25 rights and liberties protected by the Civil Code

Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

1. Freedom of religion;
2. Freedom of speech;
3. Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
4. Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
5. Freedom of suffrage;
6. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
7. The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
8. The right to the equal protection of the laws;
9. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
11. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
12. The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
14. The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
15. The right of the accused against excessive bail;
16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel;
17. The right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
18. The right of the accused to have a speedy and public trial;
19. The right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face;
20. The right of the accused to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
21. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self;
22. Freedom from being forced to confess guilt;
23. Freedom from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
24. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
25. Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility set forth above is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. (Article 32, Civil Code)

The twenty five (25) rights enumerated above are constitutional rights and liberties. They need not be implemented via an enabling law because they are self-executing. However, since the Bill of Rights, strictly speaking, can only be invoked against the State (against the Government), there is a need to incorporate these rights into civil law for them to be protected as well against private persons. 

Albano explains Article 32 this way:

Article 32 of the New Civil Code enumerates basic constitutional rights of citizens. Violation of the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. In fact, even if the act that violates this Article does not amount to a crime, still a person may be held civilly liable. Such civil action shall be proved only by preponderance of evidence.

In Aberca v. Ver (G.R. No. 69866, April 15, 1988), the Supreme Court explained the importance of Article 32. It is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear: no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community.

Joseph Charmon enlightens us about democracy and the importance of rights and liberties:

"Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls." (French Legal Philosophy, Mcmillan Co., New York, 1921, pp. 72-73)

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. (Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, April 15, 1988)

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. There is no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. However, in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed; otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned. (Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, April 15, 1988)

Article 32 "provide[s] a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution." For one to be liable, it is sufficient that a claimant's constitutional rights were violated. Whether malice or bad faith exists is not required. (Aberca v. Ver, 243 Phil. 735, 745, 1988; Lim v. De Leon, 160 Phil. 991, 1975)

In Lim v. De Leon (160 Phil. 991, 1975):

The very nature of Article 32 that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. Nevertheless, this Court has provided that judges are exempt from liability under this article unless their acts of omissions constitute a violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal statutes. (As cited in G.R. No. 211861, July 31, 2019)

In Atty. Aparicio v. Judge Andal (256 Phil. 1005, 1989):

Under Article 32, judges are excluded from liability, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code and other penal statute. As we have earlier stated, the acts of Judge Andal in denying the motion for inhibition and in thereafter proceeding with the trial of die different criminal and civil cases pending before his court were done in a regular manner and were considered as his official acts, thus, he is not answerable for damages. Thus, judges are not liable for civil damages as long as they acted in exercise of their judicial functions and within their jurisdiction. (As cited in G.R. No. 211861, July 31, 2019)

The Supreme Court further explained this policy in Alzua v. Johnson (21 Phil. 308, 1912):

Whenever and wherever a judge of a court of superior jurisdiction exercises judicial functions, he will not be personally liable in civil damages for the result of his actions," and that "the test of judicial liability is not jurisdiction, but such liability depends wholly upon the nature of the question which is being determined when the error complained of is committed by the court. If such question is one the determination of which requires the exercise of judicial functions, the judge is not liable, even though there is in reality an absolute failure of jurisdiction over the subject matter. (As cited in G.R. No. 211861, July 31, 2019)

To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith. Dr. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission, gave the following reasons during the public hearings of the Joint Senate and House Committees, why good faith on the part of the public officer or employee is immaterial. Thus, in XVI The Lawyers' Journal, No. 5, May 31, 1951. Proceedings of the public hearing of the Joint Senate and House Code Committees, p. 258 (cited in G.R. No. L-22554, August 29, 1975):

DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights: Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another person's constitutional rights only if the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.

Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing, and we made the article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one's duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights.