3 legal precepts in rape cases
1. EXTERNAL SIGNS OR INJURIES
Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission
of rape since proof of injuries is not an essential element of the
crime.[2] However, it is also a precept that
physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently
than all witnesses put together.[3] In People v. Patentes, the
prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim. In
fact, contrary to the prosecution’s claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled,
slapped and boxed, the medical certificate revealed no telltale sign of the
prosecution’s allegations. It has to be noted that the medical examination was
conducted the day after AAA’s supposed escape from accused-appellant. As shown
by the medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical injuries,
save for a kiss mark, to wit:[4]
EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURY:
Contusion, reddish purple, breast, right side, lower-inner quadrant, 2.0x1.0 cm. xxx
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The above physical injury was noted on the body of the subject, age of which is consistent with the alleged date of infliction.
2. That under normal conditions without subsequent complications and unless a deeper involvement might be present but which is not clinically apparent at the time of examination, said injury will require medical attendance of not more than seven (7) days from date of infliction.
3. Hymen intact and its orifice, wide as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized male organ in erection without causing hymenal injury.[5]
2. COMPATIBILITY WITH HUMAN KNOWLEDGE & EXPERIENCE
The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness
is its compatibility with
human knowledge, observation and common experience of man.[6] Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge,
observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial
cognizance.[7]
As culled from the records of the case of People v.
Patentes, AAA lived with appellant’s family for eight (8) days – in the same
house where appellant’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces
also lived. AAA even called appellant’s mother, “mama.” As argued by the
defense, “the members of the appellant’s family could have noticed that she
was being forced and raped by the accused if the accusations were really
true.”[8] Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex
slave for eight (8) days in a house where the abuser’s entire family,
including the abuser’s minor nephews and nieces live.
When appellant and AAA arrived in the former’s house, they were greeted by
appellant’s father. If AAA’s account were true that appellant dragged her to a
room upstairs and then tied her to a sewing machine, appellant’s father could
have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say the least, he would
have talked to the appellant about the deed. Instead, and incredibly,
appellant’s mother went to AAA’s house to propose marriage – contrary to the
common experience.
Contrary to the prosecution’s claim that AAA
only saw appellant on 4 December 1998, a day before the alleged commission of
the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew appellant as appellant was a
neighbor and friend of AAA’s brother.[9] Furthermore, appellant’s mother
was the midwife who assisted AAA’s housemaid in giving birth.[10] Lastly,
AAA and appellant have a common friend, Enriquez, who testified that she saw
the two in appellant’s house, through AAA’s invitation.[11] The TSN
reflects the inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony:[12]
Q: Do you know that his mother is a midwife? A: No, Sir. Because she helped in the delivery of our housemaid. Q: When did your housemaid give birth? A: When I went to Bansalan on December 5 I passed by the house she was about to deliver and I saw the mother of the accused that’s the time I came to know his mother. Q: Is it not that your stepfather even went to the house where you stayed? A: No, sir. Q: You will deny that? A: I did not see him. xxxx Q: Is it not you said you were being locked? A: I was locked at the door when my father arrived. I do not know because he locked me at the room. [Emphasis supplied]
For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and
anxiety among AAA’s family members, AAA’s father, instead of reporting the
matter to police authorities, went to appellant’s house to discuss AAA and
appellant’s marital plans on 7 December 1998.[13] Clearly, this is
contrary to human logic and experience, and inconsistent with the
prosecution’s claim.
3. SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT OF VICTIM
The
conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is
of utmost importance
in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.[14] In People
v. Patentes, the actuations of AAA after the alleged rape is
totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her
abuser’s mother, and worse, to live with her abuser’s entire family in one
roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape.
It
goes against the grain of human experience for a woman who has been robbed of
her honor and chastity not to seize an opportunity to escape from the clutches
of her malefactor.[15] Instead of escaping from her abuser, AAA visited
appellant’s neighbor.[16] Even if AAA had several opportunities to share
her ordeal to be rescued by her friend, Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and
instead described the details of her marital plans. What is truly exceptional,
however, is the testimony of AAA that she visited her grandmother during the
period of her alleged abduction. Despite inconsistencies in her testimony as
shown in the TSN, AAA admitted the visit to her grandmother:[17]
Appellant’s bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.[18] There is such corroboration in this case of People v. Patentes. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense presented appellant and AAA’s common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellant’s claim:[19]
Appellant’s neighbor, Gerondio, corroborated the testimony:[20]
[1] https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2021/08/gr-no-190178-february-12-2014.html.
[2] People v. Freta, 406 Phil. 853, 862 (2001).
[3] People v. Bardaje, 187 Phil. 735, 744 (1980).
[4] Exhibit “B,” records, p. 7.
[5] Id.
[6] People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 192250, 11 July 2012, 676 SCRA 347, 360.
[7] Id.
[8] CA rollo, p. 103.
[9] Records, p. 13.
[10] TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 46.
[11] TSN, 9 December 2002, p. 3.
[12] TSN, 8 February 2000, pp. 46-47.
[13] TSN, 8 February 2000, pp. 46-47.
[14] People v. Sapinoso, 385 Phil. 374, 387 (2000); People v. Moreno, 378 Phil. 951, 969 (1999)
[15] People v. Macapanpan, 449 Phil. 87-89 (2003), at 106; citing People v. Malbog, 396 Phil. 784 (2000).
[16] TSN, 20 June 2001, p. 4.
[17] TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 37
[18] People v. Jimenez, 362 Phil. 222, 233 (1999).
[19] TSN, 9 December 2002, pp. 3-4.
[20] TSN, 20 June 2001, pp. 2-4.
