Case Digest: Rom, et al. v. Roxas & Company, Inc.
G.R. No. 169331 : September 5, 2011
AGAPITO ROM, PASTORA P. ROSEL, VALENTINO R. ANILA, JUANITO P. ROSEL, VIRGILIO R. CASAL, LUIS H. BAUTISTA, CRESENCIANO M. ARGENTE, ANA M. ARGENTE, GIL B. CUENO, ENGRACIO B. BELTRAN, ANGELITO B. AURE, ESTEBAN C. BENDO, MARIA ALBAO, GILBERT H. DEL MUNDO, EUFRONIO H. DEL MUNDO, PASTOR H. DEL MUNDO, ANTONIO H. DEL MUNDO, ALBERTA H. DEL MUNDO, PEDRO H. DEL MUNDO, ROLANDO B. ATIE,Petitioners, v. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44664 from the coverage of CARP, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994. The application was docketed as DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98.
Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural land which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC [now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)]) under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983. Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands already classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use, which ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.
Considering that the application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance compensation, the DAR, through its Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-II), directed respondent to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights of bona fide occupants.
To comply with the directive, respondent offered payment of disturbance compensation and attempted to obtain the required waivers from herein petitioners who are the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject parcels of land as identified by the DAR. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement as regards the amount of disturbance compensation, hence, respondent filed on September 28, 2001 a Petition to fix disturbance compensation before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Batangas.
In its Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application.
From this Order, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Second Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Said motions, however, were dismissed by the DAR in an Order dated December 12, 2003.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
In a Decision dated April 29, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari it being an improper remedy. The CA held that petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Even if the certiorari petition is considered as properly filed, the CA ruled that it would still dismiss the same as there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DAR in issuing the assailed Orders.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the property is exempted from coverage of the CARL?
2. Whether or not the property can be exempted without payment of disturbance compensation?
3. Whether or not the remedy of appeal is available in the case?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
We note at the outset that this case is intimately related to Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, earlier resolved by this Court on December 17, 1999 and December 4, 2009, respectively. In fact, the present case is similar to one of the seven consolidated petitions in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, except that the parcels of land involved therein are located in Hacienda Palico, while here, they are situated in Hacienda Caylaway.
For purposes of discussion, a brief overview of said two cases is proper.
Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appealsinvolves three haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, namely, Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, owned by herein respondent Roxas & Company, Inc. At issue there was the validity of thehaciendas coverage under the CARP as well as Roxas application for their conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use. For failure to observe due process, the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were nullified. With respect, however, to the application for conversion, the Court held that DAR is in a better position to resolve the same, it being the primary agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. In its Decision dated December 17, 1999, this Court ordered the remand of the case to the DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of Roxass application for conversion.
Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, on the other hand, involved seven consolidated petitions, the main subjects of which were Roxas application for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use of said threehaciendas and exemption from CARP coverage. Apparently, after the remand of the case to the DAR in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and during the pendency of Roxas application for conversion, it likewise filed an application for exemption of the haciendas from the CARPs coverage on the basis of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994.
Two of the seven consolidated petitions relevant to the present case are G.R. Nos. 167505 and 179650. Both petitions revolved around Roxas application for exemption under DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994 invoking as basis the same (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 earlier alluded to. In resolving them, the Court recognized the power of a local government unit to classify and convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL and thus upheld the validity of said zoning ordinance. However, in G.R. No. 179650, the Court found that the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the application for exemption considering that there exist uncertainties on the location and identities of the properties being applied for exemption. It stated that Roxas should have submitted the comprehensive land use plan and pinpointed therein the location of the properties to prove that they are indeed within the area of coverage of the subject (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4.
With respect to G.R. No. 167505, we quote the pertinent portions of the Courts December 4, 2009 Decision:
On DAMBA-NSFWs petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, sustained, by Decision of December 20, 1994 and Resolution of May 7, 2007, the DAR Secretarys finding that Roxas & Co. had substantially complied with the prerequisites of DAR AO 6, Series of 1994. Hence, DAMBA-NFSWs petition in G.R. No. 167505.
The Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals assailed issuances, the orders of the DAR Secretary which it sustained being amply supported by evidence. In view of this, the Court ordered the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to farmer-beneficiaries of the nine parcels of land in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 subject of G.R. No. 167505, conditioned, however, on the satisfaction of the disturbance compensation of said farmer-beneficiaries pursuant to R. A. No. 3844, as amended and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994.
Remarkably, in its application for exemption in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this case, respondent submitted documents in support of its application for exemption similar to those submitted by it in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 subject of G.R. No. 167505. And, having established through said documents that the 27 parcels of land are within the coverage of the said (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, the DAR declared as well that respondent substantially complied with the requirements of DAR AO No. 6, series of 1994 in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98. The DAR thus granted the application in an Order of the same date and of exactly the same tenor as that issued in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98.
Given this backdrop, we are inclined to uphold the DARs November 6, 2002 Order which granted respondents application for exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this case. Aside from the fact that this Court in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW has already upheld the grant of a similar application which, notably, was supported by the same documents submitted in support of the application herein, our own review of the records of this case reveals that there was indeed no error on the part of the DAR in issuing said Order. The documents submitted by respondent to support its application for exemption as well as the Investigation Report of CLUPPI-II clearly show that the 27 parcels of land, specifically identified, were already re-classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL. "Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of x x x quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record."
On this ground alone we can already deny the petition. Nonetheless, we shall proceed to discuss the issues raised by petitioners.
REMEDIAL LAW: proper mode of appeal
"Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary." Hence here, petitioners should have assailed before the CA the November 6, 2002 and December 12, 2003 Orders of the DAR through a Petition for Review under Rule 43. "By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal."
Petitioners assert that a certiorari petition is the proper mode since what they principally questioned before the CA was the jurisdiction of the DAR to take cognizance of respondents application for exemption.
We are not persuaded. It bears stressing that it is the law which confers upon the DAR the jurisdiction over applications for exemption. And, "when a court, tribunal or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari." Besides, petitioners basis in claiming that the DAR has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondents application for exemption is gravely flawed. The submission of proof of payment of disturbance compensation is not jurisdictional as to deprive the DAR of the power to act on an application for exemption. To reiterate, jurisdiction over the subject of a case is conferred by law.
Also untenable is petitioners assertion that even assuming that a petition for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy, they are still entitled to the writ of certiorari. Petitioners posit that an exceptional circumstance in this case calls for the issuance of the writ, i.e., they stand to lose the land they till without receiving the appropriate disturbance compensation. It is well to remind petitioners, however, that the assailed November 6, 2002 Order of the DAR granting respondents application for exemption is subject to the payment of disturbance compensation to the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject parcels of land. Hence, petitioners fear that they will be deprived of the land they till without payment of disturbance compensation is totally without basis. There being no substantial wrong or substantial injustice to be prevented here, petitioners cannot therefore invoke the exception to the general rule that a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy.
Thus, we are totally in accord with the CAs finding that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy.
POLITICAL LAW: voluntary offer to sell
Indeed, respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell to the DAR Hacienda Caylaway, where the properties subject of this case are located. However, this offer to sell became irrelevant because respondent was later able to establish before the DAR that the subject 27 parcels of land were reclassified as non-agricultural (residential) by virtue of (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. "InNatalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR." This being the case, respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary offer to sell because the subject properties cannot be the subject of a VOS, they being clearly beyond the CARPs coverage.
POLITICAL LAW: requirements of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990.
Indeed, respondents application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance compensation or by petitioners waiver/undertaking that they will vacate the subject parcels of land whenever required. However, this Court finds that respondent has substantially complied with this requirement found under Section III (B) of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990.
Records show that upon being required by CLUPPI-II to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights of bona fide occupants after an evaluation of its application for exemption revealed that it was not accompanied by the same, respondent exerted efforts to comply with the said requirement. It offered to pay petitioners their disturbance compensation but they failed to agree on the price. Petitioners also refused to execute a waiver/ undertaking. Respondent thus filed a Petition to fix disturbance compensation before the PARAD. To prove these, it submitted to the DAR a (1) Certification dated September 10, 2001, issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that there was failure to reach an amicable settlement on the matter of disturbance compensation between the parties; and (2) copy of the Petition to fix disturbance compensation duly received by the PARAD on September 28, 2001. To us, these constitute substantial compliance with the said particular requirement of Section III (B), DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2002. At any rate, the lack of proof of such payment later proved to be of no consequence since the assailed November 6, 2002 Order of the DAR was nevertheless made subject to the condition of payment of disturbance compensation to petitioners. In fact, the Order likewise states that 10 days from such payment, proof of payment of disturbance compensation must be submitted to the DAR.
CIVIL LAW: estoppel
A careful review of the records reveals that petitioners raised the issues of respondents non-posting of bond pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 4.5 of DAR AO No. 4, Series of 2003 and its non-compliance with Section VIII thereof only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs assailed Decision. While petitioners themselves alleged that DAR AO No. 4, Series of 2003 was already in effect during the pendency of their Motions for Reconsideration before the DAR, there is no showing that they raised these points therein. "It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel." Thus, petitioners cannot now be allowed to challenge the assailed Orders of the DAR on grounds of technicalities belatedly raised as an afterthought.
The petition for review is DENIED.
AGAPITO ROM, PASTORA P. ROSEL, VALENTINO R. ANILA, JUANITO P. ROSEL, VIRGILIO R. CASAL, LUIS H. BAUTISTA, CRESENCIANO M. ARGENTE, ANA M. ARGENTE, GIL B. CUENO, ENGRACIO B. BELTRAN, ANGELITO B. AURE, ESTEBAN C. BENDO, MARIA ALBAO, GILBERT H. DEL MUNDO, EUFRONIO H. DEL MUNDO, PASTOR H. DEL MUNDO, ANTONIO H. DEL MUNDO, ALBERTA H. DEL MUNDO, PEDRO H. DEL MUNDO, ROLANDO B. ATIE,Petitioners, v. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44664 from the coverage of CARP, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994. The application was docketed as DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98.
Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural land which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC [now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)]) under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983. Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands already classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use, which ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.
Considering that the application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance compensation, the DAR, through its Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-II), directed respondent to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights of bona fide occupants.
To comply with the directive, respondent offered payment of disturbance compensation and attempted to obtain the required waivers from herein petitioners who are the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject parcels of land as identified by the DAR. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement as regards the amount of disturbance compensation, hence, respondent filed on September 28, 2001 a Petition to fix disturbance compensation before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Batangas.
In its Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application.
From this Order, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Second Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Said motions, however, were dismissed by the DAR in an Order dated December 12, 2003.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
In a Decision dated April 29, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari it being an improper remedy. The CA held that petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Even if the certiorari petition is considered as properly filed, the CA ruled that it would still dismiss the same as there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DAR in issuing the assailed Orders.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the property is exempted from coverage of the CARL?
2. Whether or not the property can be exempted without payment of disturbance compensation?
3. Whether or not the remedy of appeal is available in the case?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
We note at the outset that this case is intimately related to Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, earlier resolved by this Court on December 17, 1999 and December 4, 2009, respectively. In fact, the present case is similar to one of the seven consolidated petitions in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, except that the parcels of land involved therein are located in Hacienda Palico, while here, they are situated in Hacienda Caylaway.
For purposes of discussion, a brief overview of said two cases is proper.
Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appealsinvolves three haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, namely, Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, owned by herein respondent Roxas & Company, Inc. At issue there was the validity of thehaciendas coverage under the CARP as well as Roxas application for their conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use. For failure to observe due process, the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were nullified. With respect, however, to the application for conversion, the Court held that DAR is in a better position to resolve the same, it being the primary agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. In its Decision dated December 17, 1999, this Court ordered the remand of the case to the DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of Roxass application for conversion.
Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, on the other hand, involved seven consolidated petitions, the main subjects of which were Roxas application for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use of said threehaciendas and exemption from CARP coverage. Apparently, after the remand of the case to the DAR in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and during the pendency of Roxas application for conversion, it likewise filed an application for exemption of the haciendas from the CARPs coverage on the basis of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994.
Two of the seven consolidated petitions relevant to the present case are G.R. Nos. 167505 and 179650. Both petitions revolved around Roxas application for exemption under DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994 invoking as basis the same (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 earlier alluded to. In resolving them, the Court recognized the power of a local government unit to classify and convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL and thus upheld the validity of said zoning ordinance. However, in G.R. No. 179650, the Court found that the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the application for exemption considering that there exist uncertainties on the location and identities of the properties being applied for exemption. It stated that Roxas should have submitted the comprehensive land use plan and pinpointed therein the location of the properties to prove that they are indeed within the area of coverage of the subject (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4.
With respect to G.R. No. 167505, we quote the pertinent portions of the Courts December 4, 2009 Decision:
On DAMBA-NSFWs petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, sustained, by Decision of December 20, 1994 and Resolution of May 7, 2007, the DAR Secretarys finding that Roxas & Co. had substantially complied with the prerequisites of DAR AO 6, Series of 1994. Hence, DAMBA-NFSWs petition in G.R. No. 167505.
The Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals assailed issuances, the orders of the DAR Secretary which it sustained being amply supported by evidence. In view of this, the Court ordered the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to farmer-beneficiaries of the nine parcels of land in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 subject of G.R. No. 167505, conditioned, however, on the satisfaction of the disturbance compensation of said farmer-beneficiaries pursuant to R. A. No. 3844, as amended and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994.
Remarkably, in its application for exemption in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this case, respondent submitted documents in support of its application for exemption similar to those submitted by it in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 subject of G.R. No. 167505. And, having established through said documents that the 27 parcels of land are within the coverage of the said (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, the DAR declared as well that respondent substantially complied with the requirements of DAR AO No. 6, series of 1994 in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98. The DAR thus granted the application in an Order of the same date and of exactly the same tenor as that issued in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98.
Given this backdrop, we are inclined to uphold the DARs November 6, 2002 Order which granted respondents application for exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this case. Aside from the fact that this Court in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW has already upheld the grant of a similar application which, notably, was supported by the same documents submitted in support of the application herein, our own review of the records of this case reveals that there was indeed no error on the part of the DAR in issuing said Order. The documents submitted by respondent to support its application for exemption as well as the Investigation Report of CLUPPI-II clearly show that the 27 parcels of land, specifically identified, were already re-classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL. "Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of x x x quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record."
On this ground alone we can already deny the petition. Nonetheless, we shall proceed to discuss the issues raised by petitioners.
REMEDIAL LAW: proper mode of appeal
"Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary." Hence here, petitioners should have assailed before the CA the November 6, 2002 and December 12, 2003 Orders of the DAR through a Petition for Review under Rule 43. "By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal."
Petitioners assert that a certiorari petition is the proper mode since what they principally questioned before the CA was the jurisdiction of the DAR to take cognizance of respondents application for exemption.
We are not persuaded. It bears stressing that it is the law which confers upon the DAR the jurisdiction over applications for exemption. And, "when a court, tribunal or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari." Besides, petitioners basis in claiming that the DAR has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondents application for exemption is gravely flawed. The submission of proof of payment of disturbance compensation is not jurisdictional as to deprive the DAR of the power to act on an application for exemption. To reiterate, jurisdiction over the subject of a case is conferred by law.
Also untenable is petitioners assertion that even assuming that a petition for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy, they are still entitled to the writ of certiorari. Petitioners posit that an exceptional circumstance in this case calls for the issuance of the writ, i.e., they stand to lose the land they till without receiving the appropriate disturbance compensation. It is well to remind petitioners, however, that the assailed November 6, 2002 Order of the DAR granting respondents application for exemption is subject to the payment of disturbance compensation to the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject parcels of land. Hence, petitioners fear that they will be deprived of the land they till without payment of disturbance compensation is totally without basis. There being no substantial wrong or substantial injustice to be prevented here, petitioners cannot therefore invoke the exception to the general rule that a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy.
Thus, we are totally in accord with the CAs finding that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy.
POLITICAL LAW: voluntary offer to sell
Indeed, respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell to the DAR Hacienda Caylaway, where the properties subject of this case are located. However, this offer to sell became irrelevant because respondent was later able to establish before the DAR that the subject 27 parcels of land were reclassified as non-agricultural (residential) by virtue of (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. "InNatalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR." This being the case, respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary offer to sell because the subject properties cannot be the subject of a VOS, they being clearly beyond the CARPs coverage.
POLITICAL LAW: requirements of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990.
Indeed, respondents application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance compensation or by petitioners waiver/undertaking that they will vacate the subject parcels of land whenever required. However, this Court finds that respondent has substantially complied with this requirement found under Section III (B) of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990.
Records show that upon being required by CLUPPI-II to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights of bona fide occupants after an evaluation of its application for exemption revealed that it was not accompanied by the same, respondent exerted efforts to comply with the said requirement. It offered to pay petitioners their disturbance compensation but they failed to agree on the price. Petitioners also refused to execute a waiver/ undertaking. Respondent thus filed a Petition to fix disturbance compensation before the PARAD. To prove these, it submitted to the DAR a (1) Certification dated September 10, 2001, issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that there was failure to reach an amicable settlement on the matter of disturbance compensation between the parties; and (2) copy of the Petition to fix disturbance compensation duly received by the PARAD on September 28, 2001. To us, these constitute substantial compliance with the said particular requirement of Section III (B), DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2002. At any rate, the lack of proof of such payment later proved to be of no consequence since the assailed November 6, 2002 Order of the DAR was nevertheless made subject to the condition of payment of disturbance compensation to petitioners. In fact, the Order likewise states that 10 days from such payment, proof of payment of disturbance compensation must be submitted to the DAR.
CIVIL LAW: estoppel
A careful review of the records reveals that petitioners raised the issues of respondents non-posting of bond pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 4.5 of DAR AO No. 4, Series of 2003 and its non-compliance with Section VIII thereof only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs assailed Decision. While petitioners themselves alleged that DAR AO No. 4, Series of 2003 was already in effect during the pendency of their Motions for Reconsideration before the DAR, there is no showing that they raised these points therein. "It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel." Thus, petitioners cannot now be allowed to challenge the assailed Orders of the DAR on grounds of technicalities belatedly raised as an afterthought.
The petition for review is DENIED.
