G.R. No. 211861, July 31, 2019
THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 211861, July 31, 2019 ] REX G. RICO, PETITIONER V.
MARCIANA Q. DEGUMA, RESPONDENT.
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] assailing the January 6, 2014
Decision[2] and March 24, 2014
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93410.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's March 12, 2009
Decision[4] denying Rex G. Rico's (Rico) Complaint for damages
under Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code.
Rico was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 299, entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Leah Valencia and Venus Valencia," for violation of the Philippine Highway Act of 1953. The case was raffled to Branch 1 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, presided by Judge Mareiana Q. Deguma (Judge Deguma).[5]
During the proceedings, accused Leah and Venus Valencia filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which was submitted for resolution on May 27, 2003. Rico repeatedly followed up on its resolution, but the Demurrer remained unresolved for two (2) years.[6]
About two (2) years later, on February 14, 2005, Judge Deguma issued an Order denying the Demurrer to Evidence.[7]
A week later, on February 21, 2005, Rico filed before the Office of the Court Administrator an Administrative Complaint[8] against Judge Deguma, alleging gross inefficiency and serious misconduct for deliberately failing to resolve the Demurrer within the 90-day period under Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution.[9] Following this, Rico wrote Judge Deguma, requesting her to inhibit from the criminal case in light of the administrative case he had filed against her.[10]
Believing that Judge Deguma ignored the request, Rico filed a Motion to Recuse, citing the criminal case he filed and the judge's close relationship with a sibling of one (1) of the accused. He then filed another Motion requiring the receiving clerk to explain why his request supposedly failed to reach the judge. When both these pleadings remained unresolved, Rico filed a Supplemental Complaint before the Office of Court Administrator.[11]
Additionally, Rico filed a second supplement to the Administrative Complaint, alleging that Judge Deguma violated Rule 20, Section 2 of the Rules of Summary Procedure and Rule 30, Section 2 of the Rules of Court when she postponed a series of hearings in Criminal Case No. 299 for around three (3) months.[12]
Then, on January 13, 2006, Rico filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196, Paranaque City a Complaint for damages against Judge Deguma.[13] Rico alleged that the judge maliciously delayed the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence and persistently refused resolving the two (2) other motions,[14] violating Articles 27,15 32(8), and 32(19)16 of the Civil Code and Article 207[17] of the Revised Penal Code.[18] Further, Rico claimed that his right to information was violated when his request for copies of the records in the criminal case was denied.[19] He invoked Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution, Rule 135, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, and Rule IV, Section 6 and Rule XI, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[20]
In her Answer, Judge Deguma justified the delay in resolving the motions. She asserted that when the Demurrer to Evidence was submitted for resolution in May 2003, she had just been appointed as a new judge who inherited the docket of her predecessor, the presiding iudge on the Demurrer then.[21] She added that she began actual trial work on August 4, 2003, and "if ever there was delay, it was not deliberately done and there was no malice or bad faith on [her] part[.]"[22]
As this case was pending, the Administrative Complaint for gross inefficiency and serious misconduct was resolved. In its September 11,
2006 Resolution, this Court reprimanded Judge Deguma, sternly warning her that a similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.[23]
When Rico filed another Administrative Complaint dated January 12, 2007 against Judge Deguma, this time alleging that she denied his right to access the criminal case records,[24] this Court dismissed it. In its September 12, 2007 Resolution,[25] this Court found that Rico was not entitled to secure their copies since he did not state his request's purpose.[26] It also noted that as a private complainant in the criminal case, Rico was presumed to have long secured copies of the records.[27]
On March 12, 2009, the Regional Trial Court issued a Decision[28] dismissing the civil case against Judge Deguma:
Moreover, the trial court noted that since Judge Deguma was using the case records at the time they were requested, she did not act with malice and bad faith in declining Rico access to them. The trial court highlighted that even this Court, in its Resolution of the second Administrative Complaint, found that Judge Deguma reasonably refused to provide Rico with copies since he did not state his request's purpose.[32]
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its January 6, 2014 Decision [33] affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision:
The Court of Appeals also ruled that Judge Deguma's denial of the Motion to Recuse was an exercise of her discretion and it was not shown that she was favoring any party.[37] As to the denial of access to case records, it found her reason for denying Rico's request to be understandable, ruling that Rico was not absolutely denied access to the records at any other time.
It stated that the constitutional right to access public records is not absolute, and is within the court's power and discretion to regulate.[38]
Rico filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this Motion was denied in the Court of Appeals' March 24, 2014 Resolution.[39]
On May 16, 2014, Rico filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.[40]
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring malice or bad faith for one to be held liable under Article 27 of the Civil Code. He says that negligence is enough to hold someone liable under the provision.[41]
Petitioner explains that there are two (2) ways of violating Article 27: (1) by refusing; and/or (2) neglecting to perform an official duty. The first is committed deliberately, while the second act may be committed by omission or nonfeasance. He argues that malice or bad faith is not required in neglecting performance of a duty because once there is malice or bad faith, it already becomes intentional refusal.[42]
Petitioner points out that respondent was negligent in delaying the resolution of: (1) the Demurrer to Evidence by two (2) years; (2) the other motions by a year; and (3) the Decision in the criminal case by almost four (4) years.[43]
Expounding on this point, petitioner asserts that respondent is guilty of negligence per se because her delay resulted in violation of Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code, Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution, the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and the Rules on Summary Procedure. He argues that negligence per se need not be proved because it is a form of negligence that results from violating a statute. Hence, once refusal or neglect is shown, the public officers or employees have the burden to prove that their refusal or neglect was for a just cause.[44]
Assuming that malice or bad faith is required for one to be liable under Article 27, petitioner insists that respondent acted with malice and bad faith. He points out that respondent ignored petitioner's follow-ups on the Demurrer to Evidence's resolution, and that respondent was reprimanded and sternly warned in the Administrative Complaint for her inexcusable and unreasonable delay in resolving the criminal case and the motions. Petitioner also alleges that respondent lied about not receiving his letter requesting her to inhibit from the case. He suggests that these incidents are sufficient proof of respondent's malice and bad faith.[45]
Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent's failure to decide a case within 90 days, as mandated by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution,[46] constitutes gross inefficiency and neglect of duty.[47] He questions how respondent was able to resolve 1,071 cases in 19 months but failed to resolve a mere demurrer for two (2) years.[48] For petitioner, this proves that respondent intentionally singled out his case.[49]
Petitioner also maintains that respondent acted with malice and bad faith in denying his request to access the court records.[50] He contends that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on respondent's justification that she was working on the case at the time of his request. Claiming that this excuse is anomalous, he explained that the accused in the criminal case had yet to present their evidence when he requested the records, which makes it impossible for respondent to already be drafting a decision.[51]
Petitioner prays for the award of P330,000.00 as actual damages and P700,000.00 as moral, exemplary, temperate, and nominal damages, as well as the costs of suit.[52] He reasons that he incurred expenses for the docket fees, gasoline expenses, as well as income lost from having to devote time for the civil case.[53]
In her Comment,[54] respondent argues that the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that she did not act with bad faith or malice in the unintentional delay.[55]
-
Respondent alleges that petitioner had filed other cases against her— for violation of Article 207 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 6713—which were dismissed, and later denied with finality by this Court, for his failure to establish malice, bad faith, or bias on her part.[56]
Respondent also refutes the allegation that she singled out petitioner's case. She maintained that her overwhelming docket of 1,664 cases led her to unintentionally fail to resolve the Demurrer to Evidence.[57]
Respondent further claims that she has never denied receiving petitioner's request for the Demurrer's resolution. She also insists that she resolved the Demurrer without knowing that petitioner would file the Administrative Complaint against her a week later.[58]
Refuting petitioner's allegation that she was close with one (1) of the accused in Criminal Case No. 299, respondent notes that Rebecca Benuesa (Benuesa), a sibling of one (1) of the accused and a stenographer in an Iloilo City court, even refuted petitioner's claim. She cites Benuesa's testimony in the civil case proceedings, where she said that respondent is not her friend, and that she only knew her from having worked in the same building as respondent.[59]
Further, respondent argues that her denial of petitioner's request to access the court records is not tainted with malice or bad faith.[60] She points out that even this Court dismissed his Administrative Complaint[61] after finding no malice or bad faith in her declining access to the records, considering her immediate need to go over the case. She reiterates that, as established in the civil case, respondent denied petitioner's request because a lot of notes were already clipped to the record, which she cannot detach and attach again after petitioner returns the record.[62]
As to petitioner's prayer for damages, respondent argues that since he failed to produce competent proof, the claim for damages should be denied.[63]
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not respondent Judge Marciana Q. Deguma should be held liable for damages under Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code.
I
Article 27 of the Civil Code provides:
In Tuzon v. Court of Appeals,[67] this Court observed that Article 27 covers incidents where public officers delay or refuse to perform their duty so a bribe will be eventually offered to compel them to act. Inaction may also be due to "plain indolence or a cynical indifference"[68] to their responsibilities as a public servant. In these cases, Article 27 serves to punish the erring public officials "for whatever loss or damage the complainant has sustained."[69]
For public officers to violate Article 27, their refusal or negligence must be without just cause.
In Zulueta v. Nicolas, [70] this Court ruled that if a fiscal refuses to prosecute after not finding sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, such refusal is not without just case, and therefore, not actionable under Article 27.[71] This Court further discussed that there is just cause because the fiscal is vested with authority and discretion to determine whether there is a prima facie case, and he cannot be subjected to the orders of the complainant.[72]
The application of this provision was further defined in Torio v. Fontanilla.[73] There, this Court clarified that Article 2,7 only covers "case[s] of non-feasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty."[74] The article "does not apply to [cases] of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty."[75]
On the other hand, Article 32 of the Civil Code states:
In Lim v. De Leon:[78]
I (A)
Article 27 of the Civil Code only covers acts amounting to nonfeasance, or the non-performance of a public duty. The alleged infractions of respondent are not actionable under this provision.
Petitioner anchors his claim on three (3) grounds: (1) respondent was negligent in delaying the resolution of the incidents in the criminal case; (2) she violated his constitutional right to access public records; and (3) she should have inhibited from the criminal case.
The first incident ascribes negligence to respondent, which is not actionable under Article 27. In this instance, petitioner does not claim that respondent absolutely did not act on the motions. As correctly ruled by the trial court, there is no nonfeasance since the alleged delay has been obviated by respondent's resolution of the motions.
Moreover, respondent has sufficiently justified her delay in resolving the incidents. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals noted that respondent was not yet the presiding judge at the time the Demurrer to Evidence was filed; moreover, as a newly appointed judge, she had to study all the cases in her docket while attending trainings.
Furthermore, respondent cannot be held liable for denying petitioner's request to access case records since such denial was justified. Respondent reasoned the she denied the request because she was using the records, with her personal notes attached. Moreover, as this Court noted in the Resolution of the Administrative Complaint, the request's denial is justified because: (1) petitioner did not state his request's purpose; and (2) as the private complainant in the criminal case, he should already have had a copy of the records he was requesting.
On the last incident, respondent has the discretion on whether to inhibit from the criminal case. Besides, petitioner's allegation that she was biased in the accused's favor cannot stand: respondent's supposedly close relationship with the accused's sibling was not proven since Benuesa testified that she only recognized respondent because they used to work in the same building.
All these show that the infractions respondent supposedly committed are not actionable under Article 27 of the Civil Code. Quite the contrary, the records show that respondent's actions, while they may have resulted in delays, were justified and reasonable.
I (B)
Similarly, respondent is exempt from liability under Article 32, being a judge who acted in the exercise of her judicial functions and within the bounds of her jurisdiction. Her actions do not violate any penal statute.
Petitioner alleges that respondent violated Rule VI, Section 6 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Republic Act No. 6713, which provides:
Nevertheless, even if Article 32 did apply in this case, the Petition must still fail because petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated. To reiterate, the right to information and access to public records is not absolute, but is subject to the court's regulation and discretion. Besides, as this Court noted in its Resolution, it is not shown how petitioner was denied access to the records, considering that as a private complainant in the criminal case, he must have been sent copies of these records.
There being no cause of action under Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code, petitioner is not entitled to the award of damages.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The January 6, 2014 Decision and March 24, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CY No. 93410 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] assailing the January 6, 2014
Decision[2] and March 24, 2014
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93410.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's March 12, 2009
Decision[4] denying Rex G. Rico's (Rico) Complaint for damages
under Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code.
Rico was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 299, entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Leah Valencia and Venus Valencia," for violation of the Philippine Highway Act of 1953. The case was raffled to Branch 1 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, presided by Judge Mareiana Q. Deguma (Judge Deguma).[5]
During the proceedings, accused Leah and Venus Valencia filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which was submitted for resolution on May 27, 2003. Rico repeatedly followed up on its resolution, but the Demurrer remained unresolved for two (2) years.[6]
About two (2) years later, on February 14, 2005, Judge Deguma issued an Order denying the Demurrer to Evidence.[7]
A week later, on February 21, 2005, Rico filed before the Office of the Court Administrator an Administrative Complaint[8] against Judge Deguma, alleging gross inefficiency and serious misconduct for deliberately failing to resolve the Demurrer within the 90-day period under Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution.[9] Following this, Rico wrote Judge Deguma, requesting her to inhibit from the criminal case in light of the administrative case he had filed against her.[10]
Believing that Judge Deguma ignored the request, Rico filed a Motion to Recuse, citing the criminal case he filed and the judge's close relationship with a sibling of one (1) of the accused. He then filed another Motion requiring the receiving clerk to explain why his request supposedly failed to reach the judge. When both these pleadings remained unresolved, Rico filed a Supplemental Complaint before the Office of Court Administrator.[11]
Additionally, Rico filed a second supplement to the Administrative Complaint, alleging that Judge Deguma violated Rule 20, Section 2 of the Rules of Summary Procedure and Rule 30, Section 2 of the Rules of Court when she postponed a series of hearings in Criminal Case No. 299 for around three (3) months.[12]
Then, on January 13, 2006, Rico filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196, Paranaque City a Complaint for damages against Judge Deguma.[13] Rico alleged that the judge maliciously delayed the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence and persistently refused resolving the two (2) other motions,[14] violating Articles 27,15 32(8), and 32(19)16 of the Civil Code and Article 207[17] of the Revised Penal Code.[18] Further, Rico claimed that his right to information was violated when his request for copies of the records in the criminal case was denied.[19] He invoked Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution, Rule 135, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, and Rule IV, Section 6 and Rule XI, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[20]
In her Answer, Judge Deguma justified the delay in resolving the motions. She asserted that when the Demurrer to Evidence was submitted for resolution in May 2003, she had just been appointed as a new judge who inherited the docket of her predecessor, the presiding iudge on the Demurrer then.[21] She added that she began actual trial work on August 4, 2003, and "if ever there was delay, it was not deliberately done and there was no malice or bad faith on [her] part[.]"[22]
As this case was pending, the Administrative Complaint for gross inefficiency and serious misconduct was resolved. In its September 11,
2006 Resolution, this Court reprimanded Judge Deguma, sternly warning her that a similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.[23]
When Rico filed another Administrative Complaint dated January 12, 2007 against Judge Deguma, this time alleging that she denied his right to access the criminal case records,[24] this Court dismissed it. In its September 12, 2007 Resolution,[25] this Court found that Rico was not entitled to secure their copies since he did not state his request's purpose.[26] It also noted that as a private complainant in the criminal case, Rico was presumed to have long secured copies of the records.[27]
On March 12, 2009, the Regional Trial Court issued a Decision[28] dismissing the civil case against Judge Deguma:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint dated December 29, 2005 and the Second Supplemental Complaint dated January 12, 2007 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and, defendant's Counterclaim in her Answer dated March 7, 2006 is DENIED for lack of merit.The trial court found that Rico had no cause of action under Article 27 of the Civil Code, explaining that Judge Deguma's resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence obviated the delay and belied her "continuing refusal or indifference"[30] to resolve the case. It also ruled that Rico had no right to damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code, as this provision expressly precludes a demand for damages arising from a judge's act or omission.[31]
SO ORDERED.[29]
Moreover, the trial court noted that since Judge Deguma was using the case records at the time they were requested, she did not act with malice and bad faith in declining Rico access to them. The trial court highlighted that even this Court, in its Resolution of the second Administrative Complaint, found that Judge Deguma reasonably refused to provide Rico with copies since he did not state his request's purpose.[32]
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its January 6, 2014 Decision [33] affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision:
WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated March 12, 2009 is affirmed.The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Deguma could not be held liable as there was no showing that she acted "fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance."[35] It accepted the judge's justification for the delay in resolving the motions—particularly that she was a newly appointed judge when the Demurrer to Evidence was filed, so it took her time to study the cases alongside her trainings and caseload.[36]
SO ORDERED.[34] (Emphasis in the original)
The Court of Appeals also ruled that Judge Deguma's denial of the Motion to Recuse was an exercise of her discretion and it was not shown that she was favoring any party.[37] As to the denial of access to case records, it found her reason for denying Rico's request to be understandable, ruling that Rico was not absolutely denied access to the records at any other time.
It stated that the constitutional right to access public records is not absolute, and is within the court's power and discretion to regulate.[38]
Rico filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this Motion was denied in the Court of Appeals' March 24, 2014 Resolution.[39]
On May 16, 2014, Rico filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.[40]
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring malice or bad faith for one to be held liable under Article 27 of the Civil Code. He says that negligence is enough to hold someone liable under the provision.[41]
Petitioner explains that there are two (2) ways of violating Article 27: (1) by refusing; and/or (2) neglecting to perform an official duty. The first is committed deliberately, while the second act may be committed by omission or nonfeasance. He argues that malice or bad faith is not required in neglecting performance of a duty because once there is malice or bad faith, it already becomes intentional refusal.[42]
Petitioner points out that respondent was negligent in delaying the resolution of: (1) the Demurrer to Evidence by two (2) years; (2) the other motions by a year; and (3) the Decision in the criminal case by almost four (4) years.[43]
Expounding on this point, petitioner asserts that respondent is guilty of negligence per se because her delay resulted in violation of Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code, Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution, the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and the Rules on Summary Procedure. He argues that negligence per se need not be proved because it is a form of negligence that results from violating a statute. Hence, once refusal or neglect is shown, the public officers or employees have the burden to prove that their refusal or neglect was for a just cause.[44]
Assuming that malice or bad faith is required for one to be liable under Article 27, petitioner insists that respondent acted with malice and bad faith. He points out that respondent ignored petitioner's follow-ups on the Demurrer to Evidence's resolution, and that respondent was reprimanded and sternly warned in the Administrative Complaint for her inexcusable and unreasonable delay in resolving the criminal case and the motions. Petitioner also alleges that respondent lied about not receiving his letter requesting her to inhibit from the case. He suggests that these incidents are sufficient proof of respondent's malice and bad faith.[45]
Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent's failure to decide a case within 90 days, as mandated by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution,[46] constitutes gross inefficiency and neglect of duty.[47] He questions how respondent was able to resolve 1,071 cases in 19 months but failed to resolve a mere demurrer for two (2) years.[48] For petitioner, this proves that respondent intentionally singled out his case.[49]
Petitioner also maintains that respondent acted with malice and bad faith in denying his request to access the court records.[50] He contends that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on respondent's justification that she was working on the case at the time of his request. Claiming that this excuse is anomalous, he explained that the accused in the criminal case had yet to present their evidence when he requested the records, which makes it impossible for respondent to already be drafting a decision.[51]
Petitioner prays for the award of P330,000.00 as actual damages and P700,000.00 as moral, exemplary, temperate, and nominal damages, as well as the costs of suit.[52] He reasons that he incurred expenses for the docket fees, gasoline expenses, as well as income lost from having to devote time for the civil case.[53]
In her Comment,[54] respondent argues that the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that she did not act with bad faith or malice in the unintentional delay.[55]
-
Respondent alleges that petitioner had filed other cases against her— for violation of Article 207 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 6713—which were dismissed, and later denied with finality by this Court, for his failure to establish malice, bad faith, or bias on her part.[56]
Respondent also refutes the allegation that she singled out petitioner's case. She maintained that her overwhelming docket of 1,664 cases led her to unintentionally fail to resolve the Demurrer to Evidence.[57]
Respondent further claims that she has never denied receiving petitioner's request for the Demurrer's resolution. She also insists that she resolved the Demurrer without knowing that petitioner would file the Administrative Complaint against her a week later.[58]
Refuting petitioner's allegation that she was close with one (1) of the accused in Criminal Case No. 299, respondent notes that Rebecca Benuesa (Benuesa), a sibling of one (1) of the accused and a stenographer in an Iloilo City court, even refuted petitioner's claim. She cites Benuesa's testimony in the civil case proceedings, where she said that respondent is not her friend, and that she only knew her from having worked in the same building as respondent.[59]
Further, respondent argues that her denial of petitioner's request to access the court records is not tainted with malice or bad faith.[60] She points out that even this Court dismissed his Administrative Complaint[61] after finding no malice or bad faith in her declining access to the records, considering her immediate need to go over the case. She reiterates that, as established in the civil case, respondent denied petitioner's request because a lot of notes were already clipped to the record, which she cannot detach and attach again after petitioner returns the record.[62]
As to petitioner's prayer for damages, respondent argues that since he failed to produce competent proof, the claim for damages should be denied.[63]
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not respondent Judge Marciana Q. Deguma should be held liable for damages under Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code.
Article 27 of the Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.In Philippine Match Company, Ltd. v. City of Cebu,[64] this Court pronounced that, as a rule, public officers are not personally liable to the injuries caused by "an act performed within the scope of [their] official authority, and in the line of [their] official duty."[65] Nevertheless, if there is a refusal or omission on their part, which is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence, they are liable for damages.[66]
In Tuzon v. Court of Appeals,[67] this Court observed that Article 27 covers incidents where public officers delay or refuse to perform their duty so a bribe will be eventually offered to compel them to act. Inaction may also be due to "plain indolence or a cynical indifference"[68] to their responsibilities as a public servant. In these cases, Article 27 serves to punish the erring public officials "for whatever loss or damage the complainant has sustained."[69]
For public officers to violate Article 27, their refusal or negligence must be without just cause.
In Zulueta v. Nicolas, [70] this Court ruled that if a fiscal refuses to prosecute after not finding sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, such refusal is not without just case, and therefore, not actionable under Article 27.[71] This Court further discussed that there is just cause because the fiscal is vested with authority and discretion to determine whether there is a prima facie case, and he cannot be subjected to the orders of the complainant.[72]
The application of this provision was further defined in Torio v. Fontanilla.[73] There, this Court clarified that Article 2,7 only covers "case[s] of non-feasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty."[74] The article "does not apply to [cases] of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty."[75]
On the other hand, Article 32 of the Civil Code states:
ARTICLE 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:Article 32 "provide[s] a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution."[76] For one to be liable, it is sufficient that a claimant's constitutional rights were violated. Whether malice or bad faith exists is not required.[77]
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to lace, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In Lim v. De Leon:[78]
The very nature of Article 32 that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith.[79]Nevertheless, this Court has provided that judges are exempt from liability under this article unless their acts of omissions constitute a violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal statutes.[80] As enunciated in Aberca v. Ver.[81]
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.[82]This was reiterated in Atty. Aparicio v. Judge Andal:[83]
Under [Article 32], judges are excluded from liability, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code and other penal statute. As we have earlier stated, the acts of Judge Andal in denying the motion for inhibition and in thereafter proceeding with the trial of die different criminal and civil cases pending before his court were done in a regular manner and were considered as his official acts, thus, he is not answerable for damages.[84] (Citations omitted)Thus, judges are not liable for civil damages as long as they acted in exercise of their judicial functions and within their jurisdiction.[85] This Court explained this policy in Alzua v. Johnson:[86]
"[W]henever and wherever a judge of a court of superior jurisdiction exercises judicial functions, he will not be personally liable in civil damages for the result of his actions," and that "the test of judicial liability is not jurisdiction, but such liability depends wholly upon the nature of the question which is being determined when the error complained of is committed by the court. If such question is one the determination of which requires the exercise of judicial functions, the judge is not liable, even though there is in reality an absolute failure of jurisdiction over the subject matter."[87] (Citations omitted)From these, this Court does not find respondent liable under Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code.
Article 27 of the Civil Code only covers acts amounting to nonfeasance, or the non-performance of a public duty. The alleged infractions of respondent are not actionable under this provision.
Petitioner anchors his claim on three (3) grounds: (1) respondent was negligent in delaying the resolution of the incidents in the criminal case; (2) she violated his constitutional right to access public records; and (3) she should have inhibited from the criminal case.
The first incident ascribes negligence to respondent, which is not actionable under Article 27. In this instance, petitioner does not claim that respondent absolutely did not act on the motions. As correctly ruled by the trial court, there is no nonfeasance since the alleged delay has been obviated by respondent's resolution of the motions.
Moreover, respondent has sufficiently justified her delay in resolving the incidents. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals noted that respondent was not yet the presiding judge at the time the Demurrer to Evidence was filed; moreover, as a newly appointed judge, she had to study all the cases in her docket while attending trainings.
Furthermore, respondent cannot be held liable for denying petitioner's request to access case records since such denial was justified. Respondent reasoned the she denied the request because she was using the records, with her personal notes attached. Moreover, as this Court noted in the Resolution of the Administrative Complaint, the request's denial is justified because: (1) petitioner did not state his request's purpose; and (2) as the private complainant in the criminal case, he should already have had a copy of the records he was requesting.
On the last incident, respondent has the discretion on whether to inhibit from the criminal case. Besides, petitioner's allegation that she was biased in the accused's favor cannot stand: respondent's supposedly close relationship with the accused's sibling was not proven since Benuesa testified that she only recognized respondent because they used to work in the same building.
All these show that the infractions respondent supposedly committed are not actionable under Article 27 of the Civil Code. Quite the contrary, the records show that respondent's actions, while they may have resulted in delays, were justified and reasonable.
Similarly, respondent is exempt from liability under Article 32, being a judge who acted in the exercise of her judicial functions and within the bounds of her jurisdiction. Her actions do not violate any penal statute.
Petitioner alleges that respondent violated Rule VI, Section 6 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Republic Act No. 6713, which provides:
SECTION 6. All public documents must be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public during office hours, except those provided in Section 3, Rule IV.Considering that respondent sufficiently justified denying petitioner access to the case records, she did not violate this provision. Even the law admits of several exceptions, among which is when a document is "within the concepts of established privilege or recognized exceptions"[88] as provided by law, policy, or jurisprudence. This Court also recognized that the constitutional right to information, which was invoked by petitioner, is not absolute:
Institutions also enjoy their own right to confidentiality, that, for governmental departments and agencies, is expressed in terms of their need to protect the integrity of their mandated tasks under the Constitution and the laws; these tasks, to state the obvious, are their reasons for their being.[89]It is also worth noting that the Office of the lloilo City Prosecutor, in a Resolution,[90] dismissed the twin criminal complaints petitioner had filed against respondent, in the absence of the elements of the crime to establish probable cause. Without showing that respondent violated a penal statute. Article 32 will not apply here.
Nevertheless, even if Article 32 did apply in this case, the Petition must still fail because petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated. To reiterate, the right to information and access to public records is not absolute, but is subject to the court's regulation and discretion. Besides, as this Court noted in its Resolution, it is not shown how petitioner was denied access to the records, considering that as a private complainant in the criminal case, he must have been sent copies of these records.
There being no cause of action under Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code, petitioner is not entitled to the award of damages.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The January 6, 2014 Decision and March 24, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CY No. 93410 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
(Peralta, J., no part; Gesmundo, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated July 22, 2019.) (Reyes, A., Jr., J., on wellness leave.)
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-30.
[2] Id. at 31-45. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, and concurred in by Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Nina G. Antonio-Vaienzuela of the Special Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[3] Id. at 46. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, and concurred in by Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Nina G. Antonio-Vaienzuela of the Former Special Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[4] Id. at 248-263. The Decision in Civil Case No. 06-0015 was penned by Judge Brigido Artemon M. Luna II of Blanch 196, Regional Trial Court, Paranaque City.
[5] Id. at 9.
[6] Id. at 10-11.
[7] Id. at 12.
[8] Id. at 111-12.4. The first Administrative Complaint was docketed as AM OCA IPI No. 05-1686-MTJ, entitled, "Atty, Rex G. Rico v. Judge Marciana Q. Deguma."
[9] Id. at 11,32, and 111-124.
[10] Id. at 12 and 32-33.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 12.
[13] Id. at 12-13. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. CV-06-0015 in the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch 196, entitled "Rex G. Rico v. Marciana Q. Deguma."
[14] Id. at 199-200.
[15] Civil CODE, art. 27, provides:
ARTICLE 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. 16 Civil CODE, art. 32, provides:
[16] ARTICLE 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(8) The right to the equal protection of the lews;
(19) Freedom of access to the courts. (Emphasis supplied)
[17] REV. Pen. Code, art. 207 provides:
ARTICLE 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. — The penalty of prision correctional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of justice.
[19] Id. at 13-14.
[20] Id. at 13-14 and 243-245.
[21] Id. at 33-34.
[22] Id. at 34.
[23] Id. at 203.
[24] Id. at 32. The second Administrative Complaint was docketed as AM OCA IPI No. 05-1883-MTJ.
[25] Id. at 476 477.
[26] Id. at 36.
[27] Id. at 476.
[28] Id. at 248-263.
[29] Id. at 263.
[30] Id. at 259.
[31] Id. at 259-261.
[32] Id. at 262.
[33] Id. at 31-44.
[34] Id. at 44.
[35] Id. at 39.
[36] Id. at 40-42.
[37] Id. at 42.
[38] Id. at 43.
[39] Id. at 46.
[40] Id. at 7-30.
[41] Id. at 20.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Id. at 20-21.
[45] Id. at 22.
[46] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
[47] Rollo, p. 23.
[48] Id. at 23-24.
[49] Id. at 24.
[50] Id.
[51] Id. at 25.
[52] Id. at 26.
[53] Id. at 469.
[54] Id. at 438-475.
[55] Id. at 453.
[56] Id. at 455.
[57] Id. at 455-56.
[58] Id. at 456.
[59] Id. at 457-462.
[60] Id. at 453.
[61] Id. at 464.
[62] Id. at 465.
[63] Id. at 470.
[64] 171 Phil. 93 (1978) [Per.I. Aquino, Second Division].
[65] Id. at 103 citing 63 Am Jur 2nd 798, 799 as cited in Philippine Racing Club, Inc. v. Bonifacio, 109 Phil. 233, 240-241 (I960) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
[66] Id. at 102.
[67] 287 Phil. 819 (1992) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[68] Id. at 827.
[69] Id.
[70] 102 Phil. 944 (1958) [Per J. A. Reyes, En Bane].
[71] Id. at 946.
[72] Id.
[73] 175 Phil. 94, 110 (1978) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, First Division].
[74] Id. at 110.
[75] Id.
[76] Aberca v. Ver, 243 Phil. 735, 745 (1988) [Per J. Yap, En Banc].
[77] Lim v. De Leon, 160 Phil. 991 (1975) [Per J. Martin, First Division].
[78] Id.
[79] Id.at 1001 citing XVI The Lawyer's Journal. No. 5, May 31, 1951. Proceedings of the public hearing of the Joint Senate and Mouse Code Committees, 5.
[80] Aberca v. Ver, 243 Phil. 735(1988) [Per J. Yap. F.n Bane] and Aparicio v. Andal, 256 Phil. 1005 (1989) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc],
[81] 243 Phil. 735 (1988) [Per.I. Yap, En Banc].
[82] Id. at 748.
[83] 256 Phil. 1005 (1989) [Per J. SannientoJ.
[84] Id. at 1013-1014.
[85] Alsua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308 (1912) [Per J. Carson, En Banc].
[86] 21 Phil. 308 (1912) [Per J. Carson, En Banc].
[87] Id. at 325-326.
[88] Implementing Rules and Regulations, Republic Act No. 6713 (1989), Rule IV, sec. 3(c) provides:
Section 3 . Every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records or documents to any requesting public, except if:
(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of established privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or jurisprudence [.]
[89] In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees, February 14, 2012 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[90] Rollo, pp. 478-482.
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-30.
[2] Id. at 31-45. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, and concurred in by Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Nina G. Antonio-Vaienzuela of the Special Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[3] Id. at 46. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, and concurred in by Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Nina G. Antonio-Vaienzuela of the Former Special Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[4] Id. at 248-263. The Decision in Civil Case No. 06-0015 was penned by Judge Brigido Artemon M. Luna II of Blanch 196, Regional Trial Court, Paranaque City.
[5] Id. at 9.
[6] Id. at 10-11.
[7] Id. at 12.
[8] Id. at 111-12.4. The first Administrative Complaint was docketed as AM OCA IPI No. 05-1686-MTJ, entitled, "Atty, Rex G. Rico v. Judge Marciana Q. Deguma."
[9] Id. at 11,32, and 111-124.
[10] Id. at 12 and 32-33.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 12.
[13] Id. at 12-13. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. CV-06-0015 in the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch 196, entitled "Rex G. Rico v. Marciana Q. Deguma."
[14] Id. at 199-200.
[15] Civil CODE, art. 27, provides:
ARTICLE 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. 16 Civil CODE, art. 32, provides:
[16] ARTICLE 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(8) The right to the equal protection of the lews;
(19) Freedom of access to the courts. (Emphasis supplied)
[17] REV. Pen. Code, art. 207 provides:
ARTICLE 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. — The penalty of prision correctional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of justice.
[19] Id. at 13-14.
[20] Id. at 13-14 and 243-245.
[21] Id. at 33-34.
[22] Id. at 34.
[23] Id. at 203.
[24] Id. at 32. The second Administrative Complaint was docketed as AM OCA IPI No. 05-1883-MTJ.
[25] Id. at 476 477.
[26] Id. at 36.
[27] Id. at 476.
[28] Id. at 248-263.
[29] Id. at 263.
[30] Id. at 259.
[31] Id. at 259-261.
[32] Id. at 262.
[33] Id. at 31-44.
[34] Id. at 44.
[35] Id. at 39.
[36] Id. at 40-42.
[37] Id. at 42.
[38] Id. at 43.
[39] Id. at 46.
[40] Id. at 7-30.
[41] Id. at 20.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Id. at 20-21.
[45] Id. at 22.
[46] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
[47] Rollo, p. 23.
[48] Id. at 23-24.
[49] Id. at 24.
[50] Id.
[51] Id. at 25.
[52] Id. at 26.
[53] Id. at 469.
[54] Id. at 438-475.
[55] Id. at 453.
[56] Id. at 455.
[57] Id. at 455-56.
[58] Id. at 456.
[59] Id. at 457-462.
[60] Id. at 453.
[61] Id. at 464.
[62] Id. at 465.
[63] Id. at 470.
[64] 171 Phil. 93 (1978) [Per.I. Aquino, Second Division].
[65] Id. at 103 citing 63 Am Jur 2nd 798, 799 as cited in Philippine Racing Club, Inc. v. Bonifacio, 109 Phil. 233, 240-241 (I960) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
[66] Id. at 102.
[67] 287 Phil. 819 (1992) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[68] Id. at 827.
[69] Id.
[70] 102 Phil. 944 (1958) [Per J. A. Reyes, En Bane].
[71] Id. at 946.
[72] Id.
[73] 175 Phil. 94, 110 (1978) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, First Division].
[74] Id. at 110.
[75] Id.
[76] Aberca v. Ver, 243 Phil. 735, 745 (1988) [Per J. Yap, En Banc].
[77] Lim v. De Leon, 160 Phil. 991 (1975) [Per J. Martin, First Division].
[78] Id.
[79] Id.at 1001 citing XVI The Lawyer's Journal. No. 5, May 31, 1951. Proceedings of the public hearing of the Joint Senate and Mouse Code Committees, 5.
[80] Aberca v. Ver, 243 Phil. 735(1988) [Per J. Yap. F.n Bane] and Aparicio v. Andal, 256 Phil. 1005 (1989) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc],
[81] 243 Phil. 735 (1988) [Per.I. Yap, En Banc].
[82] Id. at 748.
[83] 256 Phil. 1005 (1989) [Per J. SannientoJ.
[84] Id. at 1013-1014.
[85] Alsua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308 (1912) [Per J. Carson, En Banc].
[86] 21 Phil. 308 (1912) [Per J. Carson, En Banc].
[87] Id. at 325-326.
[88] Implementing Rules and Regulations, Republic Act No. 6713 (1989), Rule IV, sec. 3(c) provides:
Section 3 . Every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records or documents to any requesting public, except if:
(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of established privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or jurisprudence [.]
[89] In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees, February 14, 2012 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[90] Rollo, pp. 478-482.
