Extension to file given to OSG (A.M. No. 99-2-03-SC)

[G.R. No. 191697, August 23, 2017]. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS AND ROLANDO ESGUERRA, RESPONDENTS.

This case originated from the controversy involving the agreement between the Government and PIATCO for the operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III under the Build- Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement. On November 26, 1998, the Government and PIATCO signed an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) that mainly dealt with the exclusivity of the franchise given to the concessionaire, and with the assignment by the concessionaire of its interest in the facility. In September 2002, employees of the airport service providers brought an action for prohibition in this Court (G.R. No. 155001 entitled Agan, Jr. et al. v. PIATCO, et al; and G.R. No. 155661 entitled Lopez, et al. v. PIATCO, et al.) seeking the nullification of the concession agreement, ARCA and its supplements. Several Congressmen also filed their own petition to seek the nullification of the contracts (G.R. No. 155547 entitled Baterina, et al. v. PIATCO, et al).

On May 5, 2003, the Court resolved G.R. No. 155001 entitled Agan, Jr. et al. v. PIATCO, et al.; and G.R. No. 155661 entitled Lopez, et al. v. PIATCO, et al. by declaring the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA, and their supplements null and void ab initio for being in violation of the Constitution, the laws on public bidding, and public policy.

On May 30, 2003, in the aftermath of the ruling in Agan, Jr., Atty. Jose Bernas, counsel of one of the petitioners in Agan, Jr., charged several officials of PIATCO with a violation of Article 186(1) of the Revised Penal Code (monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade) in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. In a resolution dated September 20, 2004, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the charge for insufficiency of evidence.

After Atty. Bernas moved for reconsideration, the Office of the City Prosecutor reversed itself on July 13, 2006, and filed an information for the violation of Article 186(1) of the Revised Penal Code in the Metropolitan Trial Court in Manila (MeTC). Aggrieved, some of the persons thus charged appealed the resolution of July 13, 2006 to the Department of Justice by petition for review. On September 11, 2006, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated July 13, 2006 of the Office of the City Prosecutor, and directed the withdrawal of the information.

Atty. Bernas moved for reconsideration, but the Secretary of Justice denied the motion for reconsideration on October 17, 2006.

Accordingly, Atty. Bernas filed a petition for certiorari on December 29, 2006 to assail the resolutions of September 11, 2006 and October 17, 2006 of the Secretary of Justice in the Court of Appeals (CA).

In the meanwhile, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed the motion to withdraw information dated October 27, 2006 in the MeTC, which granted the motion on December 5, 2006.

On December 28, 2006, Atty. Bernas sought the suspension of proceedings and the reconsideration of the order of December 5, 2006, praying that the MeTC hold the implementation of the order of December 5, 2006 in abeyance pending the promulgation of a ruling by the CA on his petition for certiorari. He argued that the MeTC had acted with undue haste in issuing the order of December 5, 2006; and insisted that the MeTC should have made its own independent assessment of the evidence instead of granting the motion for the withdrawal of the information.

On February 23, 2007, the MeTC denied the motion for suspension of Atty. Bernas.

On March 15, 2007, Atty. Bernas manifested his intention to appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by notice of appeal.

On January 29, 2009, the RTC reversed and set aside the orders of the MeTC dated December 5, 2006 and February 23, 2007.

On March 21, 2009, herein respondent Rolando Esguerra appealed by petition for review the RTC's decision dated January 29, 2009 to the CA.

On August 12, 2009, the CA directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition for review within 10 days from notice, or until August 30, 2009.

Due to the heavy workload of Associate Solicitor Salvador Poquiz, the handling lawyer, the OSG filed a motion for extension of 30 days from August 30, 2009, or until September 29, 2009, within which to file the comment.

The CA granted the motion for extension on October 1, 2009.

However, Associate Solicitor Poquiz filed another motion for extension of 30 days, or until October 29, 2009.

On October 29, 2009, the OSG filed a motion for extension of 10 days, or until November 8, 2009 within which to file the comment on the ground that revisions had to be made on the draft of the comment.

On November 6, 2009, the OSG filed a motion for extension of 15 days, or until November 23, 2009, stating that further study of the issues involved would be necessary to determine their possible consequences on similar and related cases currently pending before the courts.

On November 10, 2009, the case was reassigned to another solicitor, who was also constrained to request an additional period of 20 days, or until December 13, 2009, within which to file the comment.

The OSG finally filed the required comment on December 9, 2009 prior to its receipt on December 15, 2009 of the CA's resolution dated December 8, 2009 2 denying the motions for extension.

The OSG sought reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion for that purpose on February 4, 2010, viz.:
Consistent with the Resolution dated December 8, 2009, the OSG's motion for extension of twenty (20) days from November 23, 2009 or until December 13, 2009 within which to file comment is DENIED. The comment subsequently filed, with defective proof of service upon the other parties is EXPUNGED from the records. In view thereof, the OSG's Motion for Reconsideration (of the Resolution dated December 8, 2009) is likewise DENIED.
Hence, this recourse, in which the petitioners insist that:
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE COMMENT AND ORDERING THE COMMENT SUBSEQUENTLY FILED EXPUNGED FROM THE RECORD DESPITE VARIOUS JURISPRUDENCE UPHOLDING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE OVER PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITY.
The OSG pleads for the liberal application of the rules of procedure. It asserts that although it is aware of A.M. No. 99-2-03-SC that limits the OSG to an extension of 60 days within which to file its comment, and to an additional extension not exceeding 20 days if warranted by a compelling reason, it insists that the relaxation of the rules of procedure is warranted in order not to frustrate the ends of substantial justice. It urges that the strict application of the rules of procedure would result in a miscarriage of justice; and that the CA thus gravely abused its discretion in expunging the comment it ultimately filed, thereby turning a blind eye on its submissions without considering the importance of the issues.

The OSG prays for the nullification of the assailed resolutions of December 8, 2009 and February 4, 2010; and for the admission of the comment already filed in the case.

Responding, respondent Esguerra asserts that the CA correctly denied the OSG's third to fifth motions for extension of the time to file the comment.

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is lacking in merit.

First of all, the OSG contravened the rule enunciated in A.M. No. 99- 2-03-SC granting the OSG an extension of 60 days with a warning that no further extension shall be granted, unless there is a compelling reason that warrants a further extension, which in no case shall exceed 20 days. This rule takes into good account the heavy workload of the OSG but at the same time seeks to eliminate the practice of the OSG of requesting too many extensions of time which does not promote the objective of speedy justice.

As matters stood, the OSG, instead of having only 60 days to file the comment (plus 20 days if there is a compelling reason for a further extension), would actually enjoy 105 days for that purpose, the total period sought in its five requests for extension of time. Under such circumstances, the CA did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, by denying the motions for extension through its resolution dated December 8, 2009, and denying the OSG's motion for reconsideration later on.

Secondly, the OSG could not justifiably insist that the liberal application of the rules of procedure should be allowed by the CA. Such course of action would be encouraging a disobedience to the rules that have been designed to ensure the smooth administration of justice in the courts. Moreover, the OSG is reminded that lawyers should not test the limits of judicial permissiveness, but should comply with the rules first before seeking exceptions.

And, thirdly, as the respondent has pointed out, the petition for certiorari was already rendered moot by the OSG's filing of its memorandum in the CA wherein it incorporated all the arguments and stated all the positions it considered necessary to persuade the CA to its side. With the filing of the memorandum, there is nothing more to be gained by the OSG still insisting that the CA had gravely abused its discretion in denying the motions for extension to file the comment.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for its lack of merit, and for having been rendered moot and academic.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

[1] See 402 SCRA 612.

A.M. NO. 99-2-03-SC; February 9, 1999: The Court notes that in cases involving the State, the Office of the Solicitor General too often asks for several extensions of time to file Comment or Appellee's Brief. While the Court appreciates the heavy workload of the Office of the Solicitor General, nonetheless, the practice of praying for too many extensions of time to plead does not promote the objective of speedy justice. Accordingly, on its first motion for extension of time to file Comment or Appellee's' Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General shall forthwith be given an extension of sixty (60) days and ninety (90) days, respectively with a warning that no further extension shall be granted, unless compelling reason warrants a further extension, which shall in no case exceed twenty (20) days. In cases of extreme urgency, however, the period to plead that may be granted to the OSG can be shortened.