Case Digest: Pasos v. PNCC
G.R. No. 192394 : July 3, 2013
ROY D. PASOS, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Roy D. Pasos started working for respondent PNCC on April 26, 1996. Based on the PNCC's "Personnel Action Form Appointment for Project Employment" dated April 30, 1996,petitioner was designated as "Clerk II (Accounting)" and was assigned to the "NAIA II Project." It was likewise stated therein:
PARTICULARS: Project employment starting on April 26, 1996 to July 25, 1996. This contract maybe terminated at anytime for cause as provided for by law and/or existing Company Policy. This maybe terminated if services are unsatisfactory, or when it shall no longer needed, as determined by the Company. If services are still needed beyond the validity of this contract, the Company shall extend your services. After services are terminated, the employee shall be under no obligation to re-employ with the Company nor shall the Company be obliged to re-employ the employee.
Petitioners employment, however, did not end on July 25, 1996 but was extended until August 4, 1998, or more than two years later, based on the "Personnel Action Form Project Employment" dated July 7, 1998.
Based on PNCCs "Appointment for Project Employment" dated November 11, 1998,petitioner was rehired on even date as "Accounting Clerk (Reliever)" and assigned to the "PCSO Q.I. Project." It was stated therein that his employment shall end on February 11, 1999 and may be terminated for cause or in accordance with the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended. However, said employment did not actually end on February 11, 1999 but was extended until February 19, 1999 based on the "Personnel Action Form-Project Employment" dated February 17, 1999.
On February 23, 1999, petitioner was again hired by PNCC as "Accounting Clerk" and was assigned to the "SM-Project" based on the "Appointment for Project Employment" dated February 18, 1999.It did not specify the date when his employment will end but it was stated therein that it will be "co-terminus with the completion of the project." Said employment supposedly ended on August 19, 1999 per "Personnel Action Form Project Employment" dated August 18, 1999,where it was stated, "termination of petitioners project employment due to completion of assigned phase/stage of work or project effective at the close of office hours on 19 August 1999." However, it appears that said employment was extended per "Appointment for Project employment" dated August 20, 1999as petitioner was again appointed as "Accounting Clerk" for "SM Project (Package II)." It did not state a specific date up to when his extended employment will be, but it provided that it will be "co-terminus with the project." In "Personnel Action Form Project Employment" dated October 17, 2000,it appears that such extension would eventually end on October 19, 2000.
Despite the termination of his employment on October 19, 2000, petitioner claims that his superior instructed him to report for work the following day, intimating to him that he will again be employed for the succeeding SM projects. For purposes of reemployment, he then underwent a medical examination which allegedly revealed that he had pneumonitis. Petitioner was advised by PNCCs physician, Dr. Arthur C. Obena, to take a 14-day sick leave.
On November 27, 2000, after serving his sick leave, petitioner claims that he was again referred for medical examination where it was revealed that he contracted Kochs disease. He was then required to take a 60-day leave of absence.The following day, he submitted his application for sick leave but PNCCs Project Personnel Officer, Mr. R.S. Sanchez, told him that he was not entitled to sick leave because he was not a regular employee.
Petitioner still served a 60-day sick leave and underwent another medical examination on February 16, 2001. He was then given a clean bill of health and was given a medical clearance by Dr. Obena that he was fit to work. After he presented his medical clearance to the Project Personnel Officer on even date, he was informed that his services were already terminated on October 19, 2000 and he was already replaced due to expiration of his contract. This prompted petitioner on February 18, 2003 to file a complaintfor illegal dismissal against PNCC with a prayer for reinstatement and back wages. He argued that he is deemed a regular employee of PNCC due to his prolonged employment as a project employee as well as the failure on the part of PNCC to report his termination every time a project is completed. He further contended that his termination without the benefit of an administrative investigation was tantamount to an illegal dismissal.
On March 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisionin favor of petitioner.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner attained regular employment status with the repeated hiring and rehiring of his services more so when the services he was made to render were usual and necessary to PNCCs business. The Labor Arbiter likewise found that from the time petitioner was hired in 1996 until he was terminated, he was hired and rehired by PNCC and made to work not only in the project he had signed to work on but on other projects as well, indicating that he is in fact a regular employee. He also noted petitioners subsequent contracts did not anymore indicate the date of completion of the contract and the fact that his first contract was extended way beyond the supposed completion date. According to the Labor Arbiter, these circumstances indicate that the employment is no longer a project employment but has graduated into a regular one. Having attained regular status, the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner should have been accorded his right to security of tenure.
Both PNCC and petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiters decision.
On October 31, 2008, the NLRC rendered its Decision granting PNCCs appeal but dismissing that of petitioner.
As to the procedural issues raised by petitioner, the NLRC ruled that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of an appeal bond and that Mr. Erece, Jr., as head of the Personnel Services Department, is the proper person to represent PNCC. As to the substantive issues, the NLRC found that petitioner was employed in connection with certain construction projects and his employment was co-terminus with each project as evidenced by the Personnel Action Forms and the Termination Report submitted to the DOLE. It likewise noted the presence of the following project employment indicators in the instant case, namely, the duration of the project for which petitioner was engaged was determinable and expected completion was known to petitioner; the specific service that petitioner rendered in the projects was that of an accounting clerk and that was made clear to him and the service was connected with the projects; and PNCC submitted termination reports to the DOLE and petitioners name was included in the list of affected employees.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari but the appellate court dismissed the same for lack of merit.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an appeal be dismissed outright if the appeal bond filed is less than the adjudged amount?
2. Whether or not the head of the personnel department sign the verification and certification on behalf of the corporation sans any board resolution or secretarys certificate authorizing such officer to do the same?
3. Whether or not petitioner is a regular employee and not a mere project employee and thus can only be dismissed for cause?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.
REMEDIAL LAW
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory. As provided in Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, in case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
However, not only in one case has this Court relaxed this requirement in order to bring about the immediate and appropriate resolution of cases on the merits.In Quiambao v. National Labor Relations Commission,this Court allowed the relaxation of the requirement when there is substantial compliance with the rule. Likewise, in Ong v. Court of Appeals,the Court held that the bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. The Court held that "while the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond."
In the instant case, the Labor Arbiter in his decision ordered PNCC to pay petitioner back wages amounting toP422,630.41 and separation pay ofP37,662 or a total ofP460,292.41. When PNCC filed an appeal bond amounting toP422,630.41 or at least 90% of the adjudged amount, there is no question that this is substantial compliance with the requirement that allows relaxation of the rules.
COMMERCIAL LAW
It has been the constant holding of this Court in cases instituted by corporations that an individual corporate officer cannot exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors pursuant to Section 23, in relation to Section 25 of the Corporation Code which clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. However, we have in many cases recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum-shopping. Some of these cases were enumerated in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenuewhich was cited by the appellate court:
In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an "employment specialist" who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the boards authorization.
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."
While we agree with petitioner that in Cagayan Valley, the requisite board resolution was submitted though belatedly unlike in the instant case, this Court still recognizes the authority of Mr. Erece, Jr. to sign the verification and certification on behalf of PNCC sans a board resolution or secretarys certificate as we have allowed in Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan,one of the cases cited in Cagayan Valley. In Pfizer, the Court ruled as valid the verification signed by an employment specialist as she was in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petitiondespite the fact that no board resolution authorizing her was ever submitted by Pfizer, Inc. even belatedly. We believe that like the employment specialist in Pfizer, Mr. Erece, Jr. too, as head of the Personnel Services Department of PNCC, was in a position to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared in good faith and are true and correct.
Even assuming that the verification in the appeal filed by PNCC is defective, it is well settled that rules of procedure in labor cases maybe relaxed. As provided in Article 221 of the Labor Code, as amended, "rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." Moreover, the requirement of verification is merely formal and not jurisdictional. As held in Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc.
As to the defective verification in the appeal memorandum before the NLRC, the same liberality applies. After all, the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the noncompliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court or tribunal may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
LABOR LAW
In the instant case, the appointments issued to petitioner indicated that he was hired for specific projects. This Court is convinced however that although he started as a project employee, he eventually became a regular employee of PNCC.
Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, a project employee is one whose "employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season." Thus, the principal test used to determine whether employees are project employees is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project.
In the case at bar, petitioner worked continuously for more than two years after the supposed three-month duration of his project employment for the NAIA II Project. While his appointment for said project allowed such extension since it specifically provided that in case his "services are still needed beyond the validity of the contract, the Company shall extend his services," there was no subsequent contract or appointment that specified a particular duration for the extension. His services were just extended indefinitely until "Personnel Action Form Project Employment" dated July 7, 1998 was issued to him which provided that his employment will end a few weeks later or on August 4, 1998. While for first three months, petitioner can be considered a project employee of PNCC, his employment thereafter, when his services were extended without any specification of as to the duration, made him a regular employee of PNCC. And his status as a regular employee was not affected by the fact that he was assigned to several other projects and there were intervals in between said projects since he enjoys security of tenure.
Failure of an employer to file termination reports after every project completion proves that an employee is not a project employee.
REMEDIAL LAW
As a rule, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. The rule, however, is subject to the following exceptions:
The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of law, and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Court since it is not the Courts function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
In this case, records clearly show that PNCC did not report the termination of petitioners supposed project employment for the NAIA II Project to the DOLE. Department Order No. 19, or the "Guidelines Governing the Employment of Workers in the Construction Industry," requires employers to submit a report of an employees termination to the nearest public employment office every time an employees employment is terminated due to a completion of a project. PNCC submitted as evidence of its compliance with the requirement supposed photocopies of its termination reports, each listing petitioner as among the employees affected. Unfortunately, none of the reports submitted pertain to the NAIA II Project. Moreover, DOLE NCR verified that petitioner is not included in the list of affected workers based on the termination reports filed by PNCC on August 11, 17, 20 and 24, 1998 for petitioners supposed dismissal from the NAIA II Project effective August 4, 1998. This certification from DOLE was not refuted by PNCC. In Tomas Lao Construction v. NLRC,we emphasized the indispensability of the reportorial requirement:
Moreover, if private respondents were indeed employed as "project employees," petitioners should have submitted a report of termination to the nearest public employment office every time their employment was terminated due to completion of each construction project. The records show that they did not. Policy Instruction No. 20 is explicit that employers of project employees are exempted from the clearance requirement but not from the submission of termination report. We have consistently held that failure of the employer to file termination reports after every project completion proves that the employees are not project employees. Nowhere in the New Labor Code is it provided that the reportorial requirement is dispensed with. The fact is that Department Order No. 19 superseding Policy Instruction No. 20 expressly provides that the report of termination is one of the indicators of project employment.
LABOR LAW
Petitioners regular employment was terminated by PNCC due to contract expiration or project completion, which are both not among the just or authorized causes provided in the Labor Code, as amended, for dismissing a regular employee. Thus, petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement, full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
We agree with petitioner that there was no basis for the Labor Arbiters finding of strained relations and order of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. This was neither alleged nor proved. Moreover, it has long been settled that the doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. As held in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC:
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting ones right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained.
As to the back wages due petitioner, there is likewise no basis in deducting therefrom back wages equivalent to six months "representing the maximum period of confinement PNCC can require him to undergo medical treatment." Besides, petitioner was not dismissed on the ground of disease but expiration of term of project employment.
Regarding moral and exemplary damages, this Court rules that petitioner is not entitled to them.Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. Apart from his allegations, petitioner did not present any evidence to prove that his dismissal was attended with bad faith or was done oppressively.
Petitioner is also entitled to attorney's fees m the amount of ten percent (10%) of his total monetary award, having been forced to litigate in order to seek redress of his grievances, as provided in Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, and following this Court's pronouncement in Exodus International Construction Corporation v. Biscocho.
ROY D. PASOS, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Roy D. Pasos started working for respondent PNCC on April 26, 1996. Based on the PNCC's "Personnel Action Form Appointment for Project Employment" dated April 30, 1996,petitioner was designated as "Clerk II (Accounting)" and was assigned to the "NAIA II Project." It was likewise stated therein:
PARTICULARS: Project employment starting on April 26, 1996 to July 25, 1996. This contract maybe terminated at anytime for cause as provided for by law and/or existing Company Policy. This maybe terminated if services are unsatisfactory, or when it shall no longer needed, as determined by the Company. If services are still needed beyond the validity of this contract, the Company shall extend your services. After services are terminated, the employee shall be under no obligation to re-employ with the Company nor shall the Company be obliged to re-employ the employee.
Petitioners employment, however, did not end on July 25, 1996 but was extended until August 4, 1998, or more than two years later, based on the "Personnel Action Form Project Employment" dated July 7, 1998.
Based on PNCCs "Appointment for Project Employment" dated November 11, 1998,petitioner was rehired on even date as "Accounting Clerk (Reliever)" and assigned to the "PCSO Q.I. Project." It was stated therein that his employment shall end on February 11, 1999 and may be terminated for cause or in accordance with the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended. However, said employment did not actually end on February 11, 1999 but was extended until February 19, 1999 based on the "Personnel Action Form-Project Employment" dated February 17, 1999.
On February 23, 1999, petitioner was again hired by PNCC as "Accounting Clerk" and was assigned to the "SM-Project" based on the "Appointment for Project Employment" dated February 18, 1999.It did not specify the date when his employment will end but it was stated therein that it will be "co-terminus with the completion of the project." Said employment supposedly ended on August 19, 1999 per "Personnel Action Form Project Employment" dated August 18, 1999,where it was stated, "termination of petitioners project employment due to completion of assigned phase/stage of work or project effective at the close of office hours on 19 August 1999." However, it appears that said employment was extended per "Appointment for Project employment" dated August 20, 1999as petitioner was again appointed as "Accounting Clerk" for "SM Project (Package II)." It did not state a specific date up to when his extended employment will be, but it provided that it will be "co-terminus with the project." In "Personnel Action Form Project Employment" dated October 17, 2000,it appears that such extension would eventually end on October 19, 2000.
Despite the termination of his employment on October 19, 2000, petitioner claims that his superior instructed him to report for work the following day, intimating to him that he will again be employed for the succeeding SM projects. For purposes of reemployment, he then underwent a medical examination which allegedly revealed that he had pneumonitis. Petitioner was advised by PNCCs physician, Dr. Arthur C. Obena, to take a 14-day sick leave.
On November 27, 2000, after serving his sick leave, petitioner claims that he was again referred for medical examination where it was revealed that he contracted Kochs disease. He was then required to take a 60-day leave of absence.The following day, he submitted his application for sick leave but PNCCs Project Personnel Officer, Mr. R.S. Sanchez, told him that he was not entitled to sick leave because he was not a regular employee.
Petitioner still served a 60-day sick leave and underwent another medical examination on February 16, 2001. He was then given a clean bill of health and was given a medical clearance by Dr. Obena that he was fit to work. After he presented his medical clearance to the Project Personnel Officer on even date, he was informed that his services were already terminated on October 19, 2000 and he was already replaced due to expiration of his contract. This prompted petitioner on February 18, 2003 to file a complaintfor illegal dismissal against PNCC with a prayer for reinstatement and back wages. He argued that he is deemed a regular employee of PNCC due to his prolonged employment as a project employee as well as the failure on the part of PNCC to report his termination every time a project is completed. He further contended that his termination without the benefit of an administrative investigation was tantamount to an illegal dismissal.
On March 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisionin favor of petitioner.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner attained regular employment status with the repeated hiring and rehiring of his services more so when the services he was made to render were usual and necessary to PNCCs business. The Labor Arbiter likewise found that from the time petitioner was hired in 1996 until he was terminated, he was hired and rehired by PNCC and made to work not only in the project he had signed to work on but on other projects as well, indicating that he is in fact a regular employee. He also noted petitioners subsequent contracts did not anymore indicate the date of completion of the contract and the fact that his first contract was extended way beyond the supposed completion date. According to the Labor Arbiter, these circumstances indicate that the employment is no longer a project employment but has graduated into a regular one. Having attained regular status, the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner should have been accorded his right to security of tenure.
Both PNCC and petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiters decision.
On October 31, 2008, the NLRC rendered its Decision granting PNCCs appeal but dismissing that of petitioner.
As to the procedural issues raised by petitioner, the NLRC ruled that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of an appeal bond and that Mr. Erece, Jr., as head of the Personnel Services Department, is the proper person to represent PNCC. As to the substantive issues, the NLRC found that petitioner was employed in connection with certain construction projects and his employment was co-terminus with each project as evidenced by the Personnel Action Forms and the Termination Report submitted to the DOLE. It likewise noted the presence of the following project employment indicators in the instant case, namely, the duration of the project for which petitioner was engaged was determinable and expected completion was known to petitioner; the specific service that petitioner rendered in the projects was that of an accounting clerk and that was made clear to him and the service was connected with the projects; and PNCC submitted termination reports to the DOLE and petitioners name was included in the list of affected employees.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari but the appellate court dismissed the same for lack of merit.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an appeal be dismissed outright if the appeal bond filed is less than the adjudged amount?
2. Whether or not the head of the personnel department sign the verification and certification on behalf of the corporation sans any board resolution or secretarys certificate authorizing such officer to do the same?
3. Whether or not petitioner is a regular employee and not a mere project employee and thus can only be dismissed for cause?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.
REMEDIAL LAW
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory. As provided in Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, in case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
However, not only in one case has this Court relaxed this requirement in order to bring about the immediate and appropriate resolution of cases on the merits.In Quiambao v. National Labor Relations Commission,this Court allowed the relaxation of the requirement when there is substantial compliance with the rule. Likewise, in Ong v. Court of Appeals,the Court held that the bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. The Court held that "while the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond."
In the instant case, the Labor Arbiter in his decision ordered PNCC to pay petitioner back wages amounting toP422,630.41 and separation pay ofP37,662 or a total ofP460,292.41. When PNCC filed an appeal bond amounting toP422,630.41 or at least 90% of the adjudged amount, there is no question that this is substantial compliance with the requirement that allows relaxation of the rules.
COMMERCIAL LAW
It has been the constant holding of this Court in cases instituted by corporations that an individual corporate officer cannot exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors pursuant to Section 23, in relation to Section 25 of the Corporation Code which clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. However, we have in many cases recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum-shopping. Some of these cases were enumerated in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenuewhich was cited by the appellate court:
In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an "employment specialist" who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the boards authorization.
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."
While we agree with petitioner that in Cagayan Valley, the requisite board resolution was submitted though belatedly unlike in the instant case, this Court still recognizes the authority of Mr. Erece, Jr. to sign the verification and certification on behalf of PNCC sans a board resolution or secretarys certificate as we have allowed in Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan,one of the cases cited in Cagayan Valley. In Pfizer, the Court ruled as valid the verification signed by an employment specialist as she was in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petitiondespite the fact that no board resolution authorizing her was ever submitted by Pfizer, Inc. even belatedly. We believe that like the employment specialist in Pfizer, Mr. Erece, Jr. too, as head of the Personnel Services Department of PNCC, was in a position to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared in good faith and are true and correct.
Even assuming that the verification in the appeal filed by PNCC is defective, it is well settled that rules of procedure in labor cases maybe relaxed. As provided in Article 221 of the Labor Code, as amended, "rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." Moreover, the requirement of verification is merely formal and not jurisdictional. As held in Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc.
As to the defective verification in the appeal memorandum before the NLRC, the same liberality applies. After all, the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the noncompliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court or tribunal may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
LABOR LAW
In the instant case, the appointments issued to petitioner indicated that he was hired for specific projects. This Court is convinced however that although he started as a project employee, he eventually became a regular employee of PNCC.
Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, a project employee is one whose "employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season." Thus, the principal test used to determine whether employees are project employees is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project.
In the case at bar, petitioner worked continuously for more than two years after the supposed three-month duration of his project employment for the NAIA II Project. While his appointment for said project allowed such extension since it specifically provided that in case his "services are still needed beyond the validity of the contract, the Company shall extend his services," there was no subsequent contract or appointment that specified a particular duration for the extension. His services were just extended indefinitely until "Personnel Action Form Project Employment" dated July 7, 1998 was issued to him which provided that his employment will end a few weeks later or on August 4, 1998. While for first three months, petitioner can be considered a project employee of PNCC, his employment thereafter, when his services were extended without any specification of as to the duration, made him a regular employee of PNCC. And his status as a regular employee was not affected by the fact that he was assigned to several other projects and there were intervals in between said projects since he enjoys security of tenure.
Failure of an employer to file termination reports after every project completion proves that an employee is not a project employee.
REMEDIAL LAW
As a rule, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. The rule, however, is subject to the following exceptions:
The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of law, and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Court since it is not the Courts function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
In this case, records clearly show that PNCC did not report the termination of petitioners supposed project employment for the NAIA II Project to the DOLE. Department Order No. 19, or the "Guidelines Governing the Employment of Workers in the Construction Industry," requires employers to submit a report of an employees termination to the nearest public employment office every time an employees employment is terminated due to a completion of a project. PNCC submitted as evidence of its compliance with the requirement supposed photocopies of its termination reports, each listing petitioner as among the employees affected. Unfortunately, none of the reports submitted pertain to the NAIA II Project. Moreover, DOLE NCR verified that petitioner is not included in the list of affected workers based on the termination reports filed by PNCC on August 11, 17, 20 and 24, 1998 for petitioners supposed dismissal from the NAIA II Project effective August 4, 1998. This certification from DOLE was not refuted by PNCC. In Tomas Lao Construction v. NLRC,we emphasized the indispensability of the reportorial requirement:
Moreover, if private respondents were indeed employed as "project employees," petitioners should have submitted a report of termination to the nearest public employment office every time their employment was terminated due to completion of each construction project. The records show that they did not. Policy Instruction No. 20 is explicit that employers of project employees are exempted from the clearance requirement but not from the submission of termination report. We have consistently held that failure of the employer to file termination reports after every project completion proves that the employees are not project employees. Nowhere in the New Labor Code is it provided that the reportorial requirement is dispensed with. The fact is that Department Order No. 19 superseding Policy Instruction No. 20 expressly provides that the report of termination is one of the indicators of project employment.
LABOR LAW
Petitioners regular employment was terminated by PNCC due to contract expiration or project completion, which are both not among the just or authorized causes provided in the Labor Code, as amended, for dismissing a regular employee. Thus, petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement, full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
We agree with petitioner that there was no basis for the Labor Arbiters finding of strained relations and order of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. This was neither alleged nor proved. Moreover, it has long been settled that the doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. As held in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC:
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting ones right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained.
As to the back wages due petitioner, there is likewise no basis in deducting therefrom back wages equivalent to six months "representing the maximum period of confinement PNCC can require him to undergo medical treatment." Besides, petitioner was not dismissed on the ground of disease but expiration of term of project employment.
Regarding moral and exemplary damages, this Court rules that petitioner is not entitled to them.Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. Apart from his allegations, petitioner did not present any evidence to prove that his dismissal was attended with bad faith or was done oppressively.
Petitioner is also entitled to attorney's fees m the amount of ten percent (10%) of his total monetary award, having been forced to litigate in order to seek redress of his grievances, as provided in Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, and following this Court's pronouncement in Exodus International Construction Corporation v. Biscocho.
