CASE DIGEST: Philippine Realty vs. Ley Construction
G. R. No. 165548: June 13, 2011
PHILIPPINE REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
Ley Construction and Development Corporation(LCDC) was the project contractor for the construction of several buildings for Philippine Realty & Holdings Corporation (PRHC), the project owner. Engineer Dennis Abcede (Abcede) was the project construction manager of PRHC, while Joselito Santos (Santos) was its general manager and vice-president for operations.
Sometime between April 1988 and October 1989, the two corporations entered into four major construction projects, as evidenced by four duly notarized "construction agreements." LCDC committed itself to the construction of the buildings needed by PRHC, which in turn committed itself to pay the contract price agreed upon.
The agreement covering the construction of the Tektite Building was signed by a Mr. Campos under the words "Phil. Realty & Holdings Corp." and by Santos as a witness.Manuel Ley, the president of LCDC, signed under the words "Ley Const. & Dev. Corp."
The terms embodied in the afore-listed construction agreements were almost identical. Each agreement provided for a fixed price to be paid by PRHC for every project.
In the course of the construction of the Tektite Building, it became evident to both parties that LCDC would not be able to finish the project within the agreed period.Thus, through its president, LCDC met with Abcede to discuss the cause of the delay. LCDC explained that the unanticipated delay in construction was due mainly to the sudden, unexpected hike in the prices of cement and other construction materials. It claimed that, without a corresponding increase in the fixed prices found in the agreements, it would be impossible for it to finish the construction of the Tektite Building. In their analysis of the project plans for the building and of all the external factors affecting the completion of the project, the parties discovered that even if LCDC were able to collect the entire balance from the contract, the collected amount would still be insufficient to purchase all the materials needed to complete the construction of the building.
Seeking to recover all the above-mentioned amounts, LCDC filed a Complaint with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment on 2 February 1996 before the RTC in Makati City docketed as Civil Case No. 96-160
ISSUE: Whether LCDC is liable for liquidated damages for delay in the construction of the buildings for PRHC.
HELD: NO
CIVIL LAW: Obligations and Contracts, Delay
There is no question that LCDC was not able to fully construct the Tektite Building and Projects 1, 2, and 3 on time. It reasons that it should not be made liable for liquidated damages, because its rightful and reasonable requests for time extension were denied by PRHC.
It is important to note that PRHC does not question the veracity of the factual representations of LCDC to justify the latters requests for extension of time. It insists, however, that in any event LCDC agreed to the limits of the time extensions it granted.
The practice of the parties is that each time LCDC requests for more time, an extension agreement is executed and signed by both parties to indicate their joint approval of the number of days of extension agreed upon.
As previously mentioned, LCDC sent a 9 December 1992 letter to PRHC claiming that, in a period of over two years, only 256 out of the 618 days of extension requested were considered. We disregard these numbers presented by LCDC because of its failure to present evidence to prove its allegation. The tally that we will acceptas reflected by the evidence submitted to the lower courtis as follows: out of the 564 days requested, only 237 were considered.
Essentially the same aforementioned reasons or causes are presented by LCDC as defense against liability for both Projects 1 and 2.
Inasmuch as LCDCs claimed exemption from liability are beyond the approved time extensions, LCDC, according to the majority of the CA, is liable therefor.
JusticeJuan Q. Enriquez, in his Dissenting Opinion, held that the reasons submitted by LCDC fell under the definition offorce majeure. This specific point was not refuted by the majority.
We agree with Justice Enriquez on this point and thereby disagree with the majority ruling of the CA.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides: "Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable." A perusal of the construction agreements shows that the parties never agreed to make LCDC liable even in cases offorce majeure. Neither was the assumption of risk required. Thus, in the occurrence of events that could not be foreseen, or though foreseen were inevitable, neither party should be held responsible.
Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, to exempt the obligor from liability for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God" orforce majeure, the following must concur:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
The shortage in supplies and cement may be characterized asforce majeure. In the present case, hardware stores did not have enough cement available in their supplies or stocks at the time of the construction in the 1990s. Likewise, typhoons, power failures and interruptions of water supply all clearly fall underforce majeure. Since LCDC could not possibly continue constructing the building under the circumstances prevailing, it cannot be held liable for any delay that resulted from the causes aforementioned.
Further, PRHC is barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from denying that it agreed, and even promised, to hold LCDC free and clear of any liquidated damages. Abcede and Santos also promised that the latter corporation would not be held liable for liquidated damages even for a single day of delay despite the non-approval of the requests for extension.
PETITION GRANTED.
PHILIPPINE REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
Ley Construction and Development Corporation(LCDC) was the project contractor for the construction of several buildings for Philippine Realty & Holdings Corporation (PRHC), the project owner. Engineer Dennis Abcede (Abcede) was the project construction manager of PRHC, while Joselito Santos (Santos) was its general manager and vice-president for operations.
Sometime between April 1988 and October 1989, the two corporations entered into four major construction projects, as evidenced by four duly notarized "construction agreements." LCDC committed itself to the construction of the buildings needed by PRHC, which in turn committed itself to pay the contract price agreed upon.
The agreement covering the construction of the Tektite Building was signed by a Mr. Campos under the words "Phil. Realty & Holdings Corp." and by Santos as a witness.Manuel Ley, the president of LCDC, signed under the words "Ley Const. & Dev. Corp."
The terms embodied in the afore-listed construction agreements were almost identical. Each agreement provided for a fixed price to be paid by PRHC for every project.
In the course of the construction of the Tektite Building, it became evident to both parties that LCDC would not be able to finish the project within the agreed period.Thus, through its president, LCDC met with Abcede to discuss the cause of the delay. LCDC explained that the unanticipated delay in construction was due mainly to the sudden, unexpected hike in the prices of cement and other construction materials. It claimed that, without a corresponding increase in the fixed prices found in the agreements, it would be impossible for it to finish the construction of the Tektite Building. In their analysis of the project plans for the building and of all the external factors affecting the completion of the project, the parties discovered that even if LCDC were able to collect the entire balance from the contract, the collected amount would still be insufficient to purchase all the materials needed to complete the construction of the building.
Seeking to recover all the above-mentioned amounts, LCDC filed a Complaint with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment on 2 February 1996 before the RTC in Makati City docketed as Civil Case No. 96-160
ISSUE: Whether LCDC is liable for liquidated damages for delay in the construction of the buildings for PRHC.
HELD: NO
CIVIL LAW: Obligations and Contracts, Delay
There is no question that LCDC was not able to fully construct the Tektite Building and Projects 1, 2, and 3 on time. It reasons that it should not be made liable for liquidated damages, because its rightful and reasonable requests for time extension were denied by PRHC.
It is important to note that PRHC does not question the veracity of the factual representations of LCDC to justify the latters requests for extension of time. It insists, however, that in any event LCDC agreed to the limits of the time extensions it granted.
The practice of the parties is that each time LCDC requests for more time, an extension agreement is executed and signed by both parties to indicate their joint approval of the number of days of extension agreed upon.
As previously mentioned, LCDC sent a 9 December 1992 letter to PRHC claiming that, in a period of over two years, only 256 out of the 618 days of extension requested were considered. We disregard these numbers presented by LCDC because of its failure to present evidence to prove its allegation. The tally that we will acceptas reflected by the evidence submitted to the lower courtis as follows: out of the 564 days requested, only 237 were considered.
Essentially the same aforementioned reasons or causes are presented by LCDC as defense against liability for both Projects 1 and 2.
Inasmuch as LCDCs claimed exemption from liability are beyond the approved time extensions, LCDC, according to the majority of the CA, is liable therefor.
JusticeJuan Q. Enriquez, in his Dissenting Opinion, held that the reasons submitted by LCDC fell under the definition offorce majeure. This specific point was not refuted by the majority.
We agree with Justice Enriquez on this point and thereby disagree with the majority ruling of the CA.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides: "Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable." A perusal of the construction agreements shows that the parties never agreed to make LCDC liable even in cases offorce majeure. Neither was the assumption of risk required. Thus, in the occurrence of events that could not be foreseen, or though foreseen were inevitable, neither party should be held responsible.
Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, to exempt the obligor from liability for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God" orforce majeure, the following must concur:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
The shortage in supplies and cement may be characterized asforce majeure. In the present case, hardware stores did not have enough cement available in their supplies or stocks at the time of the construction in the 1990s. Likewise, typhoons, power failures and interruptions of water supply all clearly fall underforce majeure. Since LCDC could not possibly continue constructing the building under the circumstances prevailing, it cannot be held liable for any delay that resulted from the causes aforementioned.
Further, PRHC is barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from denying that it agreed, and even promised, to hold LCDC free and clear of any liquidated damages. Abcede and Santos also promised that the latter corporation would not be held liable for liquidated damages even for a single day of delay despite the non-approval of the requests for extension.
PETITION GRANTED.
