PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. (Article 34, Civil Code) Article 34 lays down the availability of a separate and independent civil action against any member of a city or municipal police force who refuses or fails to air or protect in cases of danger to life or property. What makes this provision of law more powerful is the imposition of a subsidiary liability on the part of the city or municipality. Paras, however, explains: "Incidentally, this Article does not grant to the government the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the policemen."

In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Article 33, Civil Code) Article 33 speaks of separate and independent civil actions even if the basis of the liability is the the act or omission complained of as a crime as long as the case is one of defamation, fraud or physical injuries. The words "defamation," "fraud" and "physical injuries" are general terms which should be given their general meanings. For example, in Carandang v. Santiago, it was held that murder and homicide are within the term "physical injuries," the same way libel and slander are within "defamation" and the same way "fraud" is covered by estafa and other crimes involving fraud. The Supre

Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: Freedom of religion ; Freedom of speech ; Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention ; Freedom of suffrage ; The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; The right to the equal protection of the laws; The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures ; The liberty of abode and of changing the same; The privacy of communication and correspondence; The right

SECOND DIVISION  [ G.R. No. 180741, January 11, 2010 ]  JEREMIAS I. DOLINO V. BENJAMIN R. VILLANUEVA. In the absence of bad faith, malice or gross negligence, can a public officer be nonetheless held liable for nominal damages for incurring delay in the release of a seized vehicle to its owner? The Facts and the Case Respondent Benjamin R. Villanueva (Villanueva) owned a passenger jeepney that plied the Boljoon-Camprango-Dalayday route in Boljoon, Cebu. On July 31, 1993 police authorities stopped his jeepney because of the forest products loaded in it. When the owners of the products failed to present the proper clearance for transporting these products, the police authorities seized and impounded them together with the jeepney. These were later turned over to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) at Argao, Cebu. On August 20, 1993 police authorities charged the owners of the forest products before the Provincial Prosecutor'

CASE DIGEST: [ G.R. No. 69866, April 15, 1988 ] ROGELIO ABERCA, et al., PETITIONERS, VS. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, et al. YAP, J.: FACTS: Persons apprehended and imprisoned without charges during the Martial Law regime, upon their release after a new administration took over, filed suits for damages against General Fabian Ver and others who effected their arrest and detention. ISSUE: Are respondents immune from Article 32 as members of the armed forces merely doing their duty? HELD: Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. This is not to say that military author

[ NO RECOMMENDED CITATION ] PJP UNDOCKETED : This content is yet to be peer reviewed and has not yet received any favorable recommendation for citation. It may or may not be queued up for citation recommendation or peer review. Caution is advised. CONTACT US : For immediate action on requests, comments, concerns, suggestions, and other forms of feedback, please message us on Facebook at www.m.me/projectjuris . When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. (Article 31, Civil Code) This article refers to a civil action which is no longer based on the criminal liability of the defendant, but on an obligation arising from other sources, like law, contracts, quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts. Article 1157 must be recalled in stating: "Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-con

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of. (Article 30, Civil Code) Article 30 simply means that a civil action arising from crime can proceed as long as there is no pending criminal action for the same act or omission complained of as a crime. In such a case, only a preponderance of evidence is required in the civil action to prove entitlement to damages. However, if there is a pending criminal action for the same act or omission, the suspension of the civil action is government by Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It must be emphasized that Article 30 does not refer to separate and independent civil actions . Separate and independent civil actions can proceed despite the pendency of a criminal action for the same act or omission. W

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. (Paragraph 1, Article 29, Civil Code) If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. (Paragraph 2, Article 29, Civil Code) The law, via Article 29, allows a civil action to prosper even if the accused has been acquitted due to reasonable doubt. In other words, even if the prosecution fails to prove criminal liability beyond reasonable doubt,

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION in [ G.R. Nos. 213365-66, December 10, 2018 ] ASIA PACIFIC RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, LTD., PETITIONER, vs. PAPERONE, INC., RESPONDENT. LEONEN, J.: I concur in the result. Respondent should be liable for unfair competition under Section 168 [1]  of Republic Act No. 8293, or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. I agree that we should base our decision in this case on present jurisprudence. This means, generally, that there are two types of confusion with trademarks and trade names: confusion of goods and confusion of business. A finding of confusion is highly fact-specific based on the circumstances of the case. [2]  In  Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Court of Appeals : [3] The likelihood of confusion of goods or business is a relative concept, to be determined only according to the particular, and sometimes peculiar, circumstances of each case. Indeed, in trademark law cases, even more than in oth

Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage. (Article 28 of the Civil Code) Article 28 is the counterpart of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code (Act 3815). The latter punished "unfair competition, fraudulent registration of trade-mark, trade-name or service mark, fraudulent designation of origin, and false description." Article 189 punishes: Any person who, in unfair competition and for the purposes of deceiving or defrauding another of his legitimate trade or the public in general, shall sell his goods giving them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves, or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained or the device or words the

CASE DIGEST: [ G.R. No. 86683, January 21, 1993 ] PHILIP S. YU, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF MANILA, BRANCH XXXIV (34) AND UNISIA MERCHANDISING CO., INC., RESPONDENTS. FACTS: Petitioner, the exclusive distributor of the House of Mayfair wallcovering products in the Philippines, cried foul when his former dealer of the same goods, herein private respondent, purchased the merchandise from the House of Mayfair in England thru FNF Trading in West Germany and sold said merchandise in the Philippines. Both the court of origin and the appellate court rejected petitioner’s thesis that private respondent was engaged in a sinister form of unfair competition within the context of Art. 28 of the Civil Code. In the suit for injunction which petitioner filed before the RTC of the National Capital Region stationed in Manila, petitioner pressed the idea that he was practically by-passed and, that private respon

Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the case raised in CASTEA v. Province of Camarines ( G.R. No. 199666, October 07, 2019 ) Sur involves the correct interpretation and application of the following provision of the Deed of Donation Inter-Vivos  dated September 28, 1966 (the Deed of Donation): That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above described portion of the land subject of the present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or [e]ncumber the property herein donat