integrated to the business that their absence or presence will not toll the entire operation of the business. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be determined from the records who hired Naronio; but it is also undisputed that petitioners are not his employers. This test presupposes that the recipient of the legal document is employed by the addressee. For remedial law purposes, Naronio’s receipt of any processes intended for petitioners was receipt by a stranger, without legal significance to petitioners.
Hence, there is merit in petitioners’ submission that they seasonably filed their appeal on 5 October 2001, the 10th day from their receipt of the arbiter’s ruling on 25 September 2001, or within the appeal period in Article 223 of the Labor Code. For ruling to the contrary, thus denying due course to petitioners’ appeal, the appellate court committed reversible error of law.
