Judicial decisions vs. belligerent occupation
DURING BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE INVADER CONTINUE ITS FORCE AND EFFECT EVEN AFTER THE CESSATION OF INVASION. Suffice it to say that the provisions of the Hague Conventions which imposes upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure "I'ordre et la vie publice," that is, the public order and safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged. (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945)
This is the opinion of all writers on international law up to date, among them Wheaton (Vol. II, p. 236) and Oppenheim (Vol. II, p. 338) in their recently revised Treatises on International Law, edited in the year 1944, and the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, specially in the case of Dow vs. Johnson (106 U. S., 158), in which that Court said: "As a necessary consequence of such occupation and domination, the political relations of its people to their former government are, for the time being, severed. But for their protection and benefit, and the protection and benefit of others not in the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are generally allowed to continue in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals as they were administered before the occupation. They are considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent." (Dow vs. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158; 25 U. S. [Law, ed.], 632).
The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not, therefore, exempt him from complying with said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of the courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing as much harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory, and prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered and assist the conqueror or invader in realizing his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in penalizing the nationals of the occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression. (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945)
The Supreme Court has held that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, the Court did not deem it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation should be construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the minds of person interested in sustaining a contrary interpretation or construction, the High Court was constrained to say that the term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According to this maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meaning, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the world "processes" is associated. (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945)
As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights or persons and property and provide for the punishment of crimes, are good and valid even after occupation has ceased, although it is true that no crucial instances exist to show that, were they reversed or invalidated by the restored or legitimate government, international wrong would be committed, it is nonetheless true and evident that by such abrogation national wrong would be caused to the inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate government. According to the law of nations and Wheaton himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and after the occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been restored. As there are vested rights which have been acquired by the parties by virtue of such judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot reverse or abrogate them without causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such reversal would deprive them of their properties without due process of law. (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945)
This is the opinion of all writers on international law up to date, among them Wheaton (Vol. II, p. 236) and Oppenheim (Vol. II, p. 338) in their recently revised Treatises on International Law, edited in the year 1944, and the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, specially in the case of Dow vs. Johnson (106 U. S., 158), in which that Court said: "As a necessary consequence of such occupation and domination, the political relations of its people to their former government are, for the time being, severed. But for their protection and benefit, and the protection and benefit of others not in the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are generally allowed to continue in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals as they were administered before the occupation. They are considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent." (Dow vs. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158; 25 U. S. [Law, ed.], 632).
The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not, therefore, exempt him from complying with said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of the courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing as much harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory, and prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered and assist the conqueror or invader in realizing his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in penalizing the nationals of the occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression. (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945)
The Supreme Court has held that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, the Court did not deem it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation should be construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the minds of person interested in sustaining a contrary interpretation or construction, the High Court was constrained to say that the term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According to this maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meaning, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the world "processes" is associated. (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945)
As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights or persons and property and provide for the punishment of crimes, are good and valid even after occupation has ceased, although it is true that no crucial instances exist to show that, were they reversed or invalidated by the restored or legitimate government, international wrong would be committed, it is nonetheless true and evident that by such abrogation national wrong would be caused to the inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate government. According to the law of nations and Wheaton himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and after the occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been restored. As there are vested rights which have been acquired by the parties by virtue of such judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot reverse or abrogate them without causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such reversal would deprive them of their properties without due process of law. (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945)