PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

The answer is no.First of all, obligations arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts. (Article 1157, Civil Code of the Philippines) An obligation is the juridical necessity to do, to give or not to do. (Article 1156) What the above legal provisions mean is that a person can only be legally compelled to do or not to do something if law or contract provides. Non-compliance with law or valid contract can be a ground (cause of action) to go to court and have the erring person or party made liable. There is no law that compels any person to appear in "Tulfo in Action" or any other show for the purpose of extracting from her a statement relating to her side of a controversy. In fact, if a person threatens physical harm upon another or threatens that the latter's name or reputation will be besmirched or marred on television or on the Internet, the former may be held liable for a crime under Act No. 3815 (Revised Penal Code o

Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties.[1] In no equivocal terms did the fundamental law of the land prohibit the abridgement of the freedom of expression. Section 4, Article II of the 1987 Constitution expressly states: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. A fundamental part of this cherished freedom is the right to participate in electoral processes, which includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to express one's preference for a candidate or the right to influence others to vote or otherwise not vote for a particular candidate. The Supreme Court has always recognized that these expressions are basic and fundamental ri

For content-neutral regulations that affect free speech and expression, they should be tested or measured against the intermediate scrutiny, viz.: The regulation is within the constitutional power of the government; It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; Such governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of the free expression; and The incidental restriction on the alleged freedom of expression is no greater than (narrowly tailored with) what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest. (Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155, 195, 2008) The failure to meet the fourth criterion is fatal to the regulation's validity as even if it is within the Constitutional power of the government agency or instrumentality concerned and it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest which is unrelated to the suppression of speech, the regulation shall still be invalidated if

On grounds of violation of the freedom of speech, of expression, and of assembly; denial of substantive due process; violation of the equal protection clause; and violation of the territoriality principle in criminal cases, Loida Nicolas-Lewis (petitioner) seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 36.8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189, as amended by R.A. No. 10590 and Section 74(II)(8) of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 10035, which prohibit the engagement of any person in partisan political activities abroad during the 30-day overseas voting period. CASE DIGEST: [ G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019 ] LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. DECISION. REYES, J. JR., J.: FACTS:  On February 13, 2003, R.A. No. 9189, entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for other Purposes,"

For content-neutral regulations, they should be tested or measured against the intermediate scrutiny, viz.: The regulation is within the constitutional power of the government; It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest ; Such governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of the free expression ; and The incidental restriction on the alleged freedom of expression is no greater than ( narrowly tailored with) what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest. (Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155, 195, 2008)

Justice Marvic Mario Victor Famorca Leonen Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Bar Examination Chairperson, 2020/2021 Sir: Allow us to suggest a possible way to conduct the 2021 Bar examinations online. Before we begin, we would like to emphasize that our opinion has no bearing whatsoever in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power under the 1987 Constitution. The final say, of course, in crafting the rules to govern the admission to the practice of law and the conduct of the Bar examinations is the exclusive discretion of the Court. Our opinion is not controlling in any way, shape or form. The following suggestions are a humble attempt to participate in the public discussion on the best way the Supreme Court can administer the 2020/2021 Bar examinations while simultaneously complying with best medical practices and government regulations and while making sure the integrity of this century-old tradition remains intact. Examinees do not have to travel

The President was called the "guardian of the Philippine archipelago" in Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr. (G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016) The duty to protect the State and its people. must be carried out earnestly and effectively throughout the whole territory of the Philippines in accordance with the constitutional provision on national territory. Hence, the President of the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago, including all the islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it has sovereignty or jurisdiction. These territories consist of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains; including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas; and the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions. To carry out this important duty, the President is e

In the case of Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Lariosa and NLRC (G.R. No. L-70479, February 27, 1987), the "Notice of Decision" which the employee's lawyer received together with a copy of the labor arbiter's decision advised them that an appeal could be taken to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) within ten (10) "working" days from receipt of the said decision. The Supreme Court held that the 10-day period within which to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) consists of 10 calendar (not working) days. However, the High Court, exercising equity jurisdiction, decided to overlook this particular procedural lapse and to proceed with the resolution of the case. Article 223 of the Labor Code clearly provides for a reglementary period of ten (10) days within which the appeal of a decision of the Labor Arbiter should be brought to the NLRC. The ten-day period

The formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles: (a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources; (b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities; (c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from local funds shall be appointed or removed, according to merit and fitness, by the appropriate appointing authority; (d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out the

191 Phil. 479 FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. L-32116, April 21, 1981 ] RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. AND JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND MAXIMA CASTRO, RESPONDENTS. DECISION. DE CASTRO,* J.: This is a petition for review by way of certiorari of the decision [1]  of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 39760-R entitled "Maxima Castro, plaintiff-appellee, versus Severino Valencia, et al., defendants; Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr. and Arsenio Reyes, defendants-appellants," which affirmed  in   toto  the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in favor of plaintiff-appellee, the herein private respondent Maxima Castro. On December 7, 1959, respondent Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to the Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for an industrial loan. It was Severino Valencia who arranged everything about the loan with the bank and who supplied to the latter the personal data required for Castro's loan ap

The pretermission (exclusion from computation) of a holiday applies only to a period fixed by law or the Rules of Court, not to a date fixed by the Judge or a government officer . Thus, if a public sale or foreclosure is set by the sheriff for a certain day, and that day is declared a special public holiday, the next date of the sale cannot be the next day if the needed publication for the sale on that day has not been made. If, by the Rules of Court, a defendant should answer within 15 days, and the 15th day is declared a holiday, the last day for the answer will be the 16th day. But, if a Judge fixes a trial hearing for a certain day, and that day is declared a holiday, trial will not be on the following day. In the case of Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-32116, Apr. 21, 1981, the final issue raised was the validity or invalidity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at public auction of the mortgaged property that was held on April 11, 1961. Petition

[G.R. No. L-19823. August 31, 1962.] RUPERTO ADVINCULA and BRAULIO AVELINO, Petitioners, v. HON. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS and its Chairman THE HON. PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE SENATE; SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; HON. JUDICIAL SUPERINTENDENT, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; HON. JUDGE CESARIO GOLEZ; THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, Respondents. FACTS:  Under Sec. 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, approval of Presidential appointments may be reconsidered within ONE DAY after said approval. Approval of the appointment of a certain municipal judge was made Friday, Apr. 27, 1962. Reconsideration was asked on Monday, Apr. 30, 1962, on the theory that, under Rep. Act No. 1880, Saturday and Sunday are holidays. ISSUE:  Is this a correct interpretation of the provision? HELD: This is an internal business of the legislature (interpretation of its own rules) which CANNOT be made the subject of judicial inquiry.

CASE DIGEST: MARIANO S. GONZAGA, petitioner and appellee, v. AUGUSTO CE DAVID, as Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan, respondent and Appellant. [G.R. No. L-14858. December 29, 1960.] FACTS: August 31 was the usual last day for payment of registration fees but it was declared a special public holiday by Presidential Proclamation. Now then under the law, the last day for said payment was the last working day in August (ordinarily August 31) but because of the holiday, the last working day in August for the Motor Vehicles Office was on August 30. ISSUE: May the fees still be paid without penalty on Sep. 1? HELD: Yes. Since August 31 was declared a holiday, payment could still be made on the next day, under Sec. 31 of the Revised Adm. Code. The “last working day in August’’ for the general public in paying fees is NOT necessarily the same as the “last working day in August’’ for employees in the Motor Vehicles Office. MOTOR VEHICLE LAW

If the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, is the act due that day or the following day? This is an excerpt from Paras (2008). Paras says it depends. "In an ordinary contract, the general rule is that an act is due even if the last day be a Sunday or a legal holiday. Thus, a debt due on a Sunday must, in the absence of an agreement, be paid on that Sunday. [This is because obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. (Art. 1159, Civil Code).]. There are, of course, some exceptions, among them the maturity date of a negotiable instrument. "When the time refers to a period prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by an order of the court, or by any other applicable statute, if the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, it is understood that the last day should really be the next day, provided said day is neither a Sunday nor a legal holiday."

The Supreme Court, in the case of Caltex (Phil., Inc. v. Katipunan Labor Union, L-7496, Jan. 31, 1956) held that the petition is considered filed from the time of mailing. This is because the practice in our courts is to consider the mail as an agent of the government , so that the date of mailing has always been considered as the date of the filing of any petition, motion or paper.

In Gonzalo P. Nava v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-19470, Jan. 30, 1965, the Supreme Court held that, while there is a presumption that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of mail, still, there are two facts that must first be proved before the presumption can be availed of: (a) the letter must have been properly addressed with postage prepaid, and (b) the letter must have been mailed.

Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is filed by registered mail, then the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading. (Russel v. Ebasan, G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010) The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case. (Section 3

Justice Irene Cortes, who penned the Court’s decision in Marcos v. Manglapus, has opined elsewhere on the grant of plenary executive powers on the President, “[who] personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the executive branch absent from the two other branches of government. The president is not the chief of many executives. He is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more immediate and direct than the United States president because he is given by express provision of the constitution control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” (I. Cortes, The Philippine Presidency: A Study of Executive Power, pp. 68-69; cited in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary et al., G.R. Nos. 159086, 159103, 159185, 159196, 3 February 2004) The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three departments of the government in this manner: “The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a Ho

Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months , of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (New Civil Code of the Philippines) Section 31 of Chapter 8 of the Administrative Code of the 1987 (EO No. 297) states: " Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months. "  Since the Administrative Code took effect after  the New Civil Code, the later law prevails.  "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days t