Proof to show signatures have been forged
Aside from categorically denying under oath that the signatures appearing on the deeds of absolute sale were his, witness Miguel Magsaysay gave another reason why it was impossible for those signatures to be his. According to him, he was no longer connected in any way whatsoever with Mapalad, when it supposedly sold the properties. He divested himself of all his interests in Mapalad way back in 1982. There was no reason for him to sign the subject deeds of absolute sale as president and chairman of the board of Mapalad in 1989. This was another basis for Mapalad to convince the appellate court that the signatures purporting to be those of Magsaysay on the questioned deeds of sale were not written by him.
The Supreme Court sustained the CA finding and conclusion.
While there have been guidelines cited in the petition used by the Supreme Court in determining what constitutes sufficient proof to establish whether a signature was forged, it does not preclude a party from adducing other possible proofs to establish whether a particular signature is genuine or not.
In the case at bench, not only did Magsaysay disown the signatures appearing on the deed of sale, he cited a valid legal reason for him not to have signed such document at all. He had no more power and authority to sign for and in behalf of Mapalad because as early as 1982, he had already divested himself of all his interests in said corporation. His testimonies in this case constitute sufficient basis for the Court to conclude that the signatures appearing on the two deeds of sale (Exhibits D and F) were not his signatures.
This factual determination on the genuineness or forgery of the signatures purporting to be those of Miguel Magsaysay on the subject deeds of sale is most crucial. When compared with this one, all other factual issues raised in the petition become immaterial, such as: whether the owners duplicate copies of the TCT were voluntarily delivered to, or surreptitiously taken from Mapalads custodian of such documents; whether the deeds of sale were in fact notarized by Atty. Elpidio Clemente considering that these documents do not exist in the archives or files in the notarial registry; or even whether there were two or only one document purporting to be the deed of absolute sale dated November 2, 1989.
There is, therefore, no cogent reason for this Court to delve further into these other factual matters. (G.R. No. 148516; December 27, 2007)
The Supreme Court sustained the CA finding and conclusion.
While there have been guidelines cited in the petition used by the Supreme Court in determining what constitutes sufficient proof to establish whether a signature was forged, it does not preclude a party from adducing other possible proofs to establish whether a particular signature is genuine or not.
In the case at bench, not only did Magsaysay disown the signatures appearing on the deed of sale, he cited a valid legal reason for him not to have signed such document at all. He had no more power and authority to sign for and in behalf of Mapalad because as early as 1982, he had already divested himself of all his interests in said corporation. His testimonies in this case constitute sufficient basis for the Court to conclude that the signatures appearing on the two deeds of sale (Exhibits D and F) were not his signatures.
This factual determination on the genuineness or forgery of the signatures purporting to be those of Miguel Magsaysay on the subject deeds of sale is most crucial. When compared with this one, all other factual issues raised in the petition become immaterial, such as: whether the owners duplicate copies of the TCT were voluntarily delivered to, or surreptitiously taken from Mapalads custodian of such documents; whether the deeds of sale were in fact notarized by Atty. Elpidio Clemente considering that these documents do not exist in the archives or files in the notarial registry; or even whether there were two or only one document purporting to be the deed of absolute sale dated November 2, 1989.There is, therefore, no cogent reason for this Court to delve further into these other factual matters. (G.R. No. 148516; December 27, 2007)
