Case Digest: People v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 173792: August 31, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOA, Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
In the second week of February 1998, Ochoa was introduced to Robert Gubat, a licensed electrical engineer and a resident of Pulang Lupa, Las Pis, through a certain Nila, Gubats neighbor, who had a pending application for work abroad with Ochoa. Ochoa talked to Gubat on the telephone, and during their conversation, Ochoa told Gubat that one of her applicants was already leaving for Taiwan. Per Ochoas instruction, Gubat met with Francisco Pascual, who accompanied him to Ochoas house in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, and personally introduced Gubat to Ochoa. Gubat submitted his rumto Ochoa, which Ochoa would bring to Axil International Agency where Ochoa was working as a recruiter. Right after browsing through Gubats rum Ochoa informed Gubat that as an engineer, Gubat was qualified to work as a factory supervisor and could leave for Taiwan in two weeks or in March 1998. Ochoa also told Gubat that the total application expenses would amount to ₱100,000.00, and the downpayment was ₱50,000.00. Gubat was able to actually pay Ochoa ₱18,800.00 as reservation fee at the agency; processing fee for Gubats papers at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Malacanang, and Embassy of Taiwan; and medical examination fee. Ochoa, however, only issued to Gubat three receipts, dated March 3, March 31, and April 6, all in the year 1998, in the amount of P5,000.00 each or a total of P15,000.00. Gubat started to worry when he was not able to leave for abroad as Ochoa promised and when she failed to show up at their arranged meetings. When Gubat was finally able to talk to Ochoa, Ochoa again promised him that he would be leaving for abroad soon. Despite Ochoa's renewed promise, Gubat was still not able to leave the country. Gubat then demanded that Ochoa return his documents and money. When Ochoa failed to comply with his demand, Gubat filed a report against Ochoa at Barangay (Brgy.) San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. On May 21, 1998, he met the other private complainants who had similar complaints against Ochoa. When nothing came out of the confrontation with Ochoa at Brgy. San Bartolome, Gubat and the other private complainants filed a joint complaint against Ochoa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Ochoa was also accused of illegal recruitment of other individuals.
Cory C. Aquino of the POEA authenticated the Certification dated June 3, 1998, issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo (Mateo), Director, Licensing Branch of the POEA, that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Cory identified Director Mateos signature on the Certification, being familiar with the same. The Certification was issued after a check of the POEA records pursuant to a request for certification from the NBI. Cory, however, admitted that she did not participate in the preparation of the Certification, as the NBIs request for certification was through a counter transaction, and another person was in charge of verification of counter transactions.
On April 17, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa.
Ochoa filed a Notice of Appealin which she stated her intention to appeal the RTC judgment of conviction and prayed that the records of her case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
The Special Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decisiondated June 17, 2002 affirming the appealed RTC decision dated April 17, 2000. Ochoa filed a Motion for Reconsideration,which the People opposed for being bereft of merit.
In its Resolutiondated August 6, 2003, the Court of Appeals declared that it had no jurisdiction over Ochoas appeal.
LABOR LAW
Ochoa was charged with violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042. Said provision broadens the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Codeand provides stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows:
SEC. 6.Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.All eight private complainants herein consistently declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit their bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which private complainants did. Private complainants also gave various amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa issued to Gubat, Cesar,and Agustin.Despite private complainants compliance with all the requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work abroad. Private complainants pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.
Ochoa contends that Exhibit "A," the POEA certification which states that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment was already rejected by the RTC during the hearings on bail for being hearsay, and should not have been admitted by the RTC after the trial on the merits of the criminal cases. Inadmissible evidence during bail hearings do not become admissible evidence after formal offer. Without the POEA certification, the prosecution had no proof that Ochoa is unlicensed to recruit and, thus, she should be acquitted.
Ochoa's contention is without merit.
REMEDIAL LAW
We refer to the following ruling in Fullero v. People,wherein we rejected a similar argument raised by petitioner therein against a certification issued by an officer of the Professional Regulation Commission:
Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecution's documentary evidence, consisting of Exhibits "A," "C," "F," "G," "H," "I," "J," "K," "L," "M," "N," "O," "P," "Q" and "R" and their sub-markings, are inadmissible in evidence based on the following reasons:
(1) Exhibit "A," which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, confirming that petitioner's name does not appear in the registry books of licensed civil engineers, was not properly identified during the trial. The proper person to identify the certification should have been the signatory therein which was PRC Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person who actually witnessed the execution of the certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was not present when the certification was executed, had identified the certification during the trial. Thus, the contents of the certification are mere hearsay.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was presented and testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public officer.
Exhibit "A," or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila. Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence.
In the case at bar, the POEA certification was signed by Dir. Mateo of the POEA Licensing Branch. Although Dir. Mateo himself did not testify before the RTC, the prosecution still presented Cory, Dir. Mateos subordinate at the POEA Licensing Branch, to verify Dir. Mateos signature.
Also worth re-stating is the justification provided by the Court of Appeals for the admissibility of the POEA certification, viz:
The certificate is admissible. It is true that the trial court, during the bail hearings, rejected the certification for being hearsay because at that stage of the proceedings, nobody testified yet on the document. However, as the trial progressed, an officer of the POEA, specifically in its licensing branch, had testified on the document. It does not follow, then, as appellant would want this court to assume, that evidence rejected during bail hearings could not be admissible during the formal offer of evidence.
This court admits that Ms. Cory Aquino was not the signatory of the document. Nevertheless, she could testify on the veracity of the document because she is one of the officers of the licensing branch of the POEA. Being so, she could testify whether a certain person holds a license or not. It bears stressing that Ms. Aquino is familiar with the signature of Mr. Mateo because the latter is her superior. Moreover, as testified to by Ms. Aquino, that as a policy in her office, before a certification is made, the office checks first whether the name of the person requested to be verified is a reported personnel of any licensed agency by checking their index and computer files.
As found in the offices records, appellant, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. It bears stressing, too, that this is not a case where a certification is rendered inadmissible because the one who prepared it was not presented during the trial. To reiterate, an officer of the licensing branch of the POEA, in the person of Ms. Aquino, testified on the document. Hence, its execution could be properly determined and the veracity of the statements stated therein could be ascertained.
LABOR LAW
More importantly, Ochoa could still be convicted of illegal recruitment even if we disregard the POEA certification, for regardless of whether or not Ochoa was a licensee or holder of authority, she could still have committed illegal recruitment. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault." Ochoa committed illegal recruitment as described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical fees from private complainants, evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to reimburse the private complainants the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no fault of their own.
Ochoa further argues in her defense that she should not be found personally and criminally liable for illegal recruitment because she was a mere employee of AXIL and that she had turned over the money she received from private complainants to AXIL.
We are not convinced. Ochoa's claim was not supported by any corroborating evidence. The POEA verification dated September 23, 1998, also signed by Dir. Mateo, and presented by Ochoa during trial, pertains only to the status of AXIL as a placement agency with a "limited temporary authority" which had already expired. Said verification did not show whether or not Ochoa was employed by AXIL. Strangely, for an alleged employee of AXIL, Ochoa was not able to present the most basic evidence of employment, such as appointment papers, identification card (ID), and/or payslips. The receipts presented by some of the private complainants were issued and signed by Ochoa herself, and did not contain any indication that Ochoa issued and signed the same on behalf of AXIL. Also, Ochoa was not able to present any proof that private complainants money were actually turned over to or received by AXIL.
There is no reason for us to disturb the weight and credence accorded by the RTC to the evidence of the prosecution, over that of the defense. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than the accuseds denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime.Likewise, factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence. Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.
Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. Here, there are eight private complainants who convincingly testified on Ochoas acts of illegal recruitment.
LABOR LAW
In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, we uphold the verdict of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty of illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage.
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less thanP500,000.00 nor more thanP1,000.000.00 shall be imposed when the illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Thus:
Sec. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Since the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine ofP1,000,000.00 imposed on Ochoa by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are in accord with the law, we similarly sustain the same.
CRIMINAL LAW
We affirm as well the conviction of Ochoa for estafa committed against three private complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. The very same evidence proving Ochoas criminal liability for illegal recruitment also established her criminal liability for estafa.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut That:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:
Art. 315.Swindling(estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.Both elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. Ochoa's deceit was evident in her false representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin that she possessed the authority and capability to send said private complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment as early as one to two weeks from completion of the requirements, among which were the payment of placement fees and submission of a medical examination report. Ochoa promised that there were already existing job vacancies overseas for private complainants, even quoting the corresponding salaries. Ochoa carried on the deceit by receiving application documents from the private complainants, accompanying them to the clinic for medical examination, and/or making them go to the offices of certain recruitment/placement agencies to which Ochoa had actually no connection at all. Clearly deceived by Ochoas words and actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were persuaded to hand over their money to Ochoa to pay for their placement and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover their money.
CRIMINAL LAW
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation. According to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
It was established by evidence that in Criminal Case No. 98-77301, Gubat was defrauded by Ochoa in the amount of P15,000.00; in Criminal Case No. 77-98302, Cesar paid Ochoa the sum of P17,000.00; and in Criminal Case No. 77-98303, Agustin handed over to Ochoa a total of P28,000.00.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years). If the amount of fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the aforementioned penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).Consequently, the minimum terms in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302 were correctly fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals at 2 years, 11 months, and 11 days of prision correccional. While the minimum term in Criminal Case No. 98-77303 was increased by the Court of Appeals to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, it is still within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Section 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be that which, in view of attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code. To compute the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when the amount of fraud exceeds P12,000.00, the time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this computation, the minimum period for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days; the medium period is from 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days; and the maximum period is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. Any incremental penalty (i.e., 1 year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.) shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court, provided that the total penalty does not exceed 20 years.
In Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302, the amounts of fraud were more than P12,00.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum term shall be taken from the medium period of the penalty prescribed (i.e., 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days). Thus, the maximum terms of 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days actually imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302 are proper.
As for determining the maximum term in Criminal Case No. 98-77303, we take into consideration that the amount of fraud was P28,000.00. Since the amount of fraud exceeded P22,000.00, the maximum term shall be taken from the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years; but since the amount of fraud exceeded P22,000.00 by only P6,000.00 (less than P10,000.00), no incremental penalty shall be imposed. Considering that the maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case No. 98-77303 is within the maximum period of the proscribed penalty, we see no reason for disturbing the same.
DENIED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOA, Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
In the second week of February 1998, Ochoa was introduced to Robert Gubat, a licensed electrical engineer and a resident of Pulang Lupa, Las Pis, through a certain Nila, Gubats neighbor, who had a pending application for work abroad with Ochoa. Ochoa talked to Gubat on the telephone, and during their conversation, Ochoa told Gubat that one of her applicants was already leaving for Taiwan. Per Ochoas instruction, Gubat met with Francisco Pascual, who accompanied him to Ochoas house in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, and personally introduced Gubat to Ochoa. Gubat submitted his rumto Ochoa, which Ochoa would bring to Axil International Agency where Ochoa was working as a recruiter. Right after browsing through Gubats rum Ochoa informed Gubat that as an engineer, Gubat was qualified to work as a factory supervisor and could leave for Taiwan in two weeks or in March 1998. Ochoa also told Gubat that the total application expenses would amount to ₱100,000.00, and the downpayment was ₱50,000.00. Gubat was able to actually pay Ochoa ₱18,800.00 as reservation fee at the agency; processing fee for Gubats papers at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Malacanang, and Embassy of Taiwan; and medical examination fee. Ochoa, however, only issued to Gubat three receipts, dated March 3, March 31, and April 6, all in the year 1998, in the amount of P5,000.00 each or a total of P15,000.00. Gubat started to worry when he was not able to leave for abroad as Ochoa promised and when she failed to show up at their arranged meetings. When Gubat was finally able to talk to Ochoa, Ochoa again promised him that he would be leaving for abroad soon. Despite Ochoa's renewed promise, Gubat was still not able to leave the country. Gubat then demanded that Ochoa return his documents and money. When Ochoa failed to comply with his demand, Gubat filed a report against Ochoa at Barangay (Brgy.) San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. On May 21, 1998, he met the other private complainants who had similar complaints against Ochoa. When nothing came out of the confrontation with Ochoa at Brgy. San Bartolome, Gubat and the other private complainants filed a joint complaint against Ochoa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Ochoa was also accused of illegal recruitment of other individuals.
Cory C. Aquino of the POEA authenticated the Certification dated June 3, 1998, issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo (Mateo), Director, Licensing Branch of the POEA, that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Cory identified Director Mateos signature on the Certification, being familiar with the same. The Certification was issued after a check of the POEA records pursuant to a request for certification from the NBI. Cory, however, admitted that she did not participate in the preparation of the Certification, as the NBIs request for certification was through a counter transaction, and another person was in charge of verification of counter transactions.
On April 17, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa.
Ochoa filed a Notice of Appealin which she stated her intention to appeal the RTC judgment of conviction and prayed that the records of her case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
The Special Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decisiondated June 17, 2002 affirming the appealed RTC decision dated April 17, 2000. Ochoa filed a Motion for Reconsideration,which the People opposed for being bereft of merit.
In its Resolutiondated August 6, 2003, the Court of Appeals declared that it had no jurisdiction over Ochoas appeal.
ISSUE:HELD:
Whether or not Ochoa was guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale?
LABOR LAW
Ochoa was charged with violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042. Said provision broadens the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Codeand provides stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows:
SEC. 6.Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.All eight private complainants herein consistently declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit their bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which private complainants did. Private complainants also gave various amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa issued to Gubat, Cesar,and Agustin.Despite private complainants compliance with all the requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work abroad. Private complainants pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.
Ochoa contends that Exhibit "A," the POEA certification which states that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment was already rejected by the RTC during the hearings on bail for being hearsay, and should not have been admitted by the RTC after the trial on the merits of the criminal cases. Inadmissible evidence during bail hearings do not become admissible evidence after formal offer. Without the POEA certification, the prosecution had no proof that Ochoa is unlicensed to recruit and, thus, she should be acquitted.
Ochoa's contention is without merit.
REMEDIAL LAW
We refer to the following ruling in Fullero v. People,wherein we rejected a similar argument raised by petitioner therein against a certification issued by an officer of the Professional Regulation Commission:
Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecution's documentary evidence, consisting of Exhibits "A," "C," "F," "G," "H," "I," "J," "K," "L," "M," "N," "O," "P," "Q" and "R" and their sub-markings, are inadmissible in evidence based on the following reasons:
(1) Exhibit "A," which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, confirming that petitioner's name does not appear in the registry books of licensed civil engineers, was not properly identified during the trial. The proper person to identify the certification should have been the signatory therein which was PRC Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person who actually witnessed the execution of the certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was not present when the certification was executed, had identified the certification during the trial. Thus, the contents of the certification are mere hearsay.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was presented and testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public officer.
Exhibit "A," or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila. Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence.
In the case at bar, the POEA certification was signed by Dir. Mateo of the POEA Licensing Branch. Although Dir. Mateo himself did not testify before the RTC, the prosecution still presented Cory, Dir. Mateos subordinate at the POEA Licensing Branch, to verify Dir. Mateos signature.
Also worth re-stating is the justification provided by the Court of Appeals for the admissibility of the POEA certification, viz:
The certificate is admissible. It is true that the trial court, during the bail hearings, rejected the certification for being hearsay because at that stage of the proceedings, nobody testified yet on the document. However, as the trial progressed, an officer of the POEA, specifically in its licensing branch, had testified on the document. It does not follow, then, as appellant would want this court to assume, that evidence rejected during bail hearings could not be admissible during the formal offer of evidence.
This court admits that Ms. Cory Aquino was not the signatory of the document. Nevertheless, she could testify on the veracity of the document because she is one of the officers of the licensing branch of the POEA. Being so, she could testify whether a certain person holds a license or not. It bears stressing that Ms. Aquino is familiar with the signature of Mr. Mateo because the latter is her superior. Moreover, as testified to by Ms. Aquino, that as a policy in her office, before a certification is made, the office checks first whether the name of the person requested to be verified is a reported personnel of any licensed agency by checking their index and computer files.
As found in the offices records, appellant, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. It bears stressing, too, that this is not a case where a certification is rendered inadmissible because the one who prepared it was not presented during the trial. To reiterate, an officer of the licensing branch of the POEA, in the person of Ms. Aquino, testified on the document. Hence, its execution could be properly determined and the veracity of the statements stated therein could be ascertained.
LABOR LAW
More importantly, Ochoa could still be convicted of illegal recruitment even if we disregard the POEA certification, for regardless of whether or not Ochoa was a licensee or holder of authority, she could still have committed illegal recruitment. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault." Ochoa committed illegal recruitment as described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical fees from private complainants, evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to reimburse the private complainants the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no fault of their own.
Ochoa further argues in her defense that she should not be found personally and criminally liable for illegal recruitment because she was a mere employee of AXIL and that she had turned over the money she received from private complainants to AXIL.
We are not convinced. Ochoa's claim was not supported by any corroborating evidence. The POEA verification dated September 23, 1998, also signed by Dir. Mateo, and presented by Ochoa during trial, pertains only to the status of AXIL as a placement agency with a "limited temporary authority" which had already expired. Said verification did not show whether or not Ochoa was employed by AXIL. Strangely, for an alleged employee of AXIL, Ochoa was not able to present the most basic evidence of employment, such as appointment papers, identification card (ID), and/or payslips. The receipts presented by some of the private complainants were issued and signed by Ochoa herself, and did not contain any indication that Ochoa issued and signed the same on behalf of AXIL. Also, Ochoa was not able to present any proof that private complainants money were actually turned over to or received by AXIL.
There is no reason for us to disturb the weight and credence accorded by the RTC to the evidence of the prosecution, over that of the defense. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than the accuseds denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime.Likewise, factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence. Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.
Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. Here, there are eight private complainants who convincingly testified on Ochoas acts of illegal recruitment.
LABOR LAW
In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, we uphold the verdict of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty of illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage.
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less thanP500,000.00 nor more thanP1,000.000.00 shall be imposed when the illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Thus:
Sec. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Since the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine ofP1,000,000.00 imposed on Ochoa by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are in accord with the law, we similarly sustain the same.
CRIMINAL LAW
We affirm as well the conviction of Ochoa for estafa committed against three private complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. The very same evidence proving Ochoas criminal liability for illegal recruitment also established her criminal liability for estafa.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut That:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:
Art. 315.Swindling(estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.Both elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. Ochoa's deceit was evident in her false representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin that she possessed the authority and capability to send said private complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment as early as one to two weeks from completion of the requirements, among which were the payment of placement fees and submission of a medical examination report. Ochoa promised that there were already existing job vacancies overseas for private complainants, even quoting the corresponding salaries. Ochoa carried on the deceit by receiving application documents from the private complainants, accompanying them to the clinic for medical examination, and/or making them go to the offices of certain recruitment/placement agencies to which Ochoa had actually no connection at all. Clearly deceived by Ochoas words and actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were persuaded to hand over their money to Ochoa to pay for their placement and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover their money.
CRIMINAL LAW
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation. According to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
It was established by evidence that in Criminal Case No. 98-77301, Gubat was defrauded by Ochoa in the amount of P15,000.00; in Criminal Case No. 77-98302, Cesar paid Ochoa the sum of P17,000.00; and in Criminal Case No. 77-98303, Agustin handed over to Ochoa a total of P28,000.00.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years). If the amount of fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the aforementioned penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).Consequently, the minimum terms in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302 were correctly fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals at 2 years, 11 months, and 11 days of prision correccional. While the minimum term in Criminal Case No. 98-77303 was increased by the Court of Appeals to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, it is still within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Section 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be that which, in view of attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code. To compute the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when the amount of fraud exceeds P12,000.00, the time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this computation, the minimum period for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days; the medium period is from 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days; and the maximum period is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. Any incremental penalty (i.e., 1 year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.) shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court, provided that the total penalty does not exceed 20 years.
In Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302, the amounts of fraud were more than P12,00.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum term shall be taken from the medium period of the penalty prescribed (i.e., 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days). Thus, the maximum terms of 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days actually imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302 are proper.
As for determining the maximum term in Criminal Case No. 98-77303, we take into consideration that the amount of fraud was P28,000.00. Since the amount of fraud exceeded P22,000.00, the maximum term shall be taken from the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years; but since the amount of fraud exceeded P22,000.00 by only P6,000.00 (less than P10,000.00), no incremental penalty shall be imposed. Considering that the maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case No. 98-77303 is within the maximum period of the proscribed penalty, we see no reason for disturbing the same.
DENIED
