Paguio v. NLRC (G.R. NO. 116662; February 1, 1996)
CASE DIGEST: ANGELITO PAGUIO and MODESTO ROSARIO, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, REDGOLD BROKERAGE CORPORATION, and
Spouses RODRIGO DE GUIA and CEFERINA DE GUIA, respondents.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING: (Please help us make a case digest for this
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It is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that has jurisdiction
over the case as will be expansively discussed hereinafter. It is no
hindrance to SECs jurisdiction that a person raises in his complaint the
issues that he was illegally dismissed and asks for remuneration where, as
in this case, complainant is not a mere employee but a stockholder and
officer of the corporation. The fact that the issue of jurisdiction was
not raised before it did not prevent the NLRC from taking cognizance of
the same as the issue of lack of jurisdiction was apparent upon the face
of the record. In Dy vs. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held
that: The failure of the appellees to invoke anew the aforementioned solid
ground of want of jurisdiction of the lower court in this appeal should
not prevent this Tribunal to take up that issue as the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court is apparent upon the face of the record
and it is fundamental that a court of justice could only validly act upon
a cause of action or subject matter of a case over which it has
jurisdiction and said jurisdiction is one conferred only by law; and
cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the
parties (Lagman vs. CA, 44 SCRA 234 [1972]); hence may be considered by
this court motu proprio (Gov t. vs. American Surety Co., 11 Phil. 203
[1908]). Definitely, the NLRC was not barred by estoppel from dismissing
the case before it for lack of jurisdiction: . . . [E]stoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of
action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no
agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the
decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null
and void. x x x In other words, issues of jurisdiction are not subject to
the whims of the parties involved. We all defer to what the law says.
Hence, in the case at bench, the petitioners cannot validly claim that the
question of jurisdiction has been waived. There cannot be any doubt that
petitioners complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the SEC in
accordance with Sec. 5, paragraphs (b) and (c) of PD. 902-A, quoted
hereunder: Section 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,
partnerships an other forms of associations registered with it as
expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving a) Devices
and schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business
associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations
registered with the Commission; b) Controversies arising out of
intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or
association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual
franchise or right to exist as such entity; c) Controversies in the
election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of
such corporations, partnership or associations. Petitioners argument that
the instant case involves their termination from employment and not their
appointment as managers of respondent corporation is a mere play of words.
We reiterate our ruling in the recent case of Lozon v. NLRC, G.R. No.
107660, 2 January 1995 citing Fortune Cement Corp. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 258
(1991) and Dy v. NLRC, where we were confronted with a similar situation,
thus: x x x a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act
and/or intra-corporate controversy and that nature is not altered by the
reason or wisdom which the Board of Directors may have in taking such
action. x x x Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the SEC
excludes its cognizance over claims for vacation and sick leaves, 13th
month pay, Christmas bonus, medical expenses, car expenses, and other
benefits, as well as for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Dy vs. NLRC categorically states that the question of remuneration being
asserted by an officer of a corporation is not a simple labor problem but
a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management,
and is in fact, a corporate controversy in contemplation of the
Corporation Code.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
It is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that has jurisdiction
over the case as will be expansively discussed hereinafter. It is no
hindrance to SECs jurisdiction that a person raises in his complaint the
issues that he was illegally dismissed and asks for remuneration where, as
in this case, complainant is not a mere employee but a stockholder and
officer of the corporation. The fact that the issue of jurisdiction was
not raised before it did not prevent the NLRC from taking cognizance of
the same as the issue of lack of jurisdiction was apparent upon the face
of the record. In Dy vs. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held
that: The failure of the appellees to invoke anew the aforementioned solid
ground of want of jurisdiction of the lower court in this appeal should
not prevent this Tribunal to take up that issue as the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court is apparent upon the face of the record
and it is fundamental that a court of justice could only validly act upon
a cause of action or subject matter of a case over which it has
jurisdiction and said jurisdiction is one conferred only by law; and
cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the
parties (Lagman vs. CA, 44 SCRA 234 [1972]); hence may be considered by
this court motu proprio (Gov t. vs. American Surety Co., 11 Phil. 203
[1908]). Definitely, the NLRC was not barred by estoppel from dismissing
the case before it for lack of jurisdiction: . . . [E]stoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of
action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no
agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the
decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null
and void. x x x In other words, issues of jurisdiction are not subject to
the whims of the parties involved. We all defer to what the law says.
Hence, in the case at bench, the petitioners cannot validly claim that the
question of jurisdiction has been waived. There cannot be any doubt that
petitioners complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the SEC in
accordance with Sec. 5, paragraphs (b) and (c) of PD. 902-A, quoted
hereunder: Section 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,
partnerships an other forms of associations registered with it as
expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving a) Devices
and schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business
associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations
registered with the Commission; b) Controversies arising out of
intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or
association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual
franchise or right to exist as such entity; c) Controversies in the
election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of
such corporations, partnership or associations. Petitioners argument that
the instant case involves their termination from employment and not their
appointment as managers of respondent corporation is a mere play of words.
We reiterate our ruling in the recent case of Lozon v. NLRC, G.R. No.
107660, 2 January 1995 citing Fortune Cement Corp. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 258
(1991) and Dy v. NLRC, where we were confronted with a similar situation,
thus: x x x a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act
and/or intra-corporate controversy and that nature is not altered by the
reason or wisdom which the Board of Directors may have in taking such
action. x x x Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the SEC
excludes its cognizance over claims for vacation and sick leaves, 13th
month pay, Christmas bonus, medical expenses, car expenses, and other
benefits, as well as for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Dy vs. NLRC categorically states that the question of remuneration being
asserted by an officer of a corporation is not a simple labor problem but
a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management,
and is in fact, a corporate controversy in contemplation of the
Corporation Code.
