G.R. No. 239516, July 24, 2019

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 239516, July 24, 2019 ] XXX[1] VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] filed by petitioner XXX, from the Decision[3] dated November 2, 2017 and the Resolution[4] dated April 24, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38750. The CA affirmed with modifications the Joint Decision[5] dated March 14, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 2214-19 and 2215-19, convicting the petitioner with Violations of Sections 5(b) and 10(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, also known as the Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.

The Facts

On July 30, 2014, the petitioner was charged with violations of Sections 5(b) and 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 2214-19
Violation of Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610
(Acts of Lasciviousness)

That on or about August 2012 to December 2013, at xxxxxxxxxxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lustful desires, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mash the breast of [AAA]6 and insert his right hand inside her panty and caress her vagina, thereby subjecting said child to sexual abuse, without her consent, which acts degrade, debase and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of said child who is a minor being only fourteen (14) years of age at the time of the incident, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Criminal Case No. 2215-19
Violation of Section 10(a), R.A. No. 7610
(Other Acts of Child Abuse)

That on February 4, 2014 at xxxxxxxxxxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit the child [AAA] thereby inflicting upon her "Contusion hematoma zygoma left, Contusion lower lip, shoulder right" and needs medical attention of seven to nine (7-9) days, which acts were made in the presence of her teacher and are certainly degrading and demoralizing to the said child who is only fourteen (14) years of age at the time of the incident, thereby causing on her physical and psychological abuse which has adversely affected her growth and development.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Version of the Prosecution

AAA was only 14 years old when the incidents transpired. In 2006, AAA's mother left to work in Barcelona, Spain and she was left under the custody and care of her grandparents. In 2011, her grandparents migrated to the United States of America. As a result of this, she was left under the care and custody of her stepfather, the petitioner.[9]From August 2012 to December 2013, whenever the petitioner came home late at night, he would fondle AAA's breasts and insert his hand into her underwear.[10]

AAA did not tell her mother as she felt ashamed of herself. She was also shocked that the petitioner, who was her substitute parent and the person tasked to take care of her while her mother was away, was molesting her.[11]

On February 4, 2014, CCC, AAA's teacher, invited the petitioner and AAA to her house to discuss AAA's failure to follow the school's policy on the wearing of uniform.[12]

While at CCC's house, the petitioner, who seemed intoxicated, slapped AAA several times in front of CCC. As a result of this, AAA suffered from swollen cheeks and busted lips. When CCC brought AAA to the hospital for medical examination, AAA finally disclosed what the petitioner has been doing to her for months.[13]

Dr. Ricarte Caday, the physician who examined AAA, issued a medical certificate which stated that AAA suffered two injuries, namely, "contusion hematoma zygoma left" and "contusion lower lip, shoulder right." The medical certificate also explained the following: "the injuries could have been caused by punching or slapping." And these would normally take 7 to 9 days to heal.[14]

Version of the Defense

The petitioner denied the allegations hurled against him and claimed that it was impossible for him to have committed the lascivious acts because they were not the only ones sleeping in the room. According to him, his child and niece slept in the same bedroom. He likewise insisted that the charges against him were just figments of AAA's imagination and that the latter was motivated by vengeance because he met with AAA's grandmother and aunt at the barangay to transfer custody of AAA to them. That AAA's stubbornness, lesbianism and petty theft were starting to cause problems.[15]

In its Decision[16] dated March 14, 2016, the RTC found the petitioner guilty of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 2214-19, [petitioner] is hereby found guilty of Violating Section 5 (b) of [R.A. No.] 7610 and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and further to indemnify the minor AAA in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages.

Likewise, in Criminal Case No. 2215-19, [petitioner] is hereby found guilty of violating Section 10, [paragraph] (a) of [R.A. No.] 7610 and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and further to indemnify the minor AAA in the amount of P3 0,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[17] (Citation omitted)
Undeterred, the petitioner appealed before the CA. According to him, the trial court gravely erred when it rendered a judgment of conviction despite the insufficiency of evidence to overturn the presumption of his innocence.

In its assailed Decision,[18] dated November 2, 2017, the CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction for the offenses charged albeit with modification in that he was ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for every charge. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 14 March 2016 Joint Decision of the [RTC], First Judicial Region, Branch 19, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, in Criminal Case Nos. 2214-19 and 2215-19 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellant is also ORDERED to pay AAA exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each charge. All the monetary awards for damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[19] (Emphases in the original)
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in a Resolution[20] dated April 24, 2018, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by [petitioner] is DENIED. Our Decision dated November 2, 2017 STANDS.

SO ORDERED.[21] (Emphases in the original)
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioner's conviction for the offenses charged.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

First, the issue raised in this petition calls for an examination of the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court. As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition for review brought before this Court. Time and again, the Court has consistently declared that questions of facts are beyond the pale of a petition for review.[22]

Factual findings of the trial court, more so when affirmed by the appellate courts, are generally binding on this Court unless it is one of the recognized exceptions whereby the Court is allowed to entertain factual questions in a petition for review, to wit:
(1)
When the factual findings of the [CA] and the trial court are contradictory;
(2)
When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(3)
When the inference made by the [CA] from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4)
When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5)
When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6)
When the judgment of the [CA] is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7)
When the [CA] failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8)
When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and
(10)
When the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.[23]
None of the above-mentioned exceptions are present in this case so as to justify a reversal of the lower courts' findings.

Second, even if the Court were to rule on the factual matters discussed by the petitioner, it would still fail to outweigh the evidence presented by the prosecution. AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents, which gave rise to the charges, was clear, categorical and straightforward.

Third, the grounds relied upon by the petitioner to overturn the decision of the CA are insubstantial. The fact that there was no medical certificate to support the charges in Criminal Case No. 2214-19 (Violation of Section 5(b) of R.A No. 7610) is immaterial. The existence of a medical certificate to support the sexual charges is not an element of the crime. What is essential is that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the facts on record. The testimony of AAA clearly established the series of lascivious conducts committed by the petitioner, viz.:

Direct Testimony of AAA by OIC [Provincial] Pros. Calupig: x x x x
Q:
So when you sleep at night do you have any companion who sleeps with you?
A:
I have, sir.
Q:
Who?
A:
My stepfather, sir.
Q:
Madam Witness, you filed two (2) complaints against your stepfather, one which happened on August 2012 to December 2013 and that on February 4, 2014, now we go to the first complaint, Madam Witness, what happened on those days for the period of August 2012 to December 2013?
A:
He started fondling my breast and inserting his hand inside my panty when he came home late at night, sir.
Q:
So it was during nighttime?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Where was that, that those acts happened?
A:
In their house, sir.
Q:
What were you doing when he was doing the said acts to you?
A:
I would be sleeping, sir.
Q:
So when you were already sleeping and he came home late at night, is that what you mean to say?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Did you want those act that he was doing to you?
A:
No, sir.
Q:
What did you feel whenever he did those things to you?
A:
"Nandidiri ako".
Q:
Why did you feel like that?
A:
Because he is my stepfather and I never expected him to do that to me. (sic)[24]
The Court, in People of the Philippines v. Edwin Dagsa y Bantas,[25] discussed the concept of "lascivious conduct" as defined under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610. Citing Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,[26] it clarified that the phrase "other sexual abuse" also extends to children who are subjected to lascivious conduct through the coercion or intimidation by an adult, viz.:
As to the first element, paragraph (h), Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610 defines lascivious conduct as a crime committed through the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, among others. Records show that the prosecution duly established this element when the witnesses positively testified that accused-appellant fondled AAA's vagina sometime in October 2004.

The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. This second element requires evidence proving that: (a) AAA was either exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse; and (b) she is a child as defined under RA 7610.

In the case of Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained that the phrase, "other sexual abuse" in the above provision covers not only a child who is abused for profit, but also one who engages in lascivious conduct through the coercion or intimidation by an adult. In the latter case, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's will. Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As in the present case, it is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in the case of young, innocent and immature girls, like AAA, who could not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under the same circumstances or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.[27] (Citations omitted and emphases Ours)
Although AAA's testimony may have been marred by a number of inconsistencies as found by the lower court, these discrepancies refer only to minor details and collateral matters — not to the central fact of the crime. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses' declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. The Court held:
For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.[28]
As to the petitioner's contention that there were conflicting statements regarding the time when the sexual abuse commenced, the Court finds the same devoid of merit. It has been settled that time is not a determinant nor an element of a violation under R.A. No. 7610. Moreover, uniform behavior cannot and should not be expected from victims of rape or sexual abuse since personalities vary and others may find it more difficult to confront their abusers and relive the trauma by retelling their stories of abuse.

In People v. Villamor,[29] the Court held that silence and failure to shout do not impair the credibility of the victim, viz.:
The Court had consistently found that there is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. While there are some who may have found the courage early on to reveal the abuse they experienced, there are those who have opted to initially keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves and attempt to move on with their lives. This is because a rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. The perpetrator of the rape hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would numb his victim into silence and submissiveness. In fact, incestuous rape further magnifies this terror, for the perpetrator in these cases, such as the victim's father, is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Moreover, in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, magnifying the sense of helplessness and the degree of fear.[30]
The Court likewise affirms the conviction of the petitioner for violation of Section 10(a),[31] Article III of the same Act. The CA, in its assailed decision, correctly calibrated the evidence on record:
Appellant's act of slapping AAA, a minor, several times in front of CCC constitutes child abuse as it debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It is a form of physical abuse and cruelty. It is to be noted that at the time of the incident, appellant was thirty-four (34) years old while AAA was only fourteen (14) years old. Common sense and human experience would suggest that hitting or slapping a child on a sensitive part, such as the check and lips, would cause an extreme amount of pain, especially so if it was done several times, as in this case. Appellant used excessive force, otherwise, AAA would not have sustained contusions. Being slapped several times in front of another person is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age. Appellant, as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-control.

With respect to the discrepancy as to the time of the slapping incident and the actual time of medical examination raised by appellant, suffice it to state that the discrepancy does not constitute a serious error warranting the reversal of his conviction. The time of the slapping incident and the actual medical examination are not material ingredients of the charge of child abuse because the gravamen of this offense is the abuse, cruelty or exploitation of the child. The alleged discrepancy has no substantial bearing on the commission of the offense. Indeed, inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.[32]
The Court frowns upon denial and alibi as defenses of an accused in a criminal case. Unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim.[33] In general, a plea of denial and alibi is not given much weight relative to the affirmative testimony of the offended party.[34] The only exception to this rule is where there is no effective identification, or where the identification of the accused has been fatally fainted by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies.[35]

Finally, it is an oft-stated doctrine that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.[36]

In this regard, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in upholding the conviction of the petitioner for violations of Sections 5(b) and 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, but deems it proper to modify the amount of civil indemnity and damages awarded to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 2, 2017 and Resolution dated April 24, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38750, finding petitioner XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections 5(b) and 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that petitioner XXX is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay victim AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Petitioner XXX is likewise found GUILTY of violating Section 5(b) of the same Act and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay victim AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The total monetary award shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

The rest of the assailed decision stands.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

By:

(Sgd.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III
Deputy Division Clerk of Court



[1] At the victim's instance or, if the victim is a minor, that of his or her guardian, the complete name of the accused may be replaced by fictitious initials and his or her personal circumstances blotted out from the decision, resolution, or order if the name and personal circumstances of the accused may tend to establish or compromise the victims' identities, in accordance with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 (III [1][c]) dated September 5, 2017.

[2] Rollo, pp. 11-22.

[3] Penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez, with Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Ramon A. Cruz, concurring; id. at 26-41.

[4] Id. at 44-45.

[5] Rendered by Presiding Judge Rosemarie V. Ramos; CA rollo, pp. 45-64.
[6] The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious initial shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 [2006]) and the Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017.

[7] Rollo, p. 27.

[8] Id. at 27-28.

[9] Id. at 28.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 28-29.

[13] Id. at 29.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] CA rollo, pp. 45-64.

[17] Id. at 64.

[18] Rollo, pp. 26-41.

[19] Id. at 39.

[20] Id. at 44-45.

[21] Id. at 45.

[22] National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 479 Phil. 850, 865 (2009), citing Inland Trailways, Inc. v. CA, 325 Phil. 457, 461 (1996).

[23] Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 367 (2015).

[24] Rollo, p. 35.

[25] G.R. No. 2198889, January 29,2018.

[26] 503 Phil. 421 (2005).

[27] People of the Philippines v. Edwin Dagsa y Bantas, supra note 25.

[28] People v. Tubat, 680 Phil. 730, 738 (2012).

[29] 780 Phil. 817(2016).

[30] Id. at 830.

[31] Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

[32] Rollo, pp. 37-38.

[33] People v. Castillo, 641 Phil. 570, 590 (2010).

[34] People v. Rodrigo, 586 Phil. 515, 541 (2008).

[35] Id.

[36] People v. Cajurao, 465 Phil. 98, 107 (2004).