The peculiar nature of rape
The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost
entirely upon the word of the private complainant because it is essentially
committed in relative isolation or even in secrecy, and it is usually only the
victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing rule
is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed.
Since the participants are usually the only witnesses in crimes of this nature
and the accused’s conviction or acquittal virtually depends on the private
complainant’s testimony, it must be received with utmost caution. It is then
incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the
credibility of the victim’s testimony. Judges must free themselves of the
natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have been
sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to
be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as
she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice according to law.[1][2]
Since the participants are usually the only witnesses in crimes of this nature
and the accused’s conviction or acquittal virtually depends on the private
complainant’s testimony, it must be received with utmost caution. It is then
incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the
credibility of the victim’s testimony. Judges must free themselves of the
natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have been
sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to
be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as
she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice according to law.[1][2]
[1] People v. Macapanpan, 449 Phil. 87-89 (2003) citing People v. Alitagtag,
368 Phil. 637, 647 (1999); People v. Baltazar, 385 Phil. 1023, 1031 (2000);
People v. Dumaguing, 394 Phil. 93, 103 (2000); People v. Gallo, 348 Phil. 640,
665 (1998); People v. Babera, 388 Phil. 44, 53 (2000); People v. Alvario, 341
Phil. 526, 538-539 (1997).
